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A f r i c a  a n d  T h a i l a n d .  
T h i s  t h e s i s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s  l a c k e d  w h a t  h a v e  w i d e l y  
b e e n  a c c e p t e d  a s  k e y  f e a t u r e s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s :  ( i )  t h e r e  w a s  n o  
c l e a r  p l a n  f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  k e y  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  s u c h  a s  w h e n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
w o u l d  o c c u r ,  h o w  i t  w o u l d  b e  c o n d u c t e d ,  a n d  w h a t  t h e  o u t c o m e s  w o u l d  b e ;  ( i i )  t h e  M P R  f a i l e d  
t o  w i n  t h e  p e o p l e ' s  t r u s t  i n  i t s  c a p a c i t y  a s  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y ;  a n d  ( i i i )  p u b l i c  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w a s  l i m i t e d  a n d  b a d l y  o r g a n i z e d .  
M a n y  o f  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  t h e  r e f o r m  p r o c e s s ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e l a t e d  t o  f u n d a m e n t a l  i s s u e s  w i t h i n  
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Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Indonesia. 
Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, State Audit Body. 
Commissions A of 2000, 2001 and 2002 were Commissions set up at 
the MPR Annual Sessions to further discuss the amendment draft 
prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee of the MPR. 
Commission C of 1999 was a Commission set up at the 1999 MPR 
General Session to further discuss the amendment draft prepared by 
the Ad Hoc Committee of the MPR. 
Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, Supreme Advisory Council. 
Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Regional Representatives' Council. 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Council. 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People's 
Representative Council. 
'Dual function', the formal ideology by which the ABRI claimed a 
socio-political role as well as a military role. 
Golongan Karya, the Functional Group. One of the political parties in 
the current system. It was the state political party machine under the 
New Order. 
Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme; corruption, collusion and nepotism. 
Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Civil Servants Corps. 
Mahkamah Agung, Supreme Court. The highest court in Indonesia. 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly. 
This is Indonesia's second largest Islamic organization. It was 
established in 1912 as an institutional expression of the Indonesian 
modernist movement. The organization is well-known for its 
involvement in providing the education system and providing basic 
health care for Moslems. 
Association of Islamic Scholars. This is a traditionalist Moslem 
organization established in 1926. It is the country's largest Moslem 
organization, even may be in the world. 
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
C h a p t e r  O n e  
I n  · s e a r c h  o f  a  D e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
A .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
I n  1 9 9 9 ,  t h e  M P R
1  
( M a j e l i s  P e r m u s y a w a r a t a n  R a k y a t ,  t h e  P e o p l e ' s  C o n s u l t a t i v e  A s s e m b l y )  
e n a c t e d  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  t o  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  I n d o n e s i a .  O v e r  e a c h  o f  t h e  n e x t  
t h r e e  y e a r s ,  i t  p a s s e d  a  f u r t h e r  a m e n d m e n t .  D e s p i t e  t h e i r  i m p o r t a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  I n d o n e s i a ' s  
t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  S o e h a r t o ' s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e ,  n o  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  s t u d y  h a s  b e e n  m a d e  o f  
t h e s e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s ,  a n d  t h e  p r o c e s s  b y  w h i c h  t h e y  w e r e  p r o d u c e d .  T h i s  t h e s i s  i s  a n  
a t t e m p t  t o  f i l l  t h i s  g a p ,  b y  c r i t i c a l l y  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  a n d  o u t c o m e s  o f  t h e s e  a m e n d m e n t s ,  
i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t h e o r y  a n d  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  S o u t h  
A f r i c a  a n d  T h a i l a n d . 2  
T h i s  t h e s i s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s  l a c k e d  w h a t  h a v e  w i d e l y  
b e e n  a c c e p t e d  a s  k e y  f e a t u r e s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s :  ( i )  t h e r e  w a s  n o  
c l e a r  p l a n  f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  k e y  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  s u c h  a s  w h e n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
w o u l d  o c c u r ,  h o w  i t  w o u l d  b e  c o n d u c t e d ,  a n d  w h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  w o u l d  b e ;  ( i i )  t h e  M P R  
f a i l e d  t o  w i n  t h e  p e o p l e ' s  t r u s t  i n  i t s  c a p a c i t y  a s  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y ;  a n d  ( i i i )  p u b l i c  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w a s  l i m i t e d  a n d  b a d l y  o r g a n i z e d .  
M a n y  o f  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  t h e  r e f o r m  p r o c e s s ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e l a t e d  t o  f u n d a m e n t a l  a s p e c t s  o f  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f .  I t  c o n t a i n e d  t w o  a s p e c t s  s e e n  a s  c r i t i c a l  t o  t h e  i d e n t i t y  a n d  s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r y  b y  m o s t  n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  m i l i t a r y :  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e  a n d  t h e  
i m p o s i t i o n  i n  i t s  p l a c e  o f  a  n a t i o n a l i s t  s t a t e  i d e o l o g y ,  t h e  P a n c a s i / a ,  
3  
b o t h  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  
1  
T h e  M P R ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  b e f o r e  a m e n d m e n t ,  w a s  t h e  I n d o n e s i a ' s  s u p r e m e  s o v e r e i g n  b o d y .  I t  
r e p r e s e n t e d  a n d  e x e r c i s e d  t h e  s o v e r e i g n t y  o f  t h e  p e o p l e .  M o s t  o f  i t s  m e m b e r s  w e r e  e l e c t e d  a n d  s o m e  w e r e  a p p o i n t e d .  T h e  
M P R  t h a t  c a r r i e d  o u t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  c o n s i s t e d  o f  6 9 5  m e m b e r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  5 0 0  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  ( D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
R a k y a t ,  P e o p l e ' s  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  C o u n c i l ) ,  w h o s e  s t r u c t u r e  w a s :  4 6 2  e l e c t e d  m e m b e r s  - i n  a  p r o p o r t i o n a l  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  b y  
p r o v i n c e s - a n d  3 8  a p p o i n t e d  m e m b e r s - f r o m  t h e  T N I  ( T e n t a r a  N a s i o n a l l n d o n e s i a ,  I n d o n e s i a n  N a t i o n a l  A r m y )  a n d  t h e  P o l r i  
( P o l i s i  R e p u b l i k  I n d o n e s i a ,  P o l i c e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a ) .  T h e  o t h e r  M P R  m e m b e r s  w e r e :  1 3 0  r e g i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
c h o s e n  b y  t h e  e l e c t e d  D P R D  ( D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  D a e r a h ,  t h e  R e g i o n a l  D P R ) ,  f i v e  f r o m  e a c h  o f  2 6  p r o v i n c e s  e x i s t e d  i n  
1 9 9 9  a n d  6 5  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  d e s i g n a t e d  s o c i a l  g r o u p s  ( f u n c t i o n a l  g r o u p s ) .  P u r s u a n t  t o  a r t i c l e  2  p a r a g r a p h  2  o f  t h e  L a w  
N u m b e r  4  o f  1 9 9 9  d e t e r m i n i n g  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  t h e  M P R ,  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  D P R D ,  t h e  t o t a l  o f  M P R  m e m b e r s  s h o u l d  b e  7 0 0 .  
T h e  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  f i v e  n u m b e r  w a s  b e c a u s e  E a s t  T i m o r ,  t h e  I n d o n e s i a ' s  2 7
1 1 1  
P r o v i n c e ,  v o t e d  f o r  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i n  A u g u s t  1 9 9 9 ,  
s h o r t l y  b e f o r e  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  s a i d  M P R ,  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  E a s t  T i m o r ' s  f i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  w e r e  c a n c e l l e d .  
2  
C h a p t e r  T w o  e x p l a i n s  w h y  t h e s e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  c h o s e n .  
3  
P a n c a s i / a  i s  S a n s k r i t  f o r  ' F i v e  P r i n c i p l e s ' .  T h e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  w h i c h  a r e  d e l i b e r a t e l y  h i g h l y  a b s t r a c t ,  a r e :  B e l i e f  i n  O n e  G o d ,  a  J u s t  
a n d  C i v i l i s e d  H u m a n i t y ,  t h e  U n i t y  o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  D e m o c r a c y  G u i d e d  b y  I n n e r  W i s d o m  i n  U n a n i m i t y  A r i s i n g  o u t  o f  D e l i b e r a t i o n  
a m o n g  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a n d  S o c i a l  J u s t i c e  f o r  A l l  t h e  P e o p l e  o f  I n d o n e s i a .  
2  
preamble of the Constitution. Many nationalists feared that opening the Constitution to real 
change would jeopardize these positions, which they saw, and still see, as non-negotiable 
foundation for the Republic. The result was a slow, patchy and tentative process marked by 
constant negotiation and deal-making as most stakeholders sought a way to dismantle 
Soeharto's dictatorship without disturbing these twin nationalist principles. 
Despite these problems, at the end of the process, the Constitution was more democratic in 
form. In particular, the amendments established a clearer separation of powers between the 
executive, legislative and judiciary; and more impressive human rights protections. This is 
because the euphoric transitional period provided a setting that encouraged open constitutional 
debates in the MPR and allowed public participation in these debates, despite the flaws in the 
MPR's system for public engagement. 
The amended Constitution remains, however, far from perfect. This thesis recommends further 
amendments to, first, strengthen the system of checks and balances introduced between 1999-
2002; and, second, to entrench the preamble and guarantee the difficult relationship between 
Islam and state in their current form. 
B. Thesis Questions 
The Indonesian 1945 Constitution was so limited, so poorly-drafted and so biased toward 
authoritarianism 4 that it seemed to most observers that only a constitutional revolution could 
transform it into a democratic document. This did not happen. Instead, the MPR adopted an 
evolutionary approach, revising the Constitution through slow, step-by-step amendment.5 This 
thesis evaluates whether this troubled approach allowed the MPR to conduct a democratic 
constitution-making process; and whether the outcome was, in fact, a more democratic 
Constitution. 
4 Chapter Three elaborates on this authoritarianism in the 1945 Constitution. 
5 Chapters Four to Eight elaborate on this issue. 
3 
C .  W h y  t h i s  S t u d y  i s  I m p o r t a n t  
I n  c o n d u c t i n g  t h i s  s t u d y ,  I  h a v e  b e e n  m o t i v a t e d  b y  t w o  c h i e f  f a c t o r s .  F i r s t ,  h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  
I n d o n e s i a  h a s  n e v e r  b e f o r e  s u c c e s s f u l l y  c a r r i e d  o u t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m .  T h e  f o u r  e a r l i e r  
a t t e m p t s  i n  1 9 4 5 ,  1 9 4 9 ,  1 9 5 0  a n d  1 9 5 6 - 1 9 5 9  f a i l e d  t o  c r e a t e  a  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
S e c o n d ,  t h e  f i f t h  a t t e m p t  i n  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  w a s  c r u c i a l  t o  s a f e g u a r d i n g  I n d o n e s i a n  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  
S o e h a r t o ' s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r u l e  t o  d e m o c r a t i c  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  T h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  
f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  f o u r  a t t e m p t s  t h e r e f o r e  n e e d  t o  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  i n  o r d e r  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  f i f t h  a t t e m p t .  
A s  b a c k g r o u n d ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  o u t l i n e s  k e y  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e s e  f o u r  e a r l i e r  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  a t t e m p t s  i n  I n d o n e s i a ,  b e f o r e  I  t u r n  i n  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r  t o  c u r r e n t  t h e o r y  o n  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h a n g e .  
1 .  T h e  F o u r  F a i l u r e s  o f  I n d o n e s i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m  
a .  T h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n :  A  T e m p o r a r y ,  E x p r e s s  a n d  R e v o l u t i o n a r y  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
T h e  1 9 4 5  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  w a s  t h e  f i r s t  e f f o r t  f o l l o w i n g  c o l o n i z a t i o n  t o  w r i t e  a n  
I n d o n e s i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  i t  t h u s  f o r m a l l y  s t a r t e d  I n d o n e s i a ' s  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  h i s t o r y  a s  a  
m o d e r n  i n d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e .
6  
T h e  s i t u a t i o n  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  W o r l d  W a r ,  h o w e v e r ,  f o r c e d  
I n d o n e s i a ' s  f o u n d e r s  t o  d r a f t  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  v e r y  h a s t i l y - w i t h i n  j u s t  t w e n t y  w o r k i n g  
d a y s . l  I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  f o u n d e r s '  p r i o r i t y  w a s  t o  h a v e  a  m i n i m a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  j u s t  t o  f u l f i l l  t h e  
b a s i c  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  I n d o n e s i a n  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e y  w e r e  l e s s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  
c r e a t i n g  a  c o m p l e t e  a n d  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n . a  
T h e  d r a f t  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  p r e p a r e d  b y  t h e  B P U P K I .  9  T h e  d r a f t  w a s  t h e n  r a t i f i e d  b y  t h e  
P P K I . t a  T h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  b o t h  c o m m i t t e e s  h a s ,  h o w e v e r ,  b e e n  q u e s t i o n e d  m a n y  t i m e s ,  n o t  
l e a s t  b e c a u s e  t h e y  w e r e  f o r m e d  b y  t h e  o c c u p y i n g  J a p a n e s e  f o r c e s . t t  
6  
S l a m e t  E f f e n d y  Y u s u f  a n d  U m a r  B a s a l i m ,  R e f o r m a s i  K o n s t i t u s i  I n d o n e s i a :  P e r u b a h a n  P e r t a m a  U U D  1 9 4 5  ( 2 0 0 0 )  6 .  
7
1 b i d  5 8 .  
8
1 b i d .  
9  
B a d a n  P e n y e l i d i k  U s a h a - u s a h a  P e r s i a p a n  K e m e r d e k a a n  I n d o n e s i a ,  I n v e s t i g a t i n g  C o m m i t t e e  f o r  t h e  P r e p a r a t i o n  o f  
I n d o n e s i a n  I n d e p e n d e n c e .  
1 0  P a n i t i a  P e r s i a p a n  K e m e r d e k a a n  I n d o n e s i a ,  P r e p a r a t o r y  C o m m i t t e e  f o r  I n d o n e s i a n  I n d e p e n d e n c e .  
4  
Realizing the shortcomings and imperfections of the 1945 Constitution, the founders had wisely 
decided that it would be a temporary Constitution. The Constitution itself explicitly stated: 
"Within six months of the Maje/is Permusyawaratan Rakyat being set up, the MPR shall sit in 
order to determine a Constitution". 12 On 18 August 1945, Soekarno, one of the main creators of 
the 1945 Constitution, and later Indonesia's first President, declared in a speech defending the 
draft of the Constitution that the 1945 Constitution would be a short-term and revolutionary 
document, and consequently, should be replaced by a better Constitution as soon as possible. 
Soekarno declared: 
[t]he Constitution we are now drafting is a temporary one. If I may say, this is an express 
Constitution. Later if we have already established a state and are in peaceful situation, we 
will certainly call the MPR which will frame a complete and perfect Constitution. In the 
future, we should make a perfect and complete Constitution. 13 
Unfortunately, the election to form the MPR and to make a more democratic Constitution had to 
be repeatedly postponed because of the unstable situation of the revolution. Accordingly, 
despite its temporary nature, the 1945 Constitution was applied for more than four years before 
it was replaced by the 1949 Constitution on 27 December 1949. 
b. The 1949 Constitution: A Temporary Federal Constitution 
The 1949 Constitution was made in the shadow of the Round Table Conference, the formal 
negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesian that ended the revolution that began in 
1945. This conference led to the formal transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to lndonesians. 14 
According to this Constitution, Indonesia became a federal state. This was not the intention of 
the founders, who preferred a unitary state. In fact, the federal system is widely believed to 
11 C.S.T. Kansil, Christine S.T. Kansil, and Engeline R. Palandeng, Konstitusi-konstitusi Indonesia Tahun 1945 2000 (2001) 4 
-12; Suhartono W. Pranoto, Revolusi Agustus: Nasionalisme Terpasung dan Diplomasi lntemasional (2001) 88- 91; Rozikin 
Daman, Hukum Tata Negara, Suatu Pengantar (1993) 114-118; Abdullah Zailani, Pengantar Hukum Tata Negara (1991) 111-
115; Yusuf and Basalim, above n 6, 9. 
12 Article (2) of the Additional Provision of the 1945 Constitution. 
13 Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-undang Dasar 1945 (1959) vol. 1, 410. 
14 Adnan Buyung Nasution, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-legal Study of the Indonesian 
Konstituante 1956-1959 (1992) 27. The Round Table Conference was held in Den Haag in late '1949. During the conference 
the Dutch finally acknowledged Indonesian independence. 
5 
h a v e  b e e n  a n  a t t e m p t  b y  t h e  D u t c h  t o  l e a v e  a  p o l i t i c a l  l e g a c y  t h a t  w o u l d  e v e n t u a l l y  f r a g m e n t  
I n d o n e s i a ,  u s i n g  i t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  c o l o n i a l  s t r a t e g y  o f  ' d i v i d e  a n d  c o n q u e r '  ( d i v i d e  e t  i m p e r a ) .
1
5  
I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  i t  i s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  t h a t  t h e  1 9 4 9  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  l i t t l e  m o r e  t h a n  a  s t r a t e g y  
e m p l o y e d  b y  I n d o n e s i a n s  t o  o b t a i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a c k n o w l e d g m e n t  f o r  i t s  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  
A n t h o n y  R e i d  n o t e d ,  " f o r  m a n y  c o n v i n c e d  R e p u b l i c a n s  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  
I n d o n e s i a  w a s  o n l y  t o l e r a b l e  a s  a  s t e p p i n g  s t o n e  t o  t h e  t r u e  a i m  o f  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n ,  t h e  u n i t a r y  
R e p u b l i c  p r o c l a i m e d  i n  1 9 4 5 " .
1
6  H o l d i n g  t h e  s a m e  o p i n i o n ,  M u h a m m a d  Y a m i n ,  o n e  o f  
I n d o n e s i a ' s  best-~nown f o u n d i n g  f a t h e r s ,  w r o t e  i n  1 9 6 0  t h a t  t h e  f o r m a t  o f  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  
I n d o n e s i a  w a s  t e m p o r a r y  a n d  i n t e n d e d  t o  s t i m u l a t e  t h e  f o r m i n g  o f  t h e  u n i t a r y  s t a t e  o f  
l n d o n e s i a .
1 7  
T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  a s  a  ' s t r a t e g i c '  d o c u m e n t ,  t h i s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  - l i k e  i t s  p r e d e c e s s o r -
w a s  e x p r e s s e d  t o  b e  t e m p o r a r y  i n  n a t u r e .  T h i s  c a n  b e  c l e a r l y  s e e n  i n  a r t i c l e  1 8 6 .  
[ t ] h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  s h a l l  e n a c t  a s  s o o n  a s  p o s s i b l e  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  w h i c h  s h a l l  r e p l a c e  t h i s  
p r o v i s i o n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
I t s  ' s t r a t e g i c '  o b j e c t i v e s  a n d  t e m p o r a r y  n a t u r e  m a d e  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e  1 9 4 9  C o n s t i t u t i o n  v e r y  s h o r t .  
I n  t h e  e n d ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  i n  f o r c e  f o r  l e s s  t h a n  e i g h t  m o n t h s :  f r o m  2 7  D e c e m b e r  1 9 4 9  
u n t i l 1 7  A u g u s t  1 9 5 0 .  T h e  s h o r t e s t  p e r i o d  t h a t  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  h a s  b e e n  a p p l i e d  i n  I n d o n e s i a  a n d  
o n e  o f  t h e  s h o r t e s t  i n  t h e  w o r l d .  
c .  T h e  1 9 5 0  P r o v i s i o n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n :  A  m o r e  D e m o c r a t i c  b u t  T e m p o r a r y  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  
T h e  1 9 5 0  P r o v i s i o n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  r e p l a c e d  t h e  1 9 4 9  F e d e r a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
w a s  m o r e  d e m o c r a t i c  t h a n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c o n s t i t u t i o n s .  I t  f i r m l y  a s s e r t e d  t h e  p e o p l e ' s  
s o v e r e i g n t y  a n d  p r o v i d e d  d e t a i l e d  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  h u m a n  r i g h t s ,  s u c h  a s  a d o p t i n g  t h e  U n i t e d  
N a t i o n s  D e c l a r a t i o n  o n  H u m a n  R i g h t s  a n d  i n c o r p o r a t e d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  h o l d  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  a n d  





K a n s i l ,  K a n s i l ,  a n d  P a l a n d e n g ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 ,  4 2 - 4 3 .  
1 6  
A n t h o n y  R e i d ,  T h e  I n d o n e s i a n  N a t i o n a l  R e v o l u t i o n  1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 0  (  1 9 7  4 )  1 6 2 .  
1 7  
M u h a m m a d  Y a m i n ,  P r o k l a m a s i  d a n  K o n s t i t u s i  R e p u b / i k  I n d o n e s i a  ( 1 9 6 0 )  3 4 .  
1 8
N a s u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 ,  2 8 .  
6  
Despite its democratic nature, the 1950 Constitution was - again - intended to be a temporary 
one. This was obvious from its official name: "The Provisional Constitution of Republic of 
Indonesia". In article 134 it explicitly stated - in exactly the same terms as Article 186 of the 
1949 Constitution - that: 
[t]he Konstituante together with the government shall enact as soon as possible the 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which shall replace this provisional Constitution. 
Based on this article, the government finally conducted its first general election in 1955 to elect 
members of the Konstituante (Constituent Assembly). The following paragraphs discuss the 
Konstituante, the organ of state which had specific responsibility for drafting a new Constitution 
for Indonesia and played a crucial role in Indonesian Constitutional history. 
d. The Konstituante's Constitutional Draft: An Unfinished Democratic 
Constitution? 
From Konstituante's first meeting on 10 November 1956 until its last on 2 June 1959, the 
Konstituante conducted regular discussions to develop a new Constitution. 19 During that period, 
many heated debates emerged regarding the philosophy of the state, human rights and the 
possible re-application of the 1945 Constitution. 20 Nasution has praised the Konstituante's 
meetings. He argues: 
[t]he whole enterprise of the Konstituante . . . manifested a truly democratic spirit, a 
complete freedom of expression and a fundamental commitment to a constitutional reform 
of government on the part of majority of its members ... the enterprise of the Konstituante 
can rightly be appreciated as the peak of Indonesia's effort to achieve constitutional 
government. 21 
Nasution has disagreed with the opinion - promoted both by the Soekarno and Soeharto 
regimes - that the Konstituante had failed in conducting its task of drafting a Constitution. In 
Nasution's opinion: 
19 1bid 41. 
2
°Further exploration on the debates in the Konstituante 1956-1959, see Nasution, above n 14, 51-:_ 401. 
21 1bid 405. 
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[ t ] h e r e  i s  n o  p r o o f  f o r  t h e  a l l e g a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  f a i l e d  t o  d r a f t  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e "  i d e o l o g i c a l  c o n f l i c t s  w h i c h  m a n i f e s t e d  t h e m s e l v e s  m o s t  c l e a r l y  i n  t h e  
d e b a t e  o n  t h e  D a s a r  N e g a r a .
2 2  
T h e  f a c t  i s  t h a t  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  d i d  n o t  h a v e  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c o n c l u d e  i t s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  o n  t h i s  i s s u e ;  u n t i l  t h e  u l t i m a t e  p o s i t i o n s  
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  D a s a r  N e g a r a  h a v e  b e e n  t a k e n  b y  t h e  c o n t e n d i n g  f a c t i o n s ,  a n y  j u d g e m e n t  
o n  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h i s  i d e o l o g i c a l  d e b a t e  m u s t  s t i l l  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  p r e m a t u r e .
2 3  
A s  N a s u t i o n  s a y s ,  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  d i s c u s s i o n s  a n d  d e b a t e s  i n  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  f r o m  1 9 5 5 - 1 9 5 9  
w e r e ,  i n  f a c t ,  n e v e r  f i n i s h e d .  T h e y  w e r e  d i s c o n t i n u e d  b y  P r e s i d e n t  S o e k a r n o ' s  D e c r e e  o f  5  J u l y  
1 9 5 9  
2 4  
w h i c h  u n i l a t e r a l l y  d i s s o l v e d  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  a n d  r e i n s t a t e d  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
2 5  
A t  
t h a t  t i m e ,  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  h a d  a l m o s t  c o m p l e t e d  a  d r a f t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  o n l y  n e e d e d  t o  
r e s o l v e  t h e  d e b a t e s  o n  t h e  D a s a r  N e g a r a .
2 6  
T h e  D e c r e e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  e n d e d  I n d o n e s i a ' s  c h a n c e s  
o f  h a v i n g  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  w a s  c o m m i t t e d  t o  d e m o c r a c y ,  h u m a n  r i g h t s  a n d  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  
p o w e r .
2 7  
S o e k a r n o ' s  D e c r e e  w a s  s t r a n g e  p o l i c y ,  b e c a u s e  S o e k a r n o  h i m s e l f  h a d  p r e v i o u s l y  a g r e e d  t h a t  
t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  w a s  a  m o r e  l e g i t i m a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  c o m p a r e d  t o  o t h e r  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d i e s  i n  t h e  p a s t  - i n c l u d i n g  t h e  c o m m i t t e e s  w h i c h  p r o d u c e d  t h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h a t  h e  h a d  n o w  r e i n s t a t e d .  T h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  w a s  d i r e c t l y  e l e c t e d  i n  a  r e l a t i v e l y  
f r e e  a n d  s e c r e t  b a l l o t  w i t h  t h e  s p e c i f i c  t a s k  o f  d r a f t i n g  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
2 8  
T h i s  d i d  n o t ,  
h o w e v e r ,  s t o p  S o e k a r n o  f r o m  d i s s o l v i n g  i t .  
D i s a p p o i n t m e n t  w i t h  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e ' s  d i s s o l u t i o n  g r e w  b e c a u s e  S o e k a r n o  c h o s e  t o  r e a p p l y  
t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n y  o f  t h e  o t h e r  I n d o n e s i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n s .
2
9  T h i s  w a s  h i g h l y  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  b e h a v i o r  o n  h i s  p a s t  s i n c e  h e  w a s  t h e  o n e  w h o ,  o n  t h e  d a y  o f  e n a c t m e n t  o f  t h e  
1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  ( 1 8  A u g u s t  1 9 4 5 )  h a d  f i r m l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  w a s  t e m p o r a r y ,  e x p r e s s ,  a n d  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  f r o m  1 9 5 9  u n t i l  t h e  e n d  o f  h i s  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r  i n  1 9 6 6 ,  
S o e k a r n o  n o  l o n g e r  t r e a t e d  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a s  t e m p o r a r y .  B y  r e a p p l y i n g  t h e  1 9 4 5  
2 2  T h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  s t a t e  { I n d o n e s i a n ) .  
2 3
N a s u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 ,  4 0 5 .  
2 4  
T h e  D e c r e e  c o n t a i n s  t h r e e  d e c i s i o n s :  ( 1 )  t o  d i s s o l v e  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e ,  ( 2 )  t o  p u t  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n t o  e f f e c t  a g a i n  a n d ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  d e c l a r e  i n v a l i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 5 0  P r o v i s i o n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  ( 3 )  t o  f o r m  a  P r o v i s i o n a l  M P R  a n d  a  P r o v i s i o n a l  D P A  
( D e w a n  P e r t i m b a n g a n  A g u n g  S e m e n t a r a  o r  P r o v i s i o n a l  S u p r e m e  A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l } .  
2 5  
F o r  f u r t h e r  e l a b o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  w h y  S o e k a r n o  i s s u e d  t h i s  d e c r e e ,  s e e :  D a n i e l  S .  L e v ,  T h e  T r a n s i t i o n  t o  G u i d e d  
D e m o c r a c y :  I n d o n e s i a n  P o l i t i c s ,  1 9 5 7 - 1 9 5 9  ( 1 9 6 6 )  2 3 5 - 2 8 9 .  S e e  a l s o  N a s u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 ,  3 1 3 - 4 0 1 .  
2 6  N a s u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 ,  4 0 5 .  
2 7
1 b i d  4 0 5 - 4 1 0 .  
2 8 1 b i d  3 6 - 3 7 .  
2 9  B a g i r  M a n a n ,  T e o r i  d a n  P o l i t i k  K o n s t i t u s i  ( 2 0 0 2 )  4 .  
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Constitution and implementing personal rule under his 'Guided Democracy' rubric, Soekarno 
created his own authoritarian regime, one that was to last unti11966. 
Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, it is the vague and incomplete nature of the 
1945 Constitution which contributed to the rise of authoritarian regimes under President 
Soekarno and, later, his successor, President Soeharto.30 Therefore, one of the basic demands 
of the student movements that succeeded in toppling Soeharto in 1998 was to reform the 1945 
Constitution. 3t This is the significance of the fifth constitutional reform attempt - from 1999-2002 
-which is the focus of this study. 
Closing. The constitution-making attempts in 1945, 1949 and 1950 failed because they were 
conducted in a very hasty and short period. In these three earlier attempts, the legitimacy of the 
relevant constitution-making body was very weak. This Constitution-maker issue was actually 
solved in the 1956-1959 attempt. The Konstituante enjoyed a strong legitimacy, because its 
members had been democratically elected through the 1955 election. Further, the Konstituante 
had almost three years to draft a Constitution. The problem with the Konstituante was, 
however, it did not have a strategic decision-making process, and therefore lacked an effective 
mechanism to resolve deadlocks. It was this possibility of deadlock which was used by 
Soekarno - with the support of the military - to intervene and effectively discard the promising 
constitutional draft prepared by the Konstituante. 32 
The possible deadlock in the Konstituante was closely related to the debates on whether 
Indonesian should be based on nationalism or Islam. The following section considers this issue 
in more detail. 
2. The Nationalism versus Islamic state Constitutional Debates 
Indonesian constitutional history cannot be separated from the existence of the Jakarta Charter 
(Piagam Jakarta). The discussion of the Jakarta Charter has always been one of the most 
30 See, eg, R. William Liddle, 'Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules' in Andrew Reynolds (ed), The 
Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (2002) 373, 376; National Democratic 
Institute, Indonesia's Road to Constitutional Reform: the 2000 MPR Annual Session (2000) 1. 
31 lndra J. Piliang, 'Amandemen Konstitusi dan Gerakan Mahasiswa: Sebuah Proyeksi' (2000) 4 Artalisis CSIS 441. 
32 Nasution, above n 14,400-401. 
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c o n t e n t i o u s  i s s u e s  i n  I n d o n e s i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s e s  a n d  i t  w a s  h o t l y  d e b a t e d  i n  
b o t h  1 9 4 5  a n d  1 9 5 6 - 1 9 5 9 .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  p a r a g r a p h s  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e s e  t w o  e v e n t s .  
T h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D e b a t e s .  T h e  J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  w a s  c o m p l e t e d  o n  2 2  J u n e  1 9 4 5  a n d  
M o h a m m a d  Y a m i n  g a v e  t h e  c h a r t e r  i t s  n a m e .  I t  w a s  i n t e n d e d  t o  b e c o m e  t h e  p r e a m b l e  t o  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  d r a f t  w a s  w r i t t e n  b y  a  C o m m i t t e e  o f  N i n e  ( P a n i t i a  S e m b i l a n } .
3
3  
T h i s  w a s  a  c o m m i t t e e  f o r m e d  b y  t h e  B P U P K I .  T h e  c o m m i t t e e  c o n s i s t e d  o f  f i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
f r o m  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n  a n d  f o u r  f r o m  t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n .
3 4  
T h i s  c o m p o s i t i o n  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  
d e e p  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  t h o s e  w h o  w i s h e d  t o  p r e s e r v e  a  s t a t e  w h i c h  w a s  f r e e  f r o m  r e l i g i o u s  
i n f l u e n c e ;  a n d  t h o s e  w h o  a d v o c a t e d  a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e .
3 5  
S o e p o m o  s t a t e d :  
[ t ] h e r e  a r e  i n d e e d  t w o  o p i n i o n s ,  n a m e l y  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  m e m b e r s  w h o  a r e  r e l i g i o u s  e x p e r t s  
u r g i n g  t h a t  I n d o n e s i a  s h o u l d  e s t a b l i s h  a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e  a n d  a n o t h e r  o p i n i o n  . .  .  o f  a  
n a t i o n a l  u n i t a r y  s t a t e  w h i c h  s e p a r a t e s  s t a t e  a f f a i r s  a n d  I s l a m i c  a f f a i r s ,  i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  n o t  
a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e . 3 6  
I n  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  o f  N i n e  m e e t i n g s ,  t h e  I s l a m i c  l e a d e r s  a g r e e d  t o  w i t h d r a w  t h e i r  I s l a m i c  s t a t e  
p r o p o s a l .  I n  e x c h a n g e ,  t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  i n c l u d e d  
P a n c a s i l a  b u t  w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  ' s e v e n  w o r d s '  i n  i t s  f i r s t  s i / a  o r  p r i n c i p l e :  d e n g a n  k e w a j i b a n  
m e n j a l a n k a n  s y a r i a t  I s l a m  b a g i  p e m e l u k - p e m e l u k n y a  ( w i t h  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  c a r r y  o u t  s y a r i a h 3
7  
f o r  a d h e r e n t s  o f  I s l a m ) .  T h e  c o m p r o m i s e  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  C h a r t e r  w a s  d e c l a r e d  t o  b e  a  
' g e n t l e m e n ' s  a g r e e m e n t ' .  S o e k i m a n ,  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  B P U P K I  f r o m  t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n ,  a r g u e d  
t h a t  b o t h  t h e  I s l a m i c  a n d  n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n s  s h o u l d  h o l d  f i r m l y  t o  i t . J s  
W h e n ,  t h e  c h a r t e r  w a s  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  B P U P K I  m e e t i n g s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  m e t  w i t h  h e a t e d  
d e b a t e .
3 9  
T h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n  w a s  c o n c e r n e d  t h a t  t h e  ' s e v e n  w o r d s ' ,  a s  t h e  C h a r t e r  i s  a l s o  
s o m e t i m e s  c a l l e d ,  w o u l d  t r i g g e r  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  a g a i n s t  r e l i g i o n s  o t h e r  t h a n  I s l a m .  T h e  
n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n  w a s  a l s o  w o r r i e d  b e c a u s e  t h e  ' s e v e n  w o r d s '  w e r e  a l s o  i n s e r t e d  t o  a  d r a f t  o f  
A r t i c l e  2 9 ( 1 ) .  T h i s  a r t i c l e  p r e v i o u s l y  h a d  s t i p u l a t e d ,  " T h e  s t a t e  i s  b a s e d  u p o n  b e l i e f  i n  G o d " .  I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  a  d r a f t  o f  A r t i c l e  6  r e q u i r e d  t h a t  a  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  s h o u l d  b e  a  M o s l e m .  T h e  
3 3  S r i  S o e m a n t r i ,  P r o s e d u r  d a n  S i s t e m  P e r u b a h a n  K o n s t i t u s i  ( 1 9 8 7 )  2 4 .  
3
4  
U m a r  B a s a l i m ,  P r o - K o n t r a  P i a g a m  J a k a r t a  d i  E r a  R e f o r m a s i  ( 2 0 0 2 )  2 5 .  
3 5  N a s u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 ,  6 1 .  
3 6
1 b i d .  
3
7  
S y a r i a h  i s  a n  A r a b i c  w o r d  m e a n i n g  I s l a m i c  l a w .  
3 8  N a s u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 ,  6 4 .  
1 0  
Jakarta Charter and drafts of Articles 29(1) and 6 almost led the meetings of the BPUPKI to a 
deadlock. Radjiman Wedyodiningrat, the Chairperson of the BPUPKI, proposed a vote to avoid 
the deadlock. This was not, in fact, done because members of the BPUKI agreed that a 
religious issue should not be voted on because of its sensitivity.4o 
On 16 July 1945, after a persuasive argument from Soekarno, the Christian representatives 
half-heartedly agreed to accept the constitutional draft of the BPUPKI. This included the 
Jakarta Charter and the drafts of Articles 29(1) and 6. 41 However, on 18 August 1945, one day 
after the proclamation of independence, Hatta proposed to withdraw the 'seven words' from the 
draft of the Constitution.42 Nasution argued that Hatta's intervention was due to: 
... his fear that Christian regions in Eastern Indonesia would not join the newly proclaimed 
republic, if Islam were to be accorded a special status in the Constitution.43 
Hatta's proposal was accepted, and the draft of the Constitution was then ratified, with some 
amendments. These amendments were a major compromise in Indonesian constitution-making 
history. They were as follows: 
• The Jakarta Charter was ratified as the preamble of the Constitution with the changing of 
its title from 'Mukadimah', an Arabic word, to 'Pembukaan' (Indonesian for Preamble); 
• The 'seven words' relating to syariah were deleted from the preamble and Article 29(1); 
and 
• The requirement that presidential candidates should be Moslem was deleted from Article 
6.44 
The 1956-1959 Constitutional Debates. Basalim argues that the Islamic faction agreed to 
these amendments to secure the new-born country from a potential disintegration.45 However, 
this was not the end of differences between the Islamic and the nationalist factions. The 
differences continued in the constitution-making process in the 1956-1959 Konstituante. 
39 Basalim, above n 34, 28- 34. 
40 Ibid 33. . 
41 1bid 34. 
42 1bid 37- 38. 
43 Nasution, above n 14, 64. 
44 Basalim, above n 34, 39. 
45 Jbid 42. 
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N a s u t i o n  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  d u r i n g  t h e  d e b a t e s  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n  p r o p o s e d  t h e  P a n c a s i l a ,  
w h i l e  t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n  p r o p o s e d  I s l a m  a s  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  t h e  s t a t e .
4 6  
N o n e  o f  t h e  f a c t i o n s  
h a d  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  s u p p o r t  t o  p u r s u e  t h e i r  p r o p o s a l s .  T h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n  h a d  o n l y  4 4 . 7 5 %  o f  
t h e  s e a t s  o f  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e .
4 7  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  g r o u p s  a g a i n  l e d  t h e  
d e b a t e s  t o  a  p o t e n t i a l  d e a d l o c k .  
D u r i n g  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  p r o p o s e d  t o  r e a p p l y  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
4 8  
T h e  
n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n  s u p p o r t e d  t h i s  p r o p o s a l .
4 9  
I n  r e s p o n s e ,  t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n  p r o p o s e d  
a m e n d m e n t s  t o  i n s e r t  t h e  ' s e v e n  w o r d s '  o f  t h e  J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  i n t o  t h e  p r e a m b l e ,  a n d  A r t i c l e  
2 9 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
5
°  C o m m e n t i n g  o n  t h i s  p r o p o s a l ,  A b d u l  W a h a b ,  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
K o n s t i t u a n t e  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
[ i ] f  t h i s  i s  a c c e p t e d ,  1 0 0 %  o f  t h e  M o s l e m  [ s i c ]  w i l l  s u p p o r t  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a g a i n .  I f  
t h i s  i s  r e j e c t e d ,  1 0 0 %  o f  t h e  M o s l e m s  w i l l  n o t  a c c e p t  i t .  T o  b e  o r  n o t  t o  b e ,  t h a t  i s  m y  
c o n v i c t i o n . 5
1  
O n  1  J u n e  1 9 5 9 ,  t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n ' s  p r o p o s a l  w a s  r e j e c t e d .
5 2  
I n  r e t u r n ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
p r o p o s a l ,  t o  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  r e j e c t e d  b y  t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n .
5 3  
B e c a u s e  o f  
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  w e n t  i n t o  r e c e s s .  L a t e r ,  a s  n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  b y  a r g u i n g  t h a t  t h e  
K o n s t i t u a n t e  h a d  f a i l e d  t o  f u l f i l l  i t s  d u t y ,  S o e k a r n o  i s s u e d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  D e c r e e  o f  5  J u l y  
1 9 5 9 ,  w h i c h  d i s s o l v e d  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  a n d  r e a p p l i e d  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  5 4  W i t h  t h e  s u p p o r t  
o f  t h e  a r m y ,  t h i s  d e c r e e  w a s  e f f e c t i v e .  T h i s  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  e n d  o f  a l l  o f  t h e  w o r k  o f  t h e  
K o n s t i t u a n t e  w h i c h  h a d  s t a r t e d  i t s  s e s s i o n s  w i t h  s o  m u c h  p r o m i s e  i n  N o v e m b e r  1 9 5 6 .
5 5  
T o  g a i n  t h e  s u p p o r t  f r o m  t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n ,  S o e k a r n o ' s  P r e s i d e n t i a l  D e c r e e  o f  5  J u l y  1 9 5 9  
r e l i e d  o n  t h e  P i a g a m  J a k a r t a .  5
6  
I t  s t a t e d :  
4
6  N a s u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 ,  5 1 .  
4 7 1 b i d  3 2 - 3 4 .  
4
8  B a s a l i m ,  a b o v e  n  3 4 ,  4 6 - 4 9 .  
4 9
1 b i d  5 4 .  
5 0  I b i d  4 9  - 5 0 .  
5
1  
N a s u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 ,  3 9 6 - 3 9 7 .  
5 2  I b i d  3 9 7 .  
5 3  
i b i d .  
5 4  I b i d  4 0 0 - 4 0 1 .  
5 5  I b i d  4 0 1 .  
5 6  B a s a l i m ,  a b o v e  n  3 4 ,  5 6 .  
1 2  
... the Jakarta Charter of 22 June 1945 inspired the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, the 
charter and the 1945 Constitution are inseparable. 57 
Later, this thesis will demonstrate that the 1999-2002 constitutional amendments were also 
overshadowed by the issue of adopting the 'seven words' of the Jakarta Charter into the 
Constitution. This again almost led the amendments process into a deadlock. 
3. The Importance of the 1999-2002 Constitutional Reform 
The 1999-2002 reform process thus carried an historical burden, and at the same time sought 
to anticipate the country's future fortunes. The historical burden was the continuing 
constitutional reform failures of 1945, 1949, 1950, and 1956-1959, as discussed above. As 
Harun Alrasid puts it, the failures had resulted in Indonesia always applying constitutions which 
were temporary.58 In 1998, he wrote that after more than a half century of independence, 
Indonesia had never had a stable Constitution.59 
Therefore, the MPR's task of reforming the Constitution was essential in order to break the 
historical chain of failures and secure the transition from Soeharto's authoritarian rule. Other 
fields of reform for example, politics and economics depended on legal reform, which was, 
itself, dependant on constitutional reform. Constitutional reform was thus a pre-requisite for the 
success of the country's reform as a whole, and its failure would be an early indicator of the 
death of the vulnerable transition to democracy.60 This was stated. clearly by Alrasid: 
... to have a better system we have to do a 'total reform', especially constitutional reform 
... therefore the first thing that must be done is to reform the 1945 Constitution. 61 
57 The consideration of the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959. 
58 Yusuf and Basalim, above n 6, 12. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Bachtiar Effendy, 'Reformasi Konstitusi sebagai Prasyarat Demokratisasi: Pengalaman Indonesia' (2000) 4 Ana/isis CS/S 
389-390. 
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D .  T h e s i s  O v e r v i e w  
1 .  F o c u s  o f  t h e  S t u d y  
1 9 9 9  h a s  b e e n  s e l e c t e d  a s  t h e  s t a r t i n g  d a t e  o f  t h e  s t u d y ,  b e c a u s e  t h i s  w a s  t h e  y e a r  w h e n  t h e  
M P R  f o r m a l l y  i n i t i a t e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m .  T h e  y e a r  2 0 0 2  h a s  b e e n  c h o s e n  a s  t h e  f i n a l  y e a r  
b e c a u s e  i t  w a s  t h e  y e a r  s t i p u l a t e d  b y  t h e  M P R  a s  t h e  d e a d l i n e  t o  f i n i s h  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m . 6 2  
E v e n t s  a f t e r  t h i s  y e a r  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  n o t  b e  a  c o n c e r n  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  a l t h o u g h ,  s p e c i f i c  
e x c e p t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  w h e r e  i s s u e s  t h a t  a r o s e  a f t e r  2 0 0 2  a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  
t h e  a r g u m e n t s  w i t h i n  t h i s  t h e s i s .  6
3  
2 .  R e s e a r c h  M e t h o d o l o g y  
T h i s  t h e s i s  i s  b a s e d  o n  b o t h  l i b r a r y  a n d  f i e l d  r e s e a r c h ,  a n d  a  b r o a d l y  s o c i o - l e g a l  a p p r o a c h  i s  
a d o p t e d ,  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  a d o p t e d  i n  N a s u t i o n ' s  s e m i n a l  ' T h e  A s p i r a t i o n  f o r  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
G o v e r n m e n t :  A  S o c i o - L e g a l  S t u d y  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  K o n s t i t u a n t e  1 9 5 6  - 1 9 5 9 ' .  
I n  t e r m s  o f  l i b r a r y  r e s e a r c h ,  I  h a v e  c o l l e c t e d  d a t a  f r o m  j o u r n a l s ,  p e r i o d i c a l s ,  b o o k s ,  
n e w s p a p e r s ,  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  t h e  I n t e r n e t  a n d  o t h e r  a s s o r t e d  s e c o n d a r y  m a t e r i a l s ,  a s  c i t e d  i n  t h e  
b i b l i o g r a p h y .  
F i e l d  r e s e a r c h  w a s  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  I n d o n e s i a ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n  J a k a r t a ,  w h e r e  m o s t  o f  t h e  m e e t i n g s  
o f  t h e  M P R  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  a m e n d i n g  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t o o k  p l a c e .  I  c o l l e c t e d  m a t e r i a l  
i n a c c e s s i b l e  f r o m  o u t s i d e  I n d o n e s i a ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  f u l l  m i n u t e s  o f  t h e  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  M P R .  
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  I  c o n d u c t e d  a  w i d e  r a n g e  o f  i n t e r v i e w s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i t h  i m p o r t a n t  f i g u r e s  i n v o l v e d  
i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h e s e  i n t e r v i e w s  i n c l u d e d :  
•  M P R  m e m b e r s ;  
•  e x p e r t s  f r o m  t h e  w o r k i n g  c o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  M P R ;  
6 1  
W a w a n c a r a  P r o f .  D r .  H a m n  A l r a s i d :  J i k a  F u n d a m e n  R u m a h n y a  R a p u h ,  N e g e r i  i n i  B i s a  A m b m k  ( 1 9 9 8 )  T e m p o  l n t e r a k t i f  
< h t t p : / / w w w . t e m p o . c o . i d / a n g / m i n /  0 3 / 1 0 / n a s 5 . h t m >  a t  1 2  J u n e  2 0 0 2 .  
6 2  
A r t i c l e  3  o f  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  I X  o f  2 0 0 0  o n  t h e  A u t h o r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  o f  t h e  M P R  t o  p r e p a r e  t h e  A m e n d m e n t  
D r a f t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 3  
A s  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  w r i t i n g  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  i n  2 0 0 5 ,  n o  f u r t h e r  a m e n d m e n t s  h a v e  b e e n  p a s s e d .  
1 4  
• members of non-governmental organizations who had participated in monitoring and 
campaigning for the amendment process, for example CETRO (Centre for Electoral 
Reform); and 
• members of the academic community, particularly those specializing in constitutional 
law and politics. 
The interviews concentrated on the interviewees' own direct experiences of the amendment 
process and their opinions on the process and outcomes. A typical example of the interviews 
is attached as 'Appendix 2'. 
In relation to English translation, unless otherwise noted, all of the translations are the author 
own. Where appropriate, and for the benefit of readers familiar with Indonesian, I have included 
the relevant Indonesian words or expressions as found in the original text. 
With regard to Indonesian spelling, I have adopted the standard Indonesian orthography first 
introduced in 1972. However, I continue to use the old spelling pre-1972 for personal names 
which are spelled that way by the person named (for example Soekarno instead of Sukarno). 
For easier reference, a comparative table of the 1945 Constitution showing the Constitution 
before and after the four amendments is attached as 'Appendix 1 '. 
3. Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organized into five parts and eight chapters. It starts with the introduction in Part 
One and this consists of this introductory chapter. 
The next section is Part Two and this incorporates Chapter Two. The emphasis is on providing 
a theoretical framework for understanding the nature of constitutional reform in transitions from 
authoritarian rule. The experiences of selected countries, particularly South Africa and 
Thailand, are examined to see whether their approaches aid my analysis of Indonesia and to 
compare their experiences of constitutional reform at a time of transition to the Indonesian 
experience. 
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T h e  b a c k g r o u n d  t o  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  p o l i t i c a l  t r a n s i t i o n  i s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  P a r t  T h r e e  ( C h a p t e r  
T h r e e ) .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  d e s c r i b e s  h o w  I n d o n e s i a ,  u n d e r  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  o f  S o e h a r t o ,  w a s  
u n d e m o c r a t i c .  T h i s  u n d e m o c r a t i c  s y s t e m  w a s  e n a b l e d  b y  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  
t h e  d o c u m e n t  n e e d s  t o  b e  r e f o r m e d  t o  s e c u r e  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r u l e .  
C h a p t e r  T h r e e  i s  t h e n  f o l l o w e d  b y  a  d e t a i l e d  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  i n  
P a r t  F o u r ,  w h i c h  c o n s i s t s  o f  C h a p t e r s  F o u r  t o  S e v e n .  E a c h  o f  t h e s e  c h a p t e r s  d e a l s  w i t h  o n e  o f  
t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s .  T h e  f o r m a t  o f  t h e  f o u r  c h a p t e r s  i s  s i m i l a r .  E a c h  c a n v a s s e s  t h e  
b a c k g r o u n d ,  t h e  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s .  
D a t a  f r o m  t h e s e  f o u r  c h a p t e r s  i s  a n a l y z e d  i n  P a r t  F i v e  ( C h a p t e r  E i g h t ) .  I t  e v a l u a t e s  w h e t h e r  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s  w a s  d e m o c r a t i c .  C h a p t e r  E i g h t  c o n s i d e r s  
w h e t h e r  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s  h a s ,  i n  f a c t ,  b e e n  a  m o r e  d e m o c r a t i c  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  r e c o m m e n d s  f u r t h e r  a m e n d m e n t s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  
c h e c k s  a n d  b a l a n c e s .  F i n a l l y ,  t h i s  c h a p t e r  a l s o  p r e s e n t s  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  m y  t h e s i s .  
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C h a p t e r  T w o  
A  T h e o r e t i c a l  F r a m e w o r k  o f  
D e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n  M a k i n g  
C o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  i s  a t  o n c e  t h e  m o s t  v a r i e d  a n d  t h e  m o s t  c o n c e n t r a t e d  f o r m  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t y  d u r i n g  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n .  I n  i t ,  p o l i t i c a l  m a n e u v e r i n g ,  b a r g a i n i n g  a n d  n e g o t i a t i n g  t a k e s  
p l a c e  a n d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n s ,  a g r e e m e n t s  a n d  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  b e t w e e n  g r o u p s  a n d  
l e a d e r s  c o m e  t o  t h e  f o r e .  H o w  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  d r a f t e r s  h a n d l e  t h e s e  i s s u e s  m a y  t e l l  u s  
c r u c i a l  t h i n g s  a b o u t  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  a n d  a b o u t  t h e  r e g i m e  i t  l e a d s  u p  t o .  T h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  w o r d s  a g r e e d  t o  i n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  t h a t  e m e r g e s  m a y  
p o i n t  t o  p o t e n t i a l  s e r i o u s  f u t u r e  c o n f l i c t s .  T h e  g e n e r a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  b o t h  t h e  p r o c e s s  a n d  i t s  
o u t c o m e  m a y  r e v e a l  c l u e s  a b o u t  t h e  n e w  r e g i m e ' s  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  s t a b i l i t y  o r  i n s t a b i l i t y  
( A n d r e a  B o n i m e - B i a n c ) . 6 4  
A .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
T h i s  c h a p t e r  t a k e s  t h e  f o r m  o f  a  l i t e r a t u r e  r e v i e w .  I t  a i m s  t o  p r o v i d e  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  i n  a  p e r i o d  o f  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r u l e .  
T h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  f r a m e w o r k  s u p p o r t s  t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  i n  t r a n s i t i o n  i s  c e n t r a l  i n  
s e t t i n g  u p  a  b a s i c  l e g a l  s y s t e m  f o r  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c o u n t r y ,  a s  s u g g e s t e d  b y  B o n i m e - B i a n c ,  i n  t h e  
q u o t e  a b o v e .  
T h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  i n t r o d u c e s  a n d  c l a r i f i e s  s o m e  b a s i c  
c o n c e p t s  u s e d  i n  t h i s  t h e s i s .  S e c t i o n  B  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  k e y  f e a t u r e s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  
m a k i n g  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  b e  a p p l i e d  w h e n  I  d e s c r i b e  a n d  e v a l u a t e  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  
1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  i n  C h a p t e r s  F o u r  t o  E i g h t .  S e c t i o n  C  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  k e y  
e l e m e n t s  f o r  a  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  a l s o  b e  u t i l i z e d  i n  C h a p t e r s  F o u r  t o  
E i g h t  w h e n  I  a n a l y z e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s  h a v e  c r e a t e d  a  m o r e  d e m o c r a t i c  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  d r a w s  o n  t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  d e c a d e s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n -
m a k i n g  i n  t r a n s i t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t s  a c r o s s  t h e  w o r l d .  T h i s  p e r i o d  h a s  s e e n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  c o u n t r i e s  i n  A f r i c a ; 6 s  L a t i n  A m e r i c a ; 6
6  




A n d r e a  B o n i m e - B i a n c ,  S p a i n ' s  T r a n s i t i o n  t o  D e m o c r a c y  ( 1 9 8 7 )  1 3 .  
6 5  
S e e  g e n e r a l l y  J o h n  M u k u m  M b u k u ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  E n g i n e e r i n g  a n d  t h e  T r a n s i t i o n  t o  D e m o c r a c y  i n  P o s t - C o l d  W a r  A f r i c a '  
( 1 9 9 8 )  1 1 : 4  T h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e v i e w  5 0 1  - 5 0 2 .  F o r  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  C o n s t i t u t i o n - M a k i n g  i n  T r a n s i t i o n  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  s e e  
P e n e l o p e  A n d r e w s  a n d  S t e p h e n  E l l m a n  ( e d s ) ,  P o s t - A p a r t h e i d  c o n s t i t u t i o n s :  P e r s p e c t i v e s  o n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  B a s i c  L a w  ( 2 0 0 1 ) ;  
P e r  S t r a n d ,  D e c i s i o n s  o n  D e m o c r a c y :  T h e  P o l i t i c s  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n - M a k i n g  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a  1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 6  ( 2 0 0 0 ) .  
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and Asia68 - a phenomenon which John Elster refers to as the sixth and seventh waves of 
constitution-making. 69 
Despite the broad comparative review I focus principally on constitutional reform in two 
countries: South Africa (1994-1997) and Thailand (1996-1997). There were four reasons for 
doing this. Firstly, in the two countries selected the constitutional reform took place in a period 
of transition from authoritarian rule, as in Indonesia. Secondly, South Africa's reform was led by 
its Parliament, sitting as Constituent Assembly. This was similar to the Indonesian reforms, 
which were led by the MPR, the Indonesian Parliament. Thirdly, the Thai reforms were carried 
out in a period of economic crisis, as well as political turbulence. Similarly, in Indonesia the 
devaluation of the Rupiah in mid-1997 - which was triggered by the Thai Baht evaluation -
started a financial and political crisis that subsequently engulfed the country. Fourthly, like 
Indonesia, the two countries are developing countries. Further, each of the country represents 
different regions, South Africa is - obviously - from Africa whilst Thailand, like Indonesia, is 
from Asia. 
I will start by clarifying three basic concepts: Constitution, constitution-making and transition 
from authoritarian rule. These three concepts are the main ideas of this thesis. 
1. Constitution 
Franscois Venter notes that the basic characteristic of a modern constitutional state is a written 
Constitution to which "superior legal consequence is attached" .To According to Giovanni Sartori, 
66 See generally Carlos Santiago Nino, 'Transition to Democracy, Corporatism and Constitutional Reform in Latin America' 
(1989) 44 University of Miami Law Review 129 -164; Carlos Santiago Nino, 'The Debate over Constitutional Reform in Latin 
America' ( 1993) 16 Fordham International Law Joumal635 - 651. 
67 See generally A.E. Dick Howard, Constitution Making in Eastern Europe (1993); A.E. Dick Howard, 'Constitution-Making in 
Central and Eastern Europe' (1994) 28 Suffolk University Law Review 5 - 16; For discussion on Constitution-Making in 
Transition in Spain and Poland, see Bonime-Bianc, above n 64; Mark Brzezinski, The Struggle for Constitutionalism in Poland 
(1998). 
68 See, eg, Kevin Y.L. Tan, 'The Making and Remaking of constitutions in Southeast Asia: An Overview' (2002) 6, Singapore 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 - 41. James M. West and Edward J. Baker, 'The 1987 Constitutional Reforms 
in South Korea: Electoral Processes and Judicial Independence' (1988) 1 Harvard Human Rights Year Book 135 - 177; 
Andrew Harding, 'May There be Virtue: 'New Asian Constitutionalism' in Thailand' (2001) 3:3 The Australian Journal of Asian 
Law236. 
69 Jon Elster, 'Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process' (1995) 45 Duke Law Journal394. In Section B.1. of 
this chapter, I will elaborate on Elster's constitution-making classification. 
7° Franscois Venter, 'Constitution Making and the Legitimacy of the Constitution' in Antero Jyranki (ed), National constitutions 
in the Era of Integration ( 1999) 18. 
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t h e  L a t i n  w o r d  ' c o n s t i t u t i o '  h a d  n o  r e l a t i o n  t o  w h a t  w e  c a l l  a  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n ' . 7
1  
I n  t h e  e r a  o f  a n c i e n t  
R o m e ,  a  ' c o n s t i t u t i o '  m e a n t  a  " p a r t i c u l a r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  e n a c t m e n t " J 2  I n  t h e  m i d d l e  o f  t h e  
s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  w r i t t e n  d o c u m e n t s  c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
w e r e  c a l l e d  c o v e n a n t s ,  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  a g r e e m e n t s ,  a n d  f u n d a m e n t a l  l a w s  - b u t  n e v e r  
' c o n s t i t u t i o n s ' . 7
3  
I n  f a c t ,  C h a r l e s  H o w a r d  M c i l w a i n  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  m o d e r n  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  d a t e s  f r o m  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y . 7
4  
K . C .  W h e a r e  n o t e s  t h e  u s e  o f  
t h e  t e r m  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n '  f o r  a  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  f u n d a m e n t a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  o n l y  b e g a n  
w h e n  t h e  A m e r i c a n s  d e c l a r e d  i n  1 7 8 7 :  ' W e  t h e  p e o p l e  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  . . .  d o  o r d a i n  a n d  
e s t a b l i s h  t h i s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  A m e r i c a ' .  
7 5  
A f t e r  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  T h o m a s  P a i n e  a r g u e d  t h a t  a :  
. . .  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  n o t  t h e  a c t  o f  a  g o v e r n m e n t ,  b u t  o f  a  p e o p l e  c o n s t i t u t i n g  a  g o v e r n m e n t ;  
a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  w i t h o u t  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  i s  p o w e r  w i t h o u t  a  r i g h t J 6  
H o l d i n g  t h e  s a m e  o p i n i o n  a s  P a i n e ,  W h e a r e ,  w r i t i n g  i n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 5 0 s ,  d e f i n e d  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a s  
a  w r i t t e n  d o c u m e n t  w h i c h  d e s c r i b e s  " t h e  w h o l e  s y s t e m  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  a  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  
c o l l e c t i o n  o f  r u l e s  w h i c h  e s t a b l i s h  a n d  r e g u l a t e  o r  g o v e r n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t " .  
7 7  
S a r t o r i ,  w r i t i n g  i n  
t h e  e a r l y  1 9 6 0 s ,  d e s c r i b e d  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a s  a  " t e c h n i q u e  o f  l i b e r t y ' ' . 7
8  
H e  w a s  o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  
t h a t  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  a  t e c h n i c a l  d o c u m e n t  w h i c h  s h o w s :  h o w  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  i s  l i m i t e d ,  a n d  
h o w  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  s o c i e t a l  r i g h t s  a r e  p r o t e c t e d . 7
9  
I n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s ,  S a r t o r i  c h a n g e d  h i s  p o s i t i o n  b y  
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r ,  c l a i m i n g  t h a t  t h e  
p r o t e c t i o n  o f  r i g h t s  d i d  n o t  r e a l l y  m a t t e r .
8 0  
H e  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
. . .  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w i t h o u t  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  r i g h t s  i s  s t i l l  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w h e r e a s  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
w h o s e  c o r e  a n d  c e n t e r p i e c e  i s  n o t  a  f r a m e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  i s  n o t  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  .  .  .  S o ,  
c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e ,  f i r s t  a n d  a b o v e  a l l ,  i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  w h i c h  l i m i t ,  r e s t r a i n  a n d  
a l l o w  f o r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r . 8 1  
7 1  
G i o v a n n i  S a r t o r i ,  C o m p a r a t i v e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  E n g i n e e r i n g :  A n  I n q u i r y  i n t o  S t r u c t u r e s ,  I n c e n t i v e s  a n d  O u t c o m e s  ( 2 n d  E d ,  
1 9 9 7 )  1 9 5 .  
7 2  C h a r l e s  H o w a r d  M c i l w a i n ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m :  A n c i e n t  a n d  M o d e m  ( r e v i s e d  e d . ,  1 9 4 7 )  2 4 .  
7 3  S a r t o r i ,  a b o v e  n  7 1 ,  1 9 5 .  
7 4  M c i l w a i n ,  a b o v e  n  7 2 ,  1  - 2 .  
7 5  K . C .  W h e a r e ,  M o d e r n  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  ( 1 9 5 8 )  3 .  
7
6  T h o m a s  P a i n e ,  R i g h t s  o f  M a n  ( 1 7 9 2 )  C o n s t i t u t i o n  S o c i e t y  < h t t p : / / w w w . C o n s t i t u t i o n .  o r g / t p / r i g h t s m a n 2 . h t m >  a t  9  M a r c h  
2 0 0 3 .  
7 7  W h e a r e ,  a b o v e  n  7 5 ,  1 .  
7
8  G i o v a n n i  S a r t o r i ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m :  A  P r e l i m i n a r y  D i s c u s s i o n '  ( 1 9 6 2 )  L V I : 4  A m e r i c a n  P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e  R e v i e w  8 6 2 .  
7 9  
I b i d .  
8 0  S a r t o r i ,  a b o v e  n  7 1 , 1 9 6 .  
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1 b i d .  
2 0  
Sartori's later definition has been supported by Richard-Holder Williams who argues that a 
Constitution is a legal document which contains "the rules of the political game".82 Likewise, 
Carl J. Friedrich notes that the meaning of a Constitution in modern political thinking is a very 
distinct one, that is, the process by which governmental activities are efficiently controlled.83 
Based on this notion of restraint, Friedrich classifies regimes along a continuum, from 
unconstitutional government (which are regimes with no restraints), through actual 
governments (which are those that have some restraints), to constitutional governments (which 
are those with 'complete' restraints).84 
Nevertheless, a notion of Constitution that leans more toward the control of political power does 
not negate the idea of a Constitution acting as the protector of individual and societal rights. In 
1995, S.E. Finer, Vernon Bogdanor and Bernard Rudden argued that: 
[c]onstitutions are codes of norms which aspire to regulate the allocation of functions, 
powers and duties among the various agencies and offices of government, and to define 
the relationship between these and the public.8s 
It is my view that to ensure that human rights are protected, a declaration of rights should be 
explicitly mentioned. When there is unclear protection of human rights the possibility for human 
rights violations increases. Applying this definition to Indonesia's circumstances, I argue that 
the limited protection of human rights in the 1945 Constitution contributed to the many human 
rights violations during Soeharto's authoritarian regime. I mention this because it is connected 
to the discussions of the Second Amendment of the 1945 Constitution, particularly in relation to 
the possibility of incorporating a Bill of Rights.86 
A Constitution can be a single document, or a combination of basic laws and customs.87 On this 
basis, constitutions are classified as written and unwritten.88 C.F. Strong, however, argues that 
82 Richard Holder-Williams, 'The Constitution (1787) and Modern American Government' in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.), 
constitutions in Democratic Politics (1988) 95. 
83 Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America (1950) 131. 
84 1bid 125. 
85 S.E. Finer, Vernon Bogdanor and Bernard Rudden (eds), Comparing constitutions (1995) 1. 
861 will discuss this human rights in the Second Amendment debates in Chapter Five. 
87 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1946) 125 -128; Peter Paczolay, 'The New Hungarian Constitutional State: 
Challenges and Perspectives' in A. E. Dick Howard (ed), constitution-making in Eastern Europe (1993) 30. 
88 Wheare, above n 75, 19. 
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t h e  b a s i s  o f  s u c h  a  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  s y s t e m  i s  i l l u s o r y :  t h e r e  i s  n o  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  
w r i t t e n  o r  u n w r i t t e n .  
8 9  
I t  h a s  b e e n  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  d i s c a r d e d . 9 o  S t r o n g  
p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  - w h i c h  i s  u s u a l l y  r e g a r d e d  a s  t h e  l e a d i n g  e x a m p l e  o f  a  
c o u n t r y  w i t h  a n  u n w r i t t e n  C o n s t i t u t i o n - d o e s ,  i n  f a c t ,  h a v e  s o m e  w r i t t e n  l a w s  ( e . g .  t h e  B i l l  o f  
R i g h t s  o f  1 6 8 9 ,  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  A c t  o f  1 9 1 1 )  w h i c h  h a v e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  f o r m e d  i t s  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
9 1  
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  h e  a l s o  a r g u e s  t h a t  i n  p r a c t i c e  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  w h i c h  
i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  t h e  m o s t  c o m p l e t e  w r i t t e n  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,
9 2  
u s e s  u n w r i t t e n  c o n v e n t i o n s  o r  
c u s t o m s  t o  c o m p l e m e n t  i t s  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
9 3
l n  f a c t ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  J a n - E r i k  L a n e :  
[ n ] o  s t a t e  l i v e s  t o  1 0 0  p e r  c e n t  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  i t s  w r i t t e n  d o c u m e n t s .  C u s t o m a r y  l a w  
p l a y s  a  m a j o r  r o l e  i n  e v e r y  s t a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  9
4  
I n  r e a l i t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e s e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  - w r i t t e n  a n d  u n w r i t t e n  - a r e  r e g u l a r l y  u s e d  a n d  s o  
L a n e  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  t e r m  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n '  h a s  a  d o u b l e  m e a n i n g :  a r t i c l e s  i n  a  w r i t t e n  d o c u m e n t  
a n d  o n g o i n g  s t a t e  a c t i v i t i e s .
9 5  
T h e r e f o r e ,  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n s  i t  i s  s o m e t i m e s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n  s o - c a l l e d  w r i t t e n  a n d  u n w r i t t e n  c o n s t i t u t i o n s .  E v e n  S t r o n g  r e c o g n i z e s  t h i s  
n e c e s s i t y ,  a l t h o u g h  h e  h a s  p r o p o s e d  u s i n g  a  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  t e r m i n o l o g y :  d o c u m e n t a r y  a n d  
n o n - d o c u m e n t a r y .  9 6  
I n  m o s t  c o u n t r i e s ,  w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ,  N e w  Z e a l a n d  a n d  I s r a e l ,  9
7  
t h e  w o r d  
' C o n s t i t u t i o n '  i s  u s e d  t o  d e s c r i b e  a  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  l a w s  w h i c h  r u l e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y  
a n d  w h i c h  h a v e  b e e n  g a t h e r e d  i n t o  a  w r i t t e n  d o c u m e n t . 9
8  
T h i s  t h e s i s  d e f i n e s  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n '  i n  
t h i s  s e n s e .  H e r e ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n '  a l w a y s  r e f e r s  t o  a  w r i t t e n  d o c u m e n t .  T h i s  i s ,  i n  p a r t ,  b e c a u s e  
8 9  C . F .  S t r o n g ,  M o d e m  P o l i t i c a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  ( 1 9 7 3 )  5 7 - 5 8 .  
9 0  W h e a r e ,  a b o v e  n  7 5 ,  1 9 .  
9 1
1 b i d .  
9 2  
S t r o n g ' s  o p i n i o n ,  t h a t  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i s  t h e  m o s t  c o m p l e t e l y  w r i t t e n  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  n e e d s  f u r t h e r  
c l a r i f i c a t i o n .  M a n y  o t h e r  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  m o r e  c o m p l e t e ,  a t  l e a s t  l o n g e r ,  t h a n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  T h e  I n d i a n  
a n d  N i g e r i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  h a v e  1 5 1  a n d  3 2 0  A r t i c l e s  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  w h i c h  o n l y  h a s  s e v e n  a r t i c l e s ,  p l u s  t w e n t y - s e v e n  a m e n d m e n t s  ( u p  t o  1 9 9 2 ) .  
9 3  S t r o n g ,  a b o v e  n  8 9 ,  5 7 .  
9 4  
J a n - E r i k  L a n e ,  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  P o l i t i c a l  T h e o r y  ( 1 9 9 6 )  1 1 8 .  
9 5
1 b i d  5 .  
9 6  S t r o n g ,  a b o v e  n  8 9 ,  5 8 .  
9 7  
T h r o u g h  a  s e r i e s  o f  e n a c t m e n t s  b y  i t s  p a r l i a m e n t ,  s i t t i n g  a s  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y ,  I s r a e l  h a s  b e e n  t r a n s f o r m i n g  i t s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  i n t o  a  w r i t t e n  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
9 8 W h e a r e ,  a b o v e  n  7 5 ,  1 9 .  
2 2  
Indonesia has not yet developed an accepted and sophisticated jurisprudence of unwritten 
constitutional law. 99 
Therefore, when I discuss constitution-making, constitutional amendment and constitutional 
reform, I am concerned exclusively with the making and amending of a written Constitution. In 
the words of Wheare, this thesis is focused on 'formal' rather than 'informal' amendment. 100 The 
former occurs according to the amendment mechanism set up in the Constitution itself, while 
the latter takes place through custom and usage or judicial interpretation. 101 This thesis shares 
Friedrich's opinion that despite the importance of changes which informal amendment may 
produce, particular changes - such as the structure of a federal country and its division into 
states - may be impossible without a formal amendment.1o2 
2. Constitution-Making 
According to Venter, the concept of the 'Constitution' itself is dynamic.1o3 John P. Wheeler, Jr. 
expressly argues that constitutional change is unavoidable.104 Romano Prodi suggested that, "A 
non-amendable Constitution is a weak Constitution" because "it is not adapted to reality, and 
the Constitution must be adapted to changing reality''.1os In fact, according to Brannon P. 
Denning, a mechanism of constitutional amendment is essential to guarantee that future 
generations have the tools to effectively "exercise their sovereign powers". 106 The changing 
nature of national constitutions is highlighted by Venter who notes that: 
[t]here is no such thing as a 'final' Constitution, because a national Constitution is as alive 
as the state, consisting of a multitude of thinking human beings, for whom it exists. The 
idea of a Constitution which is immutable would not be consistent with the precepts of the 
modern constitutional state. 1o7 
99 Tim Lindsey, 'Indonesian Constitutional Reform: Muddling Towards Democracy' (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 244, 276- 277. 
taowheare, above n 75, 121-145. 
101 Brannon P. Denning, 'Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change', 65:155 Tennessee Law Review, 197 -198. 
102 Friedrich, above n 83, 141. 
103 Venter, above n 70, 19. 
104 John P. Wheeler, Jr., 'Changing the Fundamental Law' in John P. Wheeler, JR. (ed), Salient Issues of Constitutional 
Revision (1961) 49. 
105 Anthony Browne, 'Prodi fears sceptics will neuter EU Constitution' Vote 2004 <http://www.vote2004.comlmediacentre/ 
display.asp?IDN0=1395> at 15 June 2004. 
106 Denning, above n 101, 160. 
107 Venter, above n 70, 19. 
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V e n t e r ' s  o p i n i o n  i s  r e m i n i s c e n t  o f  T h o m a s  J e f f e r s o n ' s  i d e a  t h a t :  
. . .  l a w s  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  m u s t  g o  h a n d  i n  h a n d  w i t h  t h e  p r o g r e s s  o f  t h e  h u m a n  m i n d .  A s  
t h a t  b e c o m e s  m o r e  d e v e l o p ,  m o r e  e n l i g h t e n e d ,  a s  n e w  d i s c o v e r i e s  a r e  m a d e ,  n e w  t r u t h s  
d i s c o v e r e d  a n d  m a n n e r s  a n d  o p i n i o n s  c h a n g e ,  w i t h  t h e  c h a n g e  o f  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  m u s t  a d v a n c e  a l s o  t o  k e e p  p a c e  w i t h  t h e  t i m e s . t o a  
A s  J a m e s  L .  S u n d s q u i s t  a c k n o w l e d g e s ,  s o o n  a f t e r  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  w r i t t e n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
i n  A m e r i c a ,  J a m e s  M a d i s o n  n o t e d ,  " I  a m  n o t  o n e  o f  t h e  n u m b e r  i f  t h e r e  b e  a n y  s u c h ,  w h o  t h i n k  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  l a t e l y  a d o p t e d  a  f a u l t l e s s  w o r k " . 1 0 9  T w e n t y - e i g h t  y e a r s  a f t e r w a r d ,  G o u v e r n e u r  
M o r r i s  w r o t e :  
[ n ] o t h i n g  h u m a n  c a n  b e  p e r f e c t .  S u r r o u n d e d  b y  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  w e  d i d  t h e  b e s t  w e  c o u l d ;  
l e a v i n g  i t  w i t h  t h o s e  w h o  s h o u l d  c o m e  a f t e r  u s  t o  t a k e  c o u n s e l  f r o m  e x p e r i e n c e ,  a n d  
e x e r c i s e  p r u d e n t l y  t h e  p o w e r  o f  a m e n d m e n t ,  w h i c h  w e  h a d  p r o v i d e d . 1 1 o  
I n  t h e  s a m e  w a y ,  E d w a r d  M c W h i n n e y  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  a s  i s  t h e  c a s e  w i t h  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  i s  a  d y n a m i c  c o n c e p t  a s  w e l l .
1 1 1  
T h e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  
a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  i s  c o n t i n u a l l y  c h a n g i n g ,  w i t h  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f  i s  t h e  c l e a r e s t  e v i d e n c e  o f  
t h a t  c h a n g e .
1 1 2  
F u r t h e r ,  M c W h i n n e y  u n d e r l i n e s  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  t a s k  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e s  i n  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t  i s  t o  a n t i c i p a t e ,  c o r r e c t ,  a n d  c h a n g e  t h e  
s u b s t a n c e s  o f  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n s u r e  i t  i s  i n  t h e  s a m e  p a t h  t o  a  p r o c e s s  t o  
d e m o c r a c y .
1 1 3  
T h e r e f o r e ,  F r i e d r i c h  a r g u e s  t h a t  i n  m o s t  w e l l - d r a w n  m o d e r n  c o n s t i t u t i o n s ,  t h e  
p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  a m e n d m e n t  f o r m  a  v i t a l  p a r t .
1 1 4  
A l o n g  t h e  s a m e  l i n e s ,  M c W h i n n e y  n o t e s  t h a t  
e v e r y :  
[ c ] o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m  m u s t  a l w a y s  i n c l u d e  a n  i n - b u i l t  q u a l i t y  o f  c h a n g e ;  a n d  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  i t s e l f  b e c o m e s  n o t  m e r e l y  t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  v a l u e s  w r i t t e n  i n t o  t h e  




0 8  J e f f r e y  R e i m a n ,  ' T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  R i g h t s ,  a n d  t h e  C o n d i t i o n s  o f  L e g i m a c y '  i n  A l a n  S .  R o s e n b a u m  ( e d ) ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m :  
t h e  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  D i m e n s i o n  ( 1 9 8 8 )  1 2 7 .  
1
0 9  J a m e s  L .  S u n s q u i s t ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m  a n d  E f f e c t i v e  G o v e r n m e n t  ( 1 9 8 6 )  1 .  
1 1 0  
I b i d .  
1 1 1  
E d w a r d  M c W h i n n e y ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n - M a k i n g :  P r i n c i p l e s ,  P r o c e s s ,  P r a c t i c e s  ( 1 9 8 1 )  1 3 2 .  
1 1
2  J a m e s  A .  C u r r y ,  R i c h a r d  B .  R i l e y ,  a n d  R i c h a r d  M .  B a t t i s t o n i ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t  T h e  A m e r i c a n  E x p e r i e n c e  ( 1 9 8 9 )  
6 .  
1 1 3  M c W h i n n e y ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 1 ,  1 3 2 .  
1 1 4  F r i e d r i c h ,  a b o v e  n  8 3 ,  1 3 5 .  
1 1 5  M c W h i n n e y ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 1 ,  1 3 2 .  
2 4  
This thesis accepts that constitutional change is necessary and must be facilitated. A non-
amendable Constitution is nothing more than a fagade document. Applying this argument to 
Indonesia's situation, it was inevitable that the policy of Soeharto's administration that the 1945 
Constitution was a sacred document, and therefore beyond amendment, would be rejected 
once Soeharto himself had fallen from p0wer.116 
Constitutional changes are only part of constitution-making.117 Wheeler distinguishes between a 
constitutional amendment and a constitutional revision. 118 He defines an 'amendment' as "a 
change of limited scope involving one or a limited number of provisions of a Constitution"; and 
a 'revision' as a "reconsideration of the whole or a major portion of the Constitution" .119 Venter 
rejects this division and argues that constitution-making covers both the amendment and the 
revision.12o 
According to Bonime-Bianc, constitution-making is a "policy-making process" in which political 
elites determine the limitations of the government's powers and the rights and duties of 
citizens. 121 Gabriel L. Negretto defines constitution-making as: 
... a temporary limited process in which a group of political actors engage in the drafting, 
discussion and approval of a written document that intends to regulate the machinery of 
government, the relation between individuals and public authorities, states of exception 
and amendment procedure.122 
For Daniel J. Elazar constitution-making is a "pre-eminently political act" because our 
conception of constitutions depends on "the relationship between the contents of the 
constitutional document and the fundamental character or form of the polity it is designed to 
serve" ,123 Bonime-Bianc argues that, at its best, constitution-making is an extensive effort at 
116 This Soeharto's policy will be elaborated in Chapter Ill. 
117Venter, above n 70, 19. 
118 Wheeler, above n 104, 50. 
119 1bid. 
120 Venter, above n 70, 19. 
121 Bonime-Bianc, above n 64, 13. 
122 Gabriel L. Negretto, 'Constitution-Making and Institutional Design: The Reform of Presidentialism in the Argentine 
Constitution of 1994' (Paper presented at the meeting of the Latin American Studies Associations, The House Hilton Hotel, 
Chicago, Illinois, 24- 26 September 1998) 3. 
123 Daniel J. Elazar, 'The Pre-eminently Political Act' in Keith G. Banting & Richard Simeon (eds), The Politics of Constitutional 
Change in Industrial Nations: Redesigning the states (1986) 232, 248. 
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s o c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  p r o b l e m  s o l v i n g .
1 2 4  
T h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  f a v o r s  t h e  e l i t e  a n d  i g n o r e s  t h e  
r o l e  o f  t h e  p e o p l e .  H a v i n g  a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h a t  p o l i c y - m a k i n g  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  r i g h t s  a n d  d u t i e s  o f  
p e o p l e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  p o w e r s  o f  a  g o v e r n m e n t ,  B o n i m e - B i a n c  s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  m o r e  p l a c e  f o r  
p u b l i c  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  
I n d e e d ,  B o n i m e - B i a n c  i d e n t i f i e s  t h a t ,  " t w o  m a j o r  c l u s t e r s  o f  d e c i s i o n s "  s h o u l d  b e  a d d r e s s e d  i n  
t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g :  t h e  " p o l i t i c a l  f o r m u l a "  a n d  t h e  " s o c i o g o v e r n m e n t a l  
f o r m u l a " . 1 2 s  T h e  ' p o l i t i c a l  f o r m u l a '  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  s h a p e ,  l i m i t s  a n d  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
w h i l e  ' s o c i o g o v e r n m e n t a l  f o r m u l a '  c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  
s o c i e t y .
1
2 6  T h e  s o c i o g o v e r n m e n t a l  f o r m u l a  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a n y  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  
w i d e l y  i n c l u d e  t h e  p e o p l e  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o p e r l y  c o v e r  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  
i n d i v i d u a l s .  T h i s  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  t h e  p e o p l e  s h o u l d  h a v e  l e s s  c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
f o r m u l a .  B o t h  f o r m u l a e  a r e  i n t i m a t e l y  r e l a t e d .  
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  m e t h o d  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g ,  R o s e n  a r g u e s  t h a t  i t  c a n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  
t h e  p r o g r e s s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m .
1 2 7  
T h e  f o r m  i n  w h i c h  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  i s  
a d o p t e d  m a y  r e v e a l  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  f u t u r e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  t h e  p r o c e s s  
t a k e s  p l a c e  d u r i n g  a  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a n  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r u l e . 1 2 a  
T h i s  t h e s i s  d e f i n e s  t h e  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  a s  I n d o n e s i a ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  
p r o c e s s  d u r i n g  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  S o e h a r t o ' s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r u l e .  A  d e m o c r a t i c  p r o c e s s e s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  b i r t h  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  s a f e  t h e  
I n d o n e s i a n  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  d e m o c r a c y .  T h e  c o n c e p t  o f  t r a n s i t i o n  i s  h e r e b y  e l a b o r a t e d .  
3 .  T r a n s i t i o n s  f r o m  A u t h o r i t a r i a n  R u l e  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  S a m u e l  P .  H u n t i n g t o n ,  s p e c i f i c  f o r m s  o f  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e s  a r e  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  
" o n e - p a r t y  s y s t e m s ,  t o t a l i t a r i a n  s y s t e m ,  p e r s o n a l  d i c t a t o r s h i p s ,  m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e s ,  a n d  t h e  l i k e " .
1 2 9  
1
2 4  B o n i m e - B i a n c ,  a b o v e  n  6 4 ,  1 3 .  
1 2 5 1 b i d  1 3 - 1 4 .  
1 2 6 1 b i d .  
1
2 7  R i c h a r d  A  R o s e n ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  P r o c e s s ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m ,  a n d  t h e  E r i t r e a n  E x p e r i e n c e '  ( 1 9 9 9 )  2 4  N o r t h  C a r o l i n a  
J o u r n a l  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  &  C o m m e r c i a l  R e g u l a t i o n  2 7 6 - 2 7 7 .  
1 2 8  B o n i m e - B i a n c ,  a b o v e  n  6 4 ,  5 - 9 .  
1
2 9  S a m u e l  P .  H u n t i n g t o n ,  T h e  T h i r d  W a v e  D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n  i n  t h e  L a t e  T w e n t i e t h  C e n t u r y ( 1 9 9 1 )  1 3 .  
2 6  
In defining 'transition', Bonime-Bianc refers to a period of reform from authoritarian to 
democratic forms of government.t30 An authoritarian regime has been defined by Juan J. Linz 
as a political system with: 
... limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but 
with distinctive mentalities); without intensive or extensive political mobilization ... and in 
which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined 
limits but actually quite predictable ones.131 
By contrast to Linz's definition of an authoritarian regime, Bonime-Bianc argues that democratic 
regimes are: 
.. . political systems with mostly unrestricted and responsible political pluralism; with a 
variety of political ideologies and mentalities; with some political mobilization and 
participation possible through political parties; and in which a leader(s) exercises power 
within formally well defined limits (constitutional ones) that are normally quite 
predictable. 132 
Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter argue, however, that transitions which start 
from definite authoritarian regimes do not always end with democratic governments. 133 Instead, 
the transition may go toward an indefinite "something else", including, for example, the 
restoration of a new, and more likely harsher, type of authoritarian regime. 134 
Bonime-Bianc argues that four developments are required to ensure that the democratic 
government is the end-point of a transition: first, pluralization and mobilization of society from 
below; second, the liberalization of socioeconomic policies; third, the constitutionalization of 
political activity; and fourth, the liberalization and possible democratization of the 
bureaucracy. 135 These developments reflect Bonime-Bianc's view that transition is an 
evolutionary process. 136 It is not a "revolutionary transformation" 137 or the change of government 
130 Bonime-Bianc, above n 64, 5-6. 
131 Juan J. Linz, 'An Authoritarian Regime: Spain' in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (eds), Mass Politics (1970) 255. 
132 Bonime-Bianc, above n 64, 8. 
133 Guillermo O'Donnel and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies' in Guillermo O'Donnel, 
Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospect for Democracy (1986) 3. 
134 1bid. 
135 Bonime-Bianc, above n 64, 6- 8. 
136 1bid. 
137 1bid 8. 
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w i t h i n  t h e  s a m e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .
1 3 8  
T h i s  i s  a  n a r r o w e r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t r a n s i t i o n .  I n  w i d e r  
s e n s e ,  t r a n s i t i o n  m a y  h a p p e n  t h r o u g h  r e v o l u t i o n ,  c i v i l  w a r  o r  c o u p  d ' e t a t .
1
3 9  
E v o l u t i o n a r y  a n d  R e v o l u t i o n a r y  T r a n s i t i o n .  R a l f  D a h r e n d o r f  s h a r e s  B o n i m e - B i a n c ' s  i d e a  o f  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  t r a n s i t i o n .  H e  a r g u e s  t h a t  t r a n s i t i o n s  a r e :  
. . .  t h e  c o n t r o l l e d  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  i l l i b e r a l  s t a t e s  i n t o  l i b e r a l  o n e s .  T r a n s i t i o n s  . . .  m a y  b e  a  
r e s p o n s e  t o  m o r e  o r  l e s s  p o p u l a r  p r e s s u r e ,  b u t  t h e y  a r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  
t h e  d a y .  S u c h  g o v e r n m e n t s  g e n e r a l l y  u n d e r g o  g r e a t  c h a n g e s  a s  t r a n s i t i o n s  c o n t i n u e .  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t r a n s i t i o n s  m a y  b e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y ,  t h e  t h r e a d  o f  c o n t i n u i t y  n e v e r  i s  
b r o k e n  c o m p l e t e l y . 1 4 o  
I n  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  b e t w e e n  t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n  a n d  r e v o l u t i o n ,  t h e  l e g a l  c o n t i n u i t y  t h e o r y  o f  H a n s  
K e l s e n  i s  r e l e v a n t .  F o r  h i m ,  a  r e v o l u t i o n  i n  t h e  m o s t  g e n e r a l  s e n s e :  
. . .  o c c u r s  w h e n e v e r  t h e  l e g a l  o r d e r  o f  c o m m u n i t y  i s  n u l l i f i e d  a n d  r e p l a c e d  b y  a  n e w  o r d e r  
i n  a n  i l l e g i t i m a t e  w a y ,  t h a t  i s ,  i n  a  w a y  n o t  p r e s c r i b e d  b y  t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  i t s e l f . 1 4 1  
K e l s e n  d e s c r i b e s  a  p a r t i c u l a r  t e s t  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h i s  c o n t i n u i t y :  i f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  c h a n g e d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  i t s  o w n  p r o v i s i o n s ,  t h e n  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  i t s  l e g a l  o r d e r  r e m a i n  t h e  s a m e .
1 4 2  
I t  d o e s  
n o t  m a t t e r  h o w  f u n d a m e n t a l  t h e  c h a n g e s  i n  s u b s t a n c e  a r e .  I f  t h e y  a r e  p e r f o r m e d  i n  c o n f o r m i t y  
w i t h  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  l e g a l  s y s t e m  w i l l  n o t  b e  i n t e r r u p t e d . 1 4
3  
P e t e r  P a c z o l a y ,  a l t h o u g h  u s i n g  t h e  p h r a s e  " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e v o l u t i o n " ,  s u p p o r t s  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  t r a n s i t i o n  o f  B o n i m e - B i a n c .
1 4 4  
R e f e r r i n g  t o  H u n g a r i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  a t  t h e  
e n d  o f  1 9 8 0 s ,  P a c z o l a y  a r g u e s  t h a t  " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e v o l u t i o n "  m e a n s  a  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  t h e  
s u p e r i o r i t y  o f  l a w ,  i n s t e a d  o f  p o w e r  a n d  f o r c e .
1 4
s  I n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  a n  e f f o r t  w a s  m a d e  t o  e n s u r e  
t h a t  t r a n s i t i o n s  " w e r e  n o t  o n l y  l e g a l l y  p r e p a r e d ,  b u t  w e r e  a l s o  b a s e d  o n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  




1 b i d .  
1 3 9
1 b i d  5 .  
1 4 0  R a l f  D a h r e n d o r f ,  ' T r a n s i t i o n s :  P o l i t i c s ,  E c o n o m i c s ,  a n d  L i b e r t y '  ( 1 9 9 0 )  1 3  W a s h i n g t o n  Q u a r t e r l y  1 3 4 .  
1 4 1  K e l s e n ,  a b o v e  n  8 7 ,  1 1 7 .  
1
4
2 1 b i d  1 1 7 - 1 1 9 .  
1 4 3 1 b i d .  
1 4 4  P e t e r  P a c z o l a y ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  T r a n s i t i o n  a n d  L e g a l  C o n t i n u i t y '  ( 1 9 9 3 )  8  C o n n e c t i c u t  J o u r n a l  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  5 6 0 .  
1 4 5
1 b i d .  
1
4
6 1 b i d  5 6 2 .  
2 8  
I need to discuss the evolutionary and revolutionary concepts of transitions because, during the 
1999-2002 constitution-making, one of the huge debates was whether a constitutional 
revolution was needed to renew the 1945 Constitution or a constitutional evolution through 
amendments was enough to reform the Constitution. I will further elaborate the debates on this 
issue in Chapters Four to Eight. In doing so, however, it is important to understand that this 
thesis focuses merely on the third stage of Bonime-Bianc's analysis, namely, the democratic 
"reordering and restructuring of political rules and institutions" .147 Finally, this thesis defines 
'democratic constitution-making in transition' as the policy making process in which new written 
provisions are given formal constitutional status in a democratic way during a transitional 
period. 
B. The Key Features of Constitution-Making 
This section elaborates four aspects of the process of constitution-making: (i) when it should 
occur; (ii) how the constitution-making should be conducted; (iii) who should be the 
constitution-making body; and (iv) how should public participation be organized. There is also 
the fifth aspect of what the Constitution should contain, but this aspect will be dealt with in 
Section C of this Chapter on the elements of a democratic Constitution. 
One may argue that the third and fourth aspects on the constitution-making body and public 
participation should be inserted in the second aspect of how the constitution-making should be 
conducted. My answer to this is that this section is structured and discussed in this way 
because it allows me to clearly and carefully evaluate the 1999-2002 constitution-making 
process in a structured and competent manner. During this process the problems of the 
constitution-making body and public participation were consistently apparent and controversial, 
and therefore, should be seriously considered on their own. 
1. When Constitution-Making should occur 
This question of when the constitution-making should occur is important as the 1999-2002 
constitution-making process was colored by the discussions of this issue. At least two problems 
147 Bonime-Bianc, above n 64, 7- 8. 
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i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  t i m i n g  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  a r o s e  i n  I n d o n e s i a :  f i r s t ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  
f r o m  S o e h a r t o ' s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e  w a s  c o n d u c i v e  t o  r e f o r m ;  a n d  s e c o n d ,  w h e t h e r  a  s p e c i f i c  
s c h e d u l e  f o r  m a k i n g  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  n e c e s s a r y .  
R o b e r t  A .  G o l d w i n  a n d  A r t  K a u f m a n  a r g u e  t h a t  m a k i n g  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  p o s s i b l e  o n l y  a t  
" c e r t a i n  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  m o m e n t s "  i n  a  n a t i o n ' s  h i s t o r y .
1 4 8  
V o n  S a v i g n y  a r g u e s  t h a t  s u c h  a  
m o m e n t  o c c u r s  w h e n  a  n a t i o n  h a s  " r e a c h e d  i t s  f u l l  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  l e g a l  m a t u r i t y " .
1 4
9  T o  c o n d u c t  a  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  b e f o r e  t h i s  m a t u r i t y  w o u l d  b e  a  " p r e m a t u r e  c o d i f i c a t i o n "  a n d  t o  d o  
s o  a f t e r w a r d s  w o u l d  b r i n g  a  c o u n t r y  i n t o  a n  " a c t  o f  f u t i l i t y "  .
1 5 0  
E l s t e r  r a i s e s  a n o t h e r  p o i n t  t h a t  
t h a t  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  i d e a l l y  s h o u l d  b e  a d o p t e d  i n  " m a x i m a l l y  c a l m  a n d  
u n d i s t u r b e d  c o n d i t i o n s "  , 1 5 1  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  M o m e n t .  I n  r e a l i t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  b o t h  S a v i g n y ' s  ' p o l i t i c a l  a n d  l e g a l  m a t u r i t y '  
r e q u i r e m e n t  a n d  E l s t e r ' s  ' c a l m  a n d  u n d i s t u r b e d  c o n d i t i o n s '  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e a c h .  P a c z o l a y  
w a r n s  " i t  i s  e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  e x c e p t i o n a l  m o m e n t s  w h e n  a  j u s t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  c a n  
b e  d r a f t e d " .
1 5 2  
I n  f a c t ,  t h e  m o m e n t u m  o f  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  o f t e n  o c c u r s  i n  a  d i f f i c u l t  
a n d  t u r b u l e n t  p e r i o d .
1 5 3  
E l s t e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  o f t e n  w r i t t e n  i n  " t i m e s  o f  c r i s e s  t h a t  
i n v i t e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  a n d  d r a m a t i c  m e a s u r e s "  .
1 5 4  
E l s t e r  i d e n t i f i e s  e i g h t  e v e n t s  w h i c h  t r i g g e r  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g :  s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s ;  r e v o l u t i o n ;  r e g i m e  c o l l a p s e ;  f e a r  o f  r e g i m e  
c o l l a p s e ;  d e f e a t  i n  w a r ;  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  a f t e r  w a r ;  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  n e w  s t a t e ;  a n d  l i b e r a t i o n  f r o m  
c o l o n i a l  r u l e .
1 5 5  
T a k i n g  t h e  s a m e  v i e w ,  M c W h i n n e y  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  s u c c e s s f u l  a c t s  o f  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  c o d i f i c a t i o n  a l m o s t  c o n s i s t e n t l y  h a p p e n  i n ,  o r  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r ,  s u c h  d i f f i c u l t  
p e r i o d s ;  o r  a f t e r  p e r i o d s  o f  g r e a t  p u b l i c  e n t h u s i a s m  f o l l o w e d  b y  p u b l i c  e u p h o r i a . 1 5 6  T h e s e  a r e  
t i m e s  w h e n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d i e s  f i n d  i t  e a s i e r  t o  d i s c o v e r  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  
m o o d  a n d  t o  t r a n s f o r m  i t  i n t o  t e c h n i c a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t e x t .  
1 4
8  R o b e r t  A .  G o l d w i n  a n d  A r t  K a u f m a n  ( e d s ) ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n  M a k e r s  a n d  C o n s t i t u t i o n  M a k i n g :  T h e  E x p e r i e n c e  o f  E i g h t  N a t i o n s  
( 1 9 8 8 )  1 .  
1 4 9  M c W h i n n e y ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 1 ,  1 5 .  
1 5 0  
I b i d .  
1 5 1  E l s t e r ,  a b o v e  n  6 9 ,  3 9 4 .  
1 5 2  P a c z o l a y ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 4 ,  3 0 .  
1
5 3  V e r n o n  B o g d a n  o r ,  ' C o n c l u s i o n '  i n  V e r n o n  B o g d a n o r  ( e d . ) ,  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  D e m o c r a t i c  P o l i t i c s  ( 1 9 8 8 )  3 8 0 .  
1 5 4  E l s t e r ,  a b o v e  n  6 9 ,  3 4 7 .  
1 5 5 1 b i d  3 7 0 - 3 7 1 .  
1 5 6  M c W h i n n e y ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 1 ,  1 5 .  
3 0  
For Bogdanor, political turmoil is necessary for reforming a Constitution, because the turmoil: 
... comes to be pressure for constitutional change when the Constitution of a country to be 
ceases to be congruent with changing social values and political tendencies; ... in these 
circumstances, political parties will be able, with some degree of success, to adopt the 
reform of the Constitution into their programmes.157 
Holding the same opinion as Bogdanor, Wheare argues that the feasibility of constitutional 
reform depends not only on the legal provisions that stipulate the method of change, but also 
the configuration of political and social groups. 158 As long as these groups are satisfied with the 
performance of the Constitution, constitutional reform will be unlikely. 159 Consequently, in a 
political turmoil situation, when the configuration of politics usually changes dramatically, the 
possibility of constitutional reform is greater. 
For Huntington, crises are the perfect time to stimulate a wave of democratization. This wave is 
a transition from totalitarian to democratic regimes which happens within a specified period of 
time. 160 According to Huntington, there are three waves of democratization which have occurred 
in the modern world. 161 The first wave, from 1828 to 1926, was started by the American and 
French revolutions. The second wave, from 1943 to 1962, occurred after World War II. Whilst, 
the third wave had its roots in the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 197 4. Within fifteen 
years, approximately thirty other countries throughout Europe, Asia and Latin America had 
followed Portugal in replacing a dictatorial regime with a democratic one.162 
Corresponding to the time periods specified in Huntington's 'wave of democratization', Elster 
identifies seven waves of constitution-making in modern political history. 163 The first wave 
occurred during 1780-1791, when the United States, France and Poland wrote their 
constitutions. The second took place during a period of revolution in Europe in 1848. The third 
wave began after the First World War. The fourth occurred subsequent to the Second World 
War. The fifth wave occurred in relation to the de-colonization process, mainly in the British and 
157 Bogdanor, above n 153, 381. 
158 Wheare, above n 75, 23. 
159 1bid. 
160 Huntington, above n 129, 15; Klaus von Beyme, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe (1996) 1 - 5. With quite 
similar analyses, Beyme counted differently and came up with the 'fourth wave of democratization'. 
161 Huntington, above n 129, 13- 26. 
162 1bid. 
163 Elster, above n 69, 368. 
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F r e n c h  c o l o n i e s  i n  t h e  1 9 4 0 s  a n d  t h e  1 9 6 0 s .  T h e  s i x t h  t o o k  p l a c e  a f t e r  t h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  
d i c t a t o r s h i p s  i n  E u r o p e  i n  t h e  m i d d l e  o f  t h e  1 9 7 0 s .  T h e  l a s t  w a v e  t o o k  p l a c e  w h e n  f o r m e r  
c o m m u n i s t  c o u n t r i e s  i n  E a s t e r n  a n d  C e n t r a l  E u r o p e  i m p l e m e n t e d  n e w  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a f t e r  t h e  
c o l l a p s e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  e m p i r e  i n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 8 0 s . 1 6 4  
B u i l d i n g  o n  t h e  E l s t e r ' s  a n a l y s i s ,  I  w o u l d  a r g u e  t h a t  f r o m  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  t o  e a r l y  t w e n t y  f i r s t  c e n t u r y ,  
t h e  e i g h t h  w a v e s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  t o o k  p l a c e .  P o i n t i n g  t o  d o c u m e n t a t i o n  o n  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  W u e r z b u r g ' s  w e b s i t e ,
1 6 5  
S a u n d e r s  h a s  c o u n t e d  m o r e  t h a n  s i x t y  n e w  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  h a v e  
b e e n  b r o u g h t  i n t o  e f f e c t  w i t h i n  t h e  l a s t  t w o  d e c a d e s . 1
6 6  
T h e  s i t e  a l s o  s h o w s  t h a t ,  o v e r  t h e  s a m e  
p e r i o d ,  m o r e  t h a n  t w e n t y - s i x  o t h e r  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a l t e r e d .
1 6 7  
T h i s  g r o u p  
o f  s i x t y  i n c l u d e  S o u t h  A f r i c a  a f t e r  t h e  a p a r t h e i d  r e g i m e ;  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  a f t e r  F e r d i n a n d  M a r c o s ;  
a n d  N i g e r i a  a n d  T h a i l a n d  a f t e r  t h e  f a l l  o f  m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e s  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s .  T h e  I n d o n e s i a n  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  o f  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2 ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  f o c u s  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  s h o u l d  b e  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h i s  l a s t  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  w a v e .  
S h o r t  P e r i o d .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  e u p h o r i c  a t m o s p h e r e  c o n d u c i v e  t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  
p r o c e s s  u s u a l l y  l a s t s  o n l y  a  s h o r t  t i m e .
1
6 8  T h e  a r t  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  i s  t o  p r o f i t  f r o m  s u c h  
b r i e f  p e r i o d s .  T o  d e l a y  c o m m e n c i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  t o o  l o n g  i s  t o  r i s k  l o s i n g  b o t h  t h e  s t i m u l u s  f o r  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  a n d  a l s o  s t r o n g  p o p u l a r  s u p p o r t  f o r  a  p e o p l e ' s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t o  e n a b l e  a  
" b r e a k  w i t h  a  d a r k  p a s t  a n d  b r i d g e  t o  a  p r o m i s i n g  f u t u r e "  . 1 6 9  
T h a i l a n d  h a s  f a c e d  t h i s  d i l e m m a .  T h e r e  w a s  a  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  1 9 9 6 - 1 9 9 7  w a s  t h e  r i g h t  
t i m e  f o r  c o n d u c t i n g  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  o r  w h e t h e r  t h e  e n o r m o u s  e f f o r t s  i n v o l v e d  w o u l d  n o t  
h a v e  b e e n  b e t t e r  d i r e c t e d  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s .
1 7
o  T h a i l a n d ' s  a n s w e r  w a s  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
a n d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e s  w e r e  " i n e x t r i c a b l y  l i n k e d "  i n  a d d r e s s i n g  t h e  i s s u e  o f  g o o d  
g o v e r n a n c e .
1 7 1  
P r u d h i s a n  J u m b a l a  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  m a d e  t h e  p a t h  o f  T h a i  
1
6 4  I b i d  3 6 8 - 3 6 9 .  
1 6 5  
< h t t p : / / w w w . u n i - w u e r z b u r q . d e / l a w l i n d e x . h t m l > .  T h i s  w e b s i t e  h o w e v e r  h a s  n o t  b e e n  a c c e s s i b l e  a n y m o r e .  T h e  o t h e r  w e b s i t e  
w h i c h  c o n t a i n s  a l m o s t  s i m i l a r  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  < h t t p : / / w w w . o e f r e . u n i b e . c h / l a w / i c l l >  a c c e s s e d  o n  5  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 4 .  
1 6 6  
C h e r y l  S a u n d e r s ,  ' W o m e n  a n d  C o n s t i t u t i o n  M a k i n g '  ( P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  " W o m e n  P e a c e  
B u i l d i n g  a n d  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g " ) ,  C o l u m b o ,  S r i  L a n k a  2 - 6  M a y  2 0 0 2  1 .  
1 6 7
1 b i d  2 0 .  
1 6 8  M c W h i n n e y ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 1 ,  1 6 .  
1 6 9
1 b i d  4 2 .  
1 7 0  H a r d i n g ,  a b o v e  n  6 8 ,  2 3 9 .  
1 7 1
1 b i d .  
3 2  
constitutional reform much easier than was ever expected.m In fact, according to Harding, 
Chuan Leekpai's administration (1996-2001) successfully handled both the economic and 
governance problems. 173 Although Leekpai lost office after the January 2001 election, the 
constitutional reforms delivered under his administration will be noted in history as having been 
the "progenitor of fundamental reforms" in Thailand.t74 
Although constitution-making in transition is a difficult task, a country usually has no choice but 
to perform it. Per Strand argues that in "Transitions to democracy imply by definition an 
element of constitutional reform". 17Sin the same way, Paczolay argues that: 
... drafting and adopting a new Constitution for a society entering a new period of 
existence is grueling but as the same time it is also a solemn and exceptional task. 176 
In this problematic relationship between a transitional period and constitution-making, Elster 
identifies two basic paradoxes. First, constitution-making generally comes out in conditions that 
are likely to work against a constructive constitution-making process. 177 Second, important and 
substantial constitution-making is unlikely to happen except when a crisis is impending.178 This 
paradox may be a blessing in disguise. The difficult circumstances during a transition period 
may create a critical situation allowing for different elements in a country to unite and address 
its problems, including making a better governance system through constitutional reform. As 
Peter H. Russell states, "a country must have a sense that its back is to the wall for its leaders 
and its people to have the will to accommodate their differences".179 
Specific Time Schedule. In regulating the time for making the Constitution, one should 
consider that it should not be too long or too short. Too long a period of constitution-making 
adds to much uncertainty to the transition from authoritarian rule. Too long a period also 
increases the possibility of a country losing the constitutional 'moment' to make a democratic 
172 Prudhisan Jumbala, 'Thailand: Constitutional Reform Amidst Economic Crisis' in Derek da Cunha and John Funston (eds), 
Southeast Asian Affairs 1998 (1998) 207, 289. See also Suchitra Punyaratabandhu, 'Thailand in 1997: Financial Crisis and 
Constitutional Reform' (1998) XXXVIII:2 Asian Survey 161, 165. 
173 Harding, above n 68, 239. 
174 1bid. 
175 Strand, above n 65, 54. 
176Paczolay, above n 144,21. 
177 Elster, above n 69, 394. 
178 1bid. 
179 Peter H. Russel, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? (2"d Ed, 1993) 106. 
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C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  t r a n s i t i o n ,  a  m o m e n t  w h i c h  u s u a l l y  h a p p e n s  w i t h i n  a  v e r y  s h o r t  t i m e  p e r i o d .
1
8 °  
"  
H o w e v e r ,  t o o  s h o r t  a  p e r i o d  f o r  m a k i n g  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  n o t  w i s e  e i t h e r .  T h e  t i m e  a l l o c a t e d  f o r  
m a k i n g  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  f l e x i b l e  t o  a l l o w  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  t o  c o n d u c t  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  a m o n g  t h e  f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  b o d y  a n d  h o l d  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  p u b l i c .  T h e r e  i s ,  
h o w e v e r ,  n o  e x a c t  f o r m u l a  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  d u r a t i o n  o f  s u c h  p r o c e s s e s .  T h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s  s h o w s  t h e  v a r i e t y  o f  s u c h  s c h e d u l e s .  T h e  T h a i  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D r a f t i n g  
A s s e m b l y  w a s  a l l o c a t e d  2 4 0  d a y s  t o  d r a f t  t h e  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
1
8 1  w h i l e  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  




I t  i s  b e t t e r  t o  h a v e  s p e c i f i c  t i m e  a l l o c a t e d  f o r  m a k i n g  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
1
8 3  T h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i m p o r t a n t  t o  g i v e  a  c l e a r  m a n d a t e  t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y .  T h e  s p e c i f i c  t i m e  h e l p s  t h e  
b o d y  t o  a r r a n g e  i t s  p l a n .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  s p e c i f i c  t i m e  p u t s  p r e s s u r e  o n  t h e  b o d y  t o  f i n i s h  i t s  
w o r k .  I f  a  s p e c i f i c  p e r i o d  d o e s  n o t  e x i s t ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  b o d y  w i l l  k e e p  p o s t p o n i n g  i t s  w o r k  
e v e r y  t i m e  i t  f a c e s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  m a k i n g  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s .  T h e  I n d o n e s i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
r e f o r m  i n  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  e x p e r i e n c e d  e x a c t l y  t h i s  p r o b l e m .
1 8 4  
T h e r e f o r e ,  A r a t o  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y ,  " s h o u l d  w o r k  w i t h  a  t i m e  l i m i t ,  s o  t h a t  n o  g r o u p  c a n  u s e  d e l a y i n g  
t a c t i c s  t o  g e t  i t s  w a y "  . 1 8 5  
A  ' b e t t e r '  s y s t e m  n e e d s  a  ' b e t t e r '  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o r ,  i n  t h e  w o r d s  o f  H o w a r d ,  " n e w  t i m e s  r e q u i r e  
n e w  c o n s t i t u t i o n s "  .
1 8 6  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d i e s  h a v e  t o  u t i l i z e  t h e  e u p h o r i c  a t m o s p h e r e  
f o l l o w i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  t r a n s i t i o n .  T h e  d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o n  h a s  t o  b e  s e e n  b y  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  
b o d i e s  a s  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  a n d  c h a l l e n g e .  I n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  c h o o s i n g  t h e  c o r r e c t  c o n s t i t u t i o n -
m a k i n g  b o d y  i s  o n e  o f  t h e  k e y s  o f  s u c c e s s .  S e c t i o n  3  o n  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  
t h i s  i s s u e  i n  m o r e  d e t a i l .  
1
8 0 M c W h i n n e y ,  a b o v e n  1 1 1 , 1 6 .  
1 8 1  A r t i c l e  2 1 1  o f  t h e  1 9 9 1  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
1
8 2 S e c t i o n  7 3  S u b s e c t i o n  ( 1 )  o f  t h e  I n t e r i m  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
1 8 3  
D e n n y  l n d r a y a n a ,  ' P r o s e s  R e f o r m a s i  K o n s t i t u s i  T r a n s i s i  ( P e n g a l a m a n  I n d o n e s i a  d a n  P e r b a n d i n g a n n y a  d e n g a n  A f r i k a  
S e l a t a n  d a n  T h a i l a n d ) ' ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  7 : 2  K a j i a n  8 3 ,  9 0 .  
1 8 4  C h a p t e r s  F i v e  a n d  S i x  w i l l  e l a b o r a t e  o n  t h i s  i s s u e .  
1 8 5  E l s t e r ,  a b o v e  n  6 9 ,  3 9 5 .  
1 8 6  H o w a r d ,  a b o v e  n  6 7 ,  9 .  
3 4  
Meanwhile, to utilize the transitional constitutional moment to make a Constitution, a 
democratic constitution-making process should be carried out. The following section will 
discuss this issue. 
2. How a Democratic Constitution-Making Process should be conducted 
In this section, I will discuss two things: first, the importance of the process and; second, the 
stages of a constitution-making process. 
a. Does Process Matter? 
This section argues that the process undertaken for constitution-making does matter. Vivien 
Hart argues that: 
[h]ow Constitution is made, as well as what it says, matters. Process has become equally 
as important as the content of the final document for the legitimacy of a new Constitution 
.. . A democratic Constitution is no longer simply one that establishes democratic 
governance. It is also a Constitution that is made in democratic process. 187 
Julius lhonvbere believes that a democratic constitution-making process is "critical to the 
strength, acceptability, and legitimacy of the final product" .188 In the same way, from the 
perspective of democratic theory, Arato is of the opinion that the kind of process that sets up 
the rules of the game for democratic politics can hardly be considered as irrelevant. 189 
Furthermore, Rosen stresses that if the basic goal of a Constitution is to create a democratic 
political system, a constitution-making process has to be "as purely democratic as possible". 190 
Nevertheless, Rosen implicitly admits that totally eliminating undemocratic elements in a 
constitution-making process is impossible. For him, there should be different treatment 
between the constitution-making process in an - already - democratic country and that in a 
country which has just started to learn how to be democratic. Rosen argues that: 
187 Vivien Hart, Democratic Constitution Making, Special Report No. 107 of United States Institutes of Peace (2003) 1, 3-4. 
188 Julius lhonvbere, 'How to Make An Undemocratic Constitution: The Nigerian Example' (2000) 21:2 Third World Quarterly 
346. 
189 Andrew Arata, 'Forms of Constitution-Making and Theories of Democracy' (1995) 17 Cardozo Law Review 191. 
190 Rosen, above n 127, 304. 
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[ i ] n  a  s o c i e t y  t h a t  a l r e a d y  o p e r a t e s  a s  a  d e m o c r a c y ,  i t  m i g h t  b e  p o s s i b l e  t o  w r i t e  a  n e w  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  w i t h o u t  v i o l a t i n g  a n y  d e m o c r a t i c  n o r m s .  H o w e v e r ,  a  s o c i e t y  i n .  w h i c h  
d e m o c r a c y  i s  t h e  u n r e a l i z e d  g o a l  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  d r a f t e r s ,  a t  s o m e  p o i n t  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  
a n  e l e m e n t  o f  n o n - d e m o c r a c y  o r  " p r e - d e m o c r a c y " ,  i s  i n e v i t a b l e .
1
9 1  
I n  s u p p o r t i n g  R o s e n ' s  o p i n i o n ,  A r a t a  e v e n  n o t e s  t h a t  t o  p r o d u c e  a  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  n o t  
o n l y  d o e s  a  c o u n t r y  n e e d  d e m o c r a t i c  p r o c e d u r e s ,  b u t  i t  s h o u l d  a l s o  p a y  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  e l e m e n t s .
1 9 2  
L o o k i n g  a t  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  F r e n c h  w h e n  m a k i n g  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  R e p u b l i c  o f  1 9 4 6 ,  A r a t a  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  i n  s p i t e  o f  i t s  " u l t r a -
d e m o c r a t i c "  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  - a s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  i n v o l v e d  t h e  
p a s s i n g  o f  t h r e e  r e f e r e n d a  - j u s t  h o w  d e m o c r a t i c  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  R e p u b l i c  w a s  i s  
s t i l l  i n  d i s p u t e .
1
9 3  T h i s  i s  d u e  t o  t h e  a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  e l e m e n t s  i m p l i e d  i n t o  t h e  F r e n c h  E l e c t i o n  
L a w  t h a t  w a s  a p p l i e d  t o  e l e c t  t h e  F r e n c h  C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m b l y .
1 9 4  
T h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  F r e n c h  h a s  p r o v e n  t h a t  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  i s  a  c o m p l i c a t e d  
i s s u e .  E v e n  ' u l t r a - d e m o c r a t i c '  p r o c e d u r e s  g i v e  n o  w a r r a n t y  t o  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  a  d e m o c r a t i c  p r o c e s s  i s  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t .  I n  
c o n t r a s t ,  t h i s  s h o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  a  c h a l l e n g e  i n  o r d e r  t o  f i n d  a  m o r e  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n -
m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  a p p r o a c h  f r o m  t h e  v e r y  b e g i n n i n g  u n t i l  t h e  e n d .  
I n  t e r m s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  i n  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r u l e ,  B o n i m e - B i a n c  a r g u e s  t h a t  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  i s  " c e n t r a l  t o  a  s u c c e s s f u l  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  d e m o c r a c y " .
1 9 5  
T h i s  c a n  
i n d i c a t e  w h e t h e r  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  d e m o c r a c y  w i l l  s u c c e e d  o r  n o t .  T h e  b a t t l e  b e t w e e n  t h e  
s u p p o r t e r s  a n d  t h e  o p p o n e n t s  o f  d e m o c r a c y  w i l l  b e  c l e a r l y  v i s i b l e  d u r i n g  t h i s  p r o c e s s .  
O b v i o u s l y ,  i f  t h e  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  d e m o c r a c y  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  a r e  s t r o n g e r  t h a n  
t h e i r  o p p o n e n t s ,  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  d e m o c r a c y  h a s  a  g r e a t e r  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  s u c c e s s .  
T h e  T y p e s  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n - M a k i n g  P r o c e s s .  A n o t h e r  a r g u m e n t  a s  t o  w h y  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n -
m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  m a t t e r s  i s  d u e  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p r o c e s s  i n f l u e n c e s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
J 9 1 1 b i d  3 0 4 - 3 0 5 .  
1 9 2  A r a t a ,  a b o v e  n  1 8 9 ,  1 9 2 .  
1 9 3 1 b i d  1 9 3 - 1 9 4 .  
1 9 4 1 b i d .  
1 9 5  B o n i m e - B i a n c ,  a b o v e  n  6 4 ,  1 3 5 .  
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outcomes.196 On this issue, Bonime-Bianc categorizes the process into three types - the 
'consensual', the 'dissensual', and the 'stillborn' .197 
The consensual process is the best form of constitution-making process of the three. This is 
because consensual constitution-making has four characteristics. First, the consensual process 
requires the participation of all -or at least most- political groups.19B Second, agreements are 
achieved by ensuring political responsibility guarding against dogmatic solution and the use of 
compromise.199 Third, this compromise frequently leads to ambiguity in the articles.200 Fourth, 
although this ambiguity often annoys one or more political groups, none of them completely 
disagree with the whole text and the majority still supports the Constitution. 201 
In the dissensual process, constitution-making is not inclusive of all political groups.202 
Dogmatic solutions are common and problems are not resolved adequately.203 Accords are 
hard to attain, and even if reached, they often involve rejection of the opinions of one or more 
major political groups.204 The dissensual Constitution most likely contains solutions palatable 
only to the dominant political groups.2os Consequently, a potential threat to the new political 
system may increase, particularly from the groups which are excluded.206 
It is also important to note that the decision-making process in the drafting period frequently 
faces obstacles. In spite of their best efforts, these obstacles may prevent the constitution-
making body from producing a final draft Constitution. This is the third type of constitution-
making: stillborn. It is a constitution-making "process that fails prior to approval and 
implementation".207 This failure occurs because the differences between political groups are too 
deep, so "that it is impossible to form a predominant coalition". 20B The main characteristic of a 
1961bid 147. 
1971bid 13 -14, 142 -144. 












s t i l l b o r n  p r o c e s s  i s  t h a t  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  n e i t h e r  m a d e ,  n o r  e v e n  i f  i t  i s  d r a f t e d ,  n a t i o n a l l y  
a p p r o v e d .
2 0 9  
F o r m u l a  f o r  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n - M a k i n g  P r o c e s s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e r e  i s  a g r e e m e n t  t h a t  p r o c e s s  d o e s  
m a t t e r ,  E l s t e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  h a s  s u c c e e d e d  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  i n  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  w a y .
2 1 0  
M c W h i n n e y  b e l i e v e s  t h a t :  
[ t ] h o s e  w h o  l o o k  f o r  g e n e r a l  r u l e s  o r  a x i o m s  a s  t o  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d r a f t i n g  w i l l  f i n d  n o n e .  
I n s t e a d ,  t h e r e  a r e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  c o n v e n t i o n s  o r  m o d e l s ,  d e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  n a t i o n a l  
l e g a l  s t y l e  o n  t h e  p r e d o m i n a n c e  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  s c h o o l s  o f  l e g a l  a n d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p h i l o s o p h y  
a t  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e  o f  d r a f t i n g . 2 t t  
L i k e w i s e ,  W h e a r e  a r g u e s  t h a t  " t h e r e  i s  a  g r e a t  v a r i e t y  i n  t h e  a m e n d i n g  p r o c e s s  p r e s c r i b e d  i n  
c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  i t  i s  n o t  e a s y  t o  f i n d  a n y  c o m m o n  p r i n c i p l e s  b e h i n d  t h e m " . 2 1 2  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  
P a c z o l a y  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  s i n g l e  u n i v e r s a l  w a y  o f  m a k i n g  c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 2
1 3  
S a u n d e r s  
a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  d i s t i n c t  a n d  s p e c i f i c  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  s u r r o u n d i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  a f f e c t  h o w  t h e  
p r o c e s s  w o u l d  b e  c a r r i e d  o u f . 2
1 4  
I n  h e r  o p i n i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  i n  
" w h a t e v e r  w a y  i s  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  f o r  w h o m  th~ s y s t e m  ' o f  g o v e r n m e n t  i s  
e s t a b l i s h e d " . 2
1 5  
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  p r o c e s s  d i f f e r s  f r o m  c o u n t r y  t o  c o u n t r y ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  A r a t a  
a r g u e s  t h a t  " o n e  e a s i l y  r u n s  i n t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  c i r c u l a r i t y  w h e n  d e m a n d i n g  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  b e  
m a d e  d e m o c r a t i c a l l y " . 2 1 6  
G e n e r a l  F o r m u l a .  W h e a r e  a r g u e s  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  t h e  m e t h o d s  a n d  p r i n c i p l e s  m a y  v a r y  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  a i m  t o  s a f e g u a r d  f o u r  o b j e c t i v e s . 2 1
7  
F i r s t ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  o n l y  w i t h  d e l i b e r a t i o n .
2 1 8  
S e c o n d ,  t h e  p e o p l e  s h o u l d  h a v e  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  
g i v e  t h e i r  o p i n i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s .
2 1 9  
T h i r d ,  i n  a  f e d e r a l  s y s t e m ,  n o  p a r t y  a c t i n g  a l o n e  s h o u l d  
2
0 9 1 b i d .  
2 1 0  E l s t e r ,  a b o v e  n  6 9 ,  3 6 4 .  
2 1 1  M c W h i n n e y ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 1 ,  5 7 .  
2 1 2 W h e a r e ,  a b o v e  n  7 5 ,  1 2 1 .  
2 1 3  P a c z o l a y ,  a b o v e  n  8 7 ,  3 0 .  
2 1 4  S a u n d e r s ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 6 ,  5 .  
2 1 5  C h e r y l  S a u n d e r s ,  / I s  Y o u r  C o n s t i t u t i o n  ( 2 n d  e d ,  2 0 0 3 )  4 .  
2 1 6  A r a t a ,  a b o v e  n  1 8 9 ,  1 9 1 .  
2 1 7 W h e a r e ,  a b o v e  n  7 5 ,  1 2 1 .  
2 1
8 1 b i d .  
2 1 9
1 b i d .  
3 8  
amend the powers of the units and of the federal government.22o Fourth, individual or 
community rights- particularly those of minorities- should be protected.221 
This thesis argues that despite there being no one formula for a democratic constitution-making 
process, the process matters. The Indonesian 1999-2002 constitution-making experience has 
shown that although the outcomes of the amendments are a more democratic Constitution, 
because the process lacked what have widely been accepted as key features of a democratic 
constitution-making process, the legitimacy of the amended 1945 Constitution was widely 
questioned. Chapters Four to Eight will further discuss this issue. 
b. Stages of Constitution-Making 
Saunders is of the opinion that the constitution-making process can be divided into three 
stages: agenda setting; development and design; and approval.222 
(1) Agenda Setting 
This stage involves the basic preparation of a constitution-making process and is critical. 223 It 
involves creating a terms of reference for the constitution-making body; developing 
constitutional principles on which the Constitution should be based; obtaining advanced 
agreement among the key figures; and deciding on an agreed approval procedure for the 
Constitution draft. 224 
Pre-Constitutional Period. In the transition from an authoritarian rule constitution-making 
process, it is advisable to begin the agenda setting with an election. This election is crucial 
because following the collapse of authoritarian regime, there are usually no legitimate bodies 
that can be trusted by the people to make a Constitution.225 Accordingly, directly following the 
breakdown of an authoritarian regime, the new temporary government should prepare a "pre-
220 Ibid 121 -122. 
221 I bid 122. 
222 Saunders, above n 166, 5-13. 
2231bid 5. 
224 1bid. 
225 1bid 6. 
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c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p e r i o d " .
2 2 6  
B o n i m e - B i a n c  d e f i n e s  t h i s  p e r i o d  a s  t h e  t i m e  a f t e r  t h e  t u r n i n g  p o i n t  
f r o m  t h e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  " r e g i m e  t o  t h e  n e w  t r a n s i t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  b e f o r e  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n -
m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  
2 2 7  
B o n i m e - B i a n c  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h r e e  c o n d i t i o n s  m u s t  d e v e l o p  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p e r i o d .
2 2
B  
O n e  o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  i s  t o  h o l d  a  n a t i o n w i d e  l e g i s l a t i v e  e l e c t i o n  p r e c e d e d  b y  l e g a l i z a t i o n  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  a n d  t h e  m a k i n g  o f  e l e c t o r a l l a w .
2 2 9  
T h e  o t h e r  t w o  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e :  ( i )  a  p r o c e s s  o f  
" s o c i o p o l i t i c a l  l e g a l i z a t i o n "  i n  w h i c h  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  c o n t r o l s  o n  b a s i c  f r e e d o m s  a r e  r e v o k e d ;  a n d  
( i i )  a  p r o c e s s  o f  " a u t h o r i t a r i a n  i l l e g a l i z a t i o n "  i n  w h i c h  c o n s t r a i n t s  a n d  p r o h i b i t i o n s  a r e  p l a c e d  o n  
t h e  m o s t  a r b i t r a r y  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  m e c h a n i s m s .
2 3 0  
I f  a n y  o f  t h e s e  p r e - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p e r i o d  
c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  m i s s i n g ,  t h e  w h o l e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  m a y  b e  j e o p a r d i z e d .
2 3 1  
A m e n d m e n t  o r  R e n e w a l .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  a g e n d a  s e t t i n g  s h o u l d  d e c i d e  w h e t h e r  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  b e  a  b r a n d  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  a m e n d m e n t s  t o  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  M o s t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r u l e  a g r e e  t o  d r a f t  a  
n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  a m e n d  t h e i r  o l d  c o n s t i t u t i o n s .  O n  t h i s  i s s u e ,  P a c z o l a y  a r g u e s  
t h a t  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w o u l d  b e  p r e f e r r e d  f o r  f o u r  r e a s o n s .
2 3 2  
F i r s t ,  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f  s t i p u l a t e s  t h e  u r g e n c y  o f  a d o p t i n g  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n . 2 3 3  S e c o n d ,  a  s t r o n g e r  




T h i r d ,  i f  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  t a k e n  b y  r e f e r e n d u m  i t  w i l l  g i v e  t h e  n e w  
d o c u m e n t  a n  u n c h a l l e n g e d  d o w n s t r e a m  l e g i t i m a c y .
2 3
5  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  c o u l d  
r e m o v e  t h e  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  o f  t h e  o l d  C o n s t i t u t i o n . 2 3 6  
T h e  T h a i  E x p e r i e n c e .  I n  T h a i l a n d ,  t h e  a g e n d a - s e t t i n g  s t a g e  b e g a n  w i t h  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  o f  
A r t i c l e  2 1 1  o f  i t s  1 9 9 1  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w h i c h  p r o v i d e s  f o r  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e d u r e .  T h e  
a m e n d e d  a r t i c l e  s t i p u l a t e d :  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D r a f t i n g  A s s e m b l y  a s  a n  
2 2 6  B o n i m e - B i a n c ,  a b o v e  n  6 4 ,  1 3 9 .  
2 2 7
1 b i d .  
2 2 8 i b i d  1 4 0 .  
2 2 9 i b i d .  
2
3 0  I b i d .  
2 3 1
i b i d .  
2 3 2  P a c z o l a y ,  a b o v e  n  8 7 ,  4 8 .  
2 3 3




i b i d .  
2 3 5
i b i d .  
4 0  
authorized institution to draft the Constitution; the selection process of the Constitutional 
Drafting Assembly membership; the approval of 240 days as the working period of the 
Constitutional Drafting Assembly; and the ratification mechanisms of the new Constitution.237 
(2) Development and Design 
At this stage, the constitution-making bodies prepare a draft Constitution. In this drafting 
period, the mechanisms of decision-making and public consultation play a crucial role. 238 Public 
consultation will be further discussed in the next part of this chapter, but the decision-making 
formula is considered in this section. 
Decision-making formula. Saunders argues that there are two main formulas for the decision-
making: majority and consensus.239 Both choices have advantages and disadvantages. Majority 
decision-making can be relatively faster in solving disagreement. However, it will be 
problematic if approval requires a special majority.24o A decision which is made in the drafting 
stage may be useless in the approval stage. Meanwhile, the consensus formula is interesting 
since it creates the potential for harmony, but tends to require more time, especially if there is a 
minority militant group opposing the majority position.241 
For Arato, consensus is preferable for making a Constitution to majority decision-making. 242 
Indeed, he argues that consensus is one of the principles of the constitution-making process 
along with publicity, legal continuity and plurality of democracies.243 Without giving special 
attention to striking a balance between consensus and the other principles, the "constitutional 
construction cannot succeed".244 
To stimulate consensus, it is crucial that the public be involved in the constitution-making 
process. This public participation opens the process to external opinion, which may help the 
236 ibid. 
237 Article 211 of the Thai Constitution of 1991. 




242 Arato, above n 189, 225-226. 
243ibid 224-228. 
244 1bid 224. 
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p o l i t i c a l  f a c t i o n s  t o  r e c o n s i d e r  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  C a s s  R .  S u n s t e i n ,  p u b l i c  
i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  p l a y s  t h e  r o l e  o f  " e x t e r n a l  s h o c k "  t o  s t o p  " p o l a r i z a t i o n  g a m e s "  , 2
4 5  
t h a t  i s ,  t h e  s h o c k  o f  e x t e r n a l  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  m a y  p r e v e n t  p o l a r i z a t i o n  a m o n g  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t i o n s ,  
w h i c h  m a y  o t h e r w i s e ,  o v e r  t i m e ,  t a k e  m o r e  e x t r e m e  p o s i t i o n s .
2 4
6  
I n  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  i n v o l v e m e n t ,  t h e  p o p u l a r  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  d r a f t i n g  p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  b e  
g r a n t e d  b e c a u s e  t h e  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  i s  a  k e y  p r i n c i p l e  i n  m a k i n g  a  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
2 4 7  
I t  
e n s u r e s  a  m o r e  o p e n  a n d  t r a n s p a r e n t  p r o c e s s .
2 4 8  
H o w e v e r ,  E l s t e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s  
s h o u l d  b e  b a l a n c e d  b e t w e e n  s e c r e c y  a n d  p u b l i c i t y .
2 4 9  
F o r  h i m ,  w i t h  " t o t a l  s e c r e c y ,  p a r t i s a n  
i n t e r e s t s  a n d  l o g r o l l i n g  c o m e  t o  f o r e f r o n t ,  w h e r e a s  f u l l  p u b l i c i t y  e n c o u r a g e s  g r a n d s t a n d i n g  a n d  
r h e t o r i c a l  o v e r b i d d i n g " .  
2 5 0  
E l s t e r  f u r t h e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e :  
. . .  s e c r e c y  o f  t h e  d e b a t e s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  t w o  c o n s e q u e n c e s .  O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  i t  w i l l  t e n d  
t o  s h i f t  t h e  c e n t e r  o f  g r a v i t y  f r o m  i m p a r t i a l  d i s c u s s i o n  t o  i n t e r e s t - b a s e d  b a r g a i n i n g  . . . .  O n  
t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  s e c r e c y  t e n d s  t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  w h a t e v e r  d i s c u s s i o n  d o e s  t a k e  
p l a c e  b e c a u s e  i t  a l l o w s  f r a m e r s  t o  c h a n g e  t h e i r  m i n d  w h e n  p e r s u a d e d  o f  t h e  t r u t h  o f  a n  
o p p o n e n t ' s  v i e w .  C o n v e r s e l y ,  w h i l e  p u b l i c  d e b a t e  d r i v e s  o u t  a n y  a p p e a r a n c e  o r  
b a r g a i n i n g ,  i t  a l s o  e n c o u r a g e s  s t u b b o r n n e s s ,  o v e r b i d d i n g ,  a n d  g r a n d s t a n d i n g  i n  w a y s  t h a t  
a r e  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  g e n u i n e  d i s c u s s i o n . 2 5 1  
( 3 )  A p p r o v a l  
A p p r o v a l  i s  t h e  l a s t  s t e p  i n  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  I t s  o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  g i v e  " l e g a l  e f f e c t "  t o  
a  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
2 5 2  
I t  i s  c r u c i a l  t o  s e l e c t  a n  e f f e c t i v e  a p p r o v a l  p r o c e d u r e ,  b e c a u s e  i t  w i l l  i n f l u e n c e  
t h e  d o w n s t r e a m  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
2
5 3  H o w e v e r ,  S a u n d e r s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  
s p e c i f i c  f o r m  o f  a p p r o v a l .
2 5 4  
R a t h e r ,  a p p r o v a l  w i l l  v a r y  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  
c o n d i t i o n s .  2 5 5  
2 4
5  C a s s  R .  S u n s t e i n ,  D e s i g n i n g  D e m o c r a c y :  W h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  D o  ( 2 0 0 1 )  3 0 .  
2 4 6
1 b i d .  
2 4 7  
C o m m o n w e a l t h  H u m a n  R i g h t s  I n i t i a t i v e s ,  P r o m o t i n g  a  C u l t u r e  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  a n d  D e m o c r a c y  i n  C o m m o n w e a l t h  
A f r i c a ,  b a c k g r o u n d  p a p e r  t o  a c c o m p a n y  C H R I ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  C o m m o n w e a l t h  H e a l t h  o f  G o v e r n m e n t  M e e t i n g  1 9 9 9  
( 1 9 9 9 )  1 3 .  
2
4
8 1 b i d  1 2 - 1 3 .  
2 4 9  E l s t e r ,  a b o v e  n  6 9 ,  3 9 5 .  
2 5 0  
I b i d .  
2 5
1  
I b i d  3 8 8 .  
2 5 2  S a u n d e r s ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 6 ,  1 2 .  
2 5 3
1 b i d .  
2 5 4
1 b i d .  
4 2  
An adequate approval procedure should provide various and anticipatory alternatives to avoid a 
deadlock which could lead to a constitutional crisis. This kind of crisis is dangerous, particularly 
when it occurs during the transition from authoritarian rule. The fragile conditions of transition 
will not be strong enough to cope with a systemic crisis. 
Approval by the people in a referendum is one way of ratifying a Constitution, in addition to 
ratification by a representative body.256 Saunders argues that the referendum "has symbolic 
significance and is likely to give a greater sense of ownership to the people at large".257 For 
Paczolay, the "ratification of a Constitution by popular vote would give it unchallenged 
legitimacy".258 Nevertheless, he further argues that a referendum is only appropriate in cases 
where there is the ratification of a new Constitution. However, in the case of a minor 
amendment, approval by parliament would usually suffice.259ln addition, Saunders warns that a 
referendum without adequate public participation is "an empty gesture".26o 
The South African Experience. In South Africa, the approval step was provided in article 73 
of the Interim Constitution, which contained rules about "adoption of new constitutional 
context". It adequately anticipated the potential-deadlock by preparing various and anticipatory 
approval methods. It provided that the constitutional draft prepared by the constitutional 
Assembly should at first gain approval of a majority of at least two-thirds of all its members. In 
case this could not be achieved, there was a second method: inviting opinions from a panel of 
constitutional experts before the Constitutional Assembly to make a decision. If this failed also, 
the third approval procedure would be applied, that is an approval of 60% of votes cast at a 
national referendum {after approval from the Constitutional Court agreeing that the draft was 
consistent with the principles of the Constitution). If this support could not be achieved in the 
referendum, there was the fourth approval attempt: a general election would be held to form a 
new Constitutional Assembly. The new Assembly would then have the task of approving the 
Constitution. 261 
255 1bid. 
256 1bid 12. 
257 1bid. 
258 Paczolay, above n 87, 48. 
259 Paczolay, above n 144, 568. 
260 Saunders, above n 166, 12. 
261 Article 73 of the Interim Constitution 
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I n  r e a l i t y ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  s u c c e e d e d  i n  a p p r o v i n g  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d r a f t i n g  u s i n g  
o n l y  t h e  f i r s t  m e t h o d  f o r  t w o  i m p o r t a n t  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  S o u t h  A f r i c a  h a d  e n c o u r a g e d  a c t i v e  
p o p u l a r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  h a d  l e d  t o  p o p u l a r  d e  f a c t o  
a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d r a f t .
2 6 2  
J e r e m y  S a r k i n  f e e l s  t h a t  t h e :  
. . .  d e a d l o c k  m e c h a n i s m s  . . .  w e r e  p o w e r f u l  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  r e a c h i n g  a g r e e m e n t  . . .  i t  i s  
e q u a l l y  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  r e f l e c t s  t o  a  l a r g e  d e g r e e  a n  a u t h e n t i c  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  
p r o c e s s .
2 6 3  
·  
T h e  s e c o n d  f a c t o r  w a s  a  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  w h i c h  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  
a g e n d a .  T h e  A f r i c a n  N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  P a r t y ,  c h a i r e d  b y  N e l s o n  M a n d e l a ,  o b t a i n e d  6 2 %  o f  
s e a t s  i n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y .
2 6 4  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h i s  r e f o r m i s t  p a r t y  - w h i c h  s t r o n g l y  
s u p p o r t e d  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  e f f o r t  - n e e d e d  o n l y  a  l i t t l e  m o r e  s u p p o r t  f r o m  
o t h e r  p a r t i e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  t w o - t h i r d  o f  v o t e s  n e e d e d  t o  a p p r o v e  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
T h e  T h a i  E x p e r i e n c e .  T h a i l a n d  h a s  e m p l o y e d  a  s i m i l a r  m e t h o d  t o  S o u t h  A f r i c a  f o r  a p p r o v i n g  
i t s  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  d r a f t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  h a d  t o  b e  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  f o r  a p p r o v a l .  I f  
m o r e  t h a n  h a l f  o f  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  m e m b e r s  a g r e e d ,  t h e  d r a f t  w o u l d  b e  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  K i n g  f o r  
r a t i f i c a t i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  i f  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  d i s a g r e e d ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  s e c o n d  m e c h a n i s m :  a  
r e f e r e n d u m .  2
6 5  
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a s  w a s  t h e  c a s e  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  T h a i l a n d  r a t i f i e d  t h e  d r a f t  s u c c e s s f u l l y ,  w i t h o u t  
n e e d i n g  t o  i n v o k e  t h e  d e a d l o c k  m e c h a n i s m .  T h e  d r a f t  p r e p a r e d  b y  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D r a f t i n g  
A s s e m b l y  h a d  b e e n  w e l l  e x p l a i n e d  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  a n d  w a s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  w e l l - s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  a n d  w a s  e v e n t u a l l y  r a t i f i e d  b y  t h e  T h a i  P a r l i a m e n t .  
3 .  W h o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  s h o u l d  b e  
T h i s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  a n a l y z e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d i e s  f r o m  t h r e e  p e r s p e c t i v e s :  i t s  l e g i t i m a c y ,  i t s  
i n t e r e s t s  a n d  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  S o u t h  A f r i c a  a n d  T h a i l a n d .  T h e  
2 6 2  F u r t h e r  e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a  w i l l  b e  i n  S e c t i o n  8 . 4 .  o n  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
2 6 3  J e r e m y  S a r k i n ,  ' T h e  D r a f t i n g  o f  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  F i n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  f r o m  a  H u m a n  R i g h t s  P e r s p e c t i v e '  ( 1 9 9 9 )  4 7  A m e r i c a n  
J o u r n a l  o f  C o m p a r a t i v e  L a w  8 6 .  
2 6 4  K a t h a r i n e  S a v a g e ,  ' N e g o t i a t i n g  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n :  A n  O v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  K e y  P l a y e r s  a n d  t h e  N e g o t i a t i o n  
P r o c e s s ' ,  P e n e l o p e  A n d r e w s  a n d  S t e p h e n  E l l m a n  ( e d s ) ,  P o s t - A p a r t h e i d  c o n s t i t u t i o n s :  P e r s p e c t i v e s  o n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  B a s i c  
L a w ( 2 0 0 1 )  1 6 4 .  
4 4  
legitimacy and interests are selected because the MPR had these two issues during the 1999-
2002 constitution-making process. Choosing an appropriate constitution-making body is crucial 
toward creating a democratic Constitution. The choice will affect whether the outcome of the 
constitution-making process is accepted and perceived as legitimate. Carl Schmitt, quoted by 
Renata Cristi, argues that a Constitution is legitimate "when the power and authority of its 
constituent power on whose decision it rests, is recognized" by the people. 266 
Types of Legitimacy. John Elster identifies three types of legitimacy: upstream legitimacy; 
process legitimacy; and downstream legitimacy.267 'Upstream legitimacy' is related to the 
constitution-making body; 'process legitimacy' is related to the decision-making process of the 
constitution-making body; and 'downstream legitimacy' is related to a Constitution's 
ratification. 26B 
A Constitution can enjoy legitimacy, Elster considers, simply by being produced by a 
constitution-making body that came into being in a legitimate way.269 There are a wide variety of 
alternatives for forming a legitimate constitution-making body. The choice among these, 
therefore, should be considered carefully. McWhinney warns that none of these alternatives will 
be value-neutral in their consequences.27o 
Interest Classifications. Another mandatory requirement for a constitution-making body is 
institutional independence. This is particularly important to avoid any interest which may 
interfere the constitution-making process. Elster divides the potential interests into three 
categories: personal, group and institutional. 271 The 'personal interests' of Constitution makers 
is a relatively minor issue.272 It refers to the private advantage that an individual expects to 
derive from particular constitutional institution.m The issue of 'group interests' is, however, far 
265 Article 211 the Thai Constitution of 1991. 
266 Renata Cristi, 'The Metaphysics of Constituent Power: Schmitt and the Genesis of Chile's 1980 Constitution' (2000) 21 
Cardozo Law Review 1749. 
267 John Elster, 'Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea', in J. Hesse (ed), Administrative 
Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (1993) 178-179. 
268 1bid. 
2691bid 178. 
270 McWhinney, above n 111, 27. 
271 Elster, above n 69, 376- 380. 
272 1bid 377. 
273 Negretto, above n 122, 6. 
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m o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t .
2 7 4  
I n c l u d e d  i n  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  a r e  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  t e r r i t o r i a l  
"  
s u b u n i t s  o r  s o c i a l  e c o n o m i c  c o r p o r a t i o n s . 2 7 s  
N e g r e t t o  n o t e s  t h a t  ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s '  i n  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  h a p p e n s  " w h e n  a  b o d y  t h a t  
p a r t i c i p a t e s  i n  t h a t  p r o c e s s  w r i t e s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  f o r  i t s e l f  i n t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n " , 2 7 6  f o r  
e x a m p l e ,  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  o r  l e g i s l a t u r e .
2 7 7  
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t ,  t h e  
e x e c u t i v e s  n o r m a l l y  t r i e s  t o  k e e p  ( o r  i n c r e a s e )  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  f r o m  t h e  
l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d y ,  a s  w e l l  a s  i n c r e a s e  i t s  p o w e r .
2 7 8  
L i k e w i s e ,  l e g i s l a t u r e s  w h i c h  b e c o m e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d i e s  w i l l  t r y  t o  b a l a n c e  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e ,  o r  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p o w e r  
o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  b r a n c h .  2 7 9  
T h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  d e s i g n a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  n e e d s  b e  d i s c u s s e d ,  b e c a u s e  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  t h e  M P R ' s  r o l e  a s  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  
w a s  c o n s t a n t l y  c h a l l e n g e d  b y  t h o s e  w h o  s e e k  t o  f o r m  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n .  C h a p t e r s  
F o u r  t o  E i g h t  w i l l  d i s c u s s  t h i s  f u r t h e r .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e s e  t w o  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
- a n  e x p e r t  c o m m i s s i o n  a n d  n o r m a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  - i n  m o r e  d e t a i l .  
a .  E x p e r t  C o m m i s s i o n  
A n  e x p e r t  c o m m i s s i o n  m a y  a l s o  b e  n a m e d  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o r  a n  " i n d e p e n d e n t  
b o d y " .
2
a o  I t  m a y  b e  c o m p r i s e d  o f  a n y  a m o u n t  o f  e x p e r t s  d e e m e d  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  e f f e c t i v e  
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g .  T h e  m e m b e r s h i p  s h o u l d  h a v e  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  k n o w l e d g e  c o n s i d e r e d  
n e c e s s a r y .  C u r r e n t  p r a c t i c e ,  h o w e v e r ,  h a s  s h o w n  t h a t  e x p e r t i s e  i s  n o t  t h e  s o l e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  t h e  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n .
2 8 1  
T o  s a t i s f y  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s  i s s u e ,  a n d  t o  t h e r e f o r e  
i n c r e a s e  i t s  l e g i t i m a c y ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  s h o u l d  b e  a s  i n c l u s i v e  a s  p o s s i b l e .  I t  s h o u l d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
b r o a d e n  i t s  m e m b e r s h i p  c r i t e r i a  t o  i n c l u d e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  b y  k e y  c o m m u n i t i e s  ( e v e n  a t  t h e  
e x p e n s e  o f  e x p e r t i s e } .
2 8 2  
P o i n t i n g  t o  t h e  F i j i  e x p e r i e n c e ,  S a u n d e r s  n o t e s  t h a t  t w o  o f  t h e  t h r e e  
2 7 4  E l s t e r ,  a b o v e  n  6 9 ,  3 7 8 .  
2 7 5 1 b i d  3 7 9 .  
2
7
6 1  b i d  3 8 0 .  
2 7 7  N e g r e t t o ,  a b o v e  n  1 2 2 ,  6 .  
2 7 8
1 b i d .  
2 7 9
1 b i d .  T h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  o n  n o r m a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  w i l l  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s  t h i s  l e g i s l a t u r e ' s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  
2 8 0  S a u n d e r s ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 6 ,  7 .  
2 8 1
1 b i d  8 .  
2 8 2
1 b i d .  
4 6  
members of the Constitutional Review Commission were chosen respectively from the 
indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian communities.2B3 Similarly, in Thailand, of the total of ninety-
nine members of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly, seventy six members were drawn from 
provinces and only the balance of twenty-three members were chosen from the category of 
'expert'. 
Upstream Legitimacy problem. Upstream legitimacy is a weak point for an expert 
commission, because the commission members are usually selected by the executive or 
legislature and are not directly elected by the people.2B4 Consequently, a commission receives 
less legitimacy from the people, compared with a normal legislature. The legitimacy problem 
may become even worse if the people have no confidence in the selecting institution. 
In a period of transition from authoritarian rule there may be no legitimate institutions to select 
members of an expert commission. Because of the bad experience in the past, neither the 
executive nor the legislature will be trusted by the people to select the commission. This 
problem can be solved by holding elections to form a legitimate executive or legislative body 
that could be directly followed by a democratic procedure for selecting the commission. 
Thailand's experience. In Thailand, the expert commission, which was called the 
Constitutional Drafting Assembly, enjoyed strong upstream legitimacy. This was as a result of 
the semi-direct election by which it was formed. Ninety-nine members of the assembly were 
elected by the National Assembly through two mechanisms: election and university 
nominations.285 The former mechanism was used to select seventy-six members representing 
the provinces, while the latter mechanism was applied to select the balance of twenty-three 
members representing experts.2B6 Therefore, the Thailand's Constitutional Drafting Assembly 
should be classified as a 'hybrid' expert commission. 
The selection mechanisms were stipulated in the amendments to Section 211 of the Thailand 
Constitution of 1991 and the Parliament passed the Constitution Amendment Bill in May 1996. 
Hajisalah named Section 211 as the "gateway for a political reform of Thailand" since it 
283 ibid. 
284 Bonime-Bianc, above n 64, 35. 
285 Section 211 of the 1991 Constitution. 
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p r o v i d e d  t h e  r i g h t  f o r  t h e  T h a i  p e o p l e  t o  b e c o m e  a c t i v e l y  i n v o l v e  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  




T h e  s e v e n t y - s i x  m e m b e r s  ( o n e  f o r  e a c h  p r o v i n c e )  w e r e  s e l e c t e d  b y  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  
f r o m  a  l i s t  o f  t e n  c a n d i d a t e s  f r o m  e a c h  p r o v i n c e  w h o  w e r e  p r e v i o u s l y  e l e c t e d  i n  e a c h  p r o v i n c i a l  
e l e c t i o n . 2 8 8  A p p r o x i m a t e l y  2 0 , 0 0 0  c a n d i d a t e s  t h r o u g h o u t  T h a i l a n d  a p p l i e d  f o r  t h e  p o s i t i o n . 2 8 9  
M o s t  o f  t h e m  w e r e  l a w y e r s ,  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  f o r m e r  m e m b e r s  o f  p a r l i a m e n t ,  r e t i r e d  
b u r e a u c r a t s  o r  w e l l - k n o w n  l o c a l  b u s i n e s s m e n .
2 9 0  
T h i s  w h o l e  e l e c t i o n  p r o c e s s  t o o k  p l a c e  o v e r  a  
s h o r t  p e r i o d  o f  o n l y  1 7  d a y s  ( 9 - 2 6  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 6 ) .
2
9 1  
T h e  r e m a i n i n g  t w e n t y - t h r e e  p e r s o n s  w e r e  s e l e c t e d  b y  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  f r o m  t h e  l i s t  o f  
f o r t y - f i v e  a c a d e m i c s  n o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  u n i v e r s i t i e s .
2 9 2  
T o  e n s u r e  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e s e  e x p e r t s  i n  
m a k i n g  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  o n l y  u n i v e r s i t i e s  w h i c h  o f f e r e d  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e ,  p u b l i c  




A m o n g  t h e  f o r t y - f i v e  
a c a d e m i c s  e a c h  o f  t h e  t h r e e  f i e l d s  w e r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  f i f t e e n  c a n d i d a t e s .
2
9 4  O n  2 6  D e c e m b e r  
1 9 9 6 ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  s c r e e n e d  a n d  e l e c t e d  e i g h t  e x p e r t s  f r o m  l a w ,  a n o t h e r  e i g h t  f r o m  
p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e  a n d  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  s e v e n  w e r e  c h o s e n  f r o m  p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D r a f t i n g  A s s e m b l y . 2 9 5  
P r o c e s s  L e g i t i m a c y .  I f  a n  e x p e r t  c o m m i s s i o n  c a n  p a s s  t h e  u p s t r e a m  l e g i t i m a c y  t e s t ,  t h e  t e s t  
o f  p r o c e s s  l e g i t i m a c y  w i l l  b e  e a s i e r .  S a u n d e r s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  a n  e x p e r t  
c o m m i s s i o n  l i e s  i n  t w o  t h i n g s :  " q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  d r a f t  C o n s t i t u t i o n "  a n d  " d i s t a n c e  f r o m  p o l i t i c a l  
p r o c e s s " .
2 9 6  
T h e  e n h a n c e d  q u a l i t y  w i l l  c o m e  f r o m  i t s  m e m b e r s '  d e p t h  o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
2 8 6
1 b i d .  
2 8 7  
A l a y a s  H a j i s a l a h ,  ' T h a i l a n d ' ,  i n  C h e r y l  S a u n d e r s  a n d  G r a h a m  H a s s a l l  ( e d s ) ,  A s i a - P a c i f i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Y e a r b o o k  1 9 9 7  
( 1 9 9 9 )  2 7 8 .  
2 8 8  
H a r d i n g ,  a b o v e  n  6 8 ,  2 3 8 .  S e e  a l s o  A l a y a s  H a j i s a l a h ,  T h e  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  K i n g d o m  o f  T h a i l a n d  1 9 9 7 :  T h e  P e o p l e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  < h t t p : / / w w w . m u s l i m l a w s t u d e n t . c o m / s s r t h a i l p 1 . p h p >  a t  3  J u l y  2 0 0 2 ;  A m a r a  R a k s a s a t a y a ,  T h e  M a k i n g  o f  t h e  
P e o p l e ' s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  < h t t p : / / w w w . i d s . a c . u k / i d s / c i v s o c l f i n a l l t h a i l a n d / t h a 6 a . d o c >  a t  4  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 3 ;  K a n o k k a n  A n u k a n s a i ,  R o l e  
o f  C i v i l  S o c i e t y  M o v e m e n t  a n d  t h e  M a k i n g  o f  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  T h a i l a n d  < h t t p : / / w w w . i d s . a c . u k / i d s / c i v s o c / f i n a l / t h a i l a n d / t h a 6 b  
. d o c >  a t  4  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 3 .  
2 8 9  H a j i s a l a h ,  a b o v e  n  2 8 8 .  
2 9 0  
I b i d .  
2 9 1
1 b i d .  
2 9 2
1 b i d .  
2 9 3
1 b i d .  
2 9 4
1 b i d .  
2 9 5
1 b i d .  
2 9 6  S a u n d e r s ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 6 ,  8 .  
4 8  
constitutional issues. This understanding is extremely important since drafting a Constitution is 
not an easy task. Even among constitutional experts the theory of constitution-making is still 
contested. On the other hand, Saunders also warns that experts may come up with too many 
constitutional alternatives. A lack of willingness to compromise amongst experts may create a 
serious possibility of deadlock.297 
Expert Commission Interests. Saunders notes that an expert commission is more 
independent than representative bodies in it tends to stay away from group and institutional 
interests.29B This is because the members of the commission are supposed to be free from 
political affiliation.299 The independence from group interests is a key ingredient to the 
commission's ability to successfully draft a Constitution.3oo Further, the commission's 
independence from institutional interests is related to the nature of a commission as an ad hoc 
institution. A commission should dissolve itself prior to the implementation of the amended, or 
the renewed, Constitution that it was involved in drafting. 
For McWhinney, however, the effect of a reduction of group interests in a commission may be 
merely theoretical.301 This is because the relation between a Constitution and politics is always 
close3o2 - as Friedrich says, the development of a Constitution is an inherently political 
process.3o3 Therefore, a selected institution may influence a commission by electing its 
members based on their past opinion on constitutional issues. 304 In McWhinney's words: 
[a]n expert commission, therefore, tends to become politically suspect, unless its 
members are selected on some genuinely independent, non-partisan basis, or unless its 
terms of reference are so precisely and narrowly defined in advance that it will be 
compelled to limit itself, in its work to a purely technical non-partisan, non-political 
function.3°5 
Thailand's Experience. To maximize its Assembly's independence Thai law required that all 
candidates applying to become members of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly must be free 
2971bid. 
298 ibid 7- 8. 
299 McWhinney, above n 111, 27- 28. 
300 Saunders, above n 166, 9. 
301 McWhinney, above n 111, 27. 
302 1bid. 
303 Friedrich, above n 83, 121. 
304 McWhinney, above n 111, 27. 
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o f  p o l i t i c a l  a f f i l i a t i o n .
3 0 6  
H a j i s a l a h  a r g u e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  w a s  n o  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  A s s e m b l y  w o u l d  n o t  b e  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .
3 0 7  
H a j i s a l a h  f u r t h e r  
a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  s e l e c t i o n  b y  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  w a s  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r f e r e n c e .
3 0 8  
T h e  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  w e r e  l i k e l y  t o  e l e c t  p e o p l e  w h o  w o u l d  w r i t e  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h a t  b e s t  s u i t e d  t h e i r  p a r t i e s  i n t e r e s t s .
3 0 9  
N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e r e  i s  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  i n  T h a i l a n d ' s  e x p e r i e n c e  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e s s  r e d u c e d  t h e  
e f f e c t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s .  T h e s e  r e d u c e d  i n t e r e s t s  w e r e  i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D r a f t i n g  A s s e m b l y ' s  w o r k .  H a r d i n g  n o t e s  t h a t  w h i l e  c o m p r o m i s e s  h a d  t o  b e  
m a d e ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a i D r a f t i n g  A s s e m b l y  a d o p t e d  a  " z e r o  t o l e r a n c e "  a p p r o a c h  i n  r e s p e c t  t o  
i t s  b a s i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e s .  
3 1 0  
A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D r a f t i n g  A s s e m b l y ' s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d r a f t  i m p o s e d  s o m e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a n d  i n t e n s e  s c r u t i n y  u p o n  g o v e r n m e n t  w h i c h  
a f f e c t e d  t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s  i n  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y .  
3 1 1  
T h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
a p p r o v e d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D r a f t i n g  A s s e m b l y ' s  d r a f t  w i t h  s o m e  r e l u c t a n c e .
3 1 2  
D o w n s t r e a m  L e g i t i m a c y  P r o b l e m .  I n d e e d  S a u n d e r s  n o t e s  t h a t  a  d r a f t  o f  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
p r e p a r e d  b y  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  c a n n o t  i m m e d i a t e l y  t a k e  e f f e c t .
3 1 3  
U s u a l l y  i t  m u s t  b e  s u b m i t t e d  t o  
a  l a w - m a k i n g  b o d y  o f  s o m e  k i n d ,  w h e t h e r  a  l e g i s l a t u r e  o r  a  p o p u l a r  r e f e r e n d u m .  T h i s  i s  
d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  a  d r a f t  p r e p a r e d  b y  a  n o r m a l  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  w h i c h  m a y  b e  d i r e c t l y  a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  
a s s e m b l y  o r  l e g i s l a t u r e  i t s e l f .  
W h e e l e r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a r g u e s  t h a t  a  c o m m i s s i o n  i s  a n  " a u x i l i a r y  d e v i c e  . . .  t h e  m a i n  s e r v i c e  o f  t h e  
c o m m i s s i o n  h a s  b e e n  r e s e a r c h ,  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  i s s u e s  a n d  e d u c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p u b l i c " .  3
1 4  
I n d e e d ,  
o n e  w a y  t o  s o l v e  t h e  d o w n s t r e a m  l e g i t i m a c y  p r o b l e m  i s  t o  m a x i m i z e  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  I n  s o  
d o i n g ,  w h e n  t h e  d r a f t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  o r  r e f e r e n d u m ,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i t s  
a d o p t i o n  i n c r e a s e s .  A  w e l l - m a n a g e d  p r o c e s s  o f  p u b l i c  i n v o l v e m e n t  m a y  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  
3 0 5 1 b i d  2 8 .  
3 0 6  H a j i s a l a h ,  a b o v e  n  2 8 8 .  
3 0 7
1 b i d .  
3 0 8
1 b i d .  
3 0 9
1 b i d .  
3 1 0  H a r d i n g ,  a b o v e  n  6 8 ,  2 3 9 .  
3 1 1
1 b i d .  
3
1 2
1 b i d .  S e e  a l s o  W i l l i a m  F .  C a s e ,  ' T h a i  D e m o c r a c y ,  2 0 0 1 :  O u t  o f  E q u i l i b r i u m '  ( 2 0 0 1 )  X L I : 3  A s i a n  S u r v e y 5 2 5 ,  5 3 0 .  
3 1 3  S a u n d e r s ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 6 ,  9 .  
3 1 4  W h e e l e r ,  a b o v e  n  1 0 4 ,  5 7 .  
5 0  
acceptance of the constitutional draft by the people, this create public pressure on the 
Parliament to adopt the draft Constitution. 
The Thai Experience. In Thailand, wide-ranging public participation increased the downstream 
legitimacy of the 1997 Constitution. The next section on the urgency of such participation 
elaborates on the Thai experience. 
In addition to the widespread participation, another factor which contributed to the strong 
downstream legitimacy of the Assembly's draft was the approval procedure for the Constitution 
itself. This amended Section 211 of the Constitution which stipulated that Parliament merely 
had the authority to approve or reject the draft. Parliament did not have the authority to amend 
discrete aspects of the draft. Had Parliament rejected it, a public referendum would have been 
conducted. 315 In any event, the referendum was not needed. As a result of comprehensive 
public involvement, the people felt that they 'owned' the documenf.316 
Having understood that there was actually some reluctance in Parliament to accept the draft,317 
the approval was more as a result of the pressure from the public than voluntary acceptance by 
Parliament. Jumbala argues that the draft was approved in the midst of fears that the draft's 
rejection would trigger further economic and political crisis, and therefore, would lead to a spiral 
of instability.31B Indeed, Harding notes that a clear threat of another military coup haunted the 
approval process. 319 
Closing. This section on expert commission suggests that if the upstream legitimacy of an 
expert commission can be addressed, by establishing a democratic selection process (such as 
shown in Thailand) the process legitimacy will be improved and the commission has a better 
chance to complete its work relatively free from group and institutional interests. In addition, the 
chance to produce a democratic Constitution is enhanced when the process widely involves the 
public, and therefore, increases the downstream legitimacy of the constitution-making process. 
315 Section 211 of the 1991 Constitution. 
316 Tan, above n 68, 38. 
317 Harding, above n 68, 239. 
318 Jumbala, above n 172, 265. 
319 Harding, above n 68, 239. 
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b .  N o r m a l  L e g i s l a t u r e  
P r i n c i p l e  o f  F l e x i b i l i t y .  M c W h i n n e y  a r g u e s  t h a t  c h o o s i n g  a  n o r m a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  a s  a  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  ' f l e x i b i l i t y ' . 3
2
o  T h i s  p r i n c i p l e  c a m e  f r o m  t h e  
F r e n c h  R e v o l u t i o n a r y  e x p e r i e n c e ,  w h e r e  c r e a t i n g  i n s u r m o u n t a b l e  b a r r i e r s  t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  l e d  t o  " a n  e x e r c i s e  i n  f u t i l i t y  a n d  a n  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  t o  t h e  r e s o r t  t o  f o r c e  i f  
a l l  e l s e  f a i l s " . 3 2 t  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  i s  m o r e  p r a c t i c a l  i f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d y - w h i c h  h a s  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
t a s k  o f  p r o d u c i n g  l a w - i s  t h e  o n e  t h a t  h a s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p o w e r .  
H o w e v e r ,  M c W h i n n e y  w a r n s  t h a t  g r a n t i n g  t h i s  m a n d a t e  t o  a  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d y  w i l l  o n l y  b e  
e f f e c t i v e  i f  " t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m  i s  a l r e a d y  a  g o i n g  c o n c e r n "  
3 2 2  
a n d  i f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
c h a n g e  d o e s  n o t  i n v o l v e  a  r a d i c a l  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t h e  s t a t e  s y s t e m .
3 2 3  
I n  s u c h  a  s i t u a t i o n ,  a  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  w h i c h  i n v o l v e s  a  h u g e  l e v e l  o f  d i r e c t  p o p u l a r  i n v o l v e m e n t ,  a s  
t h r o u g h  a  c o n s t i t u e n t  a s s e m b l y ,  " m a y  b e c o m e  n o t  m e r e l y  e x p e n s i v e  a n d  t i m e - c o n s u m i n g  b u t  
a l s o  f u n c t i o n a l l y  u n n e c e s s a r y  o r  i r r e l e v a n t " . 3 2 4  
T r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r u l e  h a s  a  d i f f e r e n t  n a t u r e  t o  a n  a l r e a d y  e s t a b l i s h e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s y s t e m .  D u r i n g  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  i n  a  p e r i o d  o f  t r a n s i t i o n ,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  ' f l e x i b i l i t y '  
c o u l d  b e c o m e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  ' i n f l e x i b i l i t y ' .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  a  n o r m a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  d o e s  n o t  m e r e l y  
f o c u s  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  o n  t h e  p r o c e s s .  T h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  s h o u l d  d i v i d e  i t s  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  i n t o  o t h e r  
l e g i s l a t i v e  r o l e s .  A  l o t  o f  t i m e s  d u r i n g  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n ,  t h e  t a s k  o f  n o r m a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  a s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  m a y  b e  d e s t r u c t i v e  b y  c o n f l i c t s  b e t w e e n  s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  I f  s u c h  
c o n f l i c t  o c c u r s ,  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  m a y  n o t  b e c o m e  t h e  p r i o r i t y  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  
T h e  I n d o n e s i a n  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  i n v o l v e d  b o t h  i n f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t s .  C h a p t e r s  F i v e  a n d  S i x  w i l l  e l a b o r a t e  o n  t h e s e  i s s u e s  f u r t h e r .  
P r o b l e m  o f  I n d e p e n d e n c e .  I n d e p e n d e n c e  i s  t h e  w e a k e s t  p o i n t  o f  a  n o r m a l  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d y .  
T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e ,  i t  i s  u s u a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  f r e e  a  n o r m a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  f r o m  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  i t s  v a r i o u s  
m e m b e r s .  A s  a  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  w h i c h  c o n s i s t s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s '  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  a  
3 2 0  M c W h i n n e y ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 1 ,  2 9 .  
3
2 1
1 b i d .  
3 2 2 1 b i d  3 1 .  
3
2 3
1 b i d .  
5 2  
legislative body will be strongly affected by the political parties' interests in making a 
constitutional draft. These group interests may negatively impact upon the constitution-making 
process. 
The Institutional Interests problems. Further, as an institution which will regulate itself in the 
Constitution, a legislative body will be heavily influenced by institutional interests. Elster argues 
that having a constitution-making body which also serves as an ordinary legislature will have 
three implications on the constitution-making process. These were confirmed in the 
constitution-making processes in Eastern Europe that took place following the collapse of the 
Soviet Empire. 325 
The first implication is that the legislative body will grant more power to the legislative branch at 
the expense of the executive and judiciary.326 Except in Hungary, no country has implemented 
provisions that would strengthen the position of the executive in comparison with legislature.327 
Elster also acknowledges, however, that, except for Poland and Romania (where the 
constitutional courts decisions can be overruled by the legislative body) the other Eastern 
European countries have enjoyed the strong constitutional court adopted in their 
constitutions. 328 
The second implication is that unicameral and bicameral legislatures will be inclined to make, 
respectively, unicameral and bicameral constitutions.329 For example, unicameral constitutions 
in Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary were produced by unicameral legislatures, while bicameral 
constitutions in Romania and Poland were created by bicameral legislatures. 330 The only 
exemption for this pattern is, however, the Czech Republic. In this country, a unicameral 
assembly created a bicamerallegislature.331 
324 1bid. 








T h e  t h i r d  i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d y  w i l l  o f t e n  g r a n t  i t s e l f  e n o r m o u s  p o w e r s  t o  a l t e r  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
3 3 2  
F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i t  i s  n o t  i n  t h e  b o d y ' s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  t o  r e c o m m e n d  t h a t  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s  b e  s u b m i t t e d  t o  r e f e r e n d u m . 3 3 3  T h i s ,  a g a i n ,  w a s  c o n f i r m e d  b y  t h e  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  i n  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  e x c e p t  f o r  R o m a n i a ,  w h e r e  
r a t i f i c a t i o n  b y  r e f e r e n d u m  i s  m a n d a t o r y . 3 3 4  
B e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d a n g e r  o f  t h e  g r o u p  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a  n o r m a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  d i s t o r t i n g  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s ,  E l s t e r  a r g u e s  t h a t :  
. . .  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  s c o p e  f o r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o u g h t  t o  b e  w r i t t e n  b y  
s p e c i a l l y  c o n v e n e d  a s s e m b l i e s  a n d  n o t  b y  b o d i e s  t h a t  a l s o  s e r v e  a s  o r d i n a r y  l e g i s l a t u r e s .  
N o r  s h o u l d  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  b e  g i v e n  a  c e n t r a l  p l a c e  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n . 3 3 5  
S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  E x p e r i e n c e .  U n l i k e  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e ,  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  
e x p e r i e n c e  s h o w s  t h a t  a  l e g i s l a t u r e  c a n  s u c c e e d  i n  d r a f t i n g  a  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  O n e  o f  
t h e  a r g u m e n t s  w h i c h  r a t i o n a l i z e  t h e  s u c c e s s  i s  t h a t  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  w a s  n o t  a  " n o r m a l "  o n e .  
T h e r e  a r e  a t  l e a s t  f i v e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  s u c c e s s :  t h e  1 9 9 4  
d e m o c r a t i c  e l e c t i o n  w h i c h  g a v e  a  s t r o n g  u p s t r e a m  l e g i t i m a c y  t o  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ;  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  
w h i c h  h a d  s p e c i f i c  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a s  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  b a s e d  o n  t h e  I n t e r i m  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  t h e  e x p e r t s '  s u p p o r t ;  t h e  i n v o l v e m e n t  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  i n  c e r t i f y i n g  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d r a f t ;  a n d  w i d e s p r e a d  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  p a r a g r a p h s  w i l l  e l a b o r a t e  o n  e a c h  o f  t h e  f i v e  f a c t o r s  i n  t u r n .  
D e m o c r a t i c  E l e c t i o n .  O n e  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  s t a g e s  o f  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  p r o c e s s  
w a s  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  I n t e r i m  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o n  2 7  A p r i l  1 9 9 4 . 3 3 6  O n  t h e  s a m e  d a y ,  t h e  f i r s t  
e l e c t i o n  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  h i s t o r y  w a s  p e a c e f u l l y  c o n c l u d e d .
3 3 7  
T h e  I n t e r i m  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  t h e  




1 b i d .  
3 3 3
1 b i d .  
3 3 4
1 b i d .  
3 3 5 1 b i d  3 9 5 .  
3 3 6  
C y r i l  R a m a p h o s a ,  ' N e g o t i a t i n g  a  N e w  N a t i o n :  R e f l e c t i o n s  o n  t h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  C o n s t i t u t i o n '  i n  P e n e l o p e  
A n d r e w s  a n d  S t e p h e n  E l l m a n  ( e d s ) ,  P o s t - A p a r t h e i d  c o n s t i t u t i o n s :  P e r s p e c t i v e s  o n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  B a s i c  L a w ( 2 0 0 1 )  7 9 .  
3 3
7
1 b i d .  
5 4  
written with legitimacy.J38 Because of these Constitution and election, a strongly legitimate 
legislature was established; and the foundation to start a constitution-making process was in 
place. The African National Congress (ANC) and its allies underlined that "an unelected body 
could not claim to have requisite mandate from the electorate" to draft a Constitution.339 
Constitutional Provisions. Pursuant to Section 68 of the Interim Constitution, the 
democratically elected National Assembly and the Senate became the Constitutional 
Assembly.340 This clear constitutional basis was a strong mandate for this Assembly to carry out 
its ultimate mission, "to draft and adopt a credible and enduring Constitution which enjoys the 
support and allegiance of all South Africa's people".J4t 
Expert Support. As set out in the Interim Constitution, the Constitutional Assembly established 
an Independent Panel of Constitutional Experts who was 'recognized constitutional experts, not 
being members of Parliament or any other legislature and not holding office in any party'. 342 
Besides its 'role as an important protection against deadlock in the approval stage, 343 the Panel 
also produced some supporting documents for the Constituent Assembly. 344 For example, the 
Panel distributed a paper on style and language for the new Constitution, 345 outlining criteria on 
how much detail the new Constitution should contain.346 
The Constitutional Court's Certification. The Interim Constitution stipulated that text of the 
new constitutional 'shall comply with the constitutional principles'.347 If a Constitution was 
adopted by the Constituent Assembly, but the Constitutional Court found that it did not conform 
to the constitutional principles, the Assembly was given an opportunity to change it and 
resubmit it to the court.J48 The thirty four principles with which the final Constitution had to 
338 1bid 80. 
339 Saras Jagwanth, 'Democracy, Civil Society and South African Constitution: Some Challenges' (Discussion Paper 65, 
Management of Social Transformation, UNESCO, 2003) 9. 
340 Section 68 (1) of the Interim Constitution. 
341 Constitutional Assembly: Annual Report May 1994-1995 (1995) <http://www.polity.orq.za/html/qovdocs/Constitution/ca/ 
ANREPORT/Ca94 95.pdf> at 12 October 2003. 
342 Section 72 Subsection (2) of the Interim Constitution. This panel consisted of seven members: Prof. MG Erasmus, Prof. J. 
Kruger, MP Sedibe-Ncholo, Adv I Semenya, Prof. J. VanDer Westhuizen, Adv Z Yacoob and Prof. C. Murray. 
343 Section 73 Subsection (3), (4) and (5) of the Interim Constitution. 
344 Constitutional Assembly, above n 341. 
345 1bid. 
3461bid. 
347 Section 71 of the Interim Constitution. 
348 Section 71 in relation to Section 73 Subsection (6) of the Interim Constitution. 
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c o n f o r m  c o n s i s t e d  o f  b a s i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s ,  s u c h  a s :  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s u p r e m a c y  a n d  
j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w ;  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  j u d i c i a r y ;  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r i g h t  t o  e q u a l i t y ;  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  
p o w e r  w i t h  c h e c k s  a n d  b a l a n c e s ;  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s ;  a n d  a  d i v i s i o n  o f  p o w e r s  b e t w e e n  
n a t i o n a l  a n d  p r o v i n c i a l  g o v e r n m e n t s . 3 4 9  
F o r  J a g w a n t h ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t ' s  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  d r a f t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  t h e  S o u t h  
A f r i c a n  w a y  o f  m a k i n g  a  c o m p r o m i s e  a s  t o  w h i c h  b o d y  s h o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  c h a r g e d  w i t h  t h e  t a s k  
o f  d r a f t i n g  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n . 3
5
o  O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  i t  o p e n e d  t h e  w a y  f o r  t h e  i n v o l v e m e n t  o f  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  W h i l s t  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  C o u r t  w a s  r e q u i r e d  t o  c e r t i f y  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
b e f o r e  i t  c a m e  i n t o  f o r c e .
3 5 1  
T h i s  C o u r t  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  w a s  a  l e g a l  m e c h a n i s m  w h i c h  p r e v e n t e d  
i r r e l e v a n t  g r o u p s  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  f r o m  b e i n g  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y  i n t o  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n . 3 5
2  
I n  f a c t ,  t h e  C o u r t  d e c l i n e d  t o  c e r t i f y  t h e  f i r s t  s u b m i s s i o n  a n d  o r d e r e d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
A s s e m b l y  t o  a m e n d  c e r t a i n  p r o v i s i o n s .  
3 5 3  
O n l y  w i t h  t h e  s e c o n d  s u b m i s s i o n  d i d  t h e  C o u r t  c e r t i f y  
t h a t  t h e  d r a f t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  c o n f o r m e d  t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s .  3 5 4  
P u b l i c  P a r t i c i p a t i o n .  W i d e s p r e a d  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w a s  a n o t h e r  f a c t o r  w h i c h  r e d u c e d  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  g r o u p  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  f r o m  c o n t a m i n a t i n g  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  ' f i n a l '  
C o n s t i t u t i o n . 3
5 5  
T h e  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  e n s u r e d  t h a t  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  n o t  d r a f t e d  b y  a n  
" i s o l a t e d  p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e " .  3 5 6  
C l o s i n g .  A  l e g i s l a t u r e  h a s  a  b e t t e r  c h a n c e  t o  h a v e  a  s t r o n g  u p s t r e a m  l e g i t i m a c y  c o m p a r e d  t o  
a n  e x p e r t  c o m m i s s i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  a  n o r m a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  i s  v u l n e r a b l e  b e c a u s e  i t  c a n  b e  
c o n t a m i n a t e d  b y  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s '  i n t e r e s t s  a n d  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ' s  i n t e r e s t s .  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  
3 4
9  C h r i s t i n a  M u r r a y ,  ' N e g o t i a t i n g  B e y o n d  D e a d l o c k :  F r o m  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  t o  t h e  C o u r t ' ,  i n  P e n e l o p e  A n d r e w s  a n d  
S t e p h e n  E l l m a n  ( e d s ) ,  P o s t - A p a r t h e i d  c o n s t i t u t i o n s :  P e r s p e c t i v e s  o n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  B a s i c  L a w  ( 2 0 0 1 )  1 0 5 .  
3 5 0  J a g w a n t h ,  a b o v e  n  3 3 9 ,  8 - 9 .  
3 5 1
1 b i d  9 .  
3 5 2  M u r r a y ,  a b o v e  n  3 4 9 ,  1 2 0 - 1 2 1 .  
3 5 3  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  o f  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  C e r t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  R e p u b l i c  o f  S o u t h  A f r i c a  ( 1 9 9 6 )  < h t t p : / / w w w . p o l i t y .  
o r g . z a / h t m l / g o v d o c s / C o n s t i t u t i o n / c e r t . h t m l >  a t  1 2  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 3 .  
3 5 4  M u r r a y ,  a b o v e  n  3 4 9 ,  1 2 2 .  
3 5 5 1 b i d  1 1 2 .  
3 5 6
1 b i d .  
5 6  
experience shows that this vulnerability could be addressed through the involvement of 
Constitutional Court and widespread public participation. 
4. The Importance of Public Participation 
Public participation is very important in making a democratic Constitution, because it 
strengthens the people's ownership of the Constitution. The recommendations from 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiatives to Commonwealth Heads of government Meeting 
1999, for example, outlined twelve constitution-making principles which are closely related to 
the public participation: (i) legitimacy; (ii) inclusivity; (iii) empowerment of civil society; (iv) 
openness and transparency; (v) accessibility; (vi) continuous review; (vii) accountability; (ix) the 
importance of process; (x) the role of political parties; (xi) the role of civil societies; and (xii) the 
role of experts.357 
Wheare argues that it is crucial that the people have a say in amending their Constitution. 358 
For Rosen, people should not be ruled by constitutions which they do not understand.359 The 
public involvement allows the Constitution to be declared as a "product of popular sovereignty 
of the peoples' will, rather than an expression of their rulers' interests".36o Further, lhonvbere 
argues that the participation will help to build ownership around the Constitution. 361 It will 
become a popular text which "the people will be willing to defend at all times".362 Therefore, the 
involvement may contribute to strengthening national solidarity and a national identity.363 
For Wheeler, the power "to make and change the fundamental law of the state" must not be too 
dependent on the constitution-making body.364 Indeed, he further argues that the major 
procedural issue of constitution-making is to ensure popular control over the constituent 
power. 365 In lhonvbere's words: 
357 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiatives, above n 247, 8-18. 
358Wheare, above n 75, 122. 
359 Rosen, above n 127, 277. 
360 Ibid. 
3611honvbere, above n 188, 346-347. 
362 1bid 347. 
363 Rosen, above n 127, 299. 
364 Wheeler, above n 104, 58. 
365 1bid. 
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[ i ] t  i s  q u i t e  e a s y  t o  m a k e  a  r e a l l y  b a d  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  A l l  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  i t s  c u s t o d i a n s  n e e d  t o  
d o  i s  t r e a t  t h e  e x e r c i s e  a s  a  p r i v a t e  o r  s e c r e t  p r o c e s s ,  c o n s u l t  n o  o n e  o r  a l l o w  o n l y  
m i n i m a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  a n d  a i m  f o r  l e g a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  b u i l d i n g  p o p u l a r  l e g i t i m a c y  
a r o u n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  O n c e  s u c h  a  p r o c e s s  i s  f o l l o w e d ,  i t  c a n  b e  g u a r a n t e e d  t h a t  t h e  
c o n t e n t  o f  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w i l l  b e  u n d e m o c r a t i c  a n d  i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  y e a r n i n g  
o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y  . . .  3 6 6  
A c t i v e  a n d  I n c l u s i v e .  S a u n d e r s  a r g u e s  t h a t  p u b l i c  c o n s u l t a t i o n  s h o u l d  f u l f i l l  a t  l e a s t  t w o  b a s i c  
r u l e s :  a c t i v e  a n d  i n c l u s i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n .
3 6 7  
T o  b e  a n  a c t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n ,  p u b l i c  c o n s u l t a t i o n  
s h o u l d  b e g i n  " b e f o r e  t h e  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  s e t " .
3 6
B  T h e  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  s h o u l d  g o  b e y o n d  j u s t  e d u c a t i n g  a  p a s s i v e  p u b l i c ,  a n d  s h o u l d  m a k e  
e v e r y  a t t e m p t  t o  a c t i v e l y  e n g a g e  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .
3 6 9  
T h e  
a c t i v i t i e s  s h o u l d  b e  " i n t e r a c t i v e  a n d  e m p o w e r i n g ,  e n c o u r a g i n g  p e o p l e  t o  m a k e  a  c o n s t r u c t i v e  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o c e s s " .
3 7
0  T h e r e f o r e ,  f o l l o w - u p  i s  c r u c i a l  t o  s h o w  t h e  p e o p l e  t h a t  t h e i r  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  c o n s i d e r e d  s e r i o u s l y . 3 7 1  
T h e n ,  t o  h a v e  a n  i n c l u s i v e  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  n e e d e d  t o  o v e r c o m e  t h e  
d o m i n a n c e  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  g r o u p s  a n d  t o  p e r s u a d e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  g r o u p s  t h a t  a r e  l i k e l y  
t o  b e  r e t i c e n t . 3 7 2  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e s  a r e  m a t t e r s  w h i c h  r a r e l y  g a i n  w i d e s p r e a d  
p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t . 3 7 3  T h e r e f o r e ,  W h e e l e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  p u b l i c  a p a t h y  t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n s  
m u s t  b e  c o m b a t e d :
3 7 4  
T h i s  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  m u s t  b e  f o c u s ;  a n d  e l e c t o r a l  
c o n t e s t s  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  h e l d  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  a s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s . 3
7 5  
F u r t h e r  t o  
t h i s ,  S a u n d e r s  a r g u e s  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n s  s h o u l d  b e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  a  f o r m  w h i c h  c a n  
e a s i l y  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  b y  t h e  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c .
3 7 6  
A l l  t y p e s  o f  m e d i a  ( t e l e v i s i o n ,  p r i n t  a n d  r a d i o )  
s h o u l d  b e  u s e d ,  b e c a u s e  d i f f e r e n t  g r o u p s  i n  s o c i e t y  u t i l i s e  d i f f e r e n t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  m e d i u m .
3 7 7  
3 6 6 1 h o n v b e r e ,  a b o v e  n  1 8 8 ,  3 4 8 - 3 4 9 .  
3 6 7  S a u n d e r s ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 6 ,  1 1 .  
3 6 8
i b i d .  
3 6 9  R o s e n ,  a b o v e  n  1 2 7 , 2 9 4 .  
3 7 0  S a u n d e r s ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 6 ,  1 1 .  
3 7 1
i b i d .  
3 7 2 1 b i d .  
3 7 3 W h e e l e r ,  a b o v e  n  1 0 4 , 6 1 .  
3 7 4
1 b i d .  
3 7 5 1 b i d .  
3
7
6  S a u n d e r s ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 6 ,  1 1 .  
3 7 7
1 b i d .  
5 8  
The South African Experience. In South Africa, the Constitutional Assembly's public 
awareness and education campaign was designed to educate the public on constitutionalism 
and basic human rights, as well as to elicit the views of the public on the substance of the new 
Constitution. 378 
Media campaigns incorporated the use of newsletters, television and radio - all bearing the 
title, Constitutional Talk- a telephone hat-line and an Internet home page (see details later in 
this section).379 In addition, thousands of public meetings were held across the country, while 
sectoral meetings were conducted with about 200 organizations representing a number of 
diverse interest groups.380 The group meetings were advertised extensively on television and 
radio.381 
Indeed, radio is one of the most effective means of communication because it reaches people 
in both rural and urban areas (where 82 per cent of the population over 18 listen to the radio). 382 
Over 10 million people a week listened to the Constitutional Assembly's show on the radio in 
one _of eight of the country's eleven official languages.383 The television campaign and the 
Constitutional Talk programmes were launched in thirty-seven editions which reached 34 per 
cent of television viewers. 384 
The Assembly's newsletter was produced fortnightly in eleven languages and distributed to 
160,000 people.385 A constitutional website was launched which contained all necessary 
information for understanding the process: minutes of meetings, constitutional drafts, opinions 
and submissions of the Constitutional Assembly. 386 The Constitutional Talk hat-line was set up 
to enable people to make submissions over the telephone; and to enable them to get an up-to-
date briefing on constitutional discussions.387 This service was available in five languages and 
378 Murray, above n 349, 106. 
379 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, above n 247, 19. 
380 Jagwanth, above n 339, 9-10. 
381 1bid 9. 
382 Constitutional Assembly: Annual Report 1996 (1996) <http://www.polity.orq.za/html/govdocs/Constitution/ca/ANREPORT 
/Ca95 96.pdf> at 12 October 2003. 
3831bid. 
384 Murray, above n 349, 107. 
385 1bid. 
386 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, above n 247, 20. 
387 1bid. 
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w a s  u s e d  b y  1 0 , 0 0 0  p e o p l e . 3 8 8 l n  a d d i t i o n ,  f o r  s t u d e n t s ,  t h e  w o r k i n g  d r a f t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  a l s o  
f o r m u l a t e d  i n t o  h u m a n  r i g h t s  c o m i c s ;  w h i l e  f o r  t h e  v i s u a l l y  i m p a i r e d ,  t a p e - r e c o r d e d  a n d  B r a i l l e -
p r i n t e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  w e r e  a v a i l a b l e . 3 8 9  
T h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  c a m p a i g n  s t r a t e g i e s  w e r e  i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  m o r e  t h a n  2  m i l l i o n  s u b m i s s i o n s  
r e c e i v e d  b y  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y .
3 9 0  
T h i s  w a s  p o s s i b l e  b e c a u s e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a n  
i n d e p e n d e n t  s u r v e y ,  t h e  w i d e - r a n g i n g  c a m p a i g n  r e a c h e d  7 3  p e r  c e n t  o f  a d u l t  S o u t h  A f r i c a n s  
( 1 8 . 5  m i l l i o n  p e o p l e ) . 3 9
1  
F o r  J a g w a n t h ,  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  e n a b l e d  t h e  b i r t h  o f  a  
d e m o c r a t i c  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  S h e  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  " o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  
s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s  w a s  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y ' s  p u b l i c  a w a r e n e s s  a n d  e d u c a t i o n  
c a m p a i g n " . 3 9
2  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  a w a r e n e s s  o f  t h e  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  
c r e a t e d  a  p o p u l a r  s e n s e  o f  o w n e r s h i p  o f  t h e  t e x t . J 9 3  
T h e  T h a i  E x p e r i e n c e .  I n  T h a i l a n d ,  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w a s  l a i d  d o w n  a s  o n e  o f  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  w i t h i n  S e c t i o n  2 1 1  o f  t h e  1 9 9 1  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  s t i p u l a t e d  
t h a t  i n  m a k i n g  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D r a f t i n g  A s s e m b l y  h a d  t o  g i v e  s p e c i a l  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n .  Q u o t e d  b y  J u m b a l a ,  B o v o r n s a k  U w a n n o  a r g u e s  t h a t  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  i s  " a l l  a b o u t  d e c o d i n g  w h a t  t h e  p e o p l e  a r e  s a y i n g  a n d  p r o d u c i n g  a  l e g a l  
d o c u m e n t  o u t  o f  t h e m " .
3 9 4  
I n  o r d e r  t o  d o  t h i s ,  t h e  A s s e m b l y  s e t  u p  a  s p e c i a l  c o m m i t t e e  i n  e a c h  
o f  t h e  s e v e n t y - s i x  p r o v i n c e s .  T h e n ,  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  A s s e m b l y  t r a v e l e d  a c r o s s  t h e  c o u n t r y  t o  
c a n v a s s  a n d  l i s t e n  t h e  o p i n i o n s  a t  l o c a l  m e e t i n g s  o r g a n i z e d  b y  t h e  A s s e m b l y  i n  c o o p e r a t i o n  
w i t h  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  g r o u p s .
3 9 5  
I t  w a s  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  8 5 0 , 0 0 0  p e o p l e  a n d  a t  l e a s t  3 0 0  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
t u r n e d  u p  a n d  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e s e  m e e t i n g s . 3 9 6  
A n u k a n s a i  p r a i s e d  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  g r o u p s  w h o  m a d e  t h e  e x t e n s i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
p o s s i b l e .
3 9 7  
T h e s e  g r o u p s  w o r k e d  e f f e c t i v e l y  t o  o r g a n i z e  o p e n  p u b l i c  c a m p a i g n  o n  
3 8 8  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y :  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  1 9 9 6 ,  a b o v e  n  3 8 2 .  
3 8 9  C o m m o n w e a l t h  H u m a n  R i g h t s  I n i t i a t i v e ,  a b o v e  n  2 4 7 ,  2 0 .  
3 9 0  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y :  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  1 9 9 6 ,  a b o v e  n  3 8 2 .  
3 9 1  M u r r a y ,  a b o v e  n  3 4 9 ,  1 0 7 .  
3 9 2  J a g w a n t h ,  a b o v e  n  3 3 9 ,  9 .  
3
9
3  S i r i  G l o p p e n ,  S o u t h  A f r i c a :  T h e  B a t t l e  o v e r  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  ( 1 9 9 7 )  2 6 6 .  
3 9 4  J u m b a l a ,  a b o v e  n  1 7 2 ,  2 7 3 .  
3
9 5
1 b i d  2 7 2 - 2 7 3 .  
3 9 6 J b i d  2 7 3 .  
3 9
7  
A n u k a n s a i ,  a b o v e  n  2 8 8 .  
6 0  
constitutional issues at the same time as the Assembly discussed the issues.398 They published 
submissions in the form of position papers and public letters; invited experts to attend the 
public hearings and comment on contents of the Constitution; and mobilized a mass movement 
to support the Constitution.399 On 26- 27 September, when Parliament was scheduled to vote 
on the Constitution, the groups organized public rallies around the country.400 These rallies 
were an effective form of pressure which contributed to the Parliament's approval to the 
Constitution. 
Another factor which developed the public's support of the Constitution was the active 
participation of the media.401 Numerous television debates, dramas and news item were shown 
frequently and educated the public about constituti~nal issues.402 Similarly radio and printed 
media gave special attention to the making of the Constitution.4o3 
Because of this successful public participation, the 1997 Thai Constitution was credited as 
being a "popular Constitution" 404 and "people's Constitution". 405 Harding has acknowledged that 
this Constitution "represents the first concerted attempt to break the cycle" of the previous 
fifteen undemocratic Thai constitutions. 406 
c. The Elements of a Democratic Constitution 
This section will focus on considering what should be contained within a democratic 
Constitution? This discussion is significant to the analysis of whether the four amendments of 






402 Punyaratabandhu, above n 172, 165. 
403 Anukansai, above n 288. 
404 Pinai Nanakom, 'Re-Making of the Constitution in Thailand' (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative 
Law90, 90. 
405 Jumbala, above n 172, 273. 




1 .  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
D e m o c r a c y .  B e f o r e  p r o c e e d i n g ,  t h e  t e r m  ' d e m o c r a c y '  s h o u l d  f i r s t  b e  d e f i n e d .  D e b a t e s  o n  w h a t  
' d e m o c r a c y '  m e a n s  h a v e  b e e n  g o i n g  o n  f o r  c e n t u r i e s  a n d  w i l l  c o n t i n u e .  T h e r e  i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  n o  
o n e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  d e m o c r a c y  t h a t  i s  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  a l l  s c h o l a r s .
4 0 7  
D a h l  a r g u e s  t h a t  d e m o c r a c y  




T h i s  t h e s i s  
d o e s  n o t  p r e s u m e  t o  s o l v e  t h e  d e b a t e .  A s  a  g u i d e ,  h o w e v e r ,  d e m o c r a c y  i n  t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  u s e d  i n  
t h e  s e n s e  a s  i t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  u n d e r s t o o d  i n  I n d o n e s i a n  p o l i t i c s ,  t h a t  i s  " g o v e r n m e n t  o f  t h e  p e o p l e ,  
b y  t h e  p e o p l e ,  a n d  f o r  t h e  p e o p l e " . 4 o 9  
F o r  B a g i r  M a n a n ,  d e m o c r a c y  i n  I n d o n e s i a  c a n  o n l y  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  c o n s i s t e n t l y  a p p l y i n g  t h e  
n o t i o n  o f  ' a  s t a t e  o f  l a w '  ( t h e  n e g a r a  h u k u m )  t h a t  i s ,  ( i )  t o  a p p l y  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
g o v e r n m e n t ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  p o w e r s  t h r o u g h  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  ( i i )  t o  h a v e  a n  
i n d e p e n d e n t  a n d  f a i r  j u d i c i a l  s y s t e m ;  ( i i i )  t o  h o n o r  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u a l i t y  b e f o r e  t h e  l a w ;  ( i v )  t o  
g u a r a n t e e  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s ;  a n d  ( v )  t o  c o n d u c t  a  f r e e ,  f a i r  a n d  j u s t  e l e c t i o n . 4 1 o  
L u b i s  i n  s i m i l a r  t e r m s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  b a s i c  i n g r e d i e n t s  o f  n e g a r a  h u k u m :  ( i )  a  
g u a r a n t e e  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s  p r o t e c t i o n ;  ( i i )  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  a n d  i m p a r t i a l  j u d i c i a r y ;  a n d  ( i i i )  s t r i c t  
a d h e r e n c e  t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  l e g a l i t y . m  
L i n d s e y  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  n e g a r a  h u k u m  i s  " a  h i g h l y  c h a r g e d  n o t i o n  t h a t  h a s  p l a y e d  a  
c e n t r a \  r o \ e "  i n  \ n d o n e s i a n  \ e g a \  a n d  \ ) O \ i \ i c a \  s y s \ e m .
4
1 2  i h e  m e a n i n g  o~ n e g a r a  h u k u m  h a s  




F o r  f u r t h e r  d e b a t e s  o n  ' d e m o c r a c y '  s e e  f o r  e x a m p l e :  R o b e r t  A .  D a h l ,  A  P r e f a c e  t o  D e m o c r a t i c  T h e o r y  ( 1 9 6 3 ) ;  M . l .  F i n l e y ,  
D e m o c r a c y  A n c i e n t  a n d  M o d e r n  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ;  G i o v a n n i  S a r t o r i ,  D e m o c r a t i c  T h e o r y  ( 1 9 6 5 ) ;  J a c k  L i v e l y ,  D e m o c r a c y  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ;  R o b e r t  
A .  D a h l ,  D e m o c r a c y  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s :  P r o m i s e  a n d  P e r f o r m a n c e  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ;  R o b e r t  A .  D a h l ,  D e m o c r a c y ,  L i b e r t y ,  a n d  E q u a l i t y  
( 1 9 8 6 ) ;  G i o v a n n i  S a r t o r i ,  T h e  T h e o r y  o f  D e m o c r a c y  R e v i s i t e d  ( 1 9 8 7 ) ;  R o b e r t  A .  D a h l ,  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  I t s  C r i t i c s  ( 1 9 8 9 ) ;  
H u n t i n g t o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 2 9 ;  B e r n a r d  C r i c k ,  D e m o c r a c y :  A  V e r y  S h o r t  I n t r o d u c t i o n  ( 2 0 0 2 ) ;  J a n - E r i k  L a n e  a n d  S v a n t e  E r s s o n  
( e d s ) ,  D e m o c r a c y  :  A  C o m p a r a t i v e  A p p r o a c h  ( 2 0 0 3 ) ;  R o b e r t  D a h l ,  l a n  S h a p i r o ,  a n d  J o s e  A n t o n i o  C h e i b u b  ( e d s ) ,  T h e  
d e m o c r a c y  S o u r c e b o o k  ( 2 0 0 3 ) .  
4
0 8  R o b e r t  A .  D a h l ,  O n  D e m o c r a c y  ( 2 0 0 0 )  3 .  
4 0 9  
F o r  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  ' d e m o c r a c y '  i n  I n d o n e s i a  s e e  f o r  e x a m p l e :  H e r b e r t  F e i t h ,  T h e  D e c l i n e  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
D e m o c r a c y  i n  I n d o n e s i a  ( 1 9 6 2 ) ;  M o h .  M a h f u d ,  D e m o k r a s i  d a n  K o n s t i t u s i  d i  I n d o n e s i a :  S t u d i  t e n t a n g  l n t e r a k s i  P o l i t i k  d a n  
K e h i d u p a n  K e t a t a n e g a r a a n  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ;  E e p  S a e f u l l o h  F a t a h ,  M a s a l a h  d a n  P r o s p e k  D e m o k r a s i  d i  I n d o n e s i a  ( 1 9 9 4 ) ;  a n d  D a v i d  
B o u r c h i e r  a n d  J o h n  L e g g e  ( e d s ) ,  D e m o c r a c y  i n  I n d o n e s i a ,  1 9 5 0 s  a n d  1 9 9 0 s  ( 1 9 9 4 )  
4
1
0  M a n  a n ,  a b o v e  n  2 9 , 1 5 1  - 1 5 5 .  
4 1 1  
T o d u n g  M u l y a  L u b i s ,  ' T h e  R e c t s s t a a t  a n d  H u m a n  R i g h t s '  i n  T i m o t h y  L i n d s e y  { e d )  I n d o n e s i a :  L a w  a n d  S o c i e t y  ( 1 9 9 9 )  1 7 2  
4 1 2  
T i m o t h y  L i n d s e y ,  ' F r o m  R u l e  o f  L a w  t o  L a w  o f  t h e  R u l e r s - t o  R e f o r m a t i o n ? '  i n  T i m o t h y  L i n d s e y  ( e d )  I n d o n e s i a :  L a w  a n d  
S o c i e t y  ( 1 9 9 9 )  1 3 .  
4 1 3
1 b i d .  
6 2  
referred to the Dutch notion of rechtsstaat as opposed to maachtsstaat, that is, a state based 
on law rather than power.414 For David Bourchier, in practice, however, the concept of negara 
hukum was not applied consistently. Bourchier referred to. the mixed signals of Soeharto's 
administration which routinely mentioned that Indonesia was a rechtsstaat but at the same time 
the government rejected the doctrine of separation of powers,415 which is a fundamental 
element of a democratic Constitution, as this thesis will argue later in this section. 
Do constitutions matter for democracy? This question has left scholars divided. Some 
scholars argue that most countries have codified constitutions, but very few are democratic 
states. Vernon Bogdanor states for example: 
... the vast majority of the ... members states comprising the United Nations have codified 
constitutions, although less than a third of these can fairly claim democratic credentials. 
The latter can ... be counted on one's fingers and toes.416 
Wheare argues that the majority of the constitutions are either suspended or openly 
dishonored.417 Conversely, Bogdanor felt that the United Kingdom, Israel and New Zealand lack 
codified constitutions, but nonetheless follow with extraordinary consistency and continuity 
what constitutional regulations they do have.41B 
This is an argument based on the "ineffectiveness of constitutions".m This argument points that 
having a Constitution is one thing whilst creating a democratic country is another. Opponents of 
constitutionalism have even concluded that "constitutions are otiose".42o If regimes implement 
self-restraint, a written Constitution will be unnecessary, and if they do not then it is 
ineffective.421 Therefore, Bogdanor concludes the existence of "constitutions are not, of course, 
confined to democratic states". 422 
414 Lubis, above n 411, 171 -172. 
415 David Bourchier, 'Positivism and Romanticism in Indonesian Legal Thought' in Timothy Lindsey (ed) Indonesia: Law and 
Society ( 1999) 186. 
416 Vernon Bogdanor, 'Introduction' in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.), constitutions in Democratic Politics (1988) 3. 
417 Wheare, above n 75, 5-6. 
418 Bogdanor, above n 416, 3 
419 Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden above n 85, 2. 
420 Ibid. 
421 1bid. 
422 Bogdanor above n 416, 3. 
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F u r t h e r ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  L a n e ,  t h e  i d e a  o f  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  m i g h t  n o t  b e  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  




L a n e  d i v i d e s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  i n t o  ' s t r o n g '  v e r s u s  ' w e a k '  b a s e d  o n  t h e  " e x t e n t  t o  
w h i c h  a  s t a t e  e n t r e n c h e s  i m m u n i t i e s  a n d  i n e r t i a " .
4 2 4  
I n  a  s t r o n g  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t a t e  t h e r e  w o u l d  
b e  m a n y  i m m u n i t i e s  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  a s  s u p e r i o r  l a w ,  w h i c h  
w o u l d  b e  p r o t e c t e d  b y  s t r o n g  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w ,  s o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w o u l d  b e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c h a n g e .
4 2
5  
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i n  a  w e a k  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t a t e  " t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  l e s s  o f  i m m u n i t i e s  a n d  n o t  
m u c h  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n e r t i a  i n  c o m b i n a t i o n  w i t h  o n l y  w e a k  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w ' ' .
4 2 6  
S t r o n g  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  c l a s h e s  w i t h  d e m o c r a c y  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  c a n  b e  t o o  m a n y  i m m u n i t i e s  
a n d  t o o  m u c h  i n e r t i a  t o w a r d s  s o c i a l  d e c i s i o n s .
4 2 7  
O n l y  w e a k  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  w o u l d  
c o m p l e m e n t  d e m o c r a c y  b y  p a s s i n g  t o  i t  m o r e  s t a b i l i t y  i n  s o c i a l  d e c i s i o n s .
4 2 8  
H o l d i n g  t h e  s a m e  
o p i n i o n ,  R i c h a r d  B e l l a m y  D a r i o  C a t i g l i o n e  s t a t e s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  a n d  d e m o c r a c y  c a n  a p p e a r  
t o  b o t h  c o n t r a d i c t  a n d  s u p p o r t  e a c h  o t h e r .  O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  r e f e r s  t o  l i m i t i n g  
a n d  d i v i d i n g  p o w e r s ,  w h i l e  d e m o c r a c y  m e a n s  " u n i f i e d  a n d  u n c o n s t r a i n e d  e x e r c i s e " .
4 2 9  
L i k e w i s e ,  
C a r l o s  S a n t i a g o  N i n o  w a r n s  t h a t :  
[ t ] h e  m a r r i a g e  o f  d e m o c r a c y  a n d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  i s  n o t  a n  e a s y  o n e  . . .  T e n s i o n s  a r i s e  
w h e n  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  d e m o c r a c y  l e a d s  t o  a  w e a k e n i n g  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m ,  o r  w h e n  t h e  
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i d e a  e n t a i l s  r e s t r a i n t  o f  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  p r o c e s s .
4 3 0  




H e  
s a i d :  
[ i ] f  d e m o c r a c y  m e a n s  n o  m o r e  t h a n  u n i v e r s a l  s u f f r a g e  o r  e q u a l i t y  o f  c o n d i t i o n s ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  
f o l l o w  a t  a l l  t h a t  i t  w i l l  p r o d u c e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t .  U n i v e r s a l  s u f f r a g e  c a n  c r e a t e  
a n d  s u p p o r t  a  t y r a n n y  o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o r  o f  a  m i n o r i t y  o r  o f  o n e  m a n  . . .  I t  i s  o n l y  i f  a  
d e m o c r a c y  m e a n s  l i b e r t y  a s  w e l l  a s  e q u a l i t y  t h a t  i t  c a n  b e  e x p e c t e d  w i t h  a n y  c o n f i d e n c e  
t o  p r o d u c e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t . 4 3 2  
4 2 3  L a n e ,  a b o v e  n  9 4 ,  2 6 3 - 2 6 4 .  
4 2 4 1 b i d  2 6 1 .  
4 2
5 1 b i d .  
4 2 6 1 b i d  2 6 1  - 2 6 2 .  
4 2
7 1 b i d  2 6 3 - 2 6 4 .  
4 2 8 1 b i d  2 6 4 .  
4
2 9  R i c h a r d  B e l l a m y  D a r i o  C a t i g l i o n e ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  a n d  D e m o c r a c y  - P o l i t i c a l  T h e o r y  a n d  t h e  A m e r i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n '  
( 1 9 9 7 )  2 7 : 4  B r i t i s h  J o u r n a l  o f  P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e  1 .  
4 3 0  C a r l o s  S a n t i a g o  N i n o ,  T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  D e l i b e r a t i v e  D e m o c r a c y  (  1 9 9 6 )  1  - 2 .  
4 3 1  W h e a r e ,  a b o v e  n  7 5 ,  2 0 5 .  
6 4  
By contrast, according to supporters of constitutionalism, constitutions are not only a symbol of 
the political times of when they were adopted, but also systematically affect the course of public 
policy. For this group, constitutions have been regarded as providing a necessary framework 
for democracy. Democracy is the main idea underlying a Constitution.433 In the context of 
transition to democracy, Bonime-Bianc argues that Constitution is "the legitimator of 
democracy. It represents the democratic prerequisite without which no democracy can exist".434 
Although acknowledging the tension between democracy and constitutions is real, the 
advocates of constitutionalism suggest one must not overstate their dissimilarities. In the issue 
of centrality of human dignity, for example, although disagreeing with the way to guard that 
value, both constitutions and democracies recognize the centrality of dignity.435 Consequently, 
to an extent, the two theories should work hand-and-hand.436 The mix of constitutionalism and 
democracy creates a reasonably effective but still limited system of government known as a 
constitutional democracy. For the supporters, the combination between the two notions is "a 
happy marriage of two valuable ideals".437 For them, constitutional democracy is a better form 
of government than "pure democracy'' or "nondemocratic constitutional government".438 
Therefore, in responding to the 'ineffective' argument, its advocates argue that constitutional 
government is not synonymous with democratic government: one should differentiate between 
the two.439 It is quite possible to find examples of constitutional government which are not 
democratic. Often authoritarian governments employ 'fac;ade constitutions'. 440 This happens, for 
example, in many developing countries. Although the governments of these countries have 
formally adopted constitutions, they generally ignore the principles of democratic constitutions, 
such as separation of powers and protection of human rights. Therefore, these countries may 
have constitutions, but their political systems are not constitutional. Indeed the twentieth 
4321bid. 
433 John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, 'Our Supermajoritarian Constitution', (2002) 80 Texas Law Review 705. 
434 Bonime-Bianc, above n 64, 13. 
435 Walter F. Murphy, 'constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy' in Douglas Greenberg et al (eds), Constitutionalism 
and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (1993) 6. 
4361bid. 
437 Nino, above n 430, 1. 
4381bid. 
439 Wheare, above n 75. 206. 
440 Sartori classifies constitutions into nominal, real and far;ade constitutions, depending on whether they are unexecuted 
documents, effectively implemented blueprints or devices hidden behind dictatorial regimes. 
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c e n t u r y  s a w  m a n y  c o u n t r i e s  l i v e  u n d e r  s u c h  c o n s t i t u t i o n s ,  b u t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  w e r e  " t r e a t e d  
w i t h  n e g l e c t  o r  c o n t e m p t " . 4 4 t  
F a 9 a d e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  e x i s t  b e c a u s e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  M c W h i n n e y ,  c a n  b e  d i v i d e d  i n t o  
' n o m i n a l '  a n d  ' n o r m a t i v e '  c o n s t i t u t i o n s .
4 4 2  
' N o m i n a l '  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  c o n t a i n  m o r e  r h e t o r i c  a n d  
s y m b o l i c  e l e m e n t s ,  a n d  m o s t l y  h a v e  a  p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s  f u n c t i o n .  T h i s  t y p e  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n  m a y  
b e  l e g a l l y  v a l i d  b u t  n o t  i m p l e m e n t e d .  I t  i s  a n  u n e x e c u t e d  d o c u m e n t .
4 4
3  M e a n w h i l e ,  ' n o r m a t i v e '  
c o n s t i t u t i o n s  h a v e  m o r e  f u n c t i o n a l  a n d  o p e r a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  T h e s e  a r e  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  
w h i c h  i n  p r a c t i c e  a r e  f u l l y  a c t i v a t e d  a n d  e f f e c t i v e .
4 4 4  
A s  a  r e s u l t ,  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  n e e d  t o  b e  m o r e  
n o r m a t i v e  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  b i r t h  o f  n o t  o n l y  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  b u t  a l s o  a  d e m o c r a t i c  
g o v e r n m e n t .  
I t  i s  t h e  c h a l l e n g e  f o r  t h e  a d v o c a t e s  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  w i l l  b e  
d e m o c r a t i c  g o v e r n m e n t s .  F o r m a l l y  w r i t t e n  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  h a v e  t o  b e  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r a c t i c e s .  M o v i n g  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  f r o m  a  d o c u m e n t a r y  s t a g e  t o  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t a g e ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  
a  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  i n v o l v i n g  m a n y  p r o b l e m s  r e l a t e d  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e s i g n  a n d  j u d i c i a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
4 4 5  
A s  a  r e s u l t ,  m a n y  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  r e m a i n  s i m p l y  a s  d e a d  p a p e r w o r k .  T h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  s u c c e s s  i n  t r a n s f e r r i n g  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  f r o m  a  ' d e a d '  l e g a l  t e x t  i n t o  t o  a  p r a c t i c a l  
d o c u m e n t  d e p e n d s  o n  a  v a r i e t y  o f  f o r c e s :  p o l i t i c s ,  e c o n o m i c  a n d  s o c i a l .
4 4 6  
I t  a l s o  d e p e n d s  o n  
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f .
4 4 7  
L a n e  a r g u e s  t h a t  " c o m p l i c a t e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  w i t h  
c o n t r a d i c t o r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  . .  .  p r o v e  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i m p l e m e n t  t h a n  a  s i m p l e  c o m p a c t  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d o c u m e n t " . 4 4 a  
F i n a l l y ,  o n  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  d e m o c r a c y  a n d  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  q u o t e  D a h l  w h o  
a r g u e s  t h a t :  
4 4 1  W h e a r e ,  a b o v e  n  7 5 ,  5 - 6 .  
4 4 2  M c W h i n n e y ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 1 ,  9 .  
4 4 3
1 b i d .  
4 4 4 1 b i d .  
4 4 5  L a n e ,  a b o v e  n  9 4 ,  2 1 1 .  
4 4
6 1 b i d  1 8 9 .  
4 4 7 1 b i d .  
4 4
8 1 b i d .  
6 6  
[a] well designed Constitution might help democratic institution to survive, whereas a badly 
designed Constitution might contribute to the breakdown of democratic Constitution.449 
2. Democratic Constitution 
What is a democratic Constitution? Ann Stuart Diamond argues that the basic definition of a 
democratic Constitution is, "one which the will of majority prevails, or in which the majority 
rules".45° For Andreas Kalyvas, a democratic Constitution is a Constitution which should 
"embody democratic values and principles".451 In Jan Erik Lane words, a democratic 
Constitution is a 'just' Constitution.452 Lane links his definition to John Rawls who defines a just 
Constitution as "a just procedure arranged to ensure a just outcome".453 
a. No Single Formula 
The above definitions of democratic Constitution are, obviously, just example. A definition of a 
democratic Constitution is different, as democracy has many different interpretation.454 For Dahl 
there is no single structure of a democratic Constitution.455 Even among countries which are 
considered democratic, "democratic constitutions come in a variety of styles and forms". 456 The 
varieties, among others, range from whether the Constitution is written or unwritten, federal or 
unitary, unicameral or bicameral legislature, and presidential or parliamentary.457 Therefore, for 
those who look for one formula of a democratic Constitution, Dahl warns that: 
[a]ll constitutional arrangements have some disadvantages; none satisfy all reasonable 
criteria. From a democratic point of view, there is no perfect Constitution.458 
Similarly, Wheare argues that "the constitutions of different countries show at once that people 
differ very much in what they think it necessary for a Constitution to contain".459 On these 
449 Dahl, above n 408, 128. 
450 Ann Stuart Diamond, 'Decent, Even Though Democracy' in Robert A Goldwin and William A Schambra (eds), How 
Democratic Is the Constitution (1980) 21. 
451 Andreas Kalyvas, 'Carl Schmitt and the Three Moments of Democracy' (2000) 21 Cardozo Law Review 1547. 
452 Lane, above n 94, 217-218. 
453 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1972) 197. 
454 Dahl, above n 408, 3. 
455 1bid 36. 
4561bid 119. 
457 1bid 120-124. 
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1: 
v a r i e t i e s ,  R a w l s  i s  o f .  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  i t  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  s o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n  o f  w h e r e  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  a p p l i e c t  4 6 0  
I n  W h e e l e r ' s  w o r d s :  
[ f j r a m i n g  a n  " i d e a l "  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  a n y  o n e  o r  a l l  o f  t h e  s t a t e s  c o u l d  a d o p t  i n  t o t o  i s  
i m p o s s i b l e .  A  C o n s t i t u t i o n  l i k e  a l l  h u m a n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  m u s t  g r o w  o u t  o f  t h e  h i s t o r y ,  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n s ,  t h e  p e c u l i a r  p r o b l e m s ,  t h e  f e l t  n e e d s  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o m m u n i t y .
4 6 1  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  U l r i c h  K .  P r e u s s :  
[ c ] o n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  n o t  a l l  a l i k e .  T h e y  d i f f e r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  t r a d i t i o n ,  p h y s i c a l ,  e c o n o m i c ,  
a n d  s o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  w o r l d  v i e w ,  c u l t u r e ,  a n d  h i s t o r i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  a  p e o p l e  w h i c h  
g i v e s  i t s e l f  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n . 4 6 2  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  w h e t h e r  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  a  d e m o c r a t i c  t e x t  o r  n o t  m a y  b e  d i f f e r e n t  
f r o m  p e r s o n  t o  p e r s o n .  T h e  A m e r i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  a n  e x a m p l e .  F o r  S t e p h e n  B r e y e r ,  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  a  d e m o c r a t i c  d o c u m e n t  w h i c h  c r e a t e s  a  f r a m e w o r k  o f :  ( a )  d e m o c r a t i c  s e l f -
g o v e r n m e n t ;  ( b )  d i s p e r s i o n  o f  p o w e r ;  ( c )  i n d i v i d u a l  d i g n i t y ;  ( d )  e q u a l i t y  b e f o r e  t h e  l a w ;  a n d  ( e )  
t h e  r u l e  o f  l a w .
4
6 3  B u t  D a h l  s t r o n g l y  d i s a g r e e s .  H e  e m p l o y s  " d e m o c r a t i c  s t a n d a r d s "  t o  e x p l o r e  
w h e t h e r  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h a r t e r  i s  " e n a b l e  p o l i t i c a l l y  e q u a l  c i t i z e n s  t o  g o v e r n  t h e m s e l v e s " .
4 6 4  
D a h l  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  t h e  A m e r i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  n o t  a l l  t h a t  d e m o c r a t i c .
4 6 5  
D a h l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
a r g u e s  t h a t  t o  m a k e  t h e  A m e r i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a  m o d e l  f o r  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  i s  a n  i l l u s i o n .
4 6 6  
b .  E l e m e n t s  o f  a  D e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
D e s p i t e  t h e  v a r i e t i e s  o n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  a n d  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  o n  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  o n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  W h e e l e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  " p r i n c i p l e s  o f  s o u n d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e "  w h i c h  
4
5 8 1 b i d  1 4 0 .  
4 5 9  W h e a r e  a b o v e  n  7 5 ,  4 6 .  
4 6 0  R a w l s ,  a b o v e  n  4 5 3 ,  3 3 9 .  
4 6 1  W h e e l e r ,  a b o v e  n  1 0 4 ,  x i .  
4
6 2  U l r i c h  K .  P r e u s s ,  ' P a t t e r n s  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  E v o l u t i o n  a n d  C h a n g e  i n  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e '  i n  J o a c h i m  J e n s  H e s s e  a n d  N e v i l  
J o h n s o n  ( e d s ) ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  P o l i c y  a n d  C h a n g e  i n  E u r o p e  ( 1 9 9 5 )  9 5 .  
4
6 3  S t e p h e n  B r e y e r ,  ' O u r  D e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n '  ( 2 0 0 2 )  7 7  N e w  Y o r k  U n i v e r s i t y  L a w  R e v i e w  2 4 7 .  
4
6 4  R o b e r t  A .  D a h l ,  H o w  D e m o c r a t i c  i s  t h e  A m e r i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n ?  ( 2 0 0 1 )  3 - 4 .  
4
6 5 1 b i d  1 1 0  - 1 3 9 .  
4 6 6 1 b i d  4 1 .  
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may be implemented in different ways, but which "provide common guidelines to the 
development of modern constitutions". 467 
I would argue that there are two essential elements which should be included in a democratic 
Constitution: separation of powers and protection of human rights. Lane argues 
"constitutionalism today would comprise at least two distinct set of institutions, namely: (a) 
human rights and (b) separation of powers institutions".468 Referring to S. Holmes, Preuss views 
that separation of powers and the guarantee of individual rights as "the main institutional 
devices" for a Constitution.469 
DanielS. Lev argues that constitutionalism is "a matter of distribution of power and authority".47o 
For Friedrich, the essence of constitutionalism is the division of power.47t He further argues that 
by dividing power, constitutionalism provides a system of effective limitations upon 
governmental actions.472 Indeed, according to Annen Junji, constitutionalism is by definition the 
limitation of political power by a Constitution.m Likewise, Lane defines constitutionalism as the 
"political doctrine that claims that political authority should be bound by institutions that restrict 
the exercise of power";474 and Scott Gordon argues that constitutionalism is "a political system 
that imposes constraints upon the exercise of political power''.475 For Mcilwain: 
... in all its successive phases, constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal 
limitation on government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic 
government, the government of will instead of law ... the most persistent and the most 
lasting essentials of true constitutionalism still remains what it has been almost from the 
beginning, the limitation of government by law.476 
467 Wheeler, above n 104, xi. 
468 Lane, above n 94, 62. 
469 Preuss, above n 462, 95. 
470 Daniel S. Lev, 'Some Movements, Constitutionalism, and Human Rights: Comments from the Malaysian and Indonesian 
Experiences' in Douglas Greenberg et a! (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World 
(1993) 140. 
471 Friedrich, above n 83, 5, 25. 
472 1bid 26. 
473 Annen Junji, 'Constitutionalism as a Political Culture' (2002) 11 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 562. 
474 Lane, above n 94, 19. 
475 Scott Gordon, Controlling the State: Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to Today(1999) 236, " 
476 Mcilwain, above n 72, 21 - 22. 
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A l o n g s i d e  t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  p o w e r ,  W a l t e r  M .  M u r p h y  a r g u e s  t h a t  a n o t h e r  c e n t r a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
"  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  i s  h u m a n  r i g h t s .
4 7 7  
A l a n  S .  R o s e n b a u m  a r g u e s  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  h a s  
e v o l v e d  t o  m e a n  " t h e  l e g a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  p l a c e d  u p o n  t h e  r i g h t f u l  p o w e r  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  i t s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  c i t i z e n s " . 4 7 8  
I n d e e d ,  f o r  L a n e ,  t h e  b a s i s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  i s  b o t h  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e  v e r s u s  s o c i e t y  
i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s ;  a n d  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s  
w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e .
4 7 9  
H e  a r g u e s  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  i s :  
. . .  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r y  t h a t  u n d e r l i n e s  t h e  r u l e  o f  l a w  l i m i t i n g  s t a t e  s o v e r e i g n t y  b y  m e a n s  o f  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  g u a r a n t e e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s  a n d  c i t i z e n s  r i g h t s .
4 8 0  
T h i s  t h e s i s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t o  a c h i e v e  t r u e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  m u s t  i n c l u d e  p r o v i s i o n s  
t h a t  a l l o w  f o r  c o n t r o l  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r s  a n d  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s .  A  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w i t h o u t  
t h e s e  t w o  e l e m e n t s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  w o u l d  o n l y  b e  a  l i f e l e s s  d o c u m e n t .  F u r t h e r  a r g u m e n t s  
w h i c h  s u p p o r t  t h e  t w o  e l e m e n t s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a r e  h e r e b y  e l a b o r a t e d .  
( 1 )  S e p a r a t i o n  o f  P o w e r s  
T h e  n o t i o n  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s  s h o u l d ·  b e  r e l a t e d  t o  D e  / ' E s p r i t  d e s  L o i x  o f  M o n t e s q u i e u  
a n d  T w o  T r e a t i s e s  o f  C i v i l  G o v e r n m e n t  w r i t t e n  b y  J o h n  L o c k e .  A n o t h e r  e a r l y  a n d  s t r o n g  
e n u n c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  d o c t r i n e  w a s  a r g u e d  b y  t h e  f o u n d i n g  f a t h e r s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  A m e r i c a .  
G e o r g e  W a s h i n g t o n  w a r n s ,  " T h e  s p i r i t  o f  e n c r o a c h m e n t  t e n d s  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  t h e  p o w e r s  o f  a l l  
t h e  d e p a r t m e n t s  i n  o n e ,  a n d  t h u s  t o  c r e a t e ,  w h a t e v e r  t h e  f o r m  o f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a  r e a l  
d e s p o t i s m " .
4
8 1  R e f e r r i n g  t o  M o n t e s q u i e u ,  R e r h a r d  C a s p e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s  i s  a  
f u n c t i o n a l  c o n c e p t  w h i c h  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a l l o w  l i b e r t y :  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s  
p r o m o t e s  t y r a n n y .
4 8 2  
C a s p e r ' s  o p i n i o n  i s  r e m i n i s c e n t  o f  J a m e s  M a d i s o n ' s  i d e a  t h a t :  
4 7
7  
M u r p h y ,  a b o v e  n  4 3 5 ,  3 .  
4 7
8  A l a n  S .  R o s e n b a u m  ( e d ) ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m :  T h e  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  D i m e n s i o n  ( 1 9 8 8 )  4 .  
4 7 9  L a n e ,  a b o v e  n  9 4 ,  2 5 ,  6 2 .  
4 8 0  
I b i d  5 8 .  
4
8 1  A r t h u r  T .  V a n d e r b i l t ,  T h e  D o c t r i n e  o f  t h e  S e p a r a t i o n  o f  P o w e r s  a n d  I t s  P r e s e n t - D a y  S i g n i f i c a n c e  ( 1 9 6 3 )  4 .  
4 8 2  
G e r h a r d  C a s p e r ,  S e p a r a t i n g  o f  P o w e r s :  E s s a y s  o n  t h e  F o u n d i n g  P e r i o d  ( 1 9 9 7 )  9 .  
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[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few or in any, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.483 · 
Therefore, Bernard H. Siegan argues that government power should be separated so that "a 
combination legislative enactment, executive implementation, and judicial interpretation, no 
group or person will be able to impose its unchecked will".484 Referring to the American 
Constitution, Siegan outlined some examples of constitutional separation of powers: the Senate 
must consent by majority vote to major appointment made by the President; the President has 
. . 
the power to veto Congressional legislation however this can be overridden by a two-thirds vote 
of Congress; and the President appoints Supreme Court all federal judges, but again 
confirmation is needed from the Senate.48s . 
Judicial Review. One of the important institutions of the separation of powers is the notion of. 
judicial review. This institution has become increasingly popular. Lane notes that several new 
constitutions provide some kind of Constitutional Court that. has the task of reviewing whether 
laws are in accordance with the Constitution.486 Dahl,. however, argues that the power of a 
Supreme Court to declare a legislation unconstitutional is "far more controversial". 487 Dahl: 
further argues that in making their review, the judges might be contaminated by their own 
ideology, biases and references.488 
On the other hand, Rawls argues that judicial review is among the legitimate institutions that is 
necessary in a democratic Constitution to constrain potential abuses of the legislature.489 
Quoted by Freeman, Rawls, however, agrees that judicial review might become; anti-
democratic when it is, for example, used to make. unnecessary decisions to overturn 
legitimately, enacted laws that are designed to promote the effective exercise of human 
rights.490 Referring to Rawls' view of "justice as fairness", Joseph M. Farber argues that "judicial 
483Vanderbilt, above n 481, 4. 
484 Bernard H. Siegan, Drafting a Constitution for a Nation or Republic Emerging into Freedom (1994) 8. 
4851bid. 
486 Lane, above n 94, 129. 
487 Dahl, above n 464, 54- 55. 
488 1bid 55. 
489 Rawls, above n 453, 224, 228- 234. 
490 SanJUel Freeman, 'Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution' (1994) 69 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 659- 660. 
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r e v i e w  c a n  b e  j u s t i f i e d  u n d e r  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a s  a  m e a n s  t o  p r o t e c t i n g  v a r i o u s  
f u n d a m e n t a l  p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s " . 4 9 1  
D i e t e r  G r i m m  a r g u e s  t h a t  " j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  i s  n o t  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  d e m o c r a c y ,  n e i t h e r  i s  i t  
i n d i s p e n s a b l e  f o r  d e m o c r a c y . " 4 9 2  G r i m m  f u r t h e r  a r g u e s  t h a t :  
[ ! ] h o s e  w h o  t a k e  t h e  o p p o s i t e  p o s i t i o n  a n d  d e c l a r e  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  a  n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  
d e m o c r a c y  u s e  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  o f  l i t t l e  o r  n o  v a l u e  w i t h o u t  a n  
i n s t i t u t i o n  t h a t  g u a r a n t e e s  g o v e r n m e n t  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s .  
4 9
3  
T h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  E x p e r i e n c e .  D . J .  B r a n d  a r g u e s  t h a t  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  1 9 9 6  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s  w a s  r e c o g n i z e d  w i t h  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  t w o - c h a m b e r  
p a r l i a m e n t ,  n a m e l y  t h e  A s s e m b l y  a n d  S e n a t e ,  a s  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  b r a n c h ,  a  s t a t e  P r e s i d e n t ,  a  
p r i m e  m i n i s t e r  a n d  c a b i n e t  a s  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  a n d  t h e  j u d i c i a r y ,  w h i c h  w a s  o r g a n i z e d  a n d  
a p p o i n t e d  a t  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  a s  t h e  t h i r d  b r a n c h  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .
4 9 4  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
e s t a b l i s h e d  i n d e p e n d e n t  a n d  i m p a r t i a l  a g e n c i e s  d e s i g n e d  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  
d e m o c r a c y :  t h e  P u b l i c  P r o t e c t o r ;  t h e .  H u m a n  R i g h t s  C o m m i s s i o n ;  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  t h e  
P r o m o t i o n  a n d  P r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  R i g h t s  . o f  C u l t u r a l ,  R e l i g i o u s  a n d  L i n g u i s t i c  C o m m u n i t i e s ;  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  G e n d e r  E q u a l i t y ;  t h e  A u d i t o r - G e n e r a l ;  a n d  t h e  E l e c t o r a l  C o m m i s s i o n .
4 9 5  
W i t h  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 9 6  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l a w  h a s  r e p l a c e d  t h e  




T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  i s  a  ~ew s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t o  " g u a r d  a n d  




O n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w ,  t h e  1 9 9 6  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
m a i n t a i n e d  t h e  c o n c e p t  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  I n t e r i m  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  J h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  h a s  t h e  
p o w e r  t o  m a k e  " a b s t r a c t  r e v i e w "  o n  b i l l s  b r o u g h t  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o r  o n  l a w s  b r o u g h t  t o  t h e  
C o u r t  b y  M e m b e r s  o f  P a r l i a m e n t .
4 9 8  
B y  p r o p e r l y  u s i n g  t h e  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  p o w e r ,  M a r g a r e t  A .  
4
9 1  J o s e p h  M .  F a r b e r ,  ' J u s t f y i n g  J u d i c i a l  R e v i e w '  ( 2 0 0 3 )  3 2  C a p i t a l  U n i v e r s i t y  L a w  R e v i e w  6 9 .  
4
9 2  D i e t e r  G r i m m ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A d j u d i c a t i o n  a n d  D e m o c r a c y '  ( 1 9 9 9 )  3 3 / s r a e /  L a w  R e v i e w  1 9 9 .  
4 9
3 1 b i d .  
4
9 4  D . J .  B r a n d ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m '  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3  C u m b e r l a n d  L a w  R e v i e w 4 .  
4 9 5  S e c t i o n  1 8 1  o f  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
4 9 6  N i c h o l a s  H a y s o m ,  ' F e d e r a l  F e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  F i n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n ' ,  i n  P e n e l o p e  A n d r e w s  a n d  S t e p h e n  E l l m a n  ( e d s ) ,  P o s t -
A p a r t h e i d  c o n s t i t u t i o n s :  P e r s p e c t i v e s  o n  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  B a s i c  L a w  ( 2 0 0 1 )  5 4 7 .  
4 9 7
1 b i d .  
4 9
8 1 b i d .  
7 2  
Burnham believes that the Constitutional Court will enable South Africa to assume its place 
-IV 
arl]ong the pre-eminent constitutional democracies of the world .499 
The Thai Experience. The Thai 1997 Constitution, despite having the monarchy as the 
fundamental basis of Thai constitutionalism, successfully strengthened the concept of 
separation of powers.50° Further the Constitution created some independent agencies designed 
to monitor the government administration,5ot namely: Election Commission; a National Counter 
Corruption Commission; the Supreme Court's Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political 
Positions; the Ombudsman; the State Audit Commission; the National Human Rights 
Commission; the Constitutional Court; and the Administrative Courts. 
{2) Protection of Human Rights 
In arguing that the adoption of protection of human rights into a democratic Constitution is 
essential, Muna Ndulo argues that: 
[b]eyond the essential ingredients of a democracy, a democratic Constitution should be 
seen as a liberating document - one that not only limits the powers of the state and its 
institutions, but guarantees the kinds of liberties that will make the pursuit of happiness 
and self-fulfillment a reality for the people.502 
In the same way, Lane argues that one of the normative criteria which should be satisfied by a 
just Constitution related to two different conceptions of justice: legal justice and social justice.5o3 
Legal justice implies providing for due process of law, equal protection and individual 
liberties.so4 Social justice refers to the distribution of income and wealth should be to everyone 
advantage.505 In Rawls' words, legal justice is the notion that "each person is to have an equal 
right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty to others".506 
499 Margaret A. Burnham, 'Cultivating a Saddling Charter: South Africa's Court Grows Its Constitution' (1997) 3 Michigan 
Journal of Race and Law 58. 
500 Harding, above n 68, 240- 241. 
501 1bid 247-248. 
502 Muna Ndulo, 'The Democratization Process and Structural Adjustment in Africa' (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 346. 
503 Lane, above n 94, 239. 
5041bid 227. 
5051bid 228-229. 
506 Rawls, above n 453, 60. 
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I n  r e g a r d  t o  l i b e r t y  a n d  e q u a l i t y ,  D a h l  a r g u e s  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  i n  A m e r i c a  r e q u i r e s  a  
'  
r e d u c t i o n  o f  " t h e  v a s t  i n e q u a l i t i e s  i n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  r e s o u r c e s " .  5 0 7  T h i s  
m e a n s  t h a t  p e o p l e  m u s t  " p o s s e s  t h e  m i n i m a l  r e s o u r c e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  a n d  t o  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  r i g h t s " .
5 0 8  
D a h l  f u r t h e r  a r g u e s  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  
s a t i s f y  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  o f  j u s t i c e  a r e  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e m o c r a c y  w h i c h  p r o t e c t  
b a s i c  l i b e r t i e s ,  l a w s  t h a t  g u a r a n t e e  f a i r  e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r t u n i t y  a n d  a  " p r o p e r t y - o w n i n g  
d e m o c r a c y " .
5 0
9  S i m i l a r l y ,  R a w l s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t o  d e s i g n  a  j u s t  p r o c e d u r e  t h e  " l i b e r t i e s  o f  e q u a l  
c i t i z e n s h i p "  s h o u l d  b e  p r o t e c t e d  b y  a n d  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n . 5 1 o  T h e s e  l i b e r t i e s  
i n c l u d e  t h o s e  o f  " l i b e r t y  o f  c o n s c i e n c e  a n d  f r e e d o m  o f  t h o u g h t ,  l i b e r t y  o f  t h e  p e r s o n ,  a n d  e q u a l  
p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s .  5 1
1  
I n  t h e  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  F r a n k l i n  I .  G a m w e l l  a r g u e s  t h a t  a  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  s t i p u l a t e  
p r i v a t e  l i b e r t i e s  a n d  p u b l i c  l i b e r t i e s .
5 1 2  
P r i v a t e  l i b e r t i e s  c o v e r  t h e  r i g h t s  t o  l i f e ,  b o d i l y  i n t e g r i t y  
a n d  m o v e m e n t ,  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e r t y ,  a n d  c o n s c i e n c e ;  w h i l e  t h e  p u b l i c  l i b e r t i e s  i n c l u d e  t h e  
f r e e d o m  o f  s p e e c h ,  f r e e d o m  o f  t h e  p r e s s ,  f r e e d o m  t o  a s s e m b l e  a n d  p e t i t i o n ,  d u e  p r o c e s s ,  a n d  
e q u a l  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  l a w s .  5 1 3  
T h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  E x p e r i e n c e .  S i r i  G l o p p e n  a r g u e s  t h a t  i n  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  e x p e r i e n c e ,  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  o u t c o m e s  r e f l e c t s  p r i n c i p l e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  h u m a n  r i g h t s  a n d  
d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e .
5 1 4  
F o r  G l o p p e n ,  s o c i a l  s t a b i l i t y  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a  w o u l d  o n l y  b e  a c h i e v e d  w h e n  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a d o p t s  a  " d e m o c r a t i c  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  r e s p e c t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  h u m a n  r i g h t s  a n d  
d i s t r i b u t i n g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  a n d  s o c i a l  g o o d s  r e a s o n a b l y  f a i r l y  a m o n g  c i t i z e n s " . 5
1
5  
T h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  i s  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  B i l l  o f  R i g h t s  i n  t h e  1 9 9 6  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
T h e s e  r i g h t s  c o v e r  n o t  o n l y  c l a s s i c  c i v i l  a n d  politi~al r i g h t s ,  b u t  h a v e  a n  e x t e n s i v e  c o m m i t m e n t  
\  
t o  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  r i g h t s ,  w h i c h  i n c l u d e :  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r i g h t s ,  t h e  r i g h t s  t o  a c c e s s  l a n d ,  
h o u s i n g ,  h e a l t h - c a r e  s e r v i c e s ,  f o o d ,  w a t e r ,  a n d  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y ,  c h i l d r e n ' s  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  r i g h t s  
5 0 7 D a h l ,  a b o v e  n  4 6 4 ,  1 5 6 .  
5 0 8 1 b i d  1 5 2 .  
5 0 9 1 b i d  2 7  4 .  
5 1 0  R a w l s ,  a b o v e  n  4 5 3 ,  1 9 7 .  
5 1 1
1 b i d .  
5
1 2  
F r a n k l i n  I .  G a m w e l l ,  ' T h e  P u r p o s e  o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s '  ( 2 0 0 3 )  2 2  M i s s i p i  C o l l e g e  L a w  R e v i e w  2 5 3 .  
5 1 3 1 b i d .  
5 1 4  G l o p p e n ,  a b o v e  n  3 9 3 ,  5 8 .  
7 4  
and educational rights.516 On the question of whether socio-economic rights should be 
protected by a Constitution, Sunstein's answer is that it should.517 He further argues that: 
[a] right to minimal social and economic guarantees can be justified, not only on the 
ground that people in desperate condition will not good lives but also on the ground that 
democracy requires a certain independence and security for everyone. 518 
To strengthen the protection of human rights, Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution 
establishes a Human Right Commission. This Commission has been given with the general 
mandate of protecting human rights. The functions of the Commission are to promote, monitor 
and assess the observance of human rights.519 
These comprehensive Bill of Rights are a reflection of the socio-political condition after the 
apartheid regime. As Karen Cavanaugh argues that: 
J 
[r]epetition and emphasis regarding the rights of all people in South Africa clearly indicates 
a recognition of the inequalities in their history and a strong desire and willingness to 
make sure that history does not repeat itself, while providing for a progressive foundation 
for the new South Africa.520 
Jeremy Sarkin concludes that the 1996 Constitution "further entrenches human rights as a 
cornerstone of South African democracy". 521 
The Thai Experience. Chapter Ill (Section 26- 65) of the Constitution stipulates an "extensive 
litany of fundamental rights".522 The chapter is further supplemented by Sections 236 - 247, 
which deal with the rights of accused person rights during criminal processes, and Sections 
199 - 200 which elaborate the investigation power of the National Human Rights 
Commission.523 Like the South Africa Bill of Rights, the Thai human rights protections covers 
5151bid. 
516 Sandra Liebenberg, 'Violation of Socio-Economic Rights: The Role of the South African Human Rights Commission' in 
Penelope Andrews and Stephen Ellman (eds), Post-Apartheid constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa's Basic Law (2001) 
405. 
517 Sunstein, above n 245, 235. 
518 1bid. 
519 Section 184(1) of the South Africa Constitution. 
52° Karen Cavanaugh, 'Emerging South Africa: Human Rights Responses in the Post-Apartheid Era' (1997) 5 Cardozo Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 297. 
521 Sarkin, above n 263, 85. 






b o t h  l e g a l  a n d  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e .  A m o n g  t h e  e x t e n s i v e  r i g h t s ,  o n e  r i g h t  i s  c l e a r l y  b a s e d  o n  
" h i s t o r i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e "  o f  r e g u l a r  m i l i t a r y  c o u p  d ' e t a t  a n d  s t i p u l a t e s  t h e  r i g h t  o f  p e a c e f u l  
r e s i s t a n c e  t o  a n y  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a c t  c o m m i t t e d  f o r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  p o w e r . s 2 4  
C o n c l u s i o n .  B a s e d  o n  t h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  r e v i e w  c h a p t e r ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  s i n g l e  f o r m u l a  
f o r  d e v e l o p i n g  a  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  d u r i n g  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s ,  
t h e r e  a r e  g u i d i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  s h o u l d  b e  f o l l o w e d :  F i r s t ,  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  
p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  b e  a r r a n g e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a  s p e c i f i c  t i m e  s c h e d u l e .  T h i s  p r o c e s s  c o u l d  b e c o m e  
a  g o l d e n  m o m e n t  f o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  i f  i t  i s  c o n d u c t e d  d u r i n g  a  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
r u l e  a n d  m a n a g e d  c a r e f u l l y .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  s h o u l d  b e  c h o s e n  c a r e f u l l y .  
T h e  l e g i t i m a c y  a n d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  e a c h  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y ,  w h i c h  m a y  a f f e c t  t h e  
p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  o u t c o m e s  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g ,  s h o u l d  b e  a n a l y z e d  t h o r o u g h l y  b e f o r e  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  a b o u t  w h o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  s h o u l d  b e  i s  m a d e .  T h i r d ,  t h e  b a s i c  
a g e n d a  s e t t i n g  s h o u l d  b e  a g r e e d  i n  a d v a n c e .  T h i s  i n c l u d e s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  o n l y  b e  a m e n d e d  o r  r e v i s e d .  F o u r t h ,  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  n e e d s  t o  b e  
o r g a n i z e d  t o  i n v o l v e  a s  m a n y  p e o p l e  a s  p o s s i b l e .  T h i s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  o r d e r  t o  g i v e  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  m o r e  l e g i t i m a c y .  
F o r  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t w o  b a s i c  e l e m e n t s  s h o u l d  b e  c o v e r e d :  s e p a r a t i o n  
o f  p o w e r s  a n d  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s .  W i t h o u t  h a v i n g  a d o p t e d  t h e s e  t w o  p r i n c i p l e s  a  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  w o u l d  b e  e a s i l y  b e c o m e  a  ' d e a d '  l e t t e r  a n d  i g n o r e d  i n  d a i l y  p o l i t i c s .  
C h a p t e r s  F o u r  t o  S e v e n  e x p l o r e  h o w  I n d o n e s i a  c o n d u c t e d  i t s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a m e n d m e n t s  a n d  
o u t l i n e  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  a m e n d m e n t s  . .  T h e n  C h a p t e r  E i g h t  e v a l u a t e s  t h e  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  o u t c o m e s  
o f  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s .  P r i o r  t o  t h e s e  c h a p t e r s ,  C h a p t e r  T h r e e  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  I n d o n e s i a n  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n d i t i o n  t o  s h o w  w h y  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  i s  n e e d e d  . .  
5 2 4  S e c t i o n  6 5  o f  t h e  T h a i l a n d  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
7 6  
PART THREE.: 
AUTHORITARIANISM IN 
THE 1945 CONSTITUTION 
77 
C h a p t e r  T h r e e  
S o e h a r t a ' s  A u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m  a n d  
t h e  U r g e n c y  f o r  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m  
T h e  n a t i o n  m u s t  n o t  r e p e a t  t h e  s a m e  m i s t a k e .  I t  s h o u l d  l e a r n  t h e  r i g h t  l e s s o n  a n d  g e t  t h e  
r i g h t  m e s s a g e  f r o m  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e s  o f  b o t h  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  a n d  t h e  O l d  O r d e r .  I t  i s  c l e a r  
t h a t  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  c o n t a i n s  w i t h i n  i t s e l f  i t s  o w n  w e a k n e s s e s  t h a t  c a n  b e  o p e n  t o  
a b u s e ,  m a n i p u l a t i o n  a n d  e x p l o i t a t i o n .  I t  i s  a  r e c i p e  f o r  d i c t a t o r s h i p ,  a n d  t h u s  f o r  d i s a s t e r ,  
f o r  i t  d o e s  n o t  p r o v i d e  a  m e c h a n i s m  o f  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l ,  f o r  p o w e r  s h a r i n g  o r  p o w e r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  f o r  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s  a n d  t h u s  f o r  a  s y s t e m  o f  c h e c k s  a n d  b a l a n c e s  
( S o e d j a t i  D j i w a n d o n o ) . 5 2 5  
T h i s  c h a p t e r  p r o v i d e s  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  s e t t i n g  p r i o r  t o  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
o f  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2 .  I t  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t w o  s e c t i o n s .  S e c t i o n  A  a r g u e s  t h a t  P r e s i d e n t  S o e h a r t o ' s  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  w a s  a n  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e .  S e c t i o n  B  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h i s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m  w a s  
e n a b l e d  b y  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  i t  l a c k e d  p r o v i s i o n s  o n  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s  a n d  
p r o t e c t i o n  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s .  A s  I  h a v e  a r g u e d  i n  C h a p t e r  T w o ,  t h e s e  t w o  c o n c e p t s  a r e  k e y  
e l e m e n t s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  c h a p t e r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
'  
n e e d e d  t o  b e  r e f o r m e d  t o  a s s u r e  I n d o n e s i a ' s  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r u l e  t o  d e m o c r a c y .  
A .  S o e h a r t o ' s  A u t h o r i t a r i a n  O r d e r  
S o e h a r t o  w a s  f o r m a l l y  c o n f i r m e d  a s  a c t i n g  P r e s i d e n t  i n  1 9 6 7  a n d  a s  P r e s i d e n t  i n  1 9 6 8 ,  r u l i n g  
u n t i l  h i s  r e s i g n a t i o n  i n  1 9 9 8 .
5 2 6  
H e  h a d  b e e n  i n  p o w e r ,  h o w e v e r ,  s i n c e  1 1  M a r c h  1 9 6 6 ,  w h e n  h e  
r e c e i v e d  t h e  S u p e r s e m a f 5
2 7  
d e c r e e  f r o m  S o e k a r n o ,  I n d o n e s i a ' s  f i r s t  P r e s i d e n t . 5 2 B  B y  t h i s  
d e c r e e ,  S o e k a r n o  h a n d e d  o v e r  h i s  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r s  t o  r e s t o r e  s e c u r i t y  a n d  c o n t r o l  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  t o  S o e h a r t o . 5 2 9  
S o e h a r t o  n a m e d  h i s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t h e  ' N e w  O r d e r '  ( O r d e  B a r u  o r  O r b a ) ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  
S o e k a r n o ' s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  w h i c h  w a s  d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h e  ' O l d  O r d e r '  ( O r d e  L a m a  o r  O r / a ) .  T h e  
5 2 5  S o e d j a t i  D j i w a n d o n o ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C h a n g e  a  M u s t ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  9  J u n e  1 9 9 9 .  
5 2 6  A r t i c l e  4  o f  P r o v i s i o n a l  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  X X X I I I  o f  1 9 6 7  o n  t h e  R e v o c a t i o n  o f  P r e s i d e n t i a l  P o w e r s  f r o m  P r e s i d e n t  S o e k a r n o ;  
P r o v i s i o n a l  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  X L I V  o f  1 9 6 8  o n  t h e  A p p o i n t m e n t  o f  S o e h a r t o  a s  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  P r e s i d e n t .  
5 2 7  S u p e r s e m a r  i s  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  o f  S u r a l  P e r i n t a h  S e b e l a s  M a r e t  o r  t h e  L e t t e r  o f  I n s t r u c t i o n  o f  E l e v e n  M a r c h .  
5 2 8  M a n y  b o o k s  h a v e  b e e n  p u b l i s h e d  a b o u t  t h i s  t r a n s f e r  o f  p o w e r  f r o m  S o e k a r n o  t o  S o e h a r t o .  F o r  f u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  s e e  I  
G u s t i  A g u n g  A y u  R a t i h ,  S o e h a r t o ' s  N e w  O r d e r  S t a t e :  I m p o s e d  I l l u s i o n s  a n d  I n v e n t e d  L e g i t i m a t i o n s  ( F i n a l  P a p e r  f o r  M a s t e r  o f  
A r t s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a n  S t u d i e s - H i s t o r y ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  W i s c o n s i n ,  1 9 9 7 )  2 .  
5 2 9  T i m o t h y  L i n d s e y ,  ' I n t r o d u c t i o n :  A n  O v e r v i e w  o f  I n d o n e s i a n  L a w '  i n  T i m o t h y  L i n d s e y  ( e d ) ,  I n d o n e s i a  L a w  a n d  S o c i e t y  ( 1 9 9 9 )  
1 .  
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New Order was initially presented. as a correction to the authoritarian Old Order, 53o however, 
the reality was that Soeharto's New Order and Soekarno's Old Order were both authoritarian 
regimes. In R. William Liddle's words: 
... since the late of 1950s, Indonesia has experienced two types of authoritarianism: the 
personal rule of President [Soekarno's] Guided Democracy until 1965 and the army-
backed New Order of President [Soeharto].53t 
This chapter will concentrate on Soeharto's authoritarian regime, because his entire presidency 
based on the 1945 Constitution, which is the focus of this study. However, Soekarno's 
administration will also be examined to show that, when Soekarno applied the 1945 
Constitution, his administration was also authoritarian, with the result that authoritarianism was 
deeply eng rained in the Indonesian legal and political systems. 
1. Indonesia under Soekarno: an Old Authoritarian Order 
Soekarno's presidency started on 18 August 1945 and was formally revoked by a decree of 
MPRs (MPR Sementara, Provisional MPR) 532 in 1967.533 Soekarno's presidency can be divided 
into four periods, each of which is marked by switching between constitutions: (i) from 1945 to 
1949, based on the 1945 Constitution;534 (ii) from 1949 to 1950, based on the 1949 
Constitution; (iii) from 1950 to 1959, based on the 1950 Provisional Constitution; and (iv) from 
1959 to 1966, again based on the 1945 Constitution. 
Commencement of the Old Order. To understand that Soekarno's Old Order was more 
authoritarian when the 1945 Constitution was applied, the period of the Old Order should firstly 
be clarified. 
There are three different views on the dates of Old Order period, that is, the period of 
Soekarno's direct personal rule. The first view, as argued by Mahfud, is that this period began 
530 A. H. Nasution, ABRI Penegak Demokrasi UUD 1945 (1966) 13-26. 
531 R. William Liddle, Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics (1996) 179. 
532 The Provisional MPR (MPR Sementara or MPRs) is the MPR established based on the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959. 
It was temporary because rione of its members were recruited through an election, but were appointed by President Soekarno. 
The establishment of 'permanent' MPR only started in 1973 after the New Order's first election in 1971. 
533 MPR Decree No. XXXIII of 1967 on the Revocation of Presidential Powers of President Soekarno. 
534 During this first period, however, the 1945 Constitution was not consistently applied. See Moh. Mahfud MD, Amandemen 
Konstitusi Menuju Reformasi Tala Negara (1999) 52. 
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w h e n  S o e k a r n o  p r o c l a i m e d  h i s  P r e s i d e n t i a l  D e c r e e  o f  5  J u l y  1 9 5 9  w h i c h  o r d e r e d  ( i )  · t h e  
d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e ;  ( i i )  t h e  r e - e n a c t m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  ( i i i )  t h e  
a b r o g a t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 5 0  P r o v i s i o n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  a n d  ( i v )  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  w i t h i n  t h e  s h o r t e s t  
p o s s i b l e  t i m e  o f  a  P r o v i s i o n a l  M P R  a n d  a  P r o v i s i o n a l  D P A .
5 3 5  
I t  e n d e d  w h e n  S o e h a r t o  t o o k  
o v e r  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r s  f r o m  S o e k a r n o  i n  1 9 6 6 .  5 3 6  
T h e  s e c o n d  v i e w ,  f a v o r e d  b y  L i d d l e ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  O l d  O r d e r  s t a r t e d  i n  1 9 5 0  a n d  e n d e d  i n  1 9 6 5 . 5 3 7  
T h e s e  f i f t e e n  y e a r s  w e r e  d i v i d e d  i n t o  a  p e r i o d  o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  d e m o c r a c y  ( 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 7 ) ,  a n d  a  
p e r i o d  o f  G u i d e d  D e m o c r a c y  ( 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 5 ) .  
5 3 8  
L i d d l e ,  h o w e v e r ,  a g r e e s  w i t h  M a h f u d ' s  v i e w  t h a t  i t  
w a s  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  p e r i o d  t h a t  t h e  O l d  O r d e r  b e c a m e  a n  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e . 5 3 9  
F o r  t h e  t w o - y e a r  p e r i o d  f r o m  1 9 5 7  t o  1 9 5 9 ,  L i d d l e  r e f e r s  t o  L e v ,
5 4
o  w h o  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  G u i d e d  
D e m o c r a c y  e f f e c t i v e l y  s t a r t e d  i n  1 9 5 7  a n d  e n d e d  i n  1 9 6 5 .  L e v  i s  o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  1 9 5 7  w a s  
w h e n  S o e k a r n o ' s  " G u i d e d  D e m o c r a c y  t o o k  f o r m " ,
5 4 1  
a s  S o e k a r n o  d e c l a r e d  e f f e c t i v e  m a r t i a l  l a w  
w i t h  h i s  ' s t a t e  o f  W a r  &  S i e g e ' ,
5 4 2  
s t i p u l a t i n g  t h a t  a l l  I n d o n e s i a n  t e r r i t o r i e s  w e r e  a t  w a r  a n d  t h u s  
i n  a  s t a t e  o f  e m e r g e n c y ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  m i l i t a r y  h e l d  d o m i n a n t  a u t h o r i t y .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  
m a r t i a l  l a w  d e c l a r a t i o n  " m a r k e d  t h e  e n d  o f  l i b e r a l  d e m o c r a c y " .
5 4 3  
N e x t ,  L i n d s e y  h a s  p u t  a  t h i r d  v i e w  t h a t  t h e  O l d  O r d e r  s t a r t e d  f r o m  1 9 4 5  a n d  e n d e d  i n  1 9 6 6 . 5 4 4  
T h e s e  p e r i o d s  e n c o m p a s s e d  a l l  o f  t h e  f o u r  p e r i o d s  o f  S o e k a r n o ' s  p r e s i d e n c y .  L i n d s e y  a r g u e s  
t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d  o f  t h e  O l d  O r d e r  ( 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 0 )  w a s  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  I n d o n e s i a n  w a r  o f  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  a g a i n s t  t h e  D u t c h .  
5 4 5  
I n d o n e s i a  t h e n  e x p e r i e n c e d  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  d e m o c r a c y  
( 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 7 )  
5 4 6  
a n d  t h e n  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  r u l e  p e r i o d  f r o m  1 9 5 7  t o  1 9 6 5 . 5 4 7  L i n d s e y  a l s o  a g r e e s  
5 3 5  P r e s i d e n t i a l  D e c r e e  N o .  1 5 0  o f  1 9 5 9  o n  t h e  R e - e n a c t i n g  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  D P A  i s  a b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  D e w a n  
P e r l i m b a n g a n  A g u n g  o r  S u p r e m e  A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l .  
5 3 6  M o h .  M a h f u d  M D ,  P o l i t i k  H u k u m  d i  I n d o n e s i a  ( 1 9 9 8 )  1 9 6 .  
5 3 7  L i d d l e ,  a b o v e  n  5 3 1 ,  1 8 1 .  
5 3 8
1 b i d .  
5 3
9 1 b i d .  
5 4 0  I b i d .  
5 4 1  D a n i e l  S .  L e v ,  ' B e t w e e n  S t a t e  a n d  S o c i e t y :  P r o f e s s i o n a l  L a w y e r s  a n d  R e f o r m  i n  I n d o n e s i a ' ,  i n  T i m o t h y  L i n d s e y  ( e d ) ,  
I n d o n e s i a  L a w  a n d  S o c i e t y ( 1 9 9 9 )  2 3 3 .  
5 4 2  
L e v ,  a b o v e  n  2 5 ,  1 2 .  S e e  a l s o  M e r l e  C .  R i c k l e f s ,  A  H i s t o r y  o f  M o d e m  I n d o n e s i a :  c  1 3 0 0  t o  t h e  P r e s e n t  ( 2 n d  e d ,  1 9 9 3 )  3 1 2  
- 3 1 3 .  
5 4 3  H a r o l d  C r o u c h ,  ' I n d o n e s i a '  i n  Z a k a r i a  H a j i  A h m a d  a n d  H a r o l d  C r o u c h  ( e d s ) ,  M i l i t a r y - C i v i l i a n  R e l a t i o n s  i n  S o u t h - E a s t  A s i a  
( 1 9 8 5 )  5 5 .  
5 4 4  L i n d s e y ,  a b o v e  n  5 2 9 ,  5 .  
5 4 5
1 b i d .  
5 4 6 1 b i d  5 - 6 .  
8 0  
that in this last period Soekarno controlled the Indonesian legal system and built his 
authoritarian regime. 548 Similarly, Adnan Buyung Nasution argues that Soekarno's concept of 
Guided Democracy was a "new political formula for a more authoritarian form of 
government".549 Michael R.J. Vatikiotis similarly argues that by applying Guided Democracy, 
Soekarno wrapped himself in the "trappings of power".550 
Although Mahfud, Liddle and Lindsey have difference of opinion as to when the Old Order 
period actually began, they agree that most of the Soekarno's presidency in the 1950's was a 
more democratic political configuration. They also agree that in the period following that- when 
he reapplied the 1945 Constitution and exercised what he called Guided Democracy - his 
administration was more authoritarian than other period of his rule. 
Guided Democracy. Soekarno himself gave many definitions of Guided Democracy. 55! One of 
these contained in Provisional MPR Decree No. VIII of 1965 on Guided Democracy, showed 
how authoritarian the concept was. It was a mechanism by which all state institutional decision-
making could be decided through a musyawarah-mufakat (discussion to reach unanimous 
agreement). If unanimous agreement could not be reached, issues were not to be put to vote, 
but rather should be given to a leader to decide. This meant Soekarno, as Chief-of-state, was 
given full authority to· make decisions. In reality, Guided Democracy enabled President 
Soekarno to control all decision-making process.552 
Soekarno's Constitutional Breaches. The broad authoritarianism of Guided Democracy 
allowed Soekarno to become the sole political power in the Old Order. In making decisions, he 




549 Nasution, above n 14, 297. 
550 Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of The New Order (3'd ed, 1998) 1. 
551 A. Syafii Maarif, 'Islam di Masa Demokrasi Liberal dan Demokrasi Terpimpin' (1988) 5 Prisma, 34. Maarif notes that 
Soekarno had at least 12 definitions for his Guided Democracy. 
552 Mahfud, above n 536, 143. 
553 The 1945 Constitution had three parts. They were: (i) the preamble, which contained the declaration of independence and 
the statement of basic principles; (ii) the body, which contained the 37 Articles accompanied by 4 transitional and 2 additional 
provisions; and (iii) the elucidation which expanded the general principles and individual Articles. 
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I n  1 9 6 0 ,  S o e k a r n o  d i s s o l v e d  t h e  D P R  f o r  r e j e c t i n g  a  d r a f t  b u d g e t  p r o p o s e d  b y  h i m . s 5 4  T h i s  
b r e a c h e d  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  ' t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  D P R  i s  s t r o n g '  
a n d  i t  ' c a n n o t  b e  d i s s o l v e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t '  ( S e c t i o n  V I I  o f  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  S y s t e m  
E l u c i d a t i o n ) .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  i n  d e c i d i n g  t h e  b u d g e t ,  t h e  D P R  ' i s  i n  a  
s t r o n g e r  p o s i t i o n  t h a n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t '  ( e l u c i d a t i o n  t o  A r t i c l e  2 3 ) .  E v e n  i f  t h e  D P R  d o e s  n o t  
a p p r o v e  a  d r a f t  b u d g e t ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  c a n n o t  d i s s o l v e  t h e  H o u s e .  I n s t e a d ,  ' t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
s h a l l  a d o p t  t h e  b u d g e t  o f  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  y e a r '  ( A r t i c l e  2 3 ( 1  ) ) .  
N e x t ,  S o e k a r n o  i n t e r v e n e d  i n  t h e  j u d i c i a l  p o w e r .  P u r s u a n t  t o  L a w  N o .  1 9  o f  1 9 6 4  o n  J u d i c i a l  
P o w e r ,  h e  f o r m a l l y  s u b o r d i n a t e d  t h e  c o u r t s  t o  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p r e r o g a t i v e  o n  q u e s t i o n s  o f  
' n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t ' ,  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  w h i c h  w a s  a t  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  S o e k a r n o . s s s  A r t i c l e  1 9  o f  t h i s  
L a w  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t :  
[ f j o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  i n t e r e s t s ,  n a t i o n a l  a n d  s t a t e  d i g n i t y ,  o r  s o c i e t y ' s  i n t e r e s t s  ·  
w h i c h  a r e  p a r a m o u n t ,  a  P r e s i d e n t  m a y  b e c o m e  i n v o l v e d  i n ,  o r  i n t e r v e n e  i n ,  j u d i c i a r y  
c a s e s .  
S o e k a r n o ' s  a c t i o n s  b r e a c h e d  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  j u d i c i a r y  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  ( e l u c i d a t i o n  t o  A r t i c l e  2 4  a n d  2 5 ) ,  w h i c h  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  ' j u d i c i a l  p o w e r  i s  
i n d e p e n d e n t .  I t  i s  f r e e  f r o m  g o v e r n m e n t  i n t e r f e r e n c e ' .  
A n o t h e r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  b r e a c h  o c c u r r e d  w h e n  S o e k a r n o  a c c e p t e d  h i s  a p p o i n t m e n t  a s  ' P r e s i d e n t  
f o r  L i f e '  p u r s u a n t  t o  a  P r o v i s i o n a l  M P R  d e c r e e .  T h i s  d e c r e e  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t :  
D r .  l r .  S o e k a r n o  ( M r .  S o e k a r n o ) ,  t h e  g r e a t  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  r e v o l u t i o n ,  w h o  i s  
c u r r e n t l y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  w i t h  t h e  b l e s s i n g  o f  t h e  G o d  s h a l l  
h e r e b y  b e c o m e  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  P r e s i d e n t  f o r  l i f e . s 5 6  
T h i s  b r e a c h e d  t h e  A r t i c l e  7  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  ' s h a l l  h o l d  
o f f i c e  f o r  a  t e r m  o f  f i v e  y e a r s  a n d  s h a l l  b e  e l i g i b l e  f o r  r e - e l e c t i o n ' .  
5 5
4  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  D e c r e e  N o . 3  o f  1 9 6 0  o n  t h e  D i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  D P R .  
5 5 5  D a n i e l S .  L e v ,  ' C o m m e n t s  o n  t h e  C o u r s e  o f  L a w  R e f o r m  i n  M o d e r n  I n d o n e s i a ' ,  i n  T i m  L i n d s e y  ( e d } ,  I n d o n e s i a :  B a n k r u p t c y ,  
L a w  R e f o r m  &  t h e  C o m m e r c i a l  C o u r t  ( 2 0 0 0 )  8 0 .  
5 5 6  A r t i c l e  1  M P R  D e c r e e  N u m b e r  I l l  o f  1 9 6 3  o n  t h e  A p p o i n t m e n t  o f  t h e  G r e a t  L e a d e r  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  R e v o l u t i o n ,  M r .  
S o e k a m o  t o  b e  a  P r e s i d e n t  f o r  L i f e .  
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Shortcomings of the 1945 Constitution. These breaches may suggest that Soekarno's 
authoritarianism did not come from the 1945 Constitution but from his willingness to breach the 
1945 Constitution. My view is, however, that the shortcomings in the 1945 Constitution 
contributed to the breaches. 
In the two earlier cases, the breaches were possible since there were no articles in the body of 
the 1945 Constitution which expressly prohibited them. Both the prohibitions on dissolving the 
DPR and the principle of independent judiciary only appeared in the elucidation of the 
Constitution. It would have been appropriate if the prohibition and the principle had appeared in 
the body of the Constitution, because it would have had stronger binding power.557 In the case 
of the President for life, it would have been better if Article 7 of the Constitution had clearly 
stipulated how many times a President could be re-elected. 
2. Indonesia under Soeharto: a New Authoritarian Order 
Despite the appointment of Soekarno as President for life, Soeharto effectively replaced 
Soekarno in 1966 and the New Order substituted the Old Order at the same time. Soekarno's 
'Guided Democracy' was thus replaced with Soeharto's 'Pancasila Democracy', drawing on the 
Pancasi/a idea developed by Soekarno, and found in the preamble to the Constitution. The 
latter is defined by Hans Antlov as "political rule through consultation, taking into consideration 
belief in God, a united Indonesia, humanitarianism and justice".55a Antlov argues that the 
Pancasila Democracy was: 
... authoritarian; opposition is not necessary since decisions are made in consensus. 
Political unity and order is more important than pluralism and accountability. The leader is 
the paternal figure that maintains political order, economic prosperity and social 
harmony.559 
Accordingly, Pancasi/a Democracy was, in reality, similar to the Guided Democracy. Both 
systems depended on their authoritarian leaders: Soeharto and Soekarno and both relied on 
557 The point that the body has stronger binding power than the elucidation is further elaborated in section B point 7 in this 
chapter. 
558 Hans Antlov, 'Demokrasi Pancasi/a and the Future of Ideology in Indonesia' in Hans Antlov and Tak-Wing Ngo (eds), The 
Cultural Construction of Politics in Asia (2000) 205. 
5591bid 205- 6. 
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t h e  s a m e  i d e o l o g i c a l  f o r m u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  u n d e m o c r a t i c  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  
N e w  O r d e r  d e s c r i b e d ·  b y  A n t l o v  c o u l d  a l s o  b e  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  O l d  O r d e r .  
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n s  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  i n  m o r e  d e t a i l  p a r t  h o w  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  S o e h a r t o ' s  N e w  O r d e r  
r e g i m e  w a s .  H u n t i n g t o n  i n  C h a p t e r  T w o  h a s  a r g u e d  t h a t  s p e c i f i c  f o r m s  o f  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e s  
a r e  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  o n e - p a r t y  s y s t e m ,  p e r s o n a l  d i c t a t o r s h i p ,  a n d  m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e .
5
6 0  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  
s e c t i o n s  w i l l  a r g u e  t h a t  S o e h a r t o ' s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f i t s  a l l  o f  t h e s e  f o r m s .  
a .  S o e h a r t o ' s  O n e  P a r t y  S y s t e m  
T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  t i g h t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  s y s t e m .  F r o m  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 7 0 s  
t o  1 9 9 8 ,  o n l y  t h r e e  p a r t i e s  h a d  b e e n  p e r m i t t e d  t o  e x i s t  i n  I n d o n e s i a :  G o l k a r , 5 6 1  t h e  P P P  5 6 2  a n d  
t h e  P D I . 5 6 3  T h e  l a t t e r  t w o  p a r t i e s  w e r e  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a  g o v e r n m e n t - s p o n s o r e d  " f o r c e d  f u s i o n " 5 6 4  
o f  t h e  n i n e  p a r t i e s  i n  e x i s t e n c e  p r i o r  t o  t h e  1 9 7 1  e l e c t i o n ,  t h e  f i r s t  e l e c t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  N e w  
O r d e r .  A l t h o u g h  G o l k a r  f o r m a l l y  w a s  n o t  a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  b u t  m e r e l y  a  ' f u n c t i o n a l  g r o u p ' ,  t h i s  
s e c t i o n  w i l l  a r g u e  t h a t ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  G o l k a r  w a s  t h e  o n e  a n d  o n l y  ' r e a l  p a r t y '  d u r i n g  t h e  N e w  
O r d e r  r e g i m e .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  t i g h t e n  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  A r t i c l e  1 4  ( 1 )  o f  L a w  N o .  1  o f  1 9 8 5  o n  t h e  P o l i t i c a l  
P a r t i e s ,  a u t h o r i z e d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  d i s s o l v e  a n y  p a r t y  n o t  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  s t a t e  g o a l s .  F u r t h e r ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  A r t i c l e  2  ( 1 )  o f  t h e  s a m e  l a w ,  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  h a d  t o  a c c e p t  P a n c a s i / a ,  t h e  
p h i l o s o p h y  o f  t h e  s t a t e ,  a s  t h e i r  s o l e  f o u n d a t i o n  ( a s a s  tungga~. V a t i k i o t i s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h i s  
c o n t r o l  t h r o u g h  t h e  ' s o l e  f o u n d a t i o n '  p r i n c i p l e  w a s ,  " t h e  N e w  O r d e r ' s  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t a i n m e n t  o f  
s o c i e t y .  T h i s  e n t a i l e d  n e u t e r i n g  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  c h a n n e l i n g  I s l a m  t h r o u g h  s t a t e - c o n t r o l l e d  
i n s t i t u t i o n s " .  
5 6 5  
5 6 0  H u n t i n g t o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 2 9 ,  1 3 .  
5 6
1  
G o l k a r  i s  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  o f  G o l o n g a n  K a r y a  o r  F u n c t i o n a l  G r o u p .  
5 6 2  P P P  i s  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  o f  P a r t a i  P e r s a t u a n  P e m b a n g u n a n  o r  U n i t e d  D e v e l o p m e n t  P a r t y .  T h e  P P P  w a s  m a d e  u p  o f  I s l a m i c  
p a r t i e s :  N a h d l a t u l  U l a m a ,  P a r m u s i  ( P a r t a i  M u s l i m i n  I n d o n e s i a ,  I n d o n e s i a n  M o s l e m s  P a r t y ) ,  P S I  ( P a r t a i  S e r i k a t  I s l a m ,  I s l a m i c  
A s s o c i a t i o n  P a r t y )  a n d  P e r t i  ( P e r g e r a k a n  T a r b i y a h  l s l a m i y a h ,  I s l a m i c  E d u c a t i o n  M o v e m e n t ) .  
5 6 3  P D I  i s  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  o f  P a r t a i  D e m o k r a s i  I n d o n e s i a  o r  I n d o n e s i a n  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r t y .  T h e  P D I  w a s  c o m p r i s e d  o f  
n a t i o n a l i s t  a n d  C h r i s t i a n  p a r t i e s :  t h e  P N I  ( P a r t a i  N a s i o n a l i s  I n d o n e s i a ,  I n d o n e s i a n  N a t i o n a l i s t  P a r t y ) ,  P a r k i n d o  ( P a r t a i  K r i s t e n  
I n d o n e s i a ,  I n d o n e s i a n  C h r i s t i a n  P a r t y ) ,  P a r t a i  K a t o l i k  ( C a t h o l i c  P a r t y ) ,  M u r b a  ( t h i s  l i t e r a l l y  m e a n s  t h e  l o w e r  c l a s s ,  a  s o c i a l i s t  
p a r t y )  a n d  I P K I  ( J k a t a n  P e n d u k u n g  K e m e r d e k a a n  I n d o n e s i a ,  L e a g u e  f o r  t h e  U p h o l d i n g  o f  I n d o n e s i a n  I n d e p e n d e n c e ) .  
5 6 4  L i d d l e ,  a b o v e  n  5 3 1 ,  1 8 9 .  
5 6 5  V a t i k i o t i s ,  a b o v e  n  5 5 0 ,  9 5 .  
8 4  
Soeharto's Golkar Party System. The weight of government control, however, was different 
to the three parties. The control over the PPP and PDI was tighter than in the case of Golkar 
which soon became a state political party closely linked to the Indonesian military.566 Soeharto's 
government helped Golkar's performance and as shown in Table 1, Golkar was undefeated in 
all of the New Order elections: 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997. 
Table 1 The New Order's General Election Results 1971-1977 567 
Monoloyalty of Civil Servants. One of the mechanisms to helped Golkar win so consistently 
was an obligation for public sector employees to support Golkar.s6s All civil servants were 
automatically members of the Korpri,S69 an institution that was associated to Golkar;s7o and 
since the early 1970s all have been required to sign a letter giving their 'monoloyalty' to 
Golkar.571 Those who declined were classified as committing an act of political disloyalty and 
this was ground for dismissal.572 
Floating Mass. Another concept that assisted Golkar was the so-called the 'floating mass'. 573 
This concept de-politicized rural people by closing down party branches below the regency (a 
provincial sub-division) level.574 It significantly limited the capacity of the two legal parties- PPP 
and the PDI - to reach their constituents. However, because Golkar claimed that officially it 
was not a political party, this floating mass rule did not limit Golkar's campaign at all. Golkar 
566 Andrew Macintyre, 'Indonesia', in ian Marsh, Jean Blonde!, and Takashi lnoguchi (eds), Democracy, Governance, and 
Economic Performance: East and Southeast Asia in the 1990s (1999) 263. 
5671bid 267. 
568 V. Silaen, 'Korpri-Golkar, Pemilu 1997, dan Demokrasi' (1997) 26 Ana/isis CS/S 162-167. 
569 Korpri is the abbreviation of Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia or Indonesian Civil Servants Corps. 
570 Lev, above n 555, 84. 
571 K.E. Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study (1974) 34. 
572 1bid. 
573 Antlov, above n 558, 206. 
574 Loekman Soetrisno, 'Current Social and Political Conditions of Rural Indonesia', in Geoff Forrester (ed), Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia Renewal or Chaos (1999) 164. 
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w a s  a b l e  t o  ~se t h e  l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s  t o  m o b i l i z e  v o t e s  a n d  r u n  d e  f a c t o  c a m p a i g n s .  T h i s  w a s  o f  
h u g e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r .  G o l k a r ' s  v i c t o r i e s  s i n c e  t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t s  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  l i v e d  i n  r u r a l  
v i l l a g e s .
5 7 5  
F i n a n c i a l  R e s o u r c e s .  A n o t h e r  v a r i a b l e  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e d  G o l k a r ' s  v i c t o r i e s  w a s  t h e  
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  u n e q u a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  a m o n g  t h e  p a r t i e s .
5 7 6  
A l l  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  a c c e p t e d  p u b l i c  f u n d i n g  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  T h e  P P P  a n d  P O l  d e p e n d e d  h e a v i l y  
o n  t h i s  s u p p o r t  t o  f u n d  t h e i r  c a m p a i g n s .  T o  r a i s e  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  b u s i n e s s ,  h o w e v e r ,  w a s  n o t  a n  
e a s y  t a s k  f o r  t h e  t w o  p a r t i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  g i v e n  t h a t  b u s i n e s s m e n  u n d e r s t o o d  t h a t  t h e  t w o  
o f f i c i a l  p a r t i e s  h a d  n o  c h a n c e  o f  w i n n i n g  t h e  e l e c t i o n s .
5 7 7  
B y  c o n t r a s t ,  G o l k a r  e n j o y e d  e c o n o m i c  
s u p p o r t  f r o m  m a n y  s o u r c e s  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  s l u s h  f u n d s  m a n a g e d  b y  s h a d o w y  s o c i a l  f o u n d a t i o n s  
t h a t  c o l l e c t e d  m o n e y  f r o m  b u s i n e s s  g r o u p s  w i t h  c l o s e  c o n n e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t . 5 7
8  
M e d i a  A c c e s s .  S i m i l a r  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  u n e q u a l  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  w a s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  
a c c e s s  a m o n g  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  m e d i a .
5 7 9  
O n e  e x a m p l e  w a s  t h e  c o v e r a g e  o f  T V R I , 5 8 °  t h e  
s t a t e - o w n e d  t e l e v i s i o n  s t a t i o n .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  o n e  s u r v e y  c o n d u c t e d  T V R I  c o v e r e d  G o l k a r  9 8  
t i m e s ,  t h e  P P P  1 0  t i m e s  a n d  t h e  P O l  j u s t  2  t i m e s  i n  i t s  n e w s  p r o g r a m s  i n  1 9 9 5 . 5 8 1  
T h e  E l e c t o r a l  C o m m i s s i o n .  M a C i n t y r e  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  f a c t o r  i n  f a v o r  o f  G o l k a r  w a s  t h e  
s t a t u s  o f  t h e  E l e c t o r a l  C o m m i s s i o n ,  t h e  b o d y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  c o n d u c t i n g  t h e  e l e c t i o n . 5 8 2  T h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  c h a i r e d  b y  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  H o m e  A f f a i r s ,  a  G o l k a r  m e m b e r ,  m a d e  
i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  n o t  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  s t a t u t o r y  a g e n c y ,
5 8 3  
a  b a s i c  r e q u i r e m e n t  
f o r  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n  t o  r u n  a  f a i r  a n d  j u s t  e l e c t i o n .  
C l o s i n g .  I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h e  t h r e e  N e w  O r d e r  p a r t i e s  w e r e  a  c a m o u f l a g e  f o r  S o e h a r t o ' s  d e  f a c t o  
' o n e  p a r t y '  s y s t e m .  L e o  S u r y a d i n a t a  c a l l s  t h i s  p a r t y  s t r u c t u r e  a  " h e g e m o n i c  p a r t y  s y s t e m  l e d  b y  
5 7 5  M a c i n t y r e ,  a b o v e  n  5 6 6 ,  2 6 4 .  
5 7 6 ,  b i d  2 6 5 .  
5 7 7
1 b i d .  
5 7 8
i b i d .  
5
7
9 1 b i d .  
5 8
0  T V R I  i s  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  T e l e v i s i  R e p u b l i k  I n d o n e s i a  o r  T e l e v i s i o n  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c .  o f  I n d o n e s i a .  
5 8
1  
M .  C o h e n ,  ' O n - A i r  C a m p a i g n i n g :  P o l i t i c i a n s  R e a c h  o u t  t o  V o t e r s  V i a  T e l e v i s i o n ' ,  F a r  E a s t e r n  E c o n o m i c  R e v i e w ,  1 5  M a y  
1 9 9 7 .  
5 8 2  M a c i n t y r e ,  a b o v e  n  5 6 6 ,  2 6 6 .  
5 8 3
i b i d .  
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Golkar''.584 Macintyre concludes that the New Order party and electoral system was "a far cry 
from meaningful democracy". 585 Similarly, Liddle argues that electoral process had become a 
"useful fiction" for Soeharto to keep all power in his hands.586 He further argues that: 
[t]he function of elections in this system has been not to choose, but to legitimate ... the 
party organizations and electoral process are closely managed by the government to 
ensure substantial Golkar victories ... 587 
b. Soeharto's Personal Dictatorship 
Nevertheless, Macintyre argues that Golkar was not the central player in the New Order 
political process. Despite the fact that Golkar won all the New Order elections, it was neither a 
locus of power in the Indonesian political system.s88 Rather, as Liddle argues, the 'king of New 
Order politics' was Soeharto himself.589 Soeharto not only ruled the executive but also the 
legislature and the judiciary. Liddle further argued that behind: 
... this democratic fa~ade of elections, Parliament, and Assembly lies the authoritarian 
reality of a political system dominated by [Soeharto], a former general whose power 
derives from his extraordinary adept husbanding and shrewd use of political resources. 590 
Control over the Executive. In regard to the executive, Soeharto held an "absolute power of 
appointmenf'.59t Macintyre argues that: 
[w]ithout the need for confirmation from the legislature, he can hire and fire at will cabinet 
members, all senior bureaucratic appointments, all senior military appointments .. . all 
senior state enterprise appointments. Unambiguously then, within the executive branch all 
accountability lines trace back to the President.592 
By this monopoly of appointment power, Soeharto managed to become the central power of 
the executive. Further, by posting all of his men in strategic governmental positions, Soeharto 
584 Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia (2002) 122. 
585 Macintyre, above n 566, 266. 
586 R. William Liddle, 'A Useful Fiction: Democratic Legitimation in New Order Indonesia' in Robert H. Taylor (ed), The Politics 
of Elections in Southeast Asia (1996) 34-60. 
587Uddle, above n 531,210. 
588 Macintyre, above n 566, 267. 
589 Liddle, above n 531, 17. 
590 Ibid 209. 
591 Macintyre, above n 566, 270. 
5921bid. 
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c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  b u r e a u c r a c y .  T h i s  w a s  a  c r u c i a l  s t e p  t o  d o m i n a t e  o t h e r  b r a n c h e s  o f  
p o w e r  s u c h  a s  l e g i s l a t u r e  a n d  j u d i c i a r y ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  r e c r u i t m e n t  o f  t h e s e  t w o  
b r a n c h e s  w a s  c l o s e l y  m a n a g e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  b u r e a u c r a c y .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  j u d g e s  
w e r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  J u s t i c e ,  w h i l e  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  m e m b e r s  o f  P a r l i a m e n t  
w e r e  h i g h l y  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  H o m e  A f f a i r s ,  t h e  m a n n e r  i n  w h i c h  t h i s  o c c u r r e d  i s  
e l a b o r a t e d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p a r a g r a p h s .  
C o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  B o d y .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  M P R  
w e r e  n o t  e l e c t e d  b u t  w e r e  a p p o i n t e d  b y  S o e h a r t o .  T h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  r u l e d  t h a t  t h e  M P R  
" s h a l l  c o n s i s t  o f  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  a u g m e n t e d  b y  t h e  d e l e g a t e s  f r o m  t h e  r e g i o n a l  
t e r r i t o r i e s  a n d  g r o u p s  a s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  b y  s t a t u t o r y  r e g u l a t i o n s " .
5 9
3  B a s e d  o n  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n ,  t h e  
p r a c t i c e  o f  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  w a s  t h a t  t h e  1 0 0 0  M P R  m e m b e r s  c o n s i s t e d  o f  5 0 0  h u n d r e d  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  5 0 0  w e r e  a p p o i n t e d  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  r e g i o n a l ,  
f u n c t i o n a l ,  a n d  s o c i a l  g r o u p s . 5 9 4  
E x c e p t  f o r  t h e  l a s t  D P R  ( w h e n  t h e  a p p o i n t e d  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  w e r e  7 5 ) , 5 9 5  t h e  D P R  h a d  
5 0 0  m e m b e r s  f r o m  t h e  e a r l y  o f  t h e  N e w  O r d e r ,  1 0 0  m e m b e r s  w e r e · a p p o i n t e d  f r o m  t h e  a r m e d  
f o r c e s  a n d  4 0 0  s e l e c t e d  t h r o u g h  e l e c t i o n .
5 9 6  
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  " f o r m a l  a n d  i n f o r m a l  r u l e s  c o v e r i n g  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  a n d  e l e c t i o n s  g a v e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  g r e a t  c o n t r o l  o v e r  p o l i t i c i a n s " . 5 9 7  A l l  
c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  t h e  D P R  w e r e  s u b j e c t  t o  a n  a p p r o v a l  p r o c e s s  a d m i n i s t e r e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  G e n e r a l  
E l e c t i o n  C o m m i s s i o n .  B e c a u s e  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  H o m e  A f f a i r s  c h a i r e d  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  c o u l d  p r e v e n t  s t r o n g  c r i t i c s  f r o m  e n t e r i n g  t h e  D P R .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  P r e s i d e n t  
S o e h a r t o  u l t i m a t e l y  c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  M P R  ( a n d  t h e  D P R )  m e m b e r s h i p .  
G i v e n  t h a t  S o e h a r t o  h a d  ' 1 0 0 %  c o n t r o l '  o f  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M P R ,  i t  i s  n o  w o n d e r  t h a t  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o w e r  o f  t h e  M P R  t o  c o n t r o l  a  P r e s i d e n t  o r  t o  c h o o s e  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
c a n d i d a t e  w a s  n e v e r  e x e r c i s e d .
5 9 8  
S u g e n g  P e r m a n a  h a s  c y n i c a l l y  c r i t i c i z e d  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  b y  
s a y i n g  t h e  " S o e h a r t o  P e o p l e ' s  A s s e m b l y  e l e c t s  S o e h a r t o  a s  P r e s i d e n t " ,  5
9
9  a n d  i n d e e d ,  f r o m  
5 9 3  A r t i c l e  2 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
5 9
4  
L a w  N u m b e r  5  o f  1 9 9 5  o n  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  M P R ,  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  D P R D .  
5 9 5  
A r t i c l e  1 0 ( 3 )  a n d  ( 4 )  o f  L a w  N u m b e r  5  o f  1 9 9 5  o n  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  M P R ,  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  D P R D .  
5 9 6
1 b i d .  
5 9 7  M a c i n t y r e ,  a b o v e  n  5 6 6 ,  2 6 8 .  
5 9 8  S e e  A r t i c l e  6 ( 2 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
5 9 9  S u g e n g  P e r m a n a ,  ' N o t  y o u r  L o c a l  M e m b e r ' ,  i n  U n d s e y  a b o v e  n  5 2 9 ,  1 9 8 .  
8 8  
1973 to 1998, the MPR named only one presidential candidate, Soeharto, and each time it 
unanimously approved him as Indonesian President. 
By controlling the selection process of the legislative body, Soeharto also took control of the 
legislature itself. Although the DPR members had the right to initiate legislation6oo and had to 
approve alllegislation,601 in practice the DPR was a "tame institution".6o2 During more than three 
decades of the New Order, the executive proposed most of the bills. None of these presidential 
bills were vetoed by the DPR, although it had the authority to do so.6o3 
Control over the Judiciary. Like the legislature, Soeharto also controlled the judiciary through 
his bureaucratic system. The President, as Chief-of-state, appointed and removed judges 
without the need for legislative approval. 604 All judges were classified as civil servants, and 
therefore, members of the KORPRI and Golkar. This of course jeopardized the judges' position 
as independent officers. It created the 'two hats' judiciary system, 605 which "rendered judges at 
once nominally independent judicial officers, and salaried government public servants". 606 
At the beginning of the New Order, the government actually made a promising decision by 
issuing a new statute607 repealing Law No. 19 of 1964 on Judicial Power which had breached 
the basic principle of the independence of judiciary in many of its provisions. The new Law No. 
14 of 1970 on Judicial Power provides the MA (Mahkamah Agung or Supreme Court)6os with 
judicial review authority over regulations below statutes. 609 In theory, this review should have 
been a 'checks and balances system' used by the judiciary to control the executive and 
legislature. However, since Soeharto controlled the recruitment of the judges, judicial review 
was never effective. 
600 Article 21 ( 1) of the 1945 Constitution. 
601 Article 20( 1) of the 1945 Constitution. 
602 Macintyre, above n 566, 268. 
603 Article 20(2) of the 1945 Constitution. 
604 Article 31 of Law No. 14 of 1970 on Judicial Power. 
605 Tim Lindsey, 'Black Letter, Black Market and Bad Faith: Corruption and the Failure of Law Reform', in Chris Manning and 
Peter Van Diermen (eds), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis (2000) 280. 
606 1bid. 
607 Law No.6 of 1969 concerning Invalidation of some Statutes and Government Regulations in Lieu of Statute. 
608 The highest court in Indonesia. 
609 Article 26(1) of Law No. 14 of 1970 on Judicial Power. 
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c .  S o e h a r t o ' s  M i l i t a r y  R e g i m e  
S o e h a r t o ' s  r e g i m e  w a s  e v e n t u a l l y  a  m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e .  O n e  o f  t h e  c l u e s  w a s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  
S o e h a r t o  h i m s e l f ,  w a s  a  f o r m e r  m i l i t a r y  g e n e r a l .  L i d d l e  a r g u e s  t h a t  S o e h a r t o ' s  " m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  
r e s o u r c e  i s  h i s  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  a r m e d  f o r c e s " .
6 1 0  
T h e  o t h e r  c l u e  w a s  t h e  w i d e - r a n g i n g  m i l i t a r y  
o f f i c e r s  i n v o l v e d  i n  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  j u s t i f i e d  b y  t h e  d w i f u n g s i  d o c t r i n e .  
D w i f u n g s i  ( D u a l  f u n c t i o n ) .  T h i s  d o c t r i n e  i s  a  p o l i t i c a l  c o n c e p t  w h i c h  a l l o w s  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  
m i l i t a r y  t o  a c t  a s  b o t h  a  " m i l i t a r y  f o r c e "  a n d  a  " s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e " .
6 1 1  
F o r m u l a t e d  s i n c e  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  m a r t i a l  l a w  i n  1 9 5 7 ,  ' D u a l  F u n c t i o n '  i s  u s u a l l y  t h o u g h t  o f  b e c o m i n g  i n f l u e n t i a l  
f r o m  1 9 6 5  w h e n  G e n e r a l  A b d u l  H a r i s  N a s u t i o n  p r e s e n t e d  h i s  " M i d d l e  W a y "  m i l i t a r y  c o n c e p t  i n  
t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  f i r s t  a r m y  s e m i n a r .
6 1 2  
D u r i n g  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  p e r i o d ,  t h e  c o n c e p t  b e c a m e  k n o w n  
a s  t h e  d w i f u n g s i  d o c t r i n e .  
H a r o l d  C r o u c h  d i v i d e s  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  d w i f u n g s i  i n t o  f o u r  d i f f e r e n t  p e r i o d s :  
t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  a g a i n s t  D u t c h  c o l o n i a l  r u l e  ( 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 9 ) ;  l i b e r a l  d e m o c r a c y  ( 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 7 ) ;  G u i d e d  
D e m o c r a c y  ( 1 9 5 7 - 1 9 6 6 ) ;  a n d  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  ( 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 9 8 } .
6 1 3  
C r o u c h  f u r t h e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  s i n c e  
t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  r e g i m e  " t h e  a r m y  h a s  b e e n  t h e  d o m i n a n t  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e " . 6 1 4  
S i m i l a r l y ,  L i d d l e  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  t h e  d w i f u n g s i  j u s t i f i e d  t h e  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  o f  th~ c i v i l i a n s  t o  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  d u r i n g  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  s y s t e m .
6 1 5  
H e  f u r t h e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  d w i f u n g s i  
d o c t r i n e  l e g i t i m i z e d  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a s  d e  f a c t o  r u l i n g  p a r t y  i n  l n d o n e s i a . 6
1
6  
C o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  E x e c u t i v e .  W i t h i n  t h e  b u r e a u c r a c y ,  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  D e f e n s e  a n d  S e c u r i t y  
- t h e  h o m e  f o r  m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t i e s - p l a y e d  t w o  " u n i q u e  r o l e s " .  
6 1 7  
F i r s t ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  L i d d l e ,  i n  
t h e  1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 7 ,  a n d  1 9 8 2  e l e c t i o n s ,  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s  h e l d  t h e  k e y  p o s i t i o n s  w i t h i n  G o l k a r  
6 1 8  
a n d  
6
1
0  L i d d l e ,  a b o v e  n  5 3 1 ,  2 0 9 .  
6 1 1  S o e b i j o n o ,  ' P e n d a h u l u a n '  i n  S o e b i j o n o  e t  a l  ( e d ) ,  D w i f u n g s i  A B R I  P e r k e m b a n g a n  d a n  P e r a n a n n y a  d a l a m  K e h i d u p a n  P o l i t i k  
d i  I n d o n e s i a  ( 1 9 9 2 )  1 ,  1 .  
6 1 2  H a r o l d  C r o u c h ,  T h e  A r m y  a n d  P o l i t i c s  i n  I n d o n e s i a  ( 1 9 7 8 )  2 4  a n d  3 4 4 .  B u t  s e e  D a v i d  J e n k i n s ,  S u h a r t o  a n d  H i s  G e n e r a l s  
I n d o n e s i a n  M i l i t a r y  P o l i t i c s  1 9 7 5 - 1 9 8 3  ( 1 9 8 4 )  2 .  J e n k i n s  a r g u e s  t h a t  i t  w a s  P r o f .  D j o k o s u t o n o ,  n o t  G e n e r a l  N a s u t i o n ,  w h o  
n a m e d  t h e  c o n c e p t  ' t h e  a r m y ' s  M i d d l e  W a y " .  
6 1 3 C r o u c h ,  a b o v e  n  5 4 3 , 5 0 - 5 1 .  
6 1 4 1 b i d  5 1 ,  6 0 .  
6 1 5  L i d d l e ,  a b o v e  n  5 3 1 , 2 9 - 3 0 .  
6 1 6 1 b i d  3 0 .  
6 1 7
1 b i d  1 9 .  
6 1 8
1 b i d .  
9 0  
therefore, contributed to the landslide victories of the government party. The military also 
regularly intervened in the internal affairs of the PPP, POl and other social organizations.619 
Second, an agency in the Department of Defense and Security routinely selected military 
officers to fill civilian government positions620 and retired military officers might also hold such 
positions. Apart from the President himself, these positions included vice presidents, ministers 
and officials holding lower positions. Umar Wirahadikusumah and Try Sutrisno were generals 
who became vice presidents. As for the ministers, Liddle notes that fourteen of thirty-seven 
ministers in Soeharto's sixth cabinet (1993-1998) had military backgrounds,621 and a study by 
John MacDougal in the 1980s showed that military officers occupied fifty-two of one hundred 
and six sub-cabinet positions (secretaries general, directors-general, and inspectors 
general). 622 The study further showed that, in provincial and districts level, the armed forces 
once filled about three-quarters of the positions in all the twenty-seven provinces. 623 
Control over the Legislature. As discussed earlier, the dwifungsi doctrine legitimized the 
appointment of 100 (then 75) military officers to the 500-seat of the DPR. 624 Permana has 
criticized this process in an imagined dialogue between teacher and student: 
Teacher. ... 200 ·million Indonesians divided by 500 means each member of the DPR 
represents 400,000 people, correct? 
Student: In that case, the 75 ABRI625 members times 400,000 makes 30 million people. Is 
that right sir? In that case our country must have the largest military force in the world. 
Teacher. No, our country's armed forces don't even reach a million. But ABRI membership 
in the MPRIDPR is a special right not possed by the other civil political parties. 626 
Closing. This thesis argues that both Soekarno's and Soeharto's authoritarianism was enabled 
by the 1945 Constitution. This authoritarianism of the 1945 Constitution is further elaborated in 
the following section. 
6t91bid 217. 
620 Ibid 19 and 187. 
621 1bid 19. 
622 1bid. 
623 1bid. 
624 Article 10(3) and (4) of Law No. 2 of 1985 in relation to Law No. 5 of 1995 on Structure of the MPR, the DPR and the 
DPRD. 
625 ABRI is the abbreviation of Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or Indonesian Armed Forces. 
626 Permana, above n 599, 198. 
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B .  A u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m  i n  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
I n  t h e  e y e s  o f  L i d d l e ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  S o e h a r t o ' s  N e w  O r d e r  
a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e  i s  c l e a r .  H e  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  v i t a l  t o  S o e h a r t o ' s  
c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  r e g i m e ,  g i v e n  t h e  d o m i n a n c e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t a l  p o w e r  b y  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t .  6 2 7  
M a h f u d  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  h a d  n e v e r  p r o d u c e d  a  d e m o c r a t i c  g o v e r n m e n t  6 2
8  
a n d ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 9  w a s  m a d e  p o s s i b l e  o n l y  b y  n o t  a p p l y i n g  
t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  t h e  d a i l y  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m .  
6 2 9  
M o h a m m a d  H a t t a ,  w h o  w a s  t h e n  V i c e -
P r e s i d e n t ,  i s s u e d  " D e c r e e  N o .  X " 6 3 o  o f  1 6  O c t o b e r  1 9 4 5 ,  w h i c h  h a d  t r a n s f e r r e d  t h e  p o w e r s  o f  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  S o e k a r n o  t o  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  t h u s  a p p l y i n g  a  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s t e m ,  s o m e t h i n g  
c l e a r l y  a  b r e a c h  f r o m  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
6 3 1  
A l t h o u g h  H a t t a  d i d  n o t  h a v e  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  d o  
t h i s ,  h i s  d e c r e e  w a s ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  e f f e c t i v e .  T h i s  d e c r e e  l i m i t e d  t h e  ' p u r e '  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
T h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s  S h o r t c o m i n g s .  M a h f u d  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e r e  w e r e  f i v e  b a s i c  
w e a k n e s s e s  i n  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  ( b e f o r e  a m e n d m e n t ) .  
6 3 2  
F i r s t ,  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m  
u n d e r  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  e x e c u t i v e - h e a v y . 6
3 3  
S e c o n d ,  i t  l a c k e d  c h e c k s  a n d  b a l a n c e s . 6 3 4  
T h i r d ,  i t  d e l e g a t e d  t o o  m a n y  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  t o  t h e  s t a t u t e  l e v e l . 6 3 s  F o u r t h ,  i t  c o n t a i n e d  
a r t i c l e s  w h i c h  w e r e  a m b i g u o u s . 6 3 6  F i f t h ,  i t  d e p e n d e d  t o o  h e a v i l y  o n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  g o o d  w i l l  a n d  
i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s .  6 3 7  
6 2 7  L i d d l e ,  a b o v e  n  5 3 1 ,  1 2 0 .  
6 2 8  M a h f u d  M D ,  a b o v e  n  5 3 4 ,  5 2 .  
6 2 9  
I b i d .  
6 3 0  T h i s  t e x t  s h o u l d  b e  r e a d  a s  D e c r e e  ' X ' ,  n o t  ' 1 0 ' ,  b e c a u s e  a t  t h e  t i m e  i t  w a s  d r a f t e d  i t  h a p p e n e d  t h a t  n o  o n e  k n e w  w h e r e  i t  
b e l o n g e d  c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y .  
6 3 1
1 b i d .  
6 3 2  M a h f u d ,  a b o v e  n  5 3 4 ,  6 6 - 6 7 .  
6 3 3 1 b i d  6 6 .  
6 3 4
1 b i d .  
6 3 5 1 b i d .  
6 3 6
1 b i d .  
6 3 7
1 b i d  6 7 .  
9 2  
The Team for Study of Amendments of the Faculty of Law of the University of Brawijaya (Tim 
Kajian Amandemen Fakultas Hukum Universitas Brawijaya) argues that in addition to these 
defects, the 1945 Constitution also contained kekosongan hukum (legal vacuums) 638 because it 
was so brief and sparse.639 Finally, Bagir Manan640 argues that the fact that too many critical 
constitutional issues were outlined in the elucidation and not in the body of the 1945 
Constitution is another shortcoming of the Constitution. 641 These flaws of the original 1945 
Constitution are now each considered in turn. 
1. 'Executive-Heavy' Constitution 
The 1945 Constitution was an 'executive-heavy' Constitution. This means it provided the 
executive with enormous powers but lacked sufficient constitutional controls. Under the 1945 
Constitution, the President is the Chief-of-Executive642 and Chief-of-state. As the Chief-of-
Executive, the President had exclusive authority over Ministers and formation of the cabinet 
(Article 17(1) and (2)). As Chief-of-state643 the President had the power to (i) be the Chief-of-
Commander of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force (Article 1 0); (ii) declare war, make peace 
and conclude treaties with other states (Article 11 ); (iii) declare a state of emergency (Article 
12); (iv) appoint ambassadors and consuls, and receive the credentials of foreign ambassadors 
(Article 13); and (v) grant titles, decorations and other distinctions of honor (Article 15). 
Except for the power to declare war, make peace and conclude treaties -which were subject 
to the agreement of the DPR (Article 11)- none of these presidential powers were subject to 
an agreement or confirmation of the other state institutions. Even the body of the 1945 
Constitution did not give this controlling authority to the DPR, although according to the 
elucidation to the Constitution, the DPR should 'at all times control the acts of President'. 644 
638 The concept of legal vacuum will be further discussed in this section point 6. 
639 Tim Kajian Amandemen Fakultas Hukum Universitas Brawijaya, Amandemen UUD 1945: Antara Teks dan Konteks dalam 
Negara yang Sedang Berubah (2000) 14. 
640 Manan is a Professor of Constitutional Law in the Faculty of Law, the University of Padjajaran. When this thesis is written, 
he is the Chief Justice of the Indonesian Supreme Court. 
641 Bagir Manan, above n 29, 16-26. 
642 Article 4 of the 1945 Constitution. 
643 TheelucidationtoArticles 10, 11, 12, 13and 15. 
644 The Elucidation of System of Government Section VII of the 1945 Constitution. 
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I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e s e  b r o a d  a n d  l a r g e l y  u n c o n t r o l l e d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r s  w e r e  u s e d  b y  S o e h a r t o  a s  
l e g a l  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  s e l e c t i n g  k e y  p e r s o n  i n  s t r a t e g i c  p o s i t i o n s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  P r e s i d e n t  S o e h a r t o  
u n s u r p r i s i n g l y  m a n a g e d  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  b u r e a u c r a c y ,  t h e  m i l i t a r y ,  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d y  a n d  t h e  
j u d i c i a r y .  H e  b a s i c a l l y  b e c a m e  t h e  o n e  a n d  o n l y  a u t h o r i t y  w h o  h a d  t h e  p o w e r  t o  a p p o i n t  o r  
d i s m i s s  a n y b o d y  a s  h e  w i s h e d .  O n e  c l e a r  e x a m p l e  w a s  w h e n  S o e h a r t o  a p p o i n t e d  h i s  e l d e s t  
d a u g h t e r ,  S i t i  ' T u t u t '  H a r d i y a n t i  R u k m a n a ,  a s  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  S o c i a l  A f f a i r s  i n  h i s  l a s t  c a b i n e t  i n  
1 9 9 8 .  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  s y s t e m  b e c a m e  m o r e  e x e c u t i v e - h e a v y  b e c a u s e ,  b e s i d e s  t h e s e  e n o r m o u s  
e x e c u t i v e  p o w e r s ,  a  P r e s i d e n t  a l s o  h e l d  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r .  T h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  c l e a r l y  s t a t e d :  
[ t ] h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  h o l d  t h e  p o w e r  t o  m a k e  s t a t u t e s  i n  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  D e w a n  
P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  ( l e g i s l a t u r e ) . 6 4 s  
A p a r t  f r o m  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  p o w e r ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  
( l e g i s l a t u r e )  e x e r c i s e s  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r  i n  t h e  s t a t e . 6
4
6  
T h e  t e r m s  t h a t  " t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  h o l d  t h e  p o w e r  t o  m a k e  s t a t u t e s "  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  
d o m i n a n c e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r  o v e r  t h e  D P R ' s  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r .  A s  q u o t e d  b y  
N a s u t i o n ,  Y a p  T h i a m  H i e n  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r  s u r p a s s e d  t h a t  o f  t h e  
D P R ,  b e c a u s e  i t  w a s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  w h o  c o u l d  i s s u e  a  g o v e r n m e n t  R e g u l a t i o n  i n  l i e u  o f  S t a t u t e  
a n d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  c o u l d  a l s o  d e t e r m i n e d  a  s t a t e  o f  e m e r g e n c y  f o r  i s s u i n g  s u c h  G o v e r n m e n t  
R e g u l a t i o n  ( A r t i c l e  2 2 ( 1 } ) . 6 4 7  
I n  s u m ,  t h e  e x e c u t i v e - h e a v i n e s s  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  i t s  e l u c i d a t i o n ,  w h i c h  
s t a t e d :  
. . .  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  t h e  H i g h e s t  E x e c u t i v e  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  t h e  s t a t e .  I n  c o n d u c t i n g  t h e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a r e  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  ( c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  u p o n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ) . 6 4 B  
6 4 5  A r t i c l e  5  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 4 6 T h e  e l u c i d a t i o n  A r t i c l e  5  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 4 7  N a s u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 ,  3 6 7 .  
6 4 8  
T h e  e l u c i d a t i o n  o f  S y s t e m  o f  G o v e r n m e n t  S e c t i o n  I V  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
9 4  
2. Unclear System of Checks and Balances 
The elucidation of the 1945 Constitution stated that: 
[i]t is the MPR that holds the highest power of the state, whereas the President shall 
pursue the state policy as outlined by the MPR. The President who is appointed by the 
MPR shall be subordinate and accountable to the MPR. He is the mandatory of the MPR; 
it is his duty to carry out its decisions. The President is not in an equal position to, but 
subordinate to the MPR.649 
The MPR was therefore the highest institution of the state and 'the manifestation of all the 
people of lndonesia',65o which 'exercised in full' the sovereignty of the people.651 Therefore, the 
power of the MPR was- in theory- unlimited.652 This VJas a concept of the MPR as a "superior 
Parliament". 653 
On the one hand, these provisions of the superior MPR led the Indonesian system to "appear 
parliamentary".654 On the other hand, the executive-heavy Constitution argument strongly 
indicated that Indonesia applied a Presidential system.655 On this mixed message from the 
Indonesian Constitution, Lindsey argues that: 
[t]he 1945 Constitution did not clearly establish either a parliamentary or a President 
political system but instead created a blended and vague hybrid that relied on the notion 
of 'distribution' of powers .. . As a result the system of checks and balances between 
judiciary, legislature and executive necessary for a democratic political system had always 
been absent. 656 
In practice, the 'superior' MPR was therefore not sufficiently strong to control the President. In 
fact, the executive-heavy Constitution system managed to override the 'superior Parliament' 
concept. Muhammad Ridwan lndra says, according to "the 1945 Constitution MPR is supreme 
(highest state institution), but in practice, the President is supreme". 657 
6491bid. 
650 Ibid. 
651 Article 1(2) of the 1945 Constitution. 
652 Elucidation of article 2(2) of the 1945 Constitution. 
653 Lindsey, above n 99, 244. 
654 1bid. 
6551bid 248- 249. 
6561bid 247. 
657 Muhammad Ridwan lndra, The 1945 Constitution: A Human Creation (1990) 45. 
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T h e  M P R ' s  C o m p o s i t i o n .  O n e  o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  w h y  t h e  s u p e r i o r  M P R  c o u l d  n o t  c o n t r o l  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  w a s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  v a g u e  p r o v i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  i t s  m e m b e r s h i p .
6 5 8  
T h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  m e r e l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  M P R  c o n t a i n e d  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  p l u s  d e l e g a t e s  
f r o m  t h e  r e g i o n s  a n d  o t h e r  g r o u p s .
6 5 9  
S p e c i f i c  c r i t e r i a  a s  t o  w h o  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  o t h e r  g r o u p s  
b e s i d e  t h e  D P R  w e r e  a b s e n t .  T h e  e l u c i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s t a t e d  o n l y  t h a t  t h e  t e r m  
" g r o u p s "  r e f e r r e d  t o  s u c h  b o d i e s  a s  " c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  l a b o r  u n i o n s ,  a n d  o t h e r  c o l l e c t i v e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s " .
6 6 0  
I t  w a s  f r o m  t h i s  v a g u e  p r o v i s i o n  t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a r g u e d  t h a t  i t  w a s  a  ' g r o u p '  
u n d e r  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  h a d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  s i t  i n  t h e  M P R .  
I  
T h i s  l a c k  o f  c l a r i t y  o n  t h e  m e m b e r s h i p  a l s o  a l l o w e d  S o e h a r t o  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  M P R .  I n  K o i c h i  
K a w a m u r a ' s  w o r d s ,  t o  " p u t  i t  s t r o n g l y ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  c a n  a p p o i n t  b y  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  a l l  m e m b e r s  o f  
t h e  M P R " . 6 6
1  
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  i n s t e a d  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  t h e  M P R  b e c a m e  a  N e w  O r d e r  
" s i l e n t  p a r t n e r ' '  w h i c h  f o l l o w e d  S o e h a r t o ' s  b i d d i n g . 6 6 2  
3 .  T o o  M a n y  D e l e g a t i o n s  t o  S t a t u t e  
I t  w a s  n o t  o n l y  t h e  M P R  c o m p o s i t i o n  w h i c h  w a s  r e g u l a t e d  b y  s t a t u t e ,  b u t  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
a l s o  d e l e g a t e d  1 2  o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  t o  b e  f u r t h e r  r e g u l a t e d  b y  s t a t u t e .  T h e s e  s t a t u t e s  
i n c l u d e d :  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  d e c l a r i n g  a  s t a t e  e m e r g e n c y ; 6 6 3  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  D P A ; 6
6 4  
t h e  
d i v i s i o n  o f  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t ; 6 6 5  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  D P R ; 6 6 6  f i n a n c i a l  a n d  t a x  m a t t e r s ; 6 6 7  t h e  
c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  B P K ;
6 6 8  
t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  a n d  p o w e r  o f  l e g a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
S u p r e m e  C o u r t ; 6 6 9  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  a n d  d i s m i s s a l  o f  j u d g e s ; 6 7 o  c i t i z e n s h i p  m a t t e r s ; 6 7 1  f r e e d o m  
6 5 8  L i d d l e ,  a b o v e  n  5 3 1 ,  1 8 6 .  
6 5 9  A r t i c l e  2 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 6 0  E l u c i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 6 1  
K o i c h i  K a w a m u r a ,  ' P o l i t i c s  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n :  D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n  a n d  I t s  I m p a c t  o n  P o l i t i c a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  I n d o n e s i a '  
( R e s e a r c h  P a p e r  N o . 3 ,  I n s t i t u t e  o f  D e v e l o p i n g  E c o n o m y ,  2 0 0 3 )  1 7 .  
6 6
2  
A n d r e w  E l l i s ,  ' T h e  I n d o n e s i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  T r a n s i t i o n :  C o n s e r v a t i s m  o r  F u n d a m e n t a l  C h a n g e '  ( 2 0 0 2 )  6 ,  S i n g a p o r e  
J o u r n a l  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  a n d  C o m p a r a t i v e  L a w  1 2 4 .  
6 6 3  A r t i c l e  1 2  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 6 4  A r t i c l e  1 6  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 6 5  A r t i c l e  1 8  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 6 6  A r t i c l e  1 9 (  1 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 6 7  A r t i c l e  2 3  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 6 8  
A r t i c l e  2 3 ( 5 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  B P K  i s  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  B a d a n  P e m e r i k s a  K e u a n g a n  o r  S t a t e  A u d i t  B o a r d .  
T h i s  B o a r d  c o n d u c t s  o f f i c i a l  e x a m i n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  f i n a n c e s .  
6 6 9  A r t i c l e  2 4  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 7 0  A r t i c l e  2 5  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
9 6  
of association and expression; 672 the rules governing defense;67J and the national educational 
system.674 
This delegation to statute would not have been problematic if the 1945 Constitution had 
provided a strong 'checks and balances system' and clear guidelines of what should have been 
regulated. These guidelines were crucial because the DPR - which was supposed to work 
together with the President to make statutes - was practically unable to control the President's 
legislative power since the composition of the DPR itself depended on statutes prepared by the 
President. Consequently, having so many unclear delegations at the statute level was another 
characteristic of the authoritarianism of the 1945 Constitution. 
4. Ambiguous Articles 
The 1945 Constitution also contained some crucial articles which were ambiguous. As 
mentioned above, one of the articles which strongly contributed to Soeharto's authoritarian 
regime was article 7 of the 1945 Constitution. It stated: 
[t]he President and Vice-President shall hold office for a term of five years and shall be 
eligible for re-election. 
Mahfud argues that, from a constitutionalism perspective, this article should be interpreted as a 
President only being able to hold his or her position for a maximum of two terms.675 However, 
Soeharto and his supporters interpreted this article as meaning there was no limitation on the 
period of presidency. The President can therefore be re-elected every 5 years, for an unlimited 
number of times, and because Soeharto practically monopolized all of the powers, his 
interpretation had to be accepted as the "right" one.676 Hence, Soeharto was re-elected six 
times in 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993 and 1998. Just like Soekarno who once appointed as 
Indonesian President for life, to ensure he was re-elected every five years, Soeharto practically 
also became a "President for Life" by exploring the weaknesses of this Article 7. 
671 Article 26 of the 1945 Constitution. 
672 Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution. 
673 Article 30(2) of the 1945 Constitution. 
674 Article 31 of the 1945 Constitution. 
675Yusuf and Basalim, above n 6, 66-67. 
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M a n  a n  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  a n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  o f  v a g u e n e s s  w a s  A r t i c l e  2 8  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  6
7
7  
T h i s  a r t i c l e  s t a t e d :  •  
[ i j r e e d o m  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  a n d  a s s e m b l y ,  o f  v e r b a l  a n d  w r i t t e n  e x p r e s s i o n  a n d  t h e  l i k e ,  s h a l l  
b e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  l a w .  
O n e  o f  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  w a s  t h a t  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  l a w  h a d  n o t  y e t  b e e n  
p r o m u l g a t e d ,  t h e s e  r i g h t s  w e r e  n o t  p r o t e c t e d .  L i n d s e y  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  i s  n o t  a  
g u a r a n t e e  o f  r i g h t s  a t  a l l ,  b u t  a  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  p o w e r  t o  r e s t r i c t  r i g h t s .
6 7 8  
5 .  T o o  M u c h  D e p e n d e n c e  o n  P o l i t i c a l  G o o d w i l l  a n d  I n t e g r i t y  
T h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h a t  d e p e n d e d  h e a v i l y  o n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  g o o d w i l l  a n d  
i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  p e r s o n  w h o  r u n s  t h e  c o u n t r y .  T h e  g e n e r a l  e l u c i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
s t a t e d  t h a t :  
[ t ] h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t s  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  s t a t e  l i f e  i s  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  g o o d w i l l  o f  t h e  
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  l e a d e r s  .  .  .  i f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  g o o d w i l l  o f  t h e  s t a t e  a u t h o r i t i e s  
a n d  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  a r e  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ,  t h e n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  i n  r e a l i t y  
m e a n i n g l e s s .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  e v e n  i f  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  i m p e r f e c t ,  b u t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
g o o d w i l l  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  l e a d e r s  i s  r i g h t ,  s u c h  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w i l l  i n  n o  w a y  h i n d e r  t h e  
p r o c e s s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .  T h u s ,  w h a t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  i s  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  g o o d w i l l .  I t  m u s t  b e  a  l i v i n g  
a n d  d y n a m i c  p o l i t i c a l  g o o d w i l l .  6 7 9  
T h i s  e l u c i d a t i o n  w a s  w r i t t e n  b y  S o e p o m o ,  o n e  o f  t h e  k e y  d r a f t e r s  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  
t h e  f o r e m o s t  p r o p o n e n t  o f  t h e  ' i n t e g r a l i s t i c  s t a t e ' ,  t h a t  i s  a  s t a t e  w h i c h  e m b r a c e s  " t h e  w h o l e  
n a t i o n ,  u n i t i n g  a l l  t h e  p e o p l e " . 6 8 o  T h i s  i d e a  " e m p h a s i z e d  t h e  u n i t y  o f  a l l  t h i n g s ; " 6 8 1  o r  i n  t h e  
J a v a n e s e  t r a d i t i o n ,  m a n u n g g a l i n g  k a w u l o  f a n  g u s t i  ( u n i t y  o f  s e r v a n t  a n d  m a s t e r ) .
6 8 2  
A s  p o i n t e d  
o u t  b y  N a s u t i o n ,  S o e p o m o ' s  v i e w  w a s ,  u n d e r  t h i s  u n i t y :  
[ t ] h e r e  c o u l d  b e  n o  c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n t e r e s t  b e t w e e n  t h e  r u l e r s  a n d  t h e  r u l e d .  g o v e r n m e n t  
o f f i c i a l s  w e r e  a s s u m e d  t o  b e  g o o d  a n d  w i s e ,  a l w a y s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  
p e o p l e .  T h e r e  w a s  n o  f e a r  o f  a b u s e  o f  p o w e r .  6 8 3  
6 7
6 1 b i d ,  6 6 .  
6 7 7 M a n a n ,  a b o v e  n  6 4 1 ,  1 5 - 1 6 .  
6 7 8  L i n d s e y ,  a b o v e  n  9 9 ,  2 5 3 .  
6 7 9  T h e  G e n e r a l  E l u c i d a t i o n  S e c t i o n  I V  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 8 0  N a s u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 ,  4 2 1 .  
6 8 1 1 b i d .  
6 8 2
1 b i d .  
6 8 3 1 b i d  4 2 2 .  
9 8  
Therefore, the people needed no fundamental of rights to protect them from potential violations 
by the state, because the state was the same as the people and "their interests were therefore 
identical". 684 Because of these similar interests, Soepomo was also named its integralistic state 
as a "family-state" in which criticisms between members of the family would be considered 
undesirable.685 Therefore, opposition or control from the citizens to the government would not 
be necessary because it would be against the principle of trusting the good faith (itikad baik) of 
their leaders.686 Lindsey argues that this na'ive concept of integralistic state unsurprisingly failed 
when it came into force, because the state and the people do not, obviously, act and think as 
one.687 Further, Nasution argues that Soepomo's notion of integralistic state is undemocratic. In 
Nasution words: 
... the concept of an integralistic state was a denial of the very problematic nature of the 
constitutional state, namely the chronically and ubiquitously problematic nature of 
government power, which requires special devices under modern constitutions to prevent 
it from becoming despotic. 688 
6. Legal Vacuums 
Before proceeding, legal vacuums should first be defined. A 'legal vacuum' is a concept of law 
recognized in civil law systems where large areas of law are codified. 689 It refers to a condition 
where a situation is not regulated yet by a written law. In the words of Pistor and Xu, "a legal 
vacuum is created by the absence of lawmaking".690 In the common law system this concept is 
not known since a judge can discover, or create law. John Herry Merryman defines common 
law is "the law created and molded by the judges."69t 
According to the Team for Study of Amendments of the Faculty of Law University of Brawijaya, 
the 1945 Constitution contained four serious legal vacuums. These vacuums were: (i) the 
684 Lindsey, above n 99, 253. 
685 Nasution, above n 14, 422. 
6861bid 422-423. 
687 Lindsey, above n 99, 253- 254. 
688 Nasution, above n 14, 423. 
689 Arthur Taylor von Mehren and James Russel Gordley, The Civil Law System (2"d edition, 1977) 3. 
69° Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, 'Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions Lessons from the Incomplete 
Law' (2002) Columbia International Affairs Online< htto://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cip01/cio01f.pdf> at 15.December 2004. 
691 John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (1985) 34. 
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I n d o n e s i a n  e c o n o m i c  s y s t e m ,  ( i i )  a  b i l l  o f  r i g h t s ;  ( i i i )  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  e n o r m o u s  p o w e r s  o f  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t ;  a n d  ( i v )  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  s y s t e m . 6 9 2  
E x c e p t  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t w o  o f  t h e  v a c u u m s ,  I  a c c e p t  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  o f  t h e  T e a m .  A s  t o  t h e  f i r s t  
s u p p o s e d  v a c u u m ,  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s y s t e m ,  I n d o n e s i a  h a d  f o r m a l l y  a d o p t e d  a  s o c i a l i s t  e c o n o m i c  
s y s t e m  i n  A r t i c l e  3 3 . 6
9 3  
T h e  e l u c i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  n a m e d  t h e  s y s t e m  a s  " t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  e c o n o m i c  d e m o c r a c y " .  
6 9 4  
T h i s  m e a n t  t h a t  i t  w a s  t h e  " p r o s p e r i t y  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  
w h i c h  i s  s t r e s s e d ,  n o t  p r o s p e r i t y  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l " .
6 9 5  
T h e  p r o b l e m  w a s  n o t  t h a t  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
h a s  b e e n  s i l e n t  b u t  t h a t  A r t i c l e  3 3  h a s  b e e n  l a r g e l y  i g n o r e d  b y  s u c c e s s i v e  g o v e r n m e n t s  s i n c e  
1 9 4 5 .  
I n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  s u p p o s e d  v a c u u m ,  t h e  b i l l  o f  r i g h t s ,  t h e r e  w e r e  a r t i c l e s  i n  t h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  p r o v i d e d  s o m e  p r o t e c t i o n s  f o r  h u m a n  r i g h t s :  e q u a l i t y  u n d e r  t h e  l a w ,  t h e  r i g h t  
t o  w o r k  a n d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  l i v e  ( A r t i c l e  2 7 ) ;  f r e e d o m  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  a n d  o p i n i o n  ( a r t i c l e  2 8 ) ;  
f r e e d o m  o f  r e l i g i o n  ( A r t i c l e  2 9 ) ;  r i g h t  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  n a t i o n a l  d e f e n s e  ( 3 0 ) ;  r i g h t  o f  e d u c a t i o n  
( A r t i c l e  3 1 ) ;  a n d  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  ( A r t i c l e  3 4 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  c r u c i a l  r i g h t s  s u c h  a s  f r e e d o m  o f  
a s s o c i a t i o n  a n d  f r e e d o m  o f  o p i n i o n  ' s h a l l  b e  p r e s c r i b e d  b y  l a w ' .  
6 9 6  
F o r  B i v i t r i  S u s a n t i ,  t h i s  
p h r a s e  i s  a  c l e a r  l e g a l  d e f e c t :  i t  o p e n s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h o s e  i n  p o w e r  t o  ' t w i s t '  t h e  r i g h t . 6 9
7
l n  
f a c t ,  d u r i n g  S o e h a r t o ' s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e ,  s u c h  a  l a w  w a s  n e v e r  b e e n  i n t r o d u c e d .  
T h e  a b s e n c e  o f  c r u c i a l  h u m a n  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  n o t  a n  o v e r s i g h t .  I t  w a s  a  
r e s u l t  o f  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e b a t e ,  i n  1 9 4 5 ,  b e t w e e n  M o h a m m a d  H a t t a  a n d  M u h a m m a d  Y a m i n ,  
w h o  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  b i l l  o f  r i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  S o e k a r n o  a n d  S o e p o m o ,  
w h o  o p p o s e d  i t .  6 9 8  T h e  v a g u e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  2 8  w a s  i n t e n d e d  t o  b e  a  ' m e e t i n g  g r o u n d '  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  c a m p s .  
6 9 2  
T i m  K a j i a n  A m a n d e m e n  F a k u l t a s  H u k u m  U n i v e r s i t a s  B r a w i j a y a ,  a b o v e  n  6 3 9 ,  1 4 - 1 5 .  
6 9 3  
A r t i c l e  3 3  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n :  ( 1 )  T h e  e c o n o m y  s h a l l  b e  o r g a n i z e d  a s  a  c o m m o n  e n d e a v o u r  b a s e d  u p o n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
o f  t h e  f a m i l y  s y s t e m .  ( 2 )  B r a n c h e s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  w h i c h  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  w h i c h  a f f e c t  t h e  l i f e  o f  m o s t  p e o p l e  s h a l l  
b e  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  t h e  s t a t e .  ( 3 )  L a n d  a n d  w a t e r  a n d  t h e  n a t u r a l  r i c h e s  c o n t a i n e d  t h e r e i n  s h a l l  b e  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  s h a l l  
b e  m a d e  u s e  o f  f o r  t h e  p e o p l e .  
6 9 4  E l u c i d a t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  3 3  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 9 5
1 b i d .  
6 9 6  A r t i c l e  2 8  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
6 9
7  
B i v i t r i  S u s a n t i ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  H u m a n  R i g h t s  P r o v i s i o n s  i n  I n d o n e s i a :  A n  U n f i n i s h e d  T a s k  i n  t h e  T r a n s i t i o n a l  P r o c e s s '  
( P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  H u m a n  R i g h t s  i n  a  G l o b a l  A g e :  A n  A s i a  P a c i f i c  H i s t o r y " ,  C a n b e r r a ,  3 0  
N o v e m b e r - 3  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 1 )  3 .  
6 9 8  
Y a m i n ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 ,  1 1 4 .  S e e  a l s o  S e k r e t a r i a t  N e g a r a  R e p u b l i k  I n d o n e s i a ,  R i s a l a h  S i d a n g  B P U P K I - P P K / 2 8  M e i  1 9 4 5 - 2 2  
A g u s t u s  1 9 4 5  ( 1 9 9 5 )  2 6 2 - 2 7 6 .  
1 0 0  
With regard to the electoral system pursuant to the 1945 Constitution the word 'election' did not 
even appear in the 1945 Constitution! As a result in the absence of constitutional limitations, 
the authoritarian interests of Soeharto's regime easily dominated the electoral process during 
the New Order. 
7. The Elucidation 
Unlike other constitutions, the 1945 Constitution had an elucidation in addition to its preamble 
and body. 699 ln fact, lndra notes that this Constitution is the only Constitution in the world which 
has an elucidation. 700 Lindsey has defined an elucidation as: 
... the explanatory memorandum that accompanies most Indonesian legislative and 
regulatory instruments and, although not a formal source of law on its own, is usually read 
as part of the text of the instrument ... it plays an absolutely essential role in interpreting 
the ConstitutionJ01 
However, the existence of this elucidation of the 1945 Constitution created two problems. First, 
this elucidation was not the product of the BPUPKI and the PPKI, the committees which 
prepared and drafted the 1945 Constitution. Instead, Soepomo, one of the members of the two 
institutions, wrote the elucidation. 702 The elucidation simply 'appeared' as part of the 1945 
Constitution in 1946,7°3 and in 1959, when Soekarno issued his 5 July Presidential Decree, but 
was not included in the original draft. 704 For these reasons, the legitimacy of the elucidation has 
often been questioned, and therefore, its binding power should have been weaker than the 
preamble and body of the Constitution. 
Second, as discussed earlier, the elucidation contained many crucial provisions which should 
properly have been placed in the body of the Constitution. This is because, as Maria Farida 
lndrati Soeprapto argues, an elucidation should not contain new principles.7°5 As a matter of 
fact, many provisions in the elucidation were entirely new and very significant constitutional 
699 Man an, above n 29, 16. 
700 lndra, above n 657, 21. 
701 Lindsey, above n 99, 247. 
702Yusuf and Basalim, above n 6, 13. 
703 The Indonesian State News Number 7 of 1946. 
704 State Gazette Number 75 of 1959. 
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p r i n c i p l e s ,  a n d  h e n c e ,  m i g h t  b e  a r g u e d  t o  b e  i n v a l i d ,  f o r  e x a m p l e  ( i )  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  I n d o n e s i a  
a s  a  s t a t e  o f  l a w  ( n e g a r a  h u k u m ,  r e c h t s s t a a Q ;  ( i i )  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  a n d  s y s t e m  o f  P r e s i d e n t i a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ;  a n d  ( i i i )  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  B P K  ( B a d a n  P e m e r i k s a  
K e u a n g a n ,  s t a t e  A u d i t  B o d y )  a n d  t h e  j u d i c i a r y J 0 6  
O t h e r  R e a s o n s  t o  R e f o r m .  B e s i d e  t h e  s h o r t c o m i n g s  c o n s i d e r e d  s o  f a r ,  t h e r e  a r e  t h e o r e t i c a l ,  
h i s t o r i c a l ,  a n d  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n s  w h y  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  r e f o r m e d J 0
7  
T h e s e  
r e a s o n s  a r e  n o w  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t u r n .  
T h e o r e t i c a l  R e a s o n s .  A s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  C h a p t e r  T w o ,  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  r e f o r m e d  i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  c h a n g i n g  o f  s o c i e t y .  T h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  i m m u n e  f r o m  
c h a n g e .  l n d r a  h a s  t h u s  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  a  h u m a n  c r e a t i o n ,  w h i c h  w o u l d  
n e v e r  b e  p e r f e c t .  
7
0 B  
U n d e r  S o e h a r t o ' s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t h e  m y t h  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  b e i n g  a n  u n a m e n d a b l e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  t h r e e  p o l i c i e s .  F i r s t ,  a  ' n a t i o n a l  c o n s e n s u s '  a u t h o r i z e d  t h e  




B y  d o i n g  s o ,  
a n y  a t t e m p t  t o  a m e n d  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  s u c c e e d e d ,  b e c a u s e  o n e  o f  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  t o  a m e n d  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  t h e  a t t e n d a n c e  o f  m o r e  t h a n  2 / 3  o f  t h e  M P R  
m e m b e r s .  n o  S o e h a r t o  s t a t e d  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h i s  n u m b e r  i n  h i s  s p e e c h  b e f o r e  t h e  s t a f f  
c o n f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  a r m e d  f o r c e s  o n  2 7  M a r c h  1 9 8 0 :  
[ b ] e c a u s e  t h e  A r m e d  F o r c e s  i t s e l f  d o e s  n o t  w a n t  t o  a m e n d  ( t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ) ,  w e  
h a v e  t o  u s e  g u n s  i f  a n  a m e n d m e n t  i s  e n a c t e d .  I f  w e  d o  n o t  w a n t  t o  u s e  g u n s ,  t h e n  I  w i l l  
e x p l a i n  t o  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  a s  f o l l o w s :  W h e n  f a c i n g  a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
a n d  P a n c a s i l a ,  i t  w o u l d  b e  b e t t e r  f o r  u s  t o  k i d n a p  o n e  t h i r d  o f  t h e  t w o  t h i r d s  w h o  w a n t  t o  
a m e n d  t h a n  t o  u s e  g u n s .  7 1 1  
7
0 5  M a r i a  F a r i d a  l n d r a t i  S o e p r a p t o ,  l l m u  P e r u n d a n g - u n d a n g a n :  D a s a r - d a s a r  d a n  P e m b e n t u k a n n y a  ( 1 9 9 8 )  1 7 5 .  
7 0 6  M a n  a n ,  a b o v e  n  6 4 1 ,  2 6 .  
7 0 7  Y u s u f  a n d  B a s a l i m ,  a b o v e  n  6 ,  5 5 - 6 4 .  
7 0 8 1 n d r a ,  a b o v e  n  6 5 7 ,  5 2 .  
7
0 9  H a r r y  T j a n  S i l a l a h i ,  K o n s e n s u s  P o l i t i k  N a s i o n a l  O r d e  B a r u  ( 1 9 9 0 )  3 2 - 4 8 .  
7 1 0  A r t i c l e  3 7  ( 1 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
7 1 1  A . M .  F a t w a ,  D e m i  S e b u a h  R e z i m :  D e m o k r a s i  d a n  K e y a k i n a n  B e r a g a m a  D i a d i l i  ( 2 0 0 0 )  2 1 4 .  
1 0 2  
Second, MPR Decree No. IV of 1983 on Referendums strengthened the national consensus. 
This decree clearly showed Soeharto's authoritarian regime sought to 'sanctify' the 1945 
Constitution. It stated: 
... the MPR has determined to maintain the 1945 Constitution, it does not wish and does 
not want to make changes to it and intends to implement it purely and consistently.712 
Third, the 1983 MPR referendum decree was than confirmed by Law No. 5 of 1985 on 
Referendum. Although this statute seemed to allow the possibility of amending the 1945 
Constitution, the very difficult requirements set up in it, paradoxically, made amendment almost 
impossible. To amend the Constitution, the statute required a referendum to be held in which: 
a) at least 90% of the authorized voters to vote; and 
b) at least 90% of these voters agree to the MPR proposal to amend the 1945 
Constitution. 713 
As a 90 per cent voter turn up and agreement is probably impossible, the New Order's strategy 
was clearly to entrench and sanctify the 1945 Constitution. Further, the requirements under the 
statute were only some of the requirements to amend the 1945 Constitution. Even if the 
referendum statute's requirements had been met, the amendment would not have been valid if 
the requirements under 37 of the 1945 Constitution had not been satisfied that is a minimum 
two-third of the MPR members attend the plenary meeting, and at least two-thirds of those 
attending agree on the amendment proposal. 
Historical Reasons. As explained in Chapter One, the 1945 Constitution was drafted in a very 
short period of time and in a state of wartime emergency, and hence, was originally designed to 
be a temporary documenU14 Therefore, the text historically required change and was prepared 
in anticipation of it. 
Practical Reasons. In practice, during the New Order, the 1945 Constitution was effectively 
amended several times. The above MPR Decree and statute on referendum, which amended 
the amendment procedure, were examples of 'silent amendments'. Mohammad Fajrul Falaakh 
712 See also Article 115 of MPR Decree Number I of 1978. 
713 Article 18 of the Law Number 5 of 1985 on Referendum. 
714Yamin, above n 13,410. 
103 
a r g u e s  t h a t  o t h e r  e x a m p l e s  o f  s i l e n t  a m e n d m e n t s  w e r e :  ( i )  t h e  b r o a d e r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  ' g r o u p s '  o f  
t h e  M P R  m e m b e r s ·  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  m i l i t a r y ;  ( i i )  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  
j u d i c i a r y  b y  S o e h a r t o  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a p p o i n t  t h e  C h i e f  a n d  D e p u t y  C h i e f  J u s t i c e s  o f  
t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t ;  a n d  ( i i i )  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  I n d o n e s i a n  t e r r i t o r y  t o  i n c l u d e  E a s t  T i m o r .  7 1 5  
Y u s u f  a n d  B a s a l i m  h a v e  s i m i l a r l y  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  b r o a d e r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  m i l i t a r y ,  
w h i c h  i n c l u d e d  t h e  P o l r i , 7 1 6  w a s  a  s i l e n t  a m e n d m e n t  t o  A r t i c l e  1 0  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
w h i c h  h a d  l i m i t e d  t h e  m i l i t a r y  t o  t h e  a r m y ,  n a v y  a n d  a i r  f o r c e . 7
1 7  
C o n c l u s i o n .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  a n  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  d o c u m e n t .  
B o t h  S o e k a r n o  a n d  S o e h a r t o  u s e d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t o  c e n t r a l i z e  n u m e r o u s  p o w e r s  o f  t h e  s t a t e  
i n  t h e i r  h a n d s .  T h i s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  h a d  t o  b e  r e f o r m e d  i f  I n d o n e s i a n  
w a s  t o  b e c o m e  a  m o r e  d e m o c r a t i c  c o u n t r y .  T h e  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  S o e h a r t o ' s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e  
w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  c h a n c e s  t o  c a r r y  o u t  s u c h  r e f o r m .  
T h e  n e x t  C h a p t e r s  F o u r  t o  S e v e n ,  o n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  a n d  o u t c o m e ,  w i l l  d e s c r i b e  h o w  
t h e  r e f o r m  w a s  c o n d u c t e d .  C h a p t e r  E i g h t  w i l l  t h e n  e v a l u a t e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  I n d o n e s i a  h a s  
s u c c e e d e d  i n  r e f o r m i n g  i t s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
7 1 5  
Y u s u f  a n d  B a s a l i m ,  a b o v e  n  6 ,  6 3  - 6 4 .  S e e  a l s o  I  M a d e  L e o  W i r a t m a ,  ' R e f o r m a s i  K o n s t i t u s i :  P o t r e t  D e m o k r a s i  d a l a m  
P r o s e s  P e m b e l a j a r a n '  ( 2 0 0 0 )  4  A n a / i s i s  C S I S  4 0 4 - 4 0 5 .  
7 1
6  P o l r i  i s  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  o f  P o / i s i  R e p u b l i k  I n d o n e s i a  o r  t h e  P o l i c e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  I n d o n e s i a .  
7 1 7  
Y u s u f  a n d  B a s a l i m ,  a b o v e  n  6 ,  6 3 .  
1 0 4  
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C h a p t e r  F o u r  
T h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t :  
A m e n d i n g  t h e  S a c r e d  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
T h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  t h e  f i r s t  o f  f o u r  f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r s  w h i c h  d e s c r i b e  e a c h  o f  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s .  
E v a l u a t i o n  a n d  c r i t i c s  o f  t h e s e  a m e n d m e n t s  c a n  b e  f o u n d  i n  C h a p t e r  E i g h t .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  
f o c u s e s  o n  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  I t  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s .  S e c t i o n  A  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  s i t u a t i o n a l  b a c k g r o u n d  t o  
t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t .  I t  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  p r e - a m e n d m e n t  p e r i o d ,  f r o m  M a y  1 9 9 8  t o  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  
t o  s h o w  t h a t  t h i s  p e r i o d  w a s  c r u c i a l  t o  s t a r t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s .  S e c t i o n  B  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  
p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  b y  a n a l y z i n g  d i s c u s s i o n s  p r i o r  t o ,  a n d  d u r i n g ,  t h e  1 9 9 9  M P R  
G e n e r a l  S e s s i o n .  S e c t i o n  C  o u t l i n e s  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  w h i c h  w a s  m o s t l y  
d i r e c t e d  a t  l i m i t i n g  t h e  p o w e r  o f  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  p o w e r  o f  D P R .  
A .  T h e  B a c k  G r o u n d :  t h e  P r e - A m e n d m e n t  P e r i o d  
T h i s  s e c t i o n  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  p e r i o d  b e t w e e n  S o e h a r t o ' s  f o r c e d  r e s i g n a t i o n  a n d  p r i o r  t o  t h e  F i r s t  
A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s .  T h i s  p r e - a m e n d m e n t  p e r i o d  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  w h a t  B o n i m e - B i a n c  c a l l s  
t h e  " p r e - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p e r i o d " . 7
1 8  
A s  e l a b o r a t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  T w o ,  B o n i m e - B i a n c  a r g u e s  t h a t  i n  a  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p e r i o d  t h r e e  c o n d i t i o n s  s h o u l d  d e v e l o p :  ( i )  a  n a t i o n w i d e  l e g i s l a t i v e  e l e c t i o n ,  
p r e c e d e d  b y  e l e c t o r a l  r e f o r m ;  ( i i )  a  p r o c e s s  o f  " s o c i o p o l i t i c a l  l e g a l i z a t i o n "  i n  w h i c h  b a s i c  
f r e e d o m s  a r e  s e c u r e d ;  a n d  ( i i i )  a  p r o c e s s  o f  " a u t h o r i t a r i a n  i l l e g a l i z a t i o n "  i n  w h i c h  p r o h i b i t i o n s  
a r e  p l a c e d  o n  t h e  a r b i t r a r y  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  m e c h a n i s m . 7
1 9  
T h e s e  t h r e e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  t o  
s e t  d o w n  a  b a s i c  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  
I n  I n d o n e s i a ,  t h e s e  t h r e e  c o n d i t i o n s  w e r e  m e t  d u r i n g  H a b i b i e ' s  p r e s i d e n c y .  T h e  m a n n e r  i n  
w h i c h  t h i s  o c c u r r e d  i s  e l a b o r a t e d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n .  
1 .  H a b i b i e ' s  P r e s i d e n c y  
T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  H a b i b i e ' s  P r e s i d e n c y .  O n  2 1  M a y  1 9 9 8 ,  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  B . J .  H a b i b i e  
t o o k  a n  o a t h  a s  I n d o n e s i a ' s  P r e s i d e n t  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  P r e s i d e n t  S o e h a r t o  r e a d  h i s  l e t t e r  o f  
7 1 8  B o n i m e - B i a n c ,  a b o v e  n  6 4 ,  1 3 9 .  
7 1 9 1 b i d  1 4 0 .  
1 0 6  
resignation. However, this transfer of presidency was soon under attack.72o Golkar, Habibie's 
own party, argued that because Soeharto and Habibie had been elected as a 'package', both 
had to resign, and the MPR should then hold a special session to elect a new President and 
Vice President. 121 
This 'package' argument was incorrect. The 1945 Constitution only stipulated that the MPR 
should elect the President and Vice President (Article 6). There was no Article in the 
Constitution which stated that both positions were a 'package'. In fact, the election for each 
position was held in a separate meeting of the MPR. Furthermore, Article 8 of the 1945 
Constitution provided: 
[s]hall the President die, resign or be unable to perform his duties during his term of office, 
he shall be succeeded by the Vice President until the expiry of his term of office. 
Habibie's presidency was, therefore, legitimate because Soeharto had unilaterally declared his 
intention to resign. 
Many critics also questioned the legitimacy of Habibie's presidency because he had taken his 
oath of office at Merdeka Palace before the MA (Supreme Court) justices instead of at the MPR 
or DPR.722 These criticisms were also incorrect. Although the 1945 Constitution made no 
provision for a situation such as Habibie's case, the legal authority for the presidential oath is 
derived from MPR Decree No. VII of 1973 on The Situation when the President and Vice-
President are Incapacitated, which stipulated: 
• Should the President be permanently incapacitated, he shall be succeeded by 
the Vice President until the expiry of his term of office. 
• Before assuming the presidency, The Vice President shall take the oath of office 
before the DPR. 
• If the DPR is unable to hold a session, the Vice President shall take the oath 
before the Supreme Court. 723 





723 Article 2 of MPR Decree No. VII of 1973 on the Situation when the President and Vice-President Incapacitated. 
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S i n c e  s t u d e n t s  w e r e  o c c u p y i n g  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  b u i l d i n g  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  S o e h a r t o ' s  r e s i g n a t i o n ,  i t  
w a s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  h o l d  a  D P R  m e e t i n g .  H a b i b i e ' s  o a t h  b e f o r e  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  w a s ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  l e g i t i m a t e J 2 4  
H a b i b i e ' s  I n i t i a t i v e s .  Q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  H a b i b i e ' s  p r e s i d e n c y  
e v e n t u a l l y  s u b s i d e d . 7
2 5  
H o w e v e r ,  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  H a b i b i e ' s  i l l e g i t i m a c y  r e m a i n e d  s t r o n g  f o r  t w o  
r e a s o n s :  h e  m e r e l y  r e p l a c e d  S o e h a r t o  a n d  n e v e r  h i m s e l f  e l e c t e d  a s  P r e s i d e n t ;  a n d  h e  h a d  a  
c l o s e  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  S o e h a r t o ' s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e . 7
2 6  
T h i s  p r o b l e m  o f  l e g i t i m a c y  i n f l u e n c e d  
m a n y  o f  H a b i b i e ' s  p o l i c i e s . 7
2 7  
U n d e r  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  t h e  p u b l i c ,  h e  i n t r o d u c e d  p o p u l a r  i n i t i a t i v e s :  
( i )  p r o m o t i n g  t h e  1 9 9 8  s p e c i a l  M P R  s e s s i o n  t o  s e t  t h e  1 9 9 9  e l e c t i o n  s c h e d u l e ;  ( i i )  s u p p o r t i n g  
t h e  1 9 9 9  e l e c t o r a l  r e f o r m ,  ( i i i )  l i b e r a l i z i n g  f r e e d o m  o f  t h e  p r e s s  a n d  f r e e d o m  o f  e x p r e s s i o n ;  ( i v )  
r e l e a s i n g  p o l i t i c a l  p r i s o n e r s ;  a n d  ( v )  c o n d u c t i n g  t h e  1 9 9 9  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n .  
7 2 8  
A l l  o f  t h e s e  
i n i t i a t i v e s  b e c a m e  p a r t  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  p r e - a m e n d m e n t  p e r i o d .  T h e s e  i n i t i a t i v e s  a r e  n o w  
c o n s i d e r e d  i n  m o r e  d e t a i l ,  i n  t u r n .  
a .  T h e  1 9 9 8  M P R  S p e c i a l  S e s s i o n  
I n  o r d e r  t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  i n  1 9 9 9 ,  t h e  M P R  w a s  l e g a l l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  h a v e  a  
s p e c i a l  s e s s i o n  t o  a m e n d  t h e  e x i s t i n g  d e c r e e  s t a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  n e x t  e l e c t i o n  w o u l d  b e  h e l d  i n  
2 0 0 2 .  
7 2 9  
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a  s p e c i a l  s e s s i o n  w a s  h e l d  o n  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 8 .  T h i s  s e s s i o n  p r o d u c e d  
t w e l v e  M P R  d e c r e e s .  
7 3 0  
T h r e e  o f  t h e  t w e l v e  d e c r e e s  f o r m e d  t h e  e m b r y o  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
r e f o r m  t h a t  f o l l o w e d .  T h e y  w e r e :  ( i )  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  V I I I  o f  1 9 9 8  o n  R e v o c a t i o n  o f  M P R  
D e c r e e  N o .  I V  o f  1 9 8 3  o n  R e f e r e n d u m s ;  ( i i )  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  X I I I  o f  1 9 9 8  o n  L i m i t a t i o n  o f  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  a n d  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t i a l  T e r m s ;  a n d  ( i i i )  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  X V I I  o f  1 9 9 8  o n  H u m a n  
R i g h t s . 7
3 1  
7 2 4  
M o h a m m a d  F a j r u l  F a l a a k h ,  ' M e g a w a t i  d a n  S u k s e s i  P o l a  H a b i b i e ' ,  K o m p a s ,  6  M a r c h  2 0 0 0 .  
7 2 5  A n w a r ,  a b o v e  n  7 2 0 ,  3 4 - 3 5 .  
7 2
6 1 b i d  3 5 .  
7 2 7
1 b i d .  
7 2 8  
M a r c u s  M i e t z n e r ,  ' F r o m  S o e h a r t o  t o  H a b i b i e :  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  A r m e d  F o r c e s  a n d  P o l i t i c a l  I s l a m  d u r i n g  t h e  T r a n s i t i o n '  i n  
G e o f f  F o r r e s t e r  ( e d ) ,  P o s t - S o e h a r t o  I n d o n e s i a :  R e n e w a l  o r  C h a o s  ( 1 9 9 9 )  9 1 .  S e e  a l s o  U d d l e ,  a b o v e  n  3 0 ,  3 8 7 - 3 8 8 ;  E d w a r d  
M a s t e r s ,  I n d o n e s i a ' s  1 9 9 9  E l e c t i o n s :  A  S e c o n d  C h a n c e  f o r  D e m o c r a c y  ( 1 9 9 9 )  A s i a n  U p d a t e  < h t t p : / / w w w . c i a o n e t . o r g l  
w p s / m a e 0 1 >  a t  3 0  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 3 .  
7 2 9  M P R  D e c r e e  N u m b e r  I I  o f  1 9 9 8  o n  B r o a d  G u i d e l i n e  o n  S t a t e  P o l i c y .  
7 3 0  A n w a r ,  a b o v e  n  7 2 0 ,  4 0 .  
7 3 1  
M a j e l i s  P e r m u s y a w a r a t a n  R a k y a t ,  P a n d u a n  d a l a m  M e m a s y a r a k a t k a n  U n d a n g - u n d a n g  D a s a r  N e g a r a  R e p u b l i k  I n d o n e s i a  
T a h u n  1 9 4 5 :  L a t a r  B e l a k a n g ,  P r o s e s  d a n  H a s i l  P e r u b a h a n  U n d a n g - u n d a n g  D a s a r  N e g a r a  R e p u b l i k  I n d o n e s i a  T a h u n  1 9 4 5  
( 2 0 0 3 )  2 9 - 3 1 .  
1 0 8  
With the revocation of the 1983 MPR Decree on Referendums, Law No. 5 of 1985 on 
Referendums,m was also automatically, annulled. The New Order's policy of preventing 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution was legally abolished. The amendment procedure was 
once again simple, as it reverted to the procedure under Article 37 of the 1945 Constitution 
which stipulated that the two-third of the MPR members should attend the amendment meeting, 
and two-third of those in attendance agree to the amendment proposal. 
MPR Decree No. XIII of 1998 altered the interpretation of Article 7 of the Constitution dealing 
with the terms of the presidency. Article 1 of this MPR decree stated that: 
[t]he President and Vice President shall hold office for a term of five years, and shall be 
eligible for re-election to the same office for one further termJ33 
This provision ended the previous interpretation that a President could be elected for more than 
two periods, an interpretation effectively used by Soeharto to be re-elected six times. This 
provision was then adopted as Article 7 of the First Amendment of the 1945 Constitution. 
Next, MPR Decree No. XVII of 1998 on human rights was the legal basis for Law No. 39 of 
1999 on Human Rights. Most of the Articles in this human rights law were then adopted in the 
Second Amendment of the 1945 Constitution, promulgated in the 2000 MPR Annual Session. 
b. The 1999 Electoral Reform 
Preparation for the 1999 general election continued with the enactment of three new laws on 
elections,734 political parties 735 and the composition of the MPR, the DPR and the DPRDsJ36 
Unfortunately, the DPR committee in charge of considering the statutes conducted out the 
process largely behind closed doors.737 Public hearings were held merely for showJ3B Short-
732 For the important content of this law see above n 713. 
733 Article 1 of MPR Decree No. XIII of 1998 on Limitation of President and Vice-President Term. 
734 Law No. 3 of 1999 on Elections. 
735 Law No.2 of 1999 on Political Parties. 
736 Law No. 4 of 1999 on the Composition of the MPR, the DPR and the DPRDs. DPRD is the abbreviation for Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or Regional DPR. 
737 National Democratic Institute, The New Legal Framework for Elections in Indonesia: A Report of an NDI Assessment Team, 
23 February 1999, 2. 
738 1bid. 
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t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  c o m p r o m i s e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  a n d  c r e a t e d  
f l a w s  i n  t h e  n e w  e l e c t o r a l  l a w s .  
' F r e e  S e a t s '  f o r  t h e  T N I - P o l r i . 7
3 9  
O n e  o f  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  s h o r t c o m i n g s  w a s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  n e w  
l a w  o n  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o m p o s i t i o n  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  w o u l d  b e  g r a n t e d  3 8  ' f r e e  s e a t s '  
f r o m  t h e  5 0 0  s e a t s  i n  t h e  D P R . 7
4 0  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  t h e s e  f r e e  s e a t s  h a d  b e e n  r e d u c e d  
f r o m  7 5 ,  r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  s e a t s  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  " i n h e r e n t l y  u n d e m o c r a t i c " . 7
4 1  
I t  p r o l o n g e d  t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c  m i l i t a r y  d o c t r i n e  o f  d w i f u n g s i .  
M u l t i p a r t y  S y s t e m .  D e s p i t e  c r i t i c i s m ,  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  l a w s  p r o v i d e d  a n  a d e q u a t e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  
1 9 9 9  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n . 7
4 2  
O n e  o f  t h e  r e f o r m s  w a s  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a  m u l t i p a r t y  s y s t e m  b a s e d  o n  
t h e  l a w  o n  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  o n e  p a r t y  s y s t e m .  T h e  
p o l i t i c a l  e u p h o r i a  o f  t h e  p o s t - S o e h a r t o  p e r i o d  l e d  t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  1 4 1  p a r t i e s ,  o f  w h i c h  4 8  
p a r t i e s  q u a l i f i e d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  1 9 9 9  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n .  L a t e r ,  t h i s  m u l t i p a r t y  s y s t e m  
s t r o n g l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  m o r e  o p e n  a n d  d e l i b e r a t i v e  d e b a t e s  t h a t  t o o k  p l a c e  b e f o r e  e a c h  o f  t h e  
f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s .  
c .  F r e e d o m  o f  t h e  P r e s s  a n d  F r e e d o m  o f  E x p r e s s i o n  
S o e h a r t o ' s  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  a p p l i e d  s t r o n g  c e n s o r s h i p  t o  l i m i t  t h e  f r e e d o m  o f  t h e  p r e s s .  
7 4 3  
H i s  
M i n i s t e r  o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  i s s u e d  a  M i n i s t e r i a l  R e g u l a t i o n  N u m b e r  0 1  o f  1 9 8 4  o n  P u b l i c a t i o n  
L i c e n s e .  T h i s  r e g u l a t i o n  a u t h o r i z e d  t h e  m i n i s t e r  t o  r e v o k e  t h e  S I U P P
7 4 4  
o r  p u b l i s h i n g  l i c e n s e  o f  
a n y  m e d i a  e n t e r p r i s e  w h i c h  d i d  n o t  s u p p o r t  g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c y .  
7 4 5  
I n  J u n e  1 9 9 8 ,  H a b i b i e ' s  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n v a l i d a t e d  t h i s  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  s i m p l i f i e d  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  
p u b l i c a t i o n s . 7
4 6  
T h i s  p o l i c y  g e n e r a t e d  h u n d r e d s  o f  n e w  p u b l i c a t i o n s  a n d  a  n e w  e r a  o f  p r e s s  
f r e e d o m .  
7 3 9  
T N I  i s  a b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  T e n t a r a  N a s i o n a l l n d o n e s i a  o r  I n d o n e s i a n  N a t i o n a l  A r m y .  B e f o r e  t h e  P o l r i  w a s  s e p a r a t e d  f r o m  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  o n  1  A p r i l 1 9 9 9 ,  t h e  m i l i t a r y  w a s  c a l l e d  A B R I .  
7 4 0  
L a w  N o .  4  o f  1 9 9 9  o n  t h e  C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  M P R ,  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  D P R D s .  
7 4 1  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  7 3 7 ,  1 0 .  
7 4 2
1 b i d  2 .  
7 4 3  
F o r  f u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  p o l i c y  t o w a r d  t h e  p r e s s ,  s e e  D a v i d  T .  H i l l ,  T h e  P r e s s  i n  N e w  O r d e r  I n d o n e s i a  
( 1 9 9 4 ) ;  O m i  l n t a n  N a o m i ,  A n j i n g  P e n j a g a :  P e r s  d i  R u m a h  O r d e  B a r u  ( 1 9 9 6 ) .  
7 4 4  
T h e  A b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  S u r a l  l z i n  U s a h a  P e n e r b i t a n  P e r s  ( P r e s s  P u b l i c a t i o n  B u s i n e s s  L i c e n s e s ) .  
7 4
5  A r t i c l e  3 3  h  o f  M i n i s t e r i a l  R e g u l a t i o n  N u m b e r  0 1  o f  1 9 8 4  o n  P u b l i c a t i o n  L i c e n s e .  
7 4 6  
D e w i  F o r t u n a  A n w a r ,  ' I n d o n e s i a ' s  T r a n s i t i o n  t o  D e m o c r a c y :  C h a l l e n g e s  a n d  P r o s p e c t s ' ,  i n  D a m i e n  K i n g s b u r y  a n d  A r i e f  
B u d i m a n  ( e d s ) ,  I n d o n e s i a  t h e  U n c e r t a i n  T r a n s i t i o n  ( 2 0 0 1 )  9 .  
1 1 0  
Further, the public also enjoyed new freedom of expression.747 They could freely and actively 
discuss critical issues, including the urgency of reforming the 1945 Constitution. This freedom 
of expression influenced the constitutional reforms of 1999-2002. Without restriction, the media 
covered the constitutional discussions. Experts and non-governmental organizations freely 
criticized shortcomings of the process and the outcome of the amendments. 
d. Releasing Political Prisoners 
Under Soeharto's authoritarian regime, any opposition leaders had to prepare to go to jail and 
became political prisoners. By the end of the regime, there were more than 200 political 
prisoners, ranging from student leaders, Moslem activists, East Timorese and elderly 
communist cadres, some of whom had been held for more than 25 years. 748 After the fall of the 
regime, therefore, the international and domestic pressures to release all these prisoners 
strengthened. Indeed, in response to these pressures, Habibie ordered 179 Indonesian and 
East Timorese political prisoners to be released.749 Muladi, Habibie's Minister of Justice, 
acknowledged that the policy was the administration's attempt to improve its image in the field 
of human rightsJso 
Whatever the intention, the rel~asing of political prisoners was one of the processes that put 
constraints on the authoritarian practices that had prevailed under Soeharto's regime. Further, 
the releases strengthened the more open political environment needed to discuss an important 
issue such as constitutional reform. 
e. The 1999 General Election 
Habibie found his legitimacy questioned by both the opposition forces and the people/51 Liddle 
points out that: 
747 1bid. 
748 Amnesty International, Indonesia: An Audit of Human Rights Report (1999) 1 -15. 
749 1bid. 
750 Indonesia Frees Two Political Prisoners (1998) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/eventslindonesiallatest news/100266.stm> at 
28 October 2003. 
751 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia (2002) 10. 
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H a b i b i e  b e g a n  a s  a n  e x t r e m e l y  w e a k  P r e s i d e n t ,  d i s l i k e d  p e r s o n a l l y  a n d  d i s d a i n e d  
p o l i t i c a l l y  b y  n e a r l y  e v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  g r o u p  i n  I n d o n e s i a n  s o c i e t y ,  i n c l u d i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  
e l e m e n t s  o f  h i s  o w n  G o l k a r  p a r t y J 5 2  
I f  H a b i b i e  h a d  h a d  s t r o n g e r  p o l i t i c a l  l e g i t i m a c y ,  h e  w o u l d  m o s t  p r o b a b l y  h a v e  a r g u e d  t h a t  h i s  
p r e s i d e n c y  s h o u l d  n o t  e x p i r e  u n t i l  2 0 0 3 .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  p u r s u a n t  t o  A r t i c l e  8  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  H a b i b i e  s h o u l d  h a v e  c o n t i n u e d  h i s  p r e s i d e n c y  u n t i l  t h e  e x p i r y  o f  S o e h a r t o ' s  t e r m  
( 1 9 9 8 - 2 0 0 3 ) .  T h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  s h o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  h a v e  o n l y  b e e n  h e l d  o n e  y e a r  b e f o r e  t h e  
t e r m  e n d e d ,  o r  i n  2 0 0 2 .  H o w e v e r ,  a s  h i s  p r e s i d e n c y  l a c k e d  l e g i t i m a c y ,  H a b i b i e  f e l t  o b l i g e d  t o  
c a l l  a n  e a r l i e r  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  i n  1 9 9 9 . 7
5 3  
A n w a r  e x p l a i n e d  t h a t :  
[ a ] l t h o u g h  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y ,  H a b i b i e ' s  t e r m  o f  o f f i c e  r u n s  t i l l  2 0 0 3 ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  h i s  
g o v e r n m e n t ' s  w e a k  p o l i t i c a l  m a n d a t e  m a k e s  s u c h  a n  o p t i o n  q u i t e  o u t  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n .  I n  
o r d e r  t o  f o r m  a  g o v e r n m e n t  w i t h  s t r o n g  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  l e g i t i m a c y  . . .  a  n e w  
g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  h a s  t o  b e  c a r r i e d  o u t  a s  s o o n  a s  p o s s i b l e /
5 4  
T h i s  c h o i c e  t o  h o l d  t h e  1 9 9 9  G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n  w a s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  p r e -
a m e n d m e n t  p e r i o d .  B y  h o l d i n g  a  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  s o  s o o n  a f t e r  t h e  f a l l  o f  S o e h a r t o ,  I n d o n e s i a  
p r o p e r l y  e m b a r k e d  o n  i t s  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r u l e .  
2 .  T h e  E l e c t i o n  R e s u l t  
A f t e r  a n  e l e c t i o n  w a s  h e l d  o n  7  J u n e  1 9 9 9  t o  e l e c t  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M P R ,  D P R  a n d  D P R D s .  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  a n d  d o m e s t i c  o b s e r v e r s  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e  e l e c t i o n ,  w h i l e  n o t  p r o b l e m - f r e e ,  w a s  
f r e e  a n d  f a i r . 7
5 5  
T h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  w h e n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  i s  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  f a 9 a d e  
e l e c t i o n s  h e l d  u n d e r  S o e h a r t o ' s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  O f  t h e  s e v e n  p r e v i o u s  e l e c t i o n s  ( i n  1 9 5 5 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  
1 9 7 7 ,  1 9 8 2 ,  1 9 8 7 ,  1 9 9 2  a n d  1 9 9 7 ) ,  o n l y  t h e  f i r s t  i n  1 9 5 5  c a n  b e  d e s c r i b e d ,  w i t h  t h e  1 9 9 9  
e l e c t i o n ,  a s  a  t r u l y  c o m p e t i t i v e  e l e c t i o n /
5 6  
L i d d l e  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  p o s t - S o e h a r t o  e l e c t i o n  w a s  
t h e  " t u r n i n g  p o i n t  o r  d e f i n i n g  m o m e n t  o f  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n " . 7
5 7  
F o r  L i d d l e  d e m o c r a t i c  e l e c t i o n  
7 5 2  L i d d l e ,  a b o v e  n  3 0 ,  3 8 7 .  
7 5 3  R a b a s a  a n d  C h a l k ,  a b o v e  n  7 5 1 ,  1 0 .  
7 5 4  A n w a r ,  a b o v e  n  7 2 0 ,  3 9 .  
7 5 5  
N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e  a n d  T h e  C a r t e r  C e n t e r ,  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e  a n d  t h e  C a r t e r  C e n t e r  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  E l e c t i o n  O b s e r v a t i o n  D e l e g a t i o n  t o  I n d o n e s i a ' s  J u n e  7 ,  1 9 9 9 ,  L e g i s l a t i v e  E l e c t i o n ,  J a k a r t a ,  9  J u n e  1 9 9 9 ,  1 .  
7 5 6
1 b i d .  B u t  s e e  R i c k l e f s ,  a b o v e  n  5 4 2 ,  a t  3 0 3 - 3 0 4 .  R i c k l e f s  a r g u e s  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  t h e  1 9 5 5  e l e c t i o n  w a s  f a i r e r  a n d  o p e n  t h a n  
t h e  f a g a d e  e l e c t i o n s  u n d e r  S o e h a r t o ,  b u t  i t  w a s  n o t  t r u l y  d e m o c r a t i c  e i t h e r ,  d u e  t o  m i l i t a r y  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  p r e s s u r e s .  
7 5 7  L i d d l e ,  a b o v e  n  3 0 ,  3 7 3 .  ·  ·  · .  
1 1 2  
indicates that the "threshold from democracy to authoritarianism has been crossed" by 
Indonesia. 75a 
The Election Result. Only 21 out of 48 parties won seats in the DPR in the 1999 general 
election. Table 2 shows this result and the overall distribution of seats in the DPR. 







(Non-party, Reserved Seats) 
PAN 762 
PBB 763 
Other 15 Parties 764 
TOTAL 











Notes: Because of its wider distribution in the less-populous provinces outside Java, which 
had greater electoral weight, the PPP, with only 10.72% of the vote, won 58 seats in the 
DPR, while the PKB, because of its concentration of voters in East and Central Java, won 
only 51 seats, despite gaining 12,66% of the vote. 
The table shows that, on the one hand, the political configuration was still dominated by the 
three parties which existed under Soeharto's authoritarian regime, with the PDIP, Golkar and 
7581bid. 
759 Rearranged from David Bourchier, 'Habibie's Interregnum: Reformasi, Elections, Regionalism and the Struggle for Power' 
Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen (eds), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis (2000) 21; and 
Suryadinata, above n 584, 103. 
76° PDIP is Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. 
761 PKB is Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or National Awakening Party. 
762 PAN is Partai Amanat Nasional or National Mandate Party. 
763 PBB is Partai Bulan Bintang or Star Crescent Party. 
764 These 15 parties are PK (Partai Keadilan, Justice Party), PDKB (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa, Love the Nation 
Democratic Party), PNU (Partai Nahdlatul Ummat, Nahdlatul Ummat Party), PKP (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, Justice and 
Unity Party), PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Country), PBI (Partai Bhinneka Tunggallka Indonesia, 
Indonesian Unity and Diversity Party), PKD (Partai Katolik Demokrat, Democratic Catholic Party), PDR (Partai Daulat Rakyat, 
People's Sovereignty Party), IPKI (lkatan Penerus Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Independence Vanguard Party), PP (Partai 
Persatuan, United Party), PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Union Party), PNI-MM (Partai Nasional 
lndonesia-Massa Marhaen, Indonesian National Party-Marhaen Masses) PNI-FM (Partai Nasionallndonesia-Front Marhaenis, 
Indonesian National Party-Marhaenis Front), the PPIIM (Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi or Indonesian Masyumi Islamic 
Party) and PKU (Partai Kebangkitan Ummat, Ummat Awakening Party). 
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t h e  P P P  b e i n g  t h e  t h r e e  b i g g e s t  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  D P R . 7
6 5  
B e c a u s e  d u r i n g  S o e h a r t o ' s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
r e g i m e  t h e  t h r e e  p a r t i e s  w e r e  l o y a l  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e i r  c o n t i n u e d  
d o m i n a t i o n  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  b i g g e s t  c h a l l e n g e s  t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m .  
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  o u t  o f  t h e  5 0 0  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R ,  o n l y  1 1 6 ,  o r  2 3  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  
n u m b e r ,  w e r e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  D P R .  7 7  p e r  c e n t  w e r e  n e w J 6 6  M o s t  o f  t h e  n e w  
m e m b e r s  w e r e  e n t r e p r e n e u r s ,  b u r e a u c r a t s  a n d  t e a c h e r s . 7
6 7  
T h i s  d e m o n s t r a t e s  r a d i c a l  c h a n g e  
i n  t h e  o c c u p a t i o n a l  b a c k g r o u n d  o f  t h e  D P R  m e m b e r s ,  w i t h  t h e  n u m b e r s  o f  b u r e a u c r a t s  a n d  
r e t i r e d  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s  f a l l i n g  e x t e n s i v e l y  a n d  m e m b e r s  w i t h  a n ·  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  b a c k g r o u n d  
t a k i n g  t h e i r  p l a c e . 7 6 B  
T h e  M P R ' s  C o m p o s i t i o n .  F o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  s e a t s  i n  t h e  D P R  w a s  l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a n  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  M P R ,  b e c a u s e  i t  w a s  t h e  
M P R  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  h o l d s  t h e  p o w e r  t o  d e t e r m i n e  a n d  t o  a m e n d  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
( A r t i c l e s  3  a n d  3 7 ) .  
P u r s u a n t  t o  t h e  L a w  N o .  4  o f  1 9 9 9  o n  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o m p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  M P R  c o n s i s t e d  o f  7 0 0  
m e m b e r s ,  o f  w h i c h  5 0 0  w e r e  f r o m  t h e  D P R  a n d  2 0 0  f r o m  a d d i t i o n a l  m e m b e r s ,  r e p r e s e n t i n g  
r e g i o n a l  a n d  f u n c t i o n a l  g r o u p s . 7
6 9  
I n  t h e  D P R  i t s e l f ,  o n l y  4 6 2  s e a t s  w e r e  c o n t e s t e d ,  w h i l e  3 8  
s e a t s  w e r e  r e s e r v e d  f o r  t h e  f r e e  s e a t s  o f  t h e  T N I  a n d  P o l r i  
7 7 0  
( 1 7  f r o m  t h e  a r m y ,  8  e a c h  f r o m  
t h e  n a v y  a n d  t h e  a i r  f o r c e ,  a n d  5  f r o m  t h e  p o l i c e ) J 7 1  
F r o m  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  2 0 0  s e a t s  i n  t h e  M P R  o c c u p i e d  b y  n o n - D P R  m e m b e r s ,  1 3 5  w e r e  
a p p o i n t e d  b y  t h e  P r o v i n c i a l  D P R D s  ( 5  f r o m  e a c h  2 7  p r o v i n c e s )  a n d  6 5  w e r e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
f r o m  n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a n d  o t h e r  n o n - p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  T h e s e  6 5  
7 6 5  
A l t h o u g h ,  o n e  m a y  a r g u e  t h a t  P D I P  ( P a r t a i  D e m o k r a s i  I n d o n e s i a  P e r j u a n g a n  o r  I n d o n e s i a n  D e m o c r a c y  P a r t y  o f  S t r u g g l e )  
w a s  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h e  P O l  ( u n d e r  S o e h a r t o ) ,  t h e  P D I P  w a s  a c t u a l l y  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  P O l  w i t h  q u i t e  s i m i l a r  n a m e  a n d  
s y m b o l .  P D I P  c h a n g e d  t h e i r  a p p e a r a n c e  a  l i t t l e  b i t  t o  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  i t  f r o m  a n o t h e r  p a r t y ,  e n g i n e e r e d  b y  S o e h a r t o ,  w h i c h  w a s  s t i l l  
c l a i m i n g  a s  t h e  ' t r u e '  P O l .  
7 6 6  S u r y a d i n a t a ,  a b o v e  n  5 8 4 ,  1 1 9 .  
7 6 7 1 b i d .  
7 6 8  
N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  T h e  1 9 9 9  P r e s i d e n t i a l  E l e c t i o n  a n d  P o s t - E l e c t i o n  D e v e l o p m e n t  i n  I n d o n e s i a :  A  P o s t - E l e c t i o n  
A s s e s s m e n t  R e p o r t ,  2 8  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  1 2 .  
7 6 9  
A r t i c l e  2  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  A r t i c l e  2 ( 2 )  o f  L a w  N o . 4  o f  1 9 9 9  o n  t h e  C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  M P R ,  t h e  D P R  
a n d  t h e  D P R D s .  
7 7 0  
A r t i c l e  1 1  o f  L a w  N u m b e r  4  o f  1 9 9 9  o n  t h e  C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  M P R ,  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  D P R D s .  
7 7 1  
N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e  a n d  T h e  C a r t e r  C e n t e r ,  P o s t - E l e c t i o n  s t a t e m e n t  N u m b e r  4 ,  P o s t - E l e c t i o n  D e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  
I n d o n e s i a ,  t h e  F o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  M P R ,  J a k a r t a ,  2 6  A u g u s t  1 9 9 9 ,  8 .  
1 1 4  
representatives were selected from 20 religious leaders (15 for Moslems, 2 for Protestants, 1 
each for Catholics, Hindus and Buddhists), 5 veterans' organizations, 9 economic 
organizations, 5 women's groups, 5 ethnic minority groups, 2 disabled groups, 9 academics 
and intellectual associations, 5 civil servants' organization and 5 NGOs, students and youth 
organizations. m 
Table 3 The Structure of the 1999-2004 MPR 







Source: Extracted from Law No.4 of 1999 
Functional Groups 
(65 menters) 
In reality, the MPR consisted of 695 members, the difference of five number is because 
East Timor was independence in 1999, and therefore, its five representatives were 
cancelled. 
The MPR's Factions. The MPR is divided into factions. According to the MPR Decree No. II of 
1999 on the MPR Standing Orders, a faction is defined as group of the MPR's members which 
represent configurations of a political party, military or regional and functional groups. 773 There 
were 11 factions in the MPR: PDIP, Golkar Party, Functional Group Representatives (Fraksi 
Utusan Go/ongan, FUG), the PPP, the PKB, the Reformasi, the TNI and Polri, the PBB, the 
KKI, the PDU and the PDK8J74 
772 1bid 4. See also Suryadinata, above n 584, 140-141. 
773 Article 13(1) of MPR Decree Number II of 1999 on Standing Order. 
774 Some of the factions were coalition of political parties, such as Reformasi was coalition between PAN and PK; Faction of 
KKI (Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia, Indonesian National Unity) was a coalition the MPR members from the POl, the IPKI, 
the PNI-Massa Marhaen, the PNI-Front Marhaen, the PKP, the PP, the PBI and the PKD; Faction of the PDU (Perserikatan 
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T a b l e  4  s h o w s  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  1 1  f a c t i o n s .  
T a b l e  4  
T h e  F a c t i o n s  a n d  C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 4  M P R  n s  
F a c t i o n s  
P D I P  
G o l k a r  P a  
F U G  ( 6 5 )  
p p p  
P K B  
R e f o r m a s i  
T N I - P o l r i  
( r e s e r v e d  s e a t s )  
K K I  
P B B  
P D U  
P D K B  
T O T A L  
D P R  
S e a t s  
A d d i t i o n a l  
S e a t s  
7 7 6  
3 2  
6 2  
8  








1 3 0  
T o t a l  
M e m b e r s  
% o f  
M e m b e r s  
2 6 . 6 2  
2 6 . 1 9  
1 0 . 5  
1 0 . 0 7  
8 . 2  
7 . 0 5  
5 . 5  
2  
1 . 8 7  
1 . 3  
0 . 7  
1 0 0  
T h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  m i l i t a r y  f a c t i o n  p r o l o n g e d  t h e  p r a c t i c e  i n  t h e  M P R  d u r i n g  S o e h a r t o ' s  
a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e .  N o n e  o f  t h e  o t h e r  f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R  r e j e c t e d  t h i s  m i l i t a r y  f a c t i o n .  I n  
c o n t r a s t ,  a  p r o p o s a l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  r e g i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f a c t i o n  w a s  r e j e c t e d ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  h a d  1 3 5  m e m b e r s  - m o r e  t h a n  t h r e e  t i m e s  t h e  3 8  m i l i t a r y  m e m b e r s J
7
B  I n  1 9 9 9 ,  
t h e  r e g i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  m e m b e r s  w e r e  f o r c e d  t o  j o i n  w i t h  o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s '  f a c t i o n s .  7 7 9  
M o s t  o f  t h e m  p r e f e r r e d  t o  j o i n  t h e  t w o  b i g g e s t  f a c t i o n s .  S i x t y - t w o ,  o r  a l m o s t  h a l f  o f  t h e  
m e m b e r s ,  c h o s e  t o  j o i n  G o l k a r ,  n e a r l y  t w i c e  a s  m a n y  a s  t h e  3 2  w h o  p r e f e r r e d  t o  j o i n  t h e  
P D I P . 7
8 0  
O a u l a t  U m m a t ,  U n i o n  o f  M o s l e m  S o v e r e i g n t y )  w a s  c o a l i t i o n  o f  t h e  M P R  m e m b e r s  f r o m  t h e  P N U ,  t h e  P K U ,  t h e  P S I I ,  P P I I M  a n d  
t h e  P D R .  S e e  a l s o  t h e  M P R  D e c i s i o n  N u m b e r  2  o f  1 9 9 9  o n  t h e  M P R  F a c t i o n s .  
7 7 5  
N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  7 6 8 ,  a p p e n d i x  9 .  
7 7 6  
T h e s e  w e r e  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  s e a t s  f r o m  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  R e g i o n a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  w h o  j o i n e d  t h e  f a c t i o n  w h i c h  t h e y  
c h o s e .  
7 7 7  
A s  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e ,  p u r s u a n t  t o  A r t i c l e  2 ( 2 )  o f  t h e  L a w  N o .  4  o f  1 9 9 9 ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  M P R  m e m b e r s  h a d  b e e n  s e t  a t  7 0 0 ,  
i n c l u d i n g  1 3 5  R e g i o n a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  b u t  t h e  f i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f r o m  E a s t  T i m o r  c o u l d  n o t  b e  c h o s e n  i n  S e p t e m b e r  g i v e n  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e r e  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  3 0  A u g u s t  1 9 9 9  r e f e r e n d u m .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  a c t u a l  n u m b e r  o f  R e g i o n a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
w a s  1 3 0 ,  a n d  t h e  t o t a l  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  t h e  M P R  w a s  6 9 5 .  
7 7
8  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  7 6 8 ,  1 4 .  
7 7 9  
I b i d .  H o w e v e r ,  l a t e r  i n  t h e  2 0 0 1  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  t h e s e  m e m b e r s  f r o m  r e g i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  s u c c e e d e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
t h e i r  o w n  f a c t i o n ,  n a m e l y  t h e  F U G  ( F r a k s i  U t u s a n  G o l o n g a n ,  R e g i o n a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  F a c t i o n ) .  
1 1 6  
B. The First Amendment: the Process 
This section considers the amendment process in four divisions: (i) when the constitution-
making should occur; (ii) how the constitution-making was conducted (iii) who the constitution-
making body was to be; and (iv) how public participation was organized. 
1. When the Constitution-Making should occur 
The Transition: a Constitutional Moment. There were arguments that the amendment should 
not be carried out during the difficult transition from Soeharto's authoritarian regime. In late 
1998, Yudhoyono argued that while Indonesia was in a crisis, it was not an appropriate time to 
amend the 1945 Constitution.781 He further argued that amendment in the midst of turmoil 
would only create further problems. 782 I would argue against Yudhoyono. As indicated in 
Chapter Two, Elster argued that constitutions are often written in a crisis situation.783 Bogdanor 
points out that a difficult and turbulent period is a golden moment for constitutional reform. 784 
Thailand, which had gone through a quite similar and difficult political transition, had succeeded 
in reforming its Constitution.785 Indeed, Thailand was in the middle of an economic crisis that 
was very much like the Indonesian economic crisis of the late 1990s when it drafted and ratified 
the people's Constitution in 1997.786 
No Sufficient Time. This belief that a transition period is a 'golden moment' was adopted by 
the MPR factions. As it got closer to the time of Soeharto's forced resignation, however, 
constitutional reform was still not on the table. The focus of the students and the opposition 
leaders was simply to topple SoehartoJ87 Demands for constitutional reform only emerged after 
Soeharto's resignation. The students called for the amendment of the 1945 Constitution as well 
780 National Democratic Institute, above n 768, 14. 
781 
'ABRI Supports Habibie, Rejects Presidium', The Jakarta Post 24 November 1999. 
782 1bid. 
783 Elster, above n 69, 347, 370-371. 
784 Bogdanor, above n 153, 380. 
785 Harding, above n 68; Jumbala, above n 172; and Punyaratabandhu, above n 172. 
7861bid. 
787 National Democratic Institute, above n 768, 12. 
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a s  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t ,  t h e  e r a d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  K K N /
8 8  
t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  d w i f u n g s i  
d o c t r i n e  a n d  t h e  t r i a l ·  o f  S o e h a r t o  a n d  h i s  c r o n i e s J 8 9  
R e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e s e  d e m a n d s  o f  t h e  s t u d e n t s ,  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  a m o n g  
t h e  p o w e r  h o l d e r s  w a s  n e v e r  f o c u s e d .  F r o m  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  S o e h a r t o ' s  f o r c e d  r e s i g n a t i o n  u n t i l  
t h e  1 9 9 9  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  d e b a t e  w a s  f o c u s e d  o n  e l e c t o r a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  
l e g i s l a t i o n .  
7 9 0  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  m o s t  o f  t h e  e n e r g i e s  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  w e r e  d e v o t e d  t o  w i n n i n g  t h e  1 9 9 9  
g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n . 7
9 1  
T h e s e  a l l  s l o w e d  d o w n  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m . 7
9 2  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i n  t h e  M P R  1 9 9 9  G e n e r a l  S e s s i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
r e f o r m  w a s  a c t i v e l y  u n d e r w a y ,  i t  w a s  s t i l l  l e s s  h e a t e d  t h a n  t h e  i s s u e  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
e l e c t i o n .  
7 9 3  
T h i s  w a s  i n d i c a t e d  b y  t h e  p r e d o m i n a n c e  o f  n e w s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t ,  c o m p a r e d  t o  d i s c u s s i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  




T w e l v e  D a y s .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  o n l y  t i m e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  M P R  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
r e f o r m  w a s  p r i o r  t o  a n d  d u r i n g  t h e  G e n e r a l  S e s s i o n ,  f r o m  1  t o  2 1  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 .  I n  f a c t ,  o n l y  
t w e l v e  d a y s  o u t  o f  t h e s e  t w e n t y - o n e  d a y s  w e r e  a l l o c a t e d  f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e .  F o r  a  c o u n t r y  w h i c h  
h a d  b e e n  " d e n i e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e b a t e  f o r  f o u r  d e c a d e s " ,
7
9 5  t w e l v e  d a y s  w a s  c e r t a i n l y  a  g r o s s l y  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  t i m e  t o  d i s c u s s  a  c o m p l e x  a n d  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  s u c h  a s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t .  
T h e  t w e l v e  d a y s  o f  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 9 9  M P R  G e n e r a l  S e s s i o n  
w e r e  d i v i d e d  i n t o  f o u r  s t a g e s  ( T a b l e  5 ) :  
•  d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R  W o r k i n g  B o d y  ( 6  a n d  1 4  O c t o b e r ) ;  
•  d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  t h e  A d  H o c  C o m m i t t e e  I l l  f o r  A m e n d m e n t  ( P a n i t i a  A d  H o c  I l l  o r  P A H  I l l )  ( 7 -
1 3  O c t o b e r ) ;  
•  d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  C  o f  t h e  1 9 9 9  M P R  G e n e r a l  S e s s i o n  ( 1 7 - 1 8  O c t o b e r ) ;  a n d  
•  d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  t h e  P l e n a r y  M e e t i n g  o f  t h e  1 9 9 9  M P R  G e n e r a l  S e s s i o n  ( 1 7 - 1 9  O c t o b e r ) .  
7 8 8  
K K N  i s  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  o f  K o r u p s i ,  K o l u s i  d a n  N e p o t i s m e  o r  C o r r u p t i o n ,  C o l l u s i o n  a n d  N e p o t i s m .  
7 8 9  P i l i a n g ,  a b o v e  n  3 1 , 4 4 1 .  
7 9 0  E l l i s ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 2 ,  1 2 5 .  
7 9 1  Y u s u f  a n d  B a s a l i m ,  a b o v e  n  6 ,  4 9 ,  8 6 .  
7 9 2  E l l i s ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 2 ,  1 2 5 .  
7 9 3 1 b i d  8 6 .  
7 9 4
1 b i d .  
1 1 8  
Table 5 Proceedings of the MPR's First Amendment Discussions 
The 1st and 2nd meetings of the Working Body 
8 October 1999 
The Formulation of the PAH I 
The 11t-"fth meetings of the PAH Ill 
7-13 October 1999 
The First Amendment Discussions 
The 3n1 Meeting of the Working Body 
14 October 1999 
llAI'V\rt of the PAH Ill 
The 1st and 2nc1 meetings of the Commission C 
17-18 October 1999 
The First Amendment Discussions In the 1999 MPR General Session 
D First Stage 
D Third Stage 
0 Second Stage 
Fourth Stage 
Source: Extracted Minutes of Meeting of the MPR's First Amendment discussions. 
795 Undsey, above n 99, 244. 
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7 9 9  Y u s u f  a n d  B a s a l i m ,  a b o v e  n  6 ,  1 1 7  - 1 1 8 .  
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a. Amendment Yes, Renewal No 
. . . 
' . ,, ' ' ' ' 
On 6 October 1999, all the factions agreed to amend and not renew the 1945 Constitution. 803 
This agreement was a historical moment because the MPR had been one of the lead 
institutions resisting attempts to change the Constitution. On the other hand, the agreement 
delivered a clear message that the constitutional reform had to be limited.804 
The PDIP's Position. Leaders ofthe PDIP frequently questioned the urgency of amending, 
much less renewing, the Constitution. Alex Litaay, who was the Secretary-General of the PDIP, 
argued that it was not necessary to amend the 1945 Constitution.8°5 He further argued that the 
country's problems did not . come from the Constitution itself but from its inconsistent 
application. 8o6 
Megawati Soekarnoputri, the Chairperson of the PDIP, endorsed Litaay's statement. She 
I 
pointed out that the PDIP's reasons to be careful were: 
... linked directly with PDIP's consistent efforts to safeguard our national life from attempts 
to alter the basic philosophy of our country in a direction that incrementally forces the 
demands and ideology of only one segment of society to be adopted, and yet implants a . 
whole new ideology that does not conform with the interests of an independent 
Indonesia. 8°7 
Yusuf and Basalim argue that the PDIP was deeply concerned that the movement to establish 
an Islamic state would re-emerge during this post-Soeharto constitutional reform process. This 
situation had occurred .during the 1945 and 1956-1959 constitution-making processes.8o8 
Because of the vacillating position of. the PDIP (the biggest faction in the MPR) as regards 
constitutional reform, renewing the 1945 Constitution was out of the question. This 'wait and 
' ·' 
see' policy of the PDIP continued until the Fourth Amendment process (Chapters Five to Eight 
will look at more detail atthe PDIP's concern). 
803 Minutes of the 2"d meeting of the Working Body, 6 October 1999, 2-35. See also 'Seluruh Fraksi MPR Sepakat Lakukan 
Amandemen UUD 1945', Kompas, 7 October 1999. 
804 1bid. 
805 
'Alex Litaay: Untuk Apa UUD '45 Diamandemen', Republika, 21 July 1999. 
8061bid. 
807 Policy Speech of Megawati Soekarnoputri, 29 July 1999. The translation from: The People's Victory in the 1999 Election 
(August 1999) Van Zorge, Heffernan & Associates <http://www.vanzorgereport.com/report/popup/index.cfm?fa=ShowReport& 
pk rpt id=258&CFID=315606&CFTOKEN=71680888> at 3 October 2003. 
80BYusuf and Basalim, above n 6, 53. 
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T w o  T e c h n i c a l  I s s u e s .  T h e  p o l i c y  t o  a m e n d ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  r e n e w ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  r a i s e d  t w o  
t e c h n i c a l  i s s u e s :  ( i )  ·  w h a t  A r t i c l e  s h o u l d  b e  u s e d  t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t ;  a n d  ( i i )  w h a t  
a m e n d m e n t  ~odel s h o u l d  b e  a d o p t e d .  
( 1 )  A r t i c l e  3  o r  A r t i c l e  3 7  ·  
T h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  p r o c e s s  c o u l d  b e  c a r r i e d  o u t  
e i t h e r  b y  a p p l y i n g  A r t i c l e  3  o r  A r t i c l e  3 7 .  A r t i c l e  3  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s t a t e d :  
.  .  
T h e  M P R  s h a l l  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  t h e  g u i d e l i n e s  o f  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  s t a t e .  
A r t i c l e  3 7  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s e t  u p  p r o c e d u r e s  t o  a m e n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t :  
1 .  I n  o r d e r  t o  a m e n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  n o t  l e s s  t h a n  t w o  t h i r d s  o f  t h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f '  •  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M P R  s h a l l  b e  i n  a t t e n d a n c e .  
2 .  D e c i s i o n s  s h a l l  b e  t a k e n  w i t h  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  n o t  l e s s  t h a n  t w o  t h i r d s  o f  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  m e m b e r s  i n  a t t e n d a n c e .  
I n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e s e  t w o  c h o i c e s ,  t h e r e  w e r e  t h r e e  v i e w s  f r o m  t h e  l e a d i n g  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l a w  
e x p e r t s .  A l r a s i d  a r g u e d  t h a t  A r t i c l e  3  - a n d  n o t  A r t i c l e  3 7  - o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  
a p p l i e d  t o  s t a r t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m . 8 ° 9  T h e  M P R  h a d  n e v e r  u s e d  A r t i c l e  3 ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  
I n d o n e s i a  h a d  n e v e r  h a d  a ' d e f i n i t i v e  Con~titution.8to 
.  - .  .  .  
I s m a i l  S u n y  a r g u e d  a g a i n s t  A l r a s i d ' s  v i e w ,  s a y i n g  t h a t  I n d o n e s i a  a l r e a d y  h a d  a  d e f i n i t i v e ·  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  8
1 1  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  M P R  h a d  n e v e r .  d i r e c t l y  .  i m p l e m e n t e d  A r t i c l e  3  o f ·  t h e  1 9 4 5  ·  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  ' i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  b e i n g  i m p l e m e n t e d '  f o r  f o u r  d e c a d e s .  T h u s  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  h a d  t o  b e  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  a  d e f i n i t i v e  o n e .  S u n y  f u r t h e r  a r g u e d  t h a t ,  b y  i s s u i n g  a n  
M P R  D e c r e e  o f  1 9 6 6  w h i c h  a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h ' e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a s  I n d o n e s i a ' s  b a s i c  l e g a l  
s o u r c e , 8
1
2  t h e  M P R  " s i l e n t l y  e x e c u t e d "  A r t i c l e  3 . 8 1 3  T h e r e f o r e ,  i f  t h e  M P R  d e c i d e d  t o  r e f o r m  t h e  
8 0 9  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  6 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  1 2  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  3 9 - 4 0 .  
8 1 0  
I b i d .  
8 1 1 1 b i d  4 1 .  
8 1 2  M P R  D e c r e e  N u m b e r  X X  o f  1 9 6 6 .  
8 1 3  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  6 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  1 2  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 , 4 1 .  
1 2 2  
1945 Constitution by directly implementing the amendment procedures as provided in Article 
37, that would be constitutionally correct.814 
Mulyosudarmo presented a third view, arguing that Article 3 should be used to renew the 
Constitution, while article 37 should be used to amend the 1945 Constitution 815 and, therefore 
Article 37 should be used for the First Amendment. Then, for any following amendment, Article 
3 should be used to make a new Constitution, prepared by a "state Commission". 816 
' - ' . ' 
The MPR's Position. All of the factions agreed that the constitutional reform should be carried 
out according to Article 37 and not Article 3. I am of the opinion that this technical choice is 
consistent with the earlier policy agreement to only amend but· not renew. the Constitution. I 
share Mulyosudarmo's interpretation that Article 3 was more suitable to renew the Constitution, 
while Article 37 was more appropriate to amend the Constitution. 
(2) The United States Model 
Also consistent with the decision to amend the Constitution, the MPR agreed that the original · 
text of the 1945 Constitution would be maintained. The amendment then would be an 
attachment to this original Constitution. This means that Indonesia - at least intentionally -
followed the United States amendment model. The Reformasi faction argued that: 
[ijor the format of the amendment, we propose to adopt the United States' model. This 
model revokes and completes specific articles by maintaining the original text of the 
Constitution. By doing this way, our next generation can study the history of this nation 
state.817 
The Reformasi faction's argument was merely technical. There was another, more substantial, 
reason behind the preference of the United States amendment model: the wish to avoid making 
a totally new Constitution. 
814 1bid. 
815 ibid 41-43. 
8161bid40-44. 
817 ibid 11. 
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b .  T h e  P r e a m b l e  N o ,  t h e  B o d y  a n d  t h e  E l u c i d a t i o n  Y e s  
"  
A n o t h e r  a g r e e m e n t  r e a c h e d  b y  t h e  M P R  w a s  t o  a m e n d  t h e  b o d y  a n d  e l u c i d a t i o n  b u t  k e e p  t h e  
p r e a m b l e  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  8
1 8  
T h i s  a g r e e m e n t  t o  k e e p  t h e  p r e a m b l e  w a s  a c t u a l l y  o n e  o f  
t h e  m a i n  r e a s o n s  b e h i n d  t h e  M P R  f a c t i o n s '  d e c i s i o n  t o  m e r e l y  a m e n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  i s  
d u e  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p r e a m b l e  d o e s  n o t  o n l y  c o n t a i n  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  b u t  
a l s o  t h e  P a n c a s i l a ,  t h e  I n d o n e s i a ' s  u n i q u e  " p a n - r e l i g i o u s  s t a t e  i d e o l o g y " .
8 1 9  
F o r  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  
'  '  .  
f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R  ( t h e  P D I P ,  T N I - P o l r i  a n d  G o l k a r ) ,  t h e  P a n c a s i l a  i s  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  I n d o n e s i a  w i l l  n o t  b e  a n  l s l a . m i c  s t a t e .  
O n e  s h o u l d  n o t e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R  ( c l e a r l y  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  t h e  
P P P ,  P B B  a n d  P D U )  a l s o  a g r e e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  p r e a m b l e .  T h i s  w a s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  c h a n g i n g  o f  
t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n s '  p o s i t i o n  w h i c h  p r e v i o u s l y ,  i n  t h e  1 9 4 5  a n d  1 9 5 6 - 1 9 5 9  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  
p r o c e s s ,  h a s  p r o p o s e d  I s l a m  a s  t h e  f o r m a l  b a s i s  o f  t h e  s t a t e .  B y  a c c e p t i n g  i n  1 9 9 9  t h a t  t h e  
P r e a m b l e  w o u l d  b e  r e t a i n e d  ( w h i c h  c o n t a i n e d  t h e  P a n c a s i / a ) ,  t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n s '  d e m a n d  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e  w a s  i n  d e c l i n e .  
D u r i n g  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n s '  p o s i t i o n  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  
pr~amble w a s  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  G o l k a r ,  t h e  R e f o r m a s i ,  t h e  K K I  a n d  t h e  T N I  a n d  P o l r i  f a c t i o n s . 8
2 0  
G o l k a r  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
. . .  t h e  p r e a m b l e  h a s  t o  b e  m a i n t a i n e d .  I t  c o n t a i n s  s o m e  d e c l a r a t i o n s  o f  I n d o n e s i a  a s  a  
c o u n t r y .  T h e s e  d e c l a r a t i o n s  a r e  f u n d a m e n t a l  a n d  f i n a l .  T h e y  a r e  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  
i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  I n d o n e s i a  a s  a  u n i t a r y  s t a t e  a n d ,  [ t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f j  t h e  
s t a t e  p h i l o s o p h y ,  t h e  P a n c a s i l a . 8 2 1  •  
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
[ i ] n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p r e a m b l e  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w i t h o u t  a n y  i n t e n t i o n  t o  m a k e  i t  
s a c r e d ,  t h e  T N I  a n d  P o l r i  f a c t i o n  d o e s  n o t  a g r e e  t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  b e  a m e n d e d .  T h e  P r e a m b l e  
c o n t a i n s  a  h o l y  a g r e e m e n t  a m o n g  t h e  p e o p l e  t o  b e c o m e  a  n a t i o n  . . .  a n d  t o  b e c o m e  a  
8 1
8  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  6 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  7  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  4 4 .  S e e  a l s o  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  3 ' d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y ,  1 4  ·  
O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  1 6 ;  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  1 •
1  
m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  C ,  1 7  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  2 4 .  
8 1 9  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  7 6 8 ,  1 8 .  
8 2 0  
M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  2 n d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  M P R  W o r k i n g  B o d y ,  6  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 , 8 ,  1 1 ,  1 8  a n d  3 2 .  
8 2 1
1 b i d  8 .  
1 2 4  
unitary state_ ... Further, the preamble declares the Pancasi/a as the philosophy of the 
state.822 
Maintaining the Unitary State. Hamdan Zoelva (PBB) argued that, in addition to the 
preamble, the idea of unitary state should not be amended.B23 He did not, however, give further 
clarification and simply mentioned that the unitary state should be considered 'final' for 
lndonesia.B24 This argument was met neither agreement nor disagreement from other factions 
at the First Amendment discussions, but later, in the Fourth Amendment, the unitary state 
became an entrenched (non-amendable) Article. 
3. Who the Constitution-Making Body was to be 
As to the question of who the constitution-making body should be, the MPR was almost 
unchallenged. Indeed, Articles 3 and 37 of the 1945 Constitution gave the authority to 
determine or to amend the 1945 Constitution to the MPR.B2s To carry out the amendment, the 
MPR established the Working Body, the PAH Ill (Ad Hoc Committee Ill for amendment) and the 
Commission C, consisting of 90, 25 and _171 MPR's members respectively.B26 In each of the 
three bodies the eleven factions were represented in proportion with the number of seats they 
held in the MPR. 
Inside the MPR. During the First Amendment discussions, of the eleven factions in the MPR, 
only the PKB and Golkar proposed that there could be another constitution-making body 
besides the MPR. The PKB proposed forming a "Constitutional Reform Team" to prepare 
amendments to the 1945 Constitution.827 The duty of this team would be to examine the body 
and the elucidation of the Constitution, to identify amendments needed to 'keep up with social 
development'.82B The draft of the amendment would then be ratified in stages by the MPR, 
L 
within one year.B29 However, the PKB was vague on how the formation of the team should be 
822 1bid 32. 
823 Minutes of the 1•t meeting of the PAH Ill, 7 October 1999, 6. 
824 ibid. 
825 Soemantri, above n 33, 7 4. 
826 The Decision of the MPR Leadership Number 7 of 1999. 




d e c i d e d .
8
3 °  I n  o n e  o f  t h e  d r a f t s  o f  i t s  M P R  D e c r e e ,  t h e  P K B  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  M P R  W o r k i n g  
B o d y  s h o u l d  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  t h e  t e a m .
8 3 1  
I n  a n o t h e r  d r a f t ,  t h i s  f a c t i o n  s u g g e s t e d  
t h a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t , .  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  D P R ,  s h o u l d  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l .  R e f o r m  




E i t h e r  w a y ,  t h e  P K B  n e v e r  s e r i o u s l y  f o u g h t  f o r  t h i s  p r o p o s a l  a n d  i t  f a i l e d .  
A n d i  M a t t a l a t a  ( G o l k a r )  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  s h o u l d  b e  d i v i d e d  i n t o  l o n g - t e r m  
a n d  s h o r t - t e r m  p r o p o s a l s .
8 3 3  
T h e  s h o r t - t e r m  p r o p o s a l s  s h o u l d  b e  a g r e e d  i n  t h e  1 9 9 9  M P R  
G e n e r a l  S e s s i o n ,  w h i l e  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  p r o p o s a l s  s h o u l d  b e  c a r r i e d  o u t  eit~er b y  t h e  M P R  
W o r k i n g  B o d y ,  o r  b y  a  " N a t i o n a l  C o m m i t t e e " .
8 3 4  
M a t t a l a t a  f u r t h e r  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h i s  N a t i o n a l  
C o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  c o n s i s t  o f  m e m b e r s  o f .  t h e  M P R  a n d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  e x p e r t s .
8 3 5  
H o w e v e r ,  
G o l k a r  n e v e r  s e r i o u s l y  p u r s u e d  t h i s  p r o p o s a l .  
N e x t ,  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  c a m e  u p  i n  t h e  f i r s t  P A H  I l l  m e e t i n g  w h i c h  s t a t e d ·  
t h a t  i f  t h e  1 9 9 9  M P R  G e n e r a l  S e s s i o n  c o u l d  n o t  f i n i s h  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  
W o r k i n g  B o d y  o r  a  " S p e c i a l  C o m m i s s i o n "  s h o u l d  b e c o m e  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  a n d  
f i n i s h e d  t h e  r e f o r m .
8 3 6  
H a r u n  K a m i l  ( F U G )  r e j e c t e d  t h i s  p r o p o s a l ,  b y  a r g u i n g  t h a t :  
. . .  i t  i s  b e t t e r  i f  w e  d e l e t e  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h i s  S p e c i a l  C o m m i s s i o n .  T h i s  t e r m  o f  
S p e c i a l  C o m m i s s i o n  d o e s  n o t  e x i s t  i n  t h e  l a w  .  . .  I  w o u l d  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  S p e c i a l  
C o m m i s s i o n  i s ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h i s  M P R  W o r k i n g  B o d y ,  t h i s  M P R  A d  H o c  C o m m i t t e e . 8 3
7  
E x p e r t s '  P o s i t i o n .  H a r u n  A l r a s i d  a r g u e d  t h a t  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  M P R ,  i t  w o u l d  b e  b e t t e r  i f :  
8 3 0  
I b i d .  
8 3 1 1 b i d .  
8 3 2 1 b i d .  
. . .  a  c o m m i s s i o n  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  T h i s  C o m m i s s i o n  w i l l  t h e n  
c a r r y  o u t  i t s  d u t y  w i t h i n  7  m o n t h s  . . .  T h e n ,  i n  t h e  n e x t  y e a r  M P R  S e s s i o n ,  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  
.  t h i s  C o m m i s s i o n  c a n  b e  p r e s e n t e d  . .  ~·the M P R  t h e n  c a n  d i s c u s s  t h e  d r a f t  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
w h i c h  i s  p r e p a r e d  b y  t h i s  C o m m i s s i o n  o f  e x p e r t s . 8 3 8  
8 3 3  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  1 •
1  
m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  7  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  4 .  
8 3 4 1 b i d .  
8 3 5 1 b i d .  
8 3 6
1 b i d  4 8 .  
8 3 7
1 b i d  5 1 .  
8 3 8  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  6 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  1 2  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  4 0 .  
1 2 6  
At the same meeting, Soewoto Mulyosudarmo agreed that the MPR should be the constitution-
making body for the First Amendment. For following amendments, however, he argued.that a 
"state Commission" should be established.8J9 He further suggested that this state Commission 
should be given full authority to make a new Constitution.84o 
The PAH Ill did not, in the end, adopt the views of Alrasid and Mulyosudarmo regarding 
alternatives to the MPR. Instead, the PAH Ill agreed that the MPR Working Body should 
continue preparing the draft of the next amendment of the 1945 Constitution. Thus the MPR 
promulgated an MPR Decree No. IX of 1999 on 'the Authorization of the Working Body of the 
MPR to continue the amendment of the 1945 Constitution'. This decree stated as follows: 
,, 
• To authorize the Working Body of the MPR to prepare a draft of amendment of 
the 1945 Constitution of the Republic Indonesia. 
• The amendment draft shall be ready to be ratified in the MPR Annual Session on 
18 August 2000. · 
4. How Public Participation was Organized 
In the first meeting of the PAH Ill, some of its members raised the public participation issue. 
One of the PAH Ill members841 argued that it would be better if part of the meetings were 
allocated to hear the public.842 This member further argued that public hearings were necessary 
so that the people would not feel left behind.843 At the same time, however, this member also 
disclosed a lack of commitment to the public involvement. He stated that, "this participation is 
just a formality. We already understand the substance".844 
Some members argued against the public participation based on time limitations.845 Zoelva 
questioned the unclear format of the participation.846 He further argued that it was.difficult to 
decide which groups should be invited among so many different groups in the country. 847 He, 
839 ibid 44. 
840 Ibid 
. I 
841 The minutes of meeting did not mention the name of this member. 




846 ibid 16. 
847Jbid. 
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t h e r e f o r e ,  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t ,  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  n o t  i n v i t e  a n y  g r o u p s  f o r  h e a r i n g s  a t  a l l
8 4 8  
b u t  
a g r e e d  t h a t  d e l e g a t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  p u b l i c  w o u l d  b e  w e l c o m e ,  i f  t h e y  c a m e  d u r i n g  t h e  C o m m i t t e e ·  
m e e t i n g s . 8
4 9  
.  
Y u s u f  M u h a m m a d  ( P K B )  s u p p o r t e d  Z o e l v a ' s  a r g u m e n t .  H e  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
[ w ] e  n e e d  i n p u t  f r o m  t h e  p u b l i c  . . .  T h i s  i s  u r g e n t l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  s h o w  o u r  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  a s  
a n  i n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  i s  c o n c e r n e d  t o .  i t s  p u b l i c  a s p i r a t i o n s .  H o w e v e r ,  w e  h a v e  a  t i m e  
l i m i t a t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i f  t h e  p u b l i c  h e a r i n g s  a r e  c o n d u c t e d ,  t h e y  w i l l  n o t  h a v e  t o  b e  f a c e - t o -
.  f a c e  m e e t i n g s .  
8 5
0  
I n  t h e  e n d ,  t h e  P A H  I l l  i n v i t e d  f i v e  e x p e r t s  t o  g i v e  t h e i r  s u g g e s t i o n s :  R o e s l a n  A b d u l  G a n i ,  I s m a i l  
S u n y ,  H a r u n  A l r a s i d ,  S o e w o t o  M u l y o s u d a r m o  a n d  S r i  S o e m a n t r i .
8 5 1  
T h e s e  e x p e r t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  
w e r e  n o t  i n v i t e d  t o  t h e  e a r l y  m e e t i n g s ,  b u t  i n  t h e  s i x t h  a n d  t h e  s e v e n t h  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l .  
A t  t h a t  t i m e ,  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  h a d  a l r e a d y  b e e n  d r a f t e d .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  s e v e n t h  m e e t i n g  
w a s  t h e  l a s t  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l .  U n d e r  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  i n p u t  f r o m  e x p e r t s  h a d  l i t t l e  
p r a c t i c a l  p u r p o s e  a n d ,  i n d e e d ,  t h e  P A H  I l l  m e e t i n g s  n e v e r  i n t e n s i v e l y  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  e x p e r t s '  
s u g g e s t i o n s .  
I n  q u a n t i t y ,  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  - o r g a n i z e d  b y  t h e  M P R -
w a s  l i m i t e d  a n d  w a s  m o s t l y  i n d i r e c t .  T h e r e  w a s  n o  ' a c t i v e  a n d  i n c l u s i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n '  a s ·  
r e c o m m e n d e d  b y  S a u n d e r s . 8
5
2  H o w e v e r ,  w i t h  o n l y  t w e l v e  e f f e c t i v e  d a y s  f o r  d e b a t e ,  i t  w a s  
i m p o s s i b l e  t o ·  c a r r y  o u t ·  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  a n d  w i d e r  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  e v e n  g i v e n  t h e  w i l l  t o  d o  
s o .  
I n  r e g a r d  t o  q u a l i t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a n  f a i r l y  w e l l .  B e f o r e  a n d  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 9 9  
M P R  G e n e r a l  S e s s i o n ,  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  t o o k  t h e  f o r m  o f  h u g e  p u b l i c  d e m a n d  f r o m  t h e  p e o p l e ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  s t u d e n t s ,  t o  a m e n d  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  t r a n s p a r e n c y  a n d  o p e n n e s s  ·  
o f  t h e  M P R  m e e t i n g s  p l a y e d  a  c r u c i a l  r o l e .  M o s t  o f  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  w e r e  
8 4 8
1 b i d .  
8
4
9 1 b i d .  
8 5 0  
I b i d .  
8 5 1  
M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  3 ' d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  M P R  W o r k i n g  B o d y ,  1 4  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  1 8 .  A b d u l  G a n i  i s  a  h i s t o r i a n ,  w h i l e  t h e  r e s t  a r e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l a w  e x p e r t s .  
8 5 2  S a u n d e r s ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 6 ,  1 1 .  
1 2 8  
open to the public. 853 Even some of the 1999 MPR General Session meetings were· broadcast 
live on the TVRI (state-owned television channel) and the RRI (state-owned radio channel), as 
well as on some private televisions and radios.854 In addition to the electronic media, printed 
media also covered the MPR meetings in detail, through special supplements.855 
C. The First Amendment: the Outcomes ss6 
This section considers the outcome of the First Amendment discussions. Before proceeding, 
the section below first presents constitutional amendment recommendations both from civil 
. ' 
society and the MPR factions. It then compar~s the two. I use this comparison to evaluate 
whether or not the MPR adequately dealt with public input in the First Amendment process. 
1. Similar Amendments Proposals 
Public Proposals. Between 1998 and 1999, before the First Amendment took place, at least 
three civil society groups prepared constitutional amendment proposals.857 They were 
Kelompok Reformasi Hukum dan Perundang-undangan (Legislation and Legal Reform Groups,· 
KRHP); the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM); and Masyarakat Transparasi Indonesia 
(Indonesian Transparency Society, MTI). 
At least five similar recommendations were proposed by these societies namely:. (i) amending 
and not renewing the 1945 Constitution; (ii) restricting presidential powers; (iii) empowering the 
MPR, the DPR; the Supreme Court, and the BPK; (iv) adopting decentralization; and (v) 
strengthening human rights provisions.858 
The KRHP and UGM also proposed: (i) to maintain the preamble and amend onlythe body and 
. ' ' 
the elucidation; and (ii) to maintain the form of unitary state. The UGM and the MTI proposed: 
853 National Democratic Institute, above n 768, 15. 
854 1bid. 
855 1bid 16. 
856 All articles in this section, except mentioned otherwise, refer to the First Amendment of the 1945 Constitution. 
857 Yusuf and Basalim, above n 6, 72-81. 
858 Ibid. See also Matrik dan Analisis Rekomendasi Perubahan UUD 1945 (1999) Masyarakat"Transparansi Indonesia 
<http://www.transparansi.or.id/kaiianlkaiian101 matriks.html> at 5 October 2003; Mahfud MD, above n 534, 112-131. 
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( i )  t o  l i q u i d a t e  t h e  D P A  ( D e w a n  P e r t i m b a n g a n  A g u n g ,  S u p r e m e  A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l ) ;  a n d  ( i i )  t o  
f o l l o w  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a m e n d m e n t  m o d e l . 8 5 9  
T h e  M P R  F a c t i o n s '  P r o p o s a l .  I n  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n ,  M P R  f a c t i o n s  p r o p o s e d  
m o s t l y  s i m i l a r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  t h o s e  j u s t  d e s c r i b e d .  I n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  
t h e y  i n t e n d e d  t o  a m e n d  a l m o s t  a l l  o f  t h e  a r t i c l e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  
M a t t a l a t a  ( G o l k a r )  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  c o v e r  t w o  i s s u e s :  
. . .  f i r s t ,  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  a n d  s e c o n d ,  t h e  e m p o w e r m e n t  o f  s t a t e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  w h i c h  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  p e o p l e  a n d  c o n t r o l  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  T h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  
t h e  M P R ,  t h e  D P R ,  t h e  B P K ,  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  a n d  t h e  A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l  . . .  8 6 0  
Z o e l v a  ( P B S )  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  a l l  a r t i c l e s  r e l a t e d  t o  n o t  o n l y  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  m e n t i o n e d  b y  M a t t a l a t a  b u t  a l s o  t h e  D P A .
8 6 1  
H e  f u r t h e r  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  F i r s t  
A m e n d m e n t  a l s o  i n c o r p o r a t e  o t h e r  i s s u e s  i n c l u d i n g :  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  t h e  B a n k  o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  a  
B i l l  o f '  R i g h t s ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  c e n t r e  a n d  p e r i p h e r y ,  m i n i s t e r s  o f  s t a t e ,  n a t i o n a l  
d e f e n s e  a n d  s e c u r i t y ,  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  t e r r i t o r y  a n d  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  e l u c i d a t i o n .  8 6 2  
A t  t h e  7  O c t o b e r  m e e t i n g ,  t h e  P A H  I l l  a g r e e d  t o  g i v e  p r i o r i t y  t o  s e v e n  i s s u e s ,  w h i c h  c o v e r e d  2 0  
A r t i c l e s .
8 6
3  T h e s e  i s s u e s  w e r e  a s  f o l l o w s :  ( i )  t h e  e m p o w e r m e n t  o f  t h e  M P R ;  ( i i )  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r s  ( i i i )  a  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  D P A ' s  p o s i t i o n ;  ( i v )  t h e  e m p o w e r m e n t  o f  t h e  D P R ;  ( v )  
t h e  e m p o w e r m e n t  o f  t h e  B P K ;  ( v i )  t h e  e m p o w e r m e n t  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t ;  a n d  ( v i i )  t h e  
p r o v i s i o n  o f  p o s i t i o n s  o f  B a n k  o f  I n d o n e s i a  G o v e r n o r ,  A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l  a n d  C h i e f  o f  S t a f f  o f  t h e ·  
T N I  i n  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n . 8 6 4  
T h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h e s e  p r i o r i t i e s  c o n t i n u e d  u n t i l 1 0  O c t o b e r ,  w h e n  t h e  P A H  I l l  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  i t  
h a d  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t i m e  t o  f i n i s h  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t .  T h e  P A H  I l l  t h e n  a g r e e d  t o  m a k e  a  " s u p e r  
p r i o r i t y ' ' 8
6 5  
w h i c h  c o v e r e d  t w o  i s s u e s :  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r s  a n d  t h e  
8 5 9
1 b i d .  
8 6 0  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  1 • t  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  7  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  3 - 4 .  
8 6 1 1 b i d  7 .  
8 6 2 1 b i d .  
8 6 3  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  7 6 8 ,  1 8 .  
8 6 4  Y u s u f  a n d  B a s a l i m ,  a b o v e  n  6 ,  1 4 4 - 1 4 5 .  
8 6 5  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  4 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  1 0  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  2 0 .  
empowerment of the DPR.B66 In the end, only these two issues were promulgated as the First 
Amendment. 
Mostly Similar. Comparing the public and MPR factions' amendment proposals (Table 6) 
makes it clears that almost all positions of the two were similar. In fact, the factions adopted the 
majority of the recommendations of the public where differences arose this was generally not 
because of different opinions, but because the MPR had not decided the issues yet. Examples 
of these unresolved cases applied to the form of the unitary state, the position of theDPA and 
human rights issues. 






2. No to the President, Yes to the DPR 
No to President. Past experience with Soekarno's and Soeharto's authoritarian regimes 
strongly influenced the output of the First Amendment.s6a In the 2nd meeting of the PAH Ill, 
Yusuf expressly argued that the 1945 'executive-heavy' Constitution was the root ·of the 
866Yusuf and Basalim, above n 6, 147-149. 
867 1bid 72- 81.See also Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia, above n 858; Mahfud, above n 628, 112 -131; and Minutes of 
Meeting of the First Amendment Discussions. · 
868 Tri Agung Kristanto, 'Amandemen Undang-undang Dasar 1945: Semangat Membatasi Kekuasaan Presiden', Kompas, 
October 20, 1999. 
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a u t h o r i t a r i a n  N e w  O r d e r  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  p o w e r s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  n e e d e d  t o  b e  
r e s t r i c t e d .
8 6 9  
S i m i l a r l y ,  A b d u l  G a n i  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
. . .  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  s h o u l d  n o t  d o m i n a t e  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  T h e  e x e c u t i v e  s h o u l d  n o t  d o m i n a t e  
t h e  j u d i c i a r y  . . .  T h e  p r i o r i t y  o f  t h i s  a m e n d m e n t  i s  t o  e m p o w e r  t h e  M P R  a n d  t h e  D P R  . . . .  I t  .  
m e a n s  . . .  i f  t h e  D P R ' s  p o w e r s  a r e  i n s u f f i c i e n t ,  t h e y  s h o u l d  b e  i n c r e a s e d ;  i f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
p o w e r s  a r e  t o o  g r e a t ,  t h e y  m u s t  b e  l i m i t e d . 8 7 o  
T h e  M P R  1 9 9 9  G e n e r a l  S e s s i o n  p r o d u c e d  a m e n d m e n t s  t o  n i n e  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s  3 7  
A r t i c l e s .  N e a r l y  a l l  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  e m p o w e r e d  t h e  D P R  a n d  l i m i t e d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r s . 8
7 1  
S h i f t i n g  L e g i s l a t i v e  P o w e r .  T h e  a m e n d m e n t s  o f  A r t i c l e  5 ,  2 0  a n d  2 1  a r e  c l e a r  e x a m p l e s  o f  a  
p o w e r  t r a n s f e r  f r o m  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  t h e  D P R .  B e f o r e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t ,  A r t i c l e  5  ( 1 )  h a d  
s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h e l d  ' t h e  p o w e r  t o  m a k e  s t a t u t e s  i n  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  D P R ' .  T h i s  
w a s  c h a n g e d  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  w a s  m e r e l y  e n t i t l e d  ' t o  s u b m i t  B i l l s  t o  t h e  D P R ' ,  a n  
e n t i t l e m e n t  w h i c h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h o u l d  s h a r e  w i t h  e v e r y  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  D P R  ( A r t i c l e  2 1  ) .  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  D P R  w o u l d  t a k e  o v e r  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  f r o m  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  T h e  n e w  A r t i c l e  
2 0  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  D P R  ' h o l d s  t h e  p o w e r  t o  m a k e  s t a t u t e s ' .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  a  p r o c e d u r e  w a s  
s t i p u l a t e d  f o r  r a t i f y i n g  b i l l s ,  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  b o t h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e  D P R  ( A r t i c l e  2 0  
( 2 ) ,  ( 3 )  a n d  ( 4 ) ) .  
T a b l e  7  
T h e  S h i f t i n g  o f  L e g i s l a t i v e  P o w e r  f r o m  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  t h e  D P R  
O r i g i n a l  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  
T h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  h o l d  t h e  p o w e r  t o  ~51h.e{Prr;side.Q!L9.C1s"·· ·  
m a k e  s t a t u t e s  i n  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  Y t B i l l s t o  t h e  . .  D~f\.: ·  ·  
D P R .  ~Jl.t,,. :GJtrf~f!•.• . . . .  • • . ; / ,  >~i;x/i:•;:·~···· 
E v e r y  l a w  s h a l l  r e q u i r e  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  '  T h e , D P R s h a l l  p a v r ;  . .  ·  · ·  ·  
t h e  D P R .  : . . ·  . . .  ;  . . .  ·  . . . . . . .  . : c : · . . . .  . .  .  . . !  . . . . .  i . / / / 1 " !  • • •  
T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  h a v e  t h e  
r i g h t  t o  s u b m i t  a  b i l l .  
8 6 9  M i n u t e s  o f t h e  2 n d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  8  O c t o b e r 1 9 9 9 ,  3 6 .  
8
7
0  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  7 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  1 3  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 , 2 6 .  
8 7 1  
T h e y  a r e  A r t i c l e s  5 ;  7 ;  9 ;  1 3 ( 2 )  a n d  ( 3 ) ;  1 4 ( 1 )  a n d  ( 2 ) ;  1 5 ;  1 7 ( 2 )  a n d  ( 3 ) ;  2 0 ( 1 ) ,  ( 2 ) ,  ( 3 )  a n d  ( 4 ) ;  a n d  2 1 .  
1 3 2  
This legislative power transfer was overwhelmingly agreed upon but some. challenges 
remained. For example, Subekti argued that: 
I totally understand that the spirit of this amendment ... is to empower the DPR, but ... are 
the DPR's members ready to have this legislative power? This power cannot be taken 
·lightly. It needs ... not only qualified human resources but also an enormous budget.872 
likewise, Mulyosudarmo argued that: 
[i]t is strange that pursuant to Article 20 the DPR holds the legislative power ... By 
changing the setting like this, the DPR will be busy making bills ... Therefore, [the original 
article] which provides the approval mechanism to the DPR is good enough to control the 
executive. 873 
I would argue against Subekti and Mulyosudarmo. The shifting of legislative power is correct. It 
places the legislative power where it is supposed to be, in the legislative body. The concern 
about the DPR members'. capacity to make bills is not a valid argument. Expert staff members 
should be provided to support members of the Parliament. 
Limitation on Presidential Term. Learning from the long authoritarian presidencies of both 
Soeharto and Soekarno, the MPR inserted into the Constitution a safeguard stating that the 
President and the Vice-President could be re-elected to the same office for only one further 
term (Article 7). This meant the MPR reaffirmed MPR Decree No. XIII of 1998 on Limitation of 
the President and Vice-President's Terms.874 
It can be argued that the authoritarian nature of Soekarno and Soeharto presidencies was 
largely due to their length. Limiting the presidential term was therefore an important reform. It 
removed one of the main authoritarian characteristics from the 1945 Constitution: Therefore, I 
share Lindsey's opinion that, "more than any other, this amendment ~as a clear stateme.nt of 
political transition from authoritarianism". 875 · 
Limitation on Presidential Judicial Powers . . The First Amendment also limited the 
President's judicial power and gave the DPR more influence in judicial issues. Amendment· of 
872Minutes of the 7th meeting ofthe PAH Ill, 13 October 1999, 14. 
873 Minutes of the 6th meeting of the PAH Ill, 12 October 1999, 43- 44. 
874 Article 1 of MPR Decree No. XIII of 1998 on Limitation of President and Vice-President Term. 
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A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 2 )  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h o u l d  l i s t e n  t o  t h e  D P R ' s  a d v i c e  b e f o r e  g r a n t i n g  
a m n e s t i e s  a n d  a b o l i t i o n s .  F u r t h e r ,  a m e n d m e n t  A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 1 )  r e q u i r e d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  c o n s u l t  t o  
t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  b e f o r e  g r a n t i n g  p a r d o n s  a n d  r e s t o r a t i o n s  o f  r i g h t s .  
L i m i t a t i o n  o n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  D i p l o m a t i c  P o w e r s .  T h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  a l s o  l i m i t e d  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t ' s  d i p l o m a t i c  - p o w e r ,  a n d  g a v e  t h e  D P R  m o r e  c o n t r o l  i n  a p p o i n t i n g  a m b a s s a d o r s  a n d  
c o n s u l s  a n d  r e c e i v i n g  f o r e i g n  a m b a s s a d o r s .  T h i s  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r  s h o u l d  b e  c o n d u c t e d  
' h a v i n g  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  a d v i c e  o f  t h e  D P R '  ( A r t i c l e  1 3 ( 2 )  a n d  ( 3 ) ) .  A  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  b e t w e e n  
I n d o n e s i a  a n d  A u s t r a l i a  s t r o n g l y  i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  d r a f t i n g  o f  t h i s  a m e n d m e n t .  I n  1 9 9 5 ,  t h e  
A u s t r a l i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  o b j e c t e d  t o  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  H B L  M a n t i r i  a s  I n d o n e s i a ' s  a m b a s s a d o r  
t o  A u s t r a l i a ,  o n  t h e  g r o u n d  t h a t  h e  h a d  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  T N I ' s  a c t i o n s  i n  S a n t a  C r u z  m a s s a c r e  i n  
E a s t  T i m o r ,  o n  1 2  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 1 . 8
7 6  
M u s t a f a  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t :  
. . .  o u r  n o m i n a t e d  a m b a s s a d o r  t o  A u s t r a l i a  w a s  r e j e c t e d  . . .  b y  . . .  s o m e  p a r t i e s  [ i n  t h e  
P a r l i a m e n t  o f  A u s t r a l i a ] .  T h a t  i s  w h y ,  I  t h i n k  i t  w o u l d  b e  w i s e r  i f  i n  r e c e i v i n g  a n o t h e r  
c o u n t r y ' s  a m b a s s a d o r ,  [ t h e  P r e s i d e n t ]  s h o u l d  a l s o  h e a r  t h e  D P R ' s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
8 7 7  
A n o t h e r  a m e n d m e n t  r e l a t e d  t o  p r e v i o u s  e v e n t s  i s  t h e  a l t e r e d  p r o v i s i o n s  o n  t h e  s w e a r i n g - i n  
c e r e m o n y  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  ( A r t i c l e  9 ) .  T h i s  a m e n d m e n t  w a s  i n s p i r e d  b y  
H a b i b i e ' s  o a t h ,  w h i c h  w a s  w i t n e s s e d  b y  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  i n  t h e  M e r d e k a  P a l a c e ,  b e c a u s e  
t h e  M P R  c . o u l d  n o t  a s s e f 1 1 b l e .  T h e  a m e n d m e n t  w h i c h  l i m i t e d  b y  l a w  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r  t o  
g r a n t  h o n o r s  a n d  m e d a l s  w a s  a l s o  t r i g g e r e d  b y  H a b i b i e ' s  a c t i o n s  ( A r t i c l e  1 5 )  i n  g r a n t i n g  h o n o r s  
t o  m a n y  o f  h i s  s u p p o r t e r s  i n  A u g u s t  1 9 9 9 . 8 7 8  
A t t e m p t  t o  L i m i t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  C a b i n e t  A p p o i n t m e n t .  T h e r e  w a s  a l s o  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  l i m i t  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  p o w e r  t o  a p p o i n t  h i s  o r  h e r  c a b i n e t .  A s n a w i  L a t i e f  ( P D U )  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  i n  
a p p o i n t i n g  m i n i s t e r s ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h o u l d  c o n s u l t  t o  t h e  D P R  c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 8 7 9  T h i s  p r o p o s a l  
f a i l e d .  A m i n  A r y o s o  ( P D I P )  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  P A H  I l l  s h o u l d  a v o i d  m o v i n g  f r o m  a n  e x e c u t i v e -
h e a v y  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t o  a  l e g i s l a t u r e - h e a v y  C o n s t i t u t i o n . 8 8 o  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  c o m m i t m e n t  o f  t h e  
8 7 5  L i n d s e y ,  a b o v e  n  9 9 ,  2 4 9 .  
8 7 6 • s e t e l a h  K o s o n g  L i m a  B u l a n ' ,  G a r d a ,  1 6 - 2 3  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 5 .  
8 7 7  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  1 1  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  1 2 .  
8 7
8  T h e  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p r e s i d e n t i a f  p o w e r  t o  c o n f e r  s t a t e  h o n o r  b y  l a w  w a s  a l s o  p r o p o s e d  b y  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  G a d j a h  M a d a  
a n d  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  T r a n s p a r e n c y  C o m m u n i t y .  
8 7 9  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  1 1  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  4 0 .  
8 8 0  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  7 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I l l ,  1 3  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9 ,  4 .  
1 3 4  
other members of the PAH Ill to strengthen presidential system blocked Latiefs proposal. 
Subekti argued that: 
... we must remember that ministers are Presidents' assistants. Therefore ... it should be 
the President who has the full authority to decide who his assistants are .. . Because we 
are now applying a multi-party system, if the DPR's advice should be considered, then 
political considerations will be stronger than professional considerations. This is not 
right.88t 
Similarly, Khofifah lndar Parawansa (PKB) warned that: 
I appreciate that we have the spirit to empower the DPR, but I think we· have to be wiser 
... If the President's powers are too limited, I think it will also be unfair ... I am afraid that 
we will actually bind ourselves.882 · · 
Conclusion. For the radicals, who believed that the authoritarian 1945 Constitution had to be 
totally renewed, the First Amendment was far from satisfying. Wall Paragon, for example, 
argued that it was half-hearted.883 I would a·rgue, however, that the amendment succeeded in 
de-mystifying. a Constitution which had been considered 'sacred' for decades. 884 Before 1998, 
changing the Constitution was unthinkable: it would have been regarded as treacherous or 
subversive.885 Further, given the strong symbolic value of the Constitution, and with only twelve 
working days to arrive at a First Amendment, this Amendment was about as good an outcome 
as anyone could have hoped for. 
One thing is clear though, that the First Amendment was an incomplete constitutional reform. It 
has to be recognized as only the beginning of constitutional changes that should have been 
completed in the 2000 MPR Annual Session.886 The next chapter will discuss whether the MPR 
could have met this schedule or not. 
881 ibid 38. 
882 ibid 20. 
883Waii Paragon, 'Amandemen UUD 1945 yang Setengah Hati", Suara Pembaruan, 5 November 1999. 
884 Yusuf and Basalim, above n 6, 222. 
885 Endi M. Bayuni, 'Finally, Indonesia's Own First Amendment', The Jakarta Post, December 27, 1999. 
886 Lindsey, above n 99, 250. " 
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C h a p t e r  F i v e  
T h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t :  
F u r t h e r  R e f o r m s .  C o n t i n u e d  D e l a y s  
T h i s  c h a p t e r  d e s c r i b e s  t h e ·  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  I t  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s .  S e c t i o n  A  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n a l  b a c k g r o u n d  o f  
t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t ,  f r o m  t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  i n  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 9  u n t i l  t h e  
M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n  o n  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 ,  t o  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  t o o k  p l a c e  i n  t h e  
m i d s t  o f  a  c r i s i s .  S e c t i o n  8  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  
A m e n d m e n t  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  t h e  M P R  f a c e d  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e l a y  i n  i t s  s c h e d u l e  a n d  
f a i l e d  t o  f u l f i l l  i t s  o w n  p l a n  t o  c o m p l e t e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  i n  2 0 0 0 .  F i n a l l y , ·  s e c t i o n  C  o u t l i n e s  t h e  
r e s u l t i n g  a m e n d m e n t  w h i c h  f u r t h e r  r e f o r m s  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  b y  a d o p t i n g  
i m p r e s s i v e  h u m a n  r i g h t s  p r o t e c t i o n s .  
A .  T h e  B a c k g r o u n d :  t h e  S h a k y  S i t u a t i o n  
A s  w e l l  a s  r a t i f y i n g  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  a n d  e l e c t i n g  A b d u r r a h m a n  W a h i d  a s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
a n d  M e g a w a t i  S o e k a r n o p u t r i  a s  t h e  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t ,  t h e  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 9  M P R  G e n e r a l  S e s s i o n  
d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e  M P R  w o u l d  h o l d  a n n u a l  s e s s i o n s  f r o m  2 0 0 0 . 8 8
7  
T h e s e  s e s s i o n s  w o u l d  e n a b l e  
t h e  M P R  t o  c o n t i n u e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w h i c h  h a d  n o t  f i n i s h e d  i n  
1 9 9 9 . 8 8 8  T h e  2 0 0 0  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n  w a s  h e l d  o n  7 - 1 8  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  T h e  M P R ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
h a d  a  l o n g e r  p e r i o d  ( f r o m  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 9  t o  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 )  t o  p r e p a r e  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  
t h a n  i t  h a d  h a d  f o r  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 .  P o l i t i c a l  C o n f l i c t s  
T h e  n i n e  m o n t h s ,  f r o m  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 9  t o  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 ,  w e r e  d o m i n a t e d  b y  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d  a n d  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t . 8 8 9  T h e  i n c r e a s e d  p o w e r  o f  t h e  D P R  a f t e r  t h e  
F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h i s  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  W a h i d  a n d  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t .  T h e  2 0 0 0  
A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  o p e n e d  i n  a n  " a t m o s p h e r e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  t e n s i o n " .
8 9 0  
A s  a  m i n o r i t y  
P r e s i d e n t ,  s u p p o r t e d  b y  l e s s  t h a n  1 1  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  P K B  s e a t s  i n  t h e  D P R ,  W a h i d  h a d  t o  f o r m  
8 8 7  A r t i c l e  5 7  o f  t h e  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  I  o f  1 9 9 9  o n  S t a n d i n g  O r d e r .  
8 8 8  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  3 0 ,  1 .  
8 8 9
1 b i d .  
1 3 6  
a 'rainbow' cabinet, and initially managed to secure political support.89t However, the harmony 
of the cabinet did not last long. In November 1999, only one month after the formation of the 
cabinet, Wahid sacked the Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare, Hamzah Haz, the chair of 
the PPP.892 In late February 2000, Wahid removed General Wiranto from his post as 
Coordinating Minister for Security. Then, in April 2000, Wahid fired Laksamana Sukardi (PDIP) 
and Jusuf Kalla (Golkar) from their posts; as Minister for Investment and state Industries and 
Minister for Trade and Industry respectively.893 
Because the PDIP, Golkar and the PPP held the majority of seats in the DPR (331 outof 
500),894 the· firing of their senior party figures, Sukardi, Kalla, and Haz put Wahid's 
administration in jeopardy. In fact, it was probably the members of these parties who made up 
the 332 DPR members who demanded that Wahid should explain the reasons behind the 
removal of Sukardi and Kalla. This opened the possibility of impeaching President Wahid in the 
2000 MPR Annual Session.895 
The 2000 Annual Session was, therefore, overshadowed by the political bargaining between 
' President Wahid and parties in the Parliament.896 Six major factions of the MPR- Golkar, the 
PDIP, the PPP, the Reformasi, the PBB and the PDU - recommended that Wahid should 
continue as the head of state and that Vice President Megawati should be made the Prime 
Minister.897 Mahfud argued that this proposal breached the 1945 Constitution which did not 
recognize the parliamentary system898 but, in the end, Wahid agreed to assign Megawati some 
technical roles without handing over his presidential authority.899 Manan argued that this 
assignment did not breach the Constitution.9oo His reasoning was that the Vice President: 
890 Ibid. 
89t R. William Liddle, 'Indonesia in 2000: A Shaky Start for Democracy' (2001) 41:1 Asian Survey 208. 
892 1bid 209. 
8931bid. 
894 See Table 3 above. 
895 National Democratic Institute, above n 30, 1. 
896 Kawamura, above n S61, 37. 
897 
'Abdurrahman Wahid Digiring hanya untuk jadi kepala Negara', Kompas, 9 August 2000. 
898 'Wapres akan Laksanakan Tug as Pemerintahan', Kompas, 10 August 2000. 
899 Article 1 of Presidential Decree No. 121 of 2000 on the Assignment from the President to the Vice President to Handle the 
Daily Government Duties. . . • 
900 Bagir Manan, 'Membagi Pekerjaan bukan Wewenang', Tempo (Jakarta) No. 25/XXIX/21 - 27 August 2000. 
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. . . .  w o u l d  b e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a s s i s t i n g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  b y  h e a d i n g  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  b u t  t h e  a b s o l u t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  e x e c u t i v e  power~ b o t h  i n  t h e  f i e l d s  o f  t h e  
s t a t e  a n d  t h e !  g o v e r n m e n t - w o u l d  r e m a i n  w i t h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  9 0 t  
2 .  S o c i a l  C o n f l i c t s  
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  President-p~rliament c o n f l i c t , a n o t h e r m a j o r  p r o b l e m  i n  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 0  w a s  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  c e n t e r  a n d  t h e  r e g i o n s .  T h e  s e p a r a t i s m  i s s u e  i n c r e a s e d a s  a r m e d  
m o v e m e n t s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  f i g h t  f o r  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  A c e h  a n d  P a p u a .  O t h e r  a r e a s  
s u c h  a s  M a l u k u ,  P o s o  ( C e n t r a l  S u l a w e s i ) ,  K u p a n g  a n d  L o m b o k  w e r e  a f f l i c t e d  b y  w i d e s p r e a d  




I n  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 0 ,  i t  w a s  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  confli~ts, 
3 0 0 , 0 0 0  I n d o n e s i a n s  h a d  b e c o m e  r e f u g e e s .
9 0
J  
3 .  E c o n o m i c  C r i s i s  
I n  1 9 9 9 ,  d u r i n g  W a h i d ' s  f i r s t  y e a r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  c o n t i n u e d  a n d  
b e c a m e  a n o t h e r  i s s u e  t h a t  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f a i l e d  t o  a d d r e s s  p r o p e r l y .
9 0 4  
A l t h o u g h  e c o n o m i c  
g r o w t h  w a s  b e t t e r  i n  1 9 9 9  t h a n  1 9 9 7  a n d  1 9 9 8 ,  i n f l a t i o n  w a s  s t i l l  r u n n i n g  a t  n e a r l y  1  0 %  a n d  t h e  
R u p i a h  c o n t i r i . u e d  t o  d e p r e c i a t e ,  d r o p p i n g  g r a d u a l l y  f r o m  R p  7 , 0 0 0  t o  n e a r l y  R p  1 0 , 0 0 0  p e r  U S  
d o l l a r .
9 0 5  
I n  m i d - 2 0 0 0 ,  c o r p o r a t e  d e b t s  a l m o s t  a m o u n t e d  t o  a r o u n d  U S $  1 2 0  b i l l i o n ,  5 7 %  o f  
I n d o n e s i a ' s  G D P . 9 o 6  
C l o s i n g .  I t  w a s  i n  t h e  s h a d o w  o f  a l l  o f  t h e s e  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m s  t h a t  
.  .  .  .  
I n d o n e s i a  d i s c u s s e d ,  d r a f t e d  a n d  r a t i f i e d  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t .  C l e a r l y  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s  w e r e  
a  c h a l l e n g e  t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  a g e n d a .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d , ·  a s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  C h a p t e r  
T w o ,  c r i s e s  d u r i n g  a  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r u l e  c a n  a c t u a l l y  b e  a  g o l d e n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  
r e f o r m  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  w i l l  f o c u s  h o w  t h e  M P R  r e s p o n d e d  t o  s u c h  a n  
o p p o r t u n i t y .  
9 0 1
1 b i d .  
9 0 2
1 b i d  2 1 5 .  S e e  a l s o  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C r i s i s  G r o u p ,  I n d o n e s i a ' s  C r i s i s :  C h r o n i c  b u t  n o t  A c u t e ,  I C G  I n d o n e s i a  R e p o r t  N o .  2  ( 2 0 0 0 )  
1 7 - 2 1 ;  M i e k e  K o o i s t r a ,  I n d o n e s i a :  R e g i o n a l  C o n f l i c t s  a n d  S t a t e  o f  T e r r o r ,  M i n o r i t y  R i g h t s  G r o u p  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  R e p o r t  ( 2 0 0 1 ) ;  
A n t h o n y  L .  S m i t h ,  ' I n d o n e s i a :  O n e  S t a t e ,  M a n y  S t a t e s ,  C h a o t i c  S t a t e '  ( P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  F o r u m  o n  R e g i o n a l  S t r a t e g i c  
a n d  P o l i t i c a l  D e v e l o p m e n t s ,  2 5  J u l y  2 0 0 1 ) .  
9 0 3 1 n t e r n a t i o n a l  C r i s i s  G r o u p ,  a b o v e  n  9 0 2 ,  2 0 .  
9 0 4  L i d d l e ,  a b o v e  n  8 9 1 ,  2 1 6 - 2 1 7 .  
9 0 5 1 b i d  2 1 8 .  
9 0 6  
J a s o n  P .  A b b o t ,  ' F a l l  f r o m  G r a c e :  T h e  P o l i t i c a l  E c o n o m y  o f  I n d o n e s i a n  D e c a y  a n d  D e c l i n e '  ( P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  G l o b a l  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  ' F a i l e d  s t a t e s ' :  T h e  C o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  A  N e w  I m p e r i a l i s m ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S u s s e x ,  1 8 - 2 0  A p r i l 2 0 0 1 ) .  .  .  
1 3 8  
B. The Se_cQnd .. Amendrnent:Jh~ ~JQ~es~---- ...... . 
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This section elaborates· the· amendment.proc.ess: in.-' four ·divisions: (i) ·when ·the constitution-
making should:~~c~~;·(-ii)·h·~~-th~'::~~~~¥ilt~-t~~~~-~-~~~;,~~~-p6~d~~t~-d (i·i~-~h~-the constitution-
; ••• .J/1-% II ... '"'· !.l !,..,. ,_, ,, • ..,.! t-1 .... l. jO" •. •d~- l 
making body was to be;.and.(iv) howthe~iublic·partiCipatiori'was organized. ___ ! 
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The MPR Second Amendment discussions were: conducted by reviewing chapt~r-by-chapter of 
' Ji~;\'~1 :,~~-}.)J~~""-~ .. \j'~.-\"'-''','ii·",-.q l ' 
the 1945 Constitution:The discussions were conducted in four stages (Table 8): 
,~··-- ----·····-·-,-~--~---~~- ---~---·-------J ____ ,.. __________ .. -- ·--·····-, 
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• First, the MPRformed a~Working~Body:\vhich'·prepared alfofthe.materials for the 2000 
I 
MPR Annual se·ssion;· thiii oodytnen fo-rmedJnree aa hoc."com-mittees:907 · : 
. ! · -· t;J:r·~ ~:~~1r: .;/._ :-:. 1 
• Second, o~~-~f the, co_~mitt_e~_s_, ·,~~~~~.JI.oq.pqrp~!~~~ I (~~~i~{~.A.~J29~Jpr PAH I or the· 
Committee), was made r~sppnsible;fpr. ptepwing,amendment drafts:·The; PAH I worked 
I , .. ,,_,l,r~·,.,,,d '-•• ,,-~ ....... S. '~"'·\:. •'""'". ~~ •• ,._,., _,t, . 
from the end of November 1999 until earlyAugusf2000. .. ! 
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• Third, Cofr!_f!llssion_.A. .. IIY.as f~rrned_ d!Jring Jhe_ 200_0_ Annuai_Session to further discuss the 
l \ ~-,. ~i.:·· :·; ;::.~::-;~)'~} 1 ", ;:' ~~~t.: t~ :, · P: ~~n """ ~:- r ;.:: r ; 
draft ofthe;second Amendment pr~pared:gyJhe CoJllmittee. 1 
l , ........ ~:·,~-q-··\·:··, ~ i·•·> ~-q ____ -~ ', "; ·.:·-->;•_;) ;~.-:-;·· \ 
• Fourth, on ~18 August 2000, in the ninth Pl~hary Meetirig'of the Annual-Session, the MPR 
ratified the SecondAmendm~ni~Sbil ,;;::_::; ::dJ ';,;> 
. ::·· --~·: :~-:-~!'.1~-1!\ ~~~ 
L_ .. , --- :·~_!_t_~ ~-· r: :.:--. ·:.t. ':! "~ .. i-~!:*:J_:·_~: ... t~·:;t J~ 
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The Working B?dy;th~;~(l.!"f! ~n.q:th~,C.Of11rt:Jissipn_A.ofthe ~PR2000:Anriiial s:ession had 90, 
( i~·~!'~·-~·:·:··~r...:;~- ! 
44 and 227 members respectively., In eac11 .. 6f this .oody, the. eleyen _factions were: represented in 
L-~-~--.. ----~-~····-- .. __ ;.:·.~: _:_ __ ~~.:.~~~1~·.:::..:_::_·.:..:· ,~ ~~-'-~ ... ::~~:-~:...~.: ... :..:.: ::.:.:~.: .:. ~ _:.: ·..:.. .. - --- -- --~----····. -~ 
proportion with the number of their seats in.the.MPR. 
<':l l ,., l l ~·f~t;J ,, Jno::-::~~ ~---
907 Minutes ofthe 4111 meting of the Working Body, 25 November 1999. 
908 The Working Body, the PAH I and the Commission A of the MPR 2000 Annual session had 90, 44 and 227 members 
respectively. In each of this body the eleven factions were represented in proportion with the number of their seats in the MPR. 
T a b l e S  
P r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h e  M P R ' s  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  D i s c u s s i o n s  
"  
T h e  4 1 1 1  M e e t i n g  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  
2 5  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 9  
F o r m u l l d i o n  o f  t h e  P A H  I  
I  
T h e  1 • - 2 6 1 "  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  P A H  I  
2 9  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 9 - 3  M a r c h  2 0 0 0  
T h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  D i s c u s s i o n s  
I  
T h e  5 ' 1 1  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  
6  M a r c h  2 0 0 0  
P r o a l ' l l l  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  P A H  I  
I  
T h e  2 7 * - 3 3 1 1 1  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  P A H  I  
7  M a r c h  - 2 2  M a y  2 0 0 0  
T h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  D i s c u s s i o n s  ( c o n t i n u e d )  
I  
T h e  P  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  
2 3 M a y 2 0 0 0  
. .  
R I D O r t  o f  t h e  P A H  I  
J  
T h e  3 4
1 1 1
- 5 1 •  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  P A H  I  
2 4  M a y  - 2 9  J u l y  2 0 0 0  
T h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  D i s c u s s i o n s  ( c o n t i n u e d )  
I  
T h e  7 1 1 1  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  
2  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0  
F i n a l  R e p c ) n  o f  t h e  P A H  I  
I  
, . . . .  . .  , . . . ,  . . . . . . .  - . . . . . . .  A n n u l i  . . . . .  
t t A I I I I I I J I I D  
T h e  F G I I I I I I I I I a n  o f  c a n . 1 1 1 1 a n  A  
I  
T h e  1
1 1
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T h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  D i s c u s s i o n s  
I  
T h e . , . _  . . .  . . . . . ,  . . . . . . .  - . . . . . . . .  _ _  . . . . .  
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, _  . . . .  l l l l t f l c t l o n a  
I  
T l l e P . . . . . ,  . . . . . . .  e i  . . . .  _ . . . A M U I I a . . l o n  
1 t  A l l g l l l t  . .  
T i l t  R l d l t l l t i O I I  o f  t h e  . . . .  A l n i i i C I I M n t  
D  F i r s t  S t a g e  
D  T h i r d  S t a g e  
D  S e c o n d  S t a g e  
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.  
S o u r c e :  E x t r a c t e d  f r o m  M i n u t e s  o f  M e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  M P R ' s  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  
D i s c u s s i o n s  
1 4 0  
In the end of its meeting, PAH I submitted a comprehensive Second Amendment draft to the 
Working Body. 909 The draft contained revisions to each of the 16 chapters of the original 1945 
Constitution and added 5 new chapters.910 Table 10 in Section C below outlines the 21 chapters 
reviewed by the PAH I. The 2000 MPR Annual Session, however, failed to discuss and ratify 
the comprehensive draft. The following section deals with this MPR's failure. 
b. The MPR's Changing Schedule 
The 1999 MPR General Session had resolved that the amendment process should be 
continued in the 2000 MPR Annual Session, and be completed on 18 August 2000. As already 
mentioned in Chapter Four, this date was chosen because it was the 55th birthday of the 1945 
Constitution. Yet the MPR failed to follow its own instruction. The PDIP argued that not all of 
the amendment proposals prepared by PAH I should be ratified in 2000.911 Hobbes Sinaga 
(PDIP) argued that the ratification should be of the agreed proposals and ratification of other 
proposed articles should be postponed.912 Similarly, the TNI-Polri argued that the undecided 
proposals needed to be submitted for the following 2001 MPR Annual Session, rather than th~y 
were wholly promulgated in 2000.913 
In contrast, Hamdan Zoelva (PBB) argued that: 
... it is a waste of time if we do not ratify all of the proposals of the amendment at this 
[2000] annual session. If we do not amend and ratify the Constitution at this time, there 
will be no amendment at all, even if the condition is more stable. The lessons from other 
countries show that, the amendment of constitutions may only be carried out during 
political upheaval, as is happening now.914 
However, as time was running out for the 2000 MPR Annual Session, all of the factions finally 
agreed to pass . MPR Decree Number IX of 2000 which extended the previous deadline of 
constitutional amendment from August 2000 to 2002. The Decree set up a new schedule that: 
909 Ellis, above n 662, 128. 
910 National Democratic Institute, above n 30, 3. See Table 10. 
911 Minutes of the 5th Plenary Meeting, 10 August 2000. 
912 Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Commission A, 11 August 2000. 
913 Minutes of the 5th (continued) Plenary Meeting, 10 August 2000. 
914 1bid. 
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[ t ] h e  a m e n d m e n t  d r a f t  m u s t  b e  r e a d y  t o  b e  d i s c u s s e d  a n d  r a t i f i e d  b y  t h e  M P R  a t  t h e  2 0 0 2  
.  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  a t  t h e  l a t e s t . 9 1 5  
c .  T h e  P u b l i c ' s  P o s i t i o n  
T h e  ·  J a k a r t a  P o s t  i d e n t i f i e d  2 0  n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t h a t  c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  
p o s t p o n e m e n t  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s
9 1 6  
m a i n l y  b e c a u s e  t h e y  l a c k e d  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  l e d  b y  t h e  M P R .  S y a f i ' i  M a ' a r i f ,  n o w  t h e  c h a i r  o f  M u h a m m a d i y a h , 9 1 7  
a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  M P R  w a s  n o t  s e r i o u s  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d r a f t .
9 1
B  M a ' a r i f  r e f e r r e d  t o  
s o m e  s e n s i t i v e  a r t i c l e s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  I s l a m ,  a n d  a r g u e d  t h a t  " I t  i s  
b e t t e r  i f  w e  d e l a y  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  b e c a u s e  w e  n e e d  m o r e  t i m e  t o  p r e p a r e .  W e  m u s t  n o t  p l a y  
g a m e s  w i t h  t h e  f a t e  o f  t h e  n a t i o n " .  9 1 9  
M a h f u d  a r g u e d .  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d r a f t  w a s  u n s y s t e m a t i c  a n d  ' m o s t l y  o v e r l a p p e d ' ,  a n d  
t h e r e f o r e ,  o p p o s e d  r a t i f y i n g  t h e  w h o l e  d r a f t  i n  t h e  2 0 0 0  a n n u a l  s e s s i o n .
9 2
0  L i k e w i s e ,  A s s h i d i q i e  
a l s o  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a r t i c l e s  w h i c h  c o n t a i n  a l t e r n a t i v e s  s h o u l d  b e  a d j o u r n e d  t o  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  M P R  a n n u a l  s e s s i o n . 9
2 1  
F o r  h i m ,  t h e  p o s t p o n e m e n t  w a s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a v o i d  p o t e n t i a l  
d i s h a r m o n y  a m o n g  a r t i c l e s . 9 2 2  
T h i s  M P R ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  p o s t p o n e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  p r o l o n g e d  t h e  d e b a t e s  i n  t h e  M P R .  
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  h o w  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  d r a f t  w a s  d e b a t e d  
f r o m  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 9  t o  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
2 .  H o w  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n - M a k i n g  w a s  C o n d u c t e d  
T h i s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  e l a b o r a t e  f o u r  i s s u e s  i n  t u r n :  ( i )  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  p r e a m b l e ,  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m  a n d  t h e  u n i t a r y  s t a t e ;  ( i i )  t h e  c h o i c e  b e t w e e n  a m e n d i n g  a n d  r e n e w i n g  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  ( i i i )  t h e  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  a n d  p r o g r e s s i v e  f a c t i o n  i n  t h e  M P R ;  a n d  
( i v )  t h e  c o n t a m i n a t i o n  o f  s h o r t - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  . .  
9 1 5  A r t i c l e  3  o f  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  I X  o f  1 9 9 9  o n  t h e  A u t h o r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  o f  t h e  M P R  t o  p r e p a r e  t h e  A m e n d m e n t  
D r a f t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
9 1 6  ' M i l i t a r y  F a c t i o n  S e e k  D e l a y  o f  A m e n d m e n t ' ,  I n d o n e s i a n  O b s e N e r ,  1 0  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 1 7  M u h a m m a d i y a h  i s  I n d o n e s i a ' s  s e c o n d  l a r g e s t  I s l a m i c  o r g a n i z a t i o n  m o v e m e n t .  I t  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1 9 1 2  a s  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
e x p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  m o d e r n i s t  m o v e m e n t .  T h e  o r g a n i z e d  i s  w e l l - k n o w n  f o r  i t s  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  p r o v i d i n g  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  
b a s i c  h e a l t h  c a r e  f o r  M o s l e m s .  
9 1 8  M i l i t a r y  f a c t i o n  s e e k  D e l a y  o f  A m e n d m e n t ,  a b o v e  n  9 1 6 .  
9 1
9 1 b i d .  
9 2 0  ' K o n s t r u k s i  P e r u b a h a n  U U D  1 9 4 5  K a c a u ' ,  K o m p a s ,  1 4  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 2 1
1 b i d .  
9 2 2
1 b i d .  
1 4 2  
a. Preserving the Preamble, the Unitary State and the Presidential System 
At the third meeting of the PAH I, the PDIP faction claimed that, in the 1999 MPR General 
Session, all of the factions had agreed to maintain three fundamental aspects of the existing 
system: the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, the unitary state and the presidential system.923 
This claim was untrue: while all the factions had agreed on preserving the preamble, there 
were differences of opinion with regard to the presiJiential system and the unitary stat~.924 
In the 4th meeting of the PAH I, A.M. Luthfi (Reformas1) proposed a federal state to replace the 
. . ' ... 
unitary state.925 In support to this proposal,, Patrialis Akbar (Reformas1) put the following 
argument: 
... the centralized system had triggered injustice. The current threat of disintegration is 
due to such injustice. Therefore, the development of decentralized system is urgently 
needed ... in this regard the Reformasi faction supports the idea of federalism· ... We, 
however, object to any separation or independence movement.926 
In addition, Zoelva indicated that· the PBB faction was willing to discuss the possibility of a 
federal state.927 Heargued that: 
... although p_ersonally I agree with a unitary state, the discussion of federalism should not 
be closed ... We should not decide the issue in this forum without hearing what the 
regions' views. They might be in favor of a federal state.92B 
Despite these differences, Jacob Tobing (PDIP, the Chair of the PAH I) persisted in claiming 
that the Committee had agreed on these three questions. At most of the public hearings held 
923 Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the PAH I, 6 December 1999 .. 
924 Blair A. King, Constitutional Tinkering- The Search for Consensus is taking Time Inside Indonesia (2001) Inside Indonesia, 
<http:f(lnsideindonesia.orq/edit65/ blair.htm> at 4 October 2003. · 
925 Minutes of the 4th meeting of the PAH I, 7 December 1999. 
926 Minutes of the 6th meeting of the PAH I, 10 December 1999. 
927 Minutes of the 5th meeting the PAH I, 9 December 1999. This was different to Zoelva's earlier position. At the First 
Amendment Discussions, Zoelva argued that the unitary state should not be amended. Above n 823. 
928 Minutes of the 8th meeting of the PAH I, 14 December 1999. . 
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b y  t h e  C o m m i t t e e ,  h e ·  c h a i r e d  t h e  m e e t i n g s
9 2 9  
a n d  o p e n e d  e a c h  o f  t h e m  w i t h  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  
C o m m i t t e e  h a d  a g r e e d  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e s e  t h r e e  i s s u e s . 9 3 o  ·  
A l t h o u g h ·  T o b i n g ' s  c l a i m  w a s  u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d ,  n o n e  o f  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  o p e n l y  
d i s a g r e e d .  I t  c o u l d  b e  a r g u e d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e y  i m p l i c i t l y  a g r e e · d ·  w i t h  T o b i n g .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a t  
t h e ·  h e a r i n g s ,  n e i t h e r  t h e  e x p e r t s  n o r  t h e  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  s t r o n g l y  o b j e c t e d  t o  t h e  i d e a  o f  
p r e s e r v i n g  t h e  p r e a m b l e ,  t h e  u n i t a r y  s t a t e  a n d  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m .  I n d e e d ,  M a n a n  
p r o p o s e d  a n  a r t i c l e  s t i p u l a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  p r e a m b l e  c o u l d  n o t  b e  a m e n d e d .
9 3 1  
Y e t  n o  f a c t i o n s  p r e s e n t e d  c o n v i n c i n g  r e a s o n s  a s  t o  w h y  t h e  p r e a m b l e ,  t h e  u n i t a r y  s t a t e  a n d  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  a m e n d e d .  P D I P ,  w h i c h  w a s  i n  f a v o r  o f t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n ,  w a s  
v a g u e  a b o u t  i t s  r e a s o n s .  W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  p r e a m b l e ,  t h e  P D I P  r e p e a t e d  t h e  a r g u m e n t  i t  h a d  
p u t  i n  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  t h a t  t h e  p r e a m b l e  c o n t a i n e d  t h e  s t a t e  p h i l o s o p h y ,  t h e  
P a n c a s i l a .
9 3 2  
T h i s  a r g u m e n t  r e a f f i r m e d  t h e  nationalist~secular f a c t i o n  p o s i t i o n ,  o f  r e j e c t i n g  a n  
I s l a m i c  s t a t e .  T h e  P D I P ' s  b a s i c  a r g u m e n t , ·  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  u n i t a r y  s t a t e ,  w a s  m e r e l y  b a s e d  o n  
t h e  t h i r d  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  P a n c a s i l a  o f  ' t h e  u n i t y  o f  I n d o n e s i a '  , 9 3 3  A s  f o r  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m ,  t h e  P D I P  p r e s e n t e d  n o  s u p p o r t i n g  a r g u m e n t  a t  a l l .  ( I n  f a c t ,  a s  E l l i s  h a s  
p o i n t e d  o u t ,  t h e r e  w a s  n o  e x p l a n a t i o n  a s  t o  w h a t  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m w a s ) . 9
3 4  
T h e r e  a r e  h i s t o r i c a l  r e a s o n s  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  m a k i n g  o f  c h a n g e s  o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  
, ,  , ,  i  •  \  '  •  •  
k e y  a s p e c t s  o f t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  B e h i n d  t h e  p o l i c y  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e  p r e a m b l e  w a s  t h e  
'  .  
u n r e s o l v e d  d e b a t e  i n  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  i n  1 9 5 6 - 1 9 5 9 ,  o v e r  w h e t h e r  I n d o n e s i a  s h o u l d  b e  a  
P a n c a s i l a  o r  I s l a m i c  s t a t e .
9 3 5  
T h e  u n s t a b l e  p o l i t i c s  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s t e m  i n ,  
t h e  1 9 5 0 s  h a d  m a d e  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m  p r e f e r a b l e  a n d  h a d  m a d e  b o t h  t h e  c o n c e p t  ~f. a n d  
e v e n  t h e  ter~, ' p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s t e m '  u n a c c e p t a b l e . 9 3 6  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  m e m o r y  o f  t h e  f a i l e d  
9 2 9  T o b i n g  c h a i r e d  t h e  m e e t i n g s  w i t h  S l a m e t  E f f e n d y  Y u s u f  o f  G o l k a r  a n d  H a r u n  K a m i l  o f  F u n c t i o n a l  G r o u p s  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ·  
i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y .  U n l i k e  T o b i n g ,  n e i t h e r  Y u s u f  n o r  K a m i l  c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  h a d  a g r e e d  o n  t h e  t h r e e  i s s u e s .  ·  
9 3 0  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  4 t h ,  1 7 t h ,  1 9 t h ,  2 0 t h ,  2 2 " d ,  2 4 t h ,  2 5 t h  a n d  2 9 t h  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  7  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 9 - 9  M a r c h  2 0 0 0 .  
9 3 1  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  9 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  1 6  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 9 .  
9 3 2  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  3 ' d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  6  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 9 .  
9
3 3 1 b i d .  
9 3 4  A n d r e w  E l l i s ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m  a n d  t h e  2 0 0 4  E l e c t i o n ' ,  u n p u b l i s h e d  p a p e r ,  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 3 .  
9 3 5  N a s u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 4 ,  5 1 - 1 3 0 .  
9 3 6  E l l i s ,  a b o v e  n  9 3 4 .  
1 4 4  
federal system under the short-lived 1949 Constitution contributed to the consensus of 
unacceptability of a federal state.9J7 
This agreement - to maintain the preamble, the unitary state and the presidential system -
. strengthened the MPR's intention to amend the 1945 Constitution instead of drafting an entirely 
new Constitution.938 However the following section will demonstrate how the intention came to 
be undermined. 
b. Not a Totally New Constitution, but a Total Rewrite of the Old Constitution 
Despite the fact that in the 1999 General Session the MPR had agreed to merely amend the 
1945 Constitution, the movement for a new Constitution strengthened during the Second 
Amendment discussions. 
Public Position. Alrasid argued that rather than amending part of the Constitution, the MPR 
should establish a 'Constitutional Renewal Commission' which would totally amend the 1945 
Constitution.939 Alrasid agreed, however, that the preamble of the. Constitution • should be 
maintained.94o Similarly, Bambang Widjojanto, who was the chair of the YLBHI,94t called for a 
renewal arguing that: 
[i]f the method is an amendment ... that is fine, as long as the final result is a renewed 
Constitution ... [The process] could amend the Constitution step-by-step, based on the. 
possibility and the urgency, but overall these amendments must be very significant. 942 
. . 
The MPR's Position. Thee L. Sambuaga (Golkar) suggested that the constitutional reform 
approach should be comprehensive and not just an article-by-article amendmenf.943 Gregori us· 
Seto Haryanto (PDKB) pointed out that, although the people did not openly object to the· 
decision in favor of amendment, the "reality shows that people's submissions from·alllevelsof 
9371bid. 
938 King, above n 924. 
939 Harun Alrasid, 'Menuju UUD 2000', Tempo, 25-31 October 1999. 
940 Ibid. 
941 YLBHI is the abbreviation of Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia or Foundation of the Indonesian Legal Aid 
lnstitut, one of Indonesian most influential NGOs. 
942 Minutes of the 17th meeting of the PAH I, 21 February 2000. 
943 Minutes of the 8th meeting of the PAH I, 14 December 1999. 
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t h e  s o c i e t y  c o v e r e d  v e r y  m a n y  a r t i c l e s .  I t  i s  r e c o m m e n d e d  t h a t  a l m o s t  a l l  a r t i c l e s  b e  a l t e r e d  
a n d  t e n s  o f  n e w  a r t i c l e s  b e  a d d e d " . 9 4 4  
I n d e e d ,  a s  m e n t i o n e d  e a r l i e r ,  t h e  a m e n d m e n t d r a f t  p r e p a r e d  b y  t h e  P A H  I  w a s  e x t r e m e l y  
c o m p r e h e n s i v e .
9 4 5  
T h e  p r o p o s a l s  c o n t a i n e d  2 1  C h a p t e r s  w h i c h  r e v i s e d  e a c h  o f  t h e  1 6  c h a p t e r s  
o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l 1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  a d d e d  5  n e w  c h a p t e r s . 9
4
6  S u c h  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  p r o p o s a l s .  
w e r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  A m e r i c a n  a m e n d m e n t  m e t h o d ,  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  p r e v i o u s l y  a g r e e d  
o n  i n  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s .  A r i e f  B i k i  ( F U G )  c o m m e n t e d  t h a t :  
. . .  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  e a c h  a m e n d m e n t  o n l y  r e l a t e d  t o  o n e  i s s u e  . . . .  W e  a r e  d r a f t i n g  a n  
a m e n d m e n t  w h i c h  w i l l  r e v i s e  6 0 %  o f  o u r  C o n s t i t u t i o n  . . .  m y  q u e s t i o n  i s  w h a t  i s  t h e  r e a s o n  
b e h i n d  t h i s  6 0 %  a m e n d m e n t ? 9 4 7  ·  
T h e s e  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  p r o p o s a l s  a l s o  w o r r i e d  s o m e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  g r o u p s .  B u d i  H a r s o n o  o f  t h e  
T N I  a n d  P o l r i  f a c t i o n  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
. . .  t h e r e .  i s  a n  int~ntion t o  t o t a l l y  r e v i s e  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  m o r e  
t h a n  7 0  A r t i c l e s  p r e p a r e d .  T h i s  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  r e v i s i o n  n e e d s  t o  b e  w a t c h e d  a n d  
c o n s i d e r e d  c a r e f u l l y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  b e c a u s e  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  h a s  e m e r g e d  i n  t h e  m i d s t  o f  a  
s o c i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  a n d  c r i s e s . 9 4 B  
T h e r e  w e r e  s o m e  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t ,  d u r i n g  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  
w h e t h e r .  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  r e n e w e d  o r  a m e n d e d  w a s  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  l e f t  
u n a n s w e r e d .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  w h e n  r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  p r o g r e s s  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  A m i e n  R a i s ,  
'  .  .  
t h e  S p e a k e r  o f  t h e  M P R  a n d  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y ,  c o n c l u d e d ,  f r o m  t h e  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  
a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s  p r e p a r e d  b y  t h e  C o m m i t t e e ,  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a  s t r o n g  w i l l  t o  t o t a l l y  r e n e w  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
9 4
g l n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s ,  T o b i n g  ( P D I P )  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  n o  f i r m  i n t e n t i o n  t o  
t o t a l l y  c h a n g e  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  h e  f u r t h e r  a d d e d  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t .  w o u l d  b e  a n  
o n g o i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  . o n l y  t i m e  w o u l d  t e l l  w h a t  t h e  f i n a l  r e s u l t  w o u l d  b e . 9
5 0  
S i m i l a r l y ,  w h e n  
S u b e k t i  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  f i r m l y  d e c i d e  e i t h e r  t o  m a k e  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  
o n l y  a m e n d  p a r t  o f  t h e  d o c u m e n t ,  T o b i n g ' s  d i r e c t  r e s p o n s e  w a s  n o n - c o m m i t t a l .  H e  s i m p l y  
9 4 4  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  2 n d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  1 1  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 4 5  E l l i s ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 2 ,  1 2 8 .  
9 4 6  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  3 0 ,  3 .  S e e  T a b l e  1 0 .  
9
4 7  
M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 t h  ( c o n t i n u e d )  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  1 3  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 4 8  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 t h  ( c o n t i n u e d )  t h e  P l e n a r y  M e e t i n g ,  1 0  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9
4
9  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y ,  6  M a r c h  2 0 0 0 .  
1 4 6  
mentioned that the Committee would stick with its plan - but without clarifying what the plan 
was.9s1 
Tobing's attitude was closely related to the concern of PDIP to avoid an Islamic state on the 
one hand, and to respond to the strong pressure from the society to totally amend the 1945 
Constitution, on the other hand. He stated that:. 
[a] total change of the Constitution cannot be avoided, but it should reflect the preamble in 
its articles. The MPR should, however, preserve matters that were approved by the 
founders, including matters in relation to religion and the state.952 · 
c. Conservative Versus Progressive Groups 
The concern of the Islamic state contributed to the postponement of ratification of several 
. . 
Second Amendment drafts. Yusuf (Golkar faction) complained that conservative forces 
obstructed the MPR from ratifying the comprehensive amendment draft which had been agreed 
earlier by the PAH 1.953 At the 8th plenary meeting of the Annual Session, Simon Patrice 
(Golkar) argued that: 
[t]he Golkar party declares our deepest regret that ... the amendment of the 1945 
Constitution is not optimal ... Unfortunately, the ratification of some articles, which are 
important to democratization, ... must be delayed.954 
Likewise, M. S. Kaban (PBB) argued that: 
... unfortunately, at this first annual session, the amendment of the 1945 Constitution has 
not yet fully 'been achieved. Articles and paragraphs which should be amended are 
untouchable. There is an impression that the amendment process is intentionally created 
to be more difficult.9ss 
Neither the Golkar nor the PBB factions expressly mentioned who the 'conservative factions' 
were. Both King and the NDI, however, claim that the nationalist factions- the PDIP and TN I-
950
'Diusulkan Pencabutan Tap MPR Pertanggungjawaban Soeharto', Kompas, 7 March 2000. 
951 1bid. 
952 
'Diakui ada Politicking dalam Pembahasan Amandemen UUD 1945', Kompas, 24 June 2000. 
953 1bid. 
954 Minutes of the 8th (continued) Plenary Meeting, 15 August 2000. 
955 Minutes of the 8th Plenary Meeting, 15 August 2000. 
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P o l r i  - l e d  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  c a m p .
9 5
6  T h e s e  t w o  f a c t i o n s ,  t o g e t h e r ,  h e l d  2 2 3  o f  t h e  6 9 5  s e a t s  i n  
t h e  M P R .  
9 5 7  
T h i s  n u m b e r  w a s  j u s t  s h o r t  o f  9  v o t e s  n e e d e d  t o  b l o c k  a l l  o f  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s ,  
b e c a u s e  p u r s u a n t  t o  A r t i c l e  3 7  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t w o - t h i r d s  o f  t h e  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M P R  w e r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  ·  r a t i f y  a n  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l ,  a s  m e n t i o n e d .  
U n s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  · p o i P  a n d  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  f a c t i o n s ,  t o  
c o n d u c t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e b a t e  " i n  a  s l o w  a n d  c a u t i o u s  m a n n e r ' ' ,  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  d e l a y  o f  
t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  m a k i n g  p r o c e s s . 9 5 a  
T h e  P D I P ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  f a c t i o n s ,  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  s h o u l d  f o c u s  o n  t h e  
a g r e e d  d r a f t  a n d  s h o u l d  n o t  c o n c e n t r a t e  o n  t h e  a r t i c l e s  w h i c h  s t i l l  c o n t a i n e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s .
9 5 9  
T h e  
P D I P  r e p e a t e d  i t s  o l d  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m  d u r i n g  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  w a s  m o r e  b e c a u s e  
o f  t h e  r u l e r  t h a n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  t o t a l l y  a m e n d  t h e  1 9 4 5  
.  ~. ~ 
C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  a n  u n w i s e  o n e .
9 6 0  
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  f a c t i o n  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
d r a f t  c o u l d  c h a n g e  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  d r a f t  s h o u l d  b e  




H a r i  S a b a r n o  ( T N I - P o l r i )  a r g u e d  t h a t ,  " I  t h i n k  w e  s h o u l d  n o t  r u s h  t o  
a m e n d  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  b e c a u s e  w e  n e e d  t o  l o o k  m o r e  c l o s e l y  a t  t h e  d r a f t .  
A f t e r  a l l  w e  h o l d  t h i s  s e s s i o n  e v e r y  y e a r ' ' .
9 6 2  
T h i s  m i l i t a r y  f a c t i o n  f u r t h e r  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
. . .  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  t o  t o t a l l y  r e v i s e  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  c a r e f u l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  b y  
t h i s  c o m m i s s i o n  . .  .  W e  d o  n o t  w a n t  t o  c r e a t e  a  n e w  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  t h e  p e o p l e  w h o  
s u p p o r t  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  a n d  t h o s e  w h o  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  s u c h  a  d r a s t i c  a m e n d m e n t . 9 6 3  
Z o e l v a  ( P B B )  r e s p o n d e d  t h a t  t h e  a n x i e t y  o f  t h e  P D I P  a n d  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  f a c t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
d r a f t  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  w a s  u n n e c e s s a r y .
9 6 4  
S i m i l a r l y ,  M a t t a l a t a  ( G o l k a r )  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
[ w ] e  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  d r a f t  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  c a r e f u l l y  d i s c u s s e d  . . .  T h e  c a r e f u l  
d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  w e  s h o u l d  s l o w  i n  a n t i c i p a t i n g  t h e  p r o g r e s s i v e  
d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e  c a r e f u l  d i s c u s s i o n  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  w e  s h o u l d  b e  l a t e  i n  s o l v i n g  o u r  
p r o b l e m s .  9 6 5  
9 5 6  K i n g ,  a b o v e  n  9 2 4 .  
9 5 7
1 b i d .  
9 5 8  
K i n g ,  a b o v e  n  9 2 4 .  
9 5 9  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  2 n d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  1 1  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 6 0  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 1 1 1  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  1 3  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 6 1  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 t h  ( c o n t i n u e d )  P l e n a r y  M e e t i n g ,  1 0  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 6 2  M i l i t a r y  f a c t i o n  s e e k  D e l a y  o f  A m e n d m e n t ,  a b o v e  n  9 1 6 .  
9 6 3  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  2 n d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  1 1  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 6 4  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 t h  ( c o n t i n u e d )  o f  t h e  p l e n a r y  m e e t i n g ,  1 0  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 6 5  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 1 1 1  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  1 3  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
1 4 8  
In the 2000 MPR Annual Session, the conservative factions successfully used the absence of 
effective procedure to discuss the amendment proposal.966 An effort to solve this problem 
through line by line drafting in the meetings of the Commission A (with over 200 members) 
. failed -- unsurprisingly.967 As the Commission A had only four days to debate the 
comprehensive 21 chapters prepared by the PAH I, the strong effort of the progressive groups 
· to accelerate the process, and finish the whole amendment in the 2000 MPR Annual Session, 
soon became a 'mission impossible'. 
d. Short-Term Political Interests 
Lindsey describes political interests (kepentingan politik) in the MPR during the constitution-
making process as "political power games [which] dominate policy and law-making, displacing 
genuine concern for the nation's welfare".96B In drafting a Constitution, political interests are 
unavoidable.969 Especially if the constitution-making body is a Parliament, which consists of 
representation of political parties, bargaining is a conditio sine qua non. Every party obviously 
has its own political agenda. As elaborated in Chapter Two, Elster argues that constitution: 
making body which also serves as a Parliament will have its political parties' interest which will 
affect the constitution-making outcome.97o However, what happened during the Second 
Amendment discussions was not solely a party fighting for its long-term political interests. 
Some of the discussions were contaminated by political intrigues which influenced the quality of 
amendment proposals. Kamil (FUG) warned that: 
[w]e must discuss this amendment without taking into account short-term political interests 
... These interests would contaminate our amendment proposals. We, therefore, would 
not be able to produce the best amendment proposal. Many letters addressed to the PAH 
I question our ability to amend the Constitution. Let us answer these hesitations with 
evidence that we can prepare the amendment solely for the sake of our nation.971, 
Politicization Article 8. Despite this warning, short-term interests remained. One of the most 
significant was the proposal to amend Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution which originally 
966 National Democratic Institute, above n 30, 4. 
967 1bid 4- 5. 
968 Lindsey, above n 99, 273. 
9691bid 276. 
970 Elster, above n 69, 380. 
971 Minutes of the 31st meeting of the PAH I, 15 May 2000. 
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s t i p u l a t e d  ' S h o u l d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  d i e ,  r e s i g n  o r  b e  u n a b l e  t o  p e r f o r m  h i s  d u t i e s  d u r i n g  h i s  t e r m  o f  
o f f i c e ,  h e  s h a l l  b e  s u c c e e d e d  b y  t h e  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  u n t i l  t h e  e x p i r y  o f  h i s  t e r m  o f  o f f i c e ' .  G o l k a r  
a n d  P A N  p r o p o s e d  a n  a m e n d m e n t  t o  t h i s  a r t i c l e  a n d  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  c o u l d  n o t  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  r e p l a c e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i f  t h e  l a t t e r  w a s  i n c a p a c i t a t e d . 9 7 2  A k b a r  ( R e f o r m a s 1 )  a r g u e d  
t h a t :  
[ i ] f  t h e  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  r e p l a c e s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  w h e n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  b e c o m e s  
i n c a p a c i t a t e d ,  i t  m a y  r a i s e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  l e g i t i m a c y  . . . .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  V i c e  
P r e s i d e n t  m a y  n o t  b e  c a p a b l e  t o  b e  P r e s i d e n t ,  b e c a u s e  h e  o r  s h e  h a d  b e e n  c h o s e n  a s  
V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  n o t  a s  P r e s i d e n t  . . .  9 7 3  
T h e  P D I P  c o m p l a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s a l  w a s  m o t i v a t e d  b y  s h o r t - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  o r d e r  
t o .  p r e v e n t  M e g a w a t i  f r o m  r e p l a c i n g  W a h i d  i f  h e  b e c a m e  p e r m a n e n t l y  i n c a p a c i t a t e d . 9 7 4  
R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  p r o p o s a l ,  T o b i n g  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  h a d  b e e n  p o l i t i c i z e d .
9 7
5  
T r i  A g u n g  K r i s t a n t o  o f  K o m p a s  a r g u e d  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  t h e  i s s u e  m a y  b e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  m a n y  
d i f f e r e n t  w a y s ,  o r d i n a r y .  p e o p l e  e a s i l y  u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t  s o m e  M P R  m e m b e r s  d i d  n o t  w a n t  
M e g a w a t i  t o  b e c o m e  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e . 9
7
6  
M a n a n  o p p o s e d  t h e  p r o p o s a l  a n d  a r g u e d  t h a t  . " I t ' s  n o t  f a i r  i f  a n  a m e n d m e n t  t o  t h e  a r t i c l e  i s  
d e m a n d e d  b e c a u s e  c e r t a i n  p o l i t i c i a n s  d o  n o t  l i k e  M e g a w a t i " . 9
7 7
l n  l i n e  w i t h  M a n a n ' s  v i e w ,  Y u s r i l  
l h z a  M a h e n d r a  a r g u e d  t h a t ,  i n  a l l  r e p u b l i c  s t a t e s ,  w h e n e v e r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  i n c a p a c i t a t e d ,  t h e  
V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  r e p l a c e s  h i m  o r  h e r . 9
7 8  
I t  w a s  o n l y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e s e  o b j e c t i o n s  
.  '  .  '  .  
t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t o  a m e n d  A r t i c l e  8  w a s  f i n a l l y  w i t h d r a w n  f r o m  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d r a f t  o f  t h e  
P A H  1 . 9 7 9  
S e a t s r e s e r v e d  f o r  t h e  m i l i t a r y .  A n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  o f  s h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t s  c o n c e r n e d  t h e  
r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  s e a t s  f o r  t h e  m i l i t a r y  i n  t h e  M P R .  T h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l  o f  A r t i c l e  I I  o f  t h e  
T r a n s i t i o n a l  P r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t :  
9 7 2  
' M e n a n g k a l  M e g a ,  M e n y i a s a t i  U U D ' ,  T E M P O ,  N o .  0 1 / X X I X / 6 ,  M a r c h  1 2 ,  2 0 0 0 .  S e e  a l s o  A d e  A l a w i ,  ' M e n g e m p i s k a n  B a n  
S e r e p ' ,  M e d i a  I n d o n e s i a ,  2 6  M a r c h  2 0 0 0 .  ·  
9 7 3  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  6 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  1 0  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 9 .  
9 7 4  ' J a c o b  T o b i n g :  A d a  A g e n d a  T e r s e m b u n y i ' ,  M e d i a  I n d o n e s i a ,  2 6  M a r c h  2 0 0 0 .  
9 7
5  D i a k u i  a d a  P o l i t i c k i n g  d a l a m  P e m b a h a s a n  A m a n d e m e n  U U D  1 9 4 5 ,  a b o v e  n  9 5 2 .  
9 7 6  
T r i  A g u n g  K r i s t a n t o ,  ' A m a n d e m e n  d a l a m  S u a t u  K e p e n t i n g a n  P o l i t i k ' ,  K o m p a s ,  8  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 7 7  
' S c h o l a r  O p p o s e s  P r e s i d e n t i a l  R u l i n g  A m e n d m e n t ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  M a r c h  8 ,  2 0 0 0 .  S e e  a l s o  ' S r i  S o e m a n t r i :  A m a n d e m e n  
K o n s t i t u s i  b e r n u a n s a  P o l i t i s ' ,  S u a r a  P e m b a r u a n ,  1 6  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 7 8  K r i s t a n t o ,  a b o v e  n  9 7 6 .  
9
7 9
1 b i d .  
1 5 0  
The additional members of the MPR ... are the representatives of the Indonesian National 
Army.98o 
The coalition of non-governmental organizations condemned the above proposal and warned 
. that it would prolong the application of the dwifungsi doctrine.981 Mukhtie Fajar argued that by 
providing the reserved article in the Constitution, the proposal strengthened the legal authority 
for the dwifungsi, which had previously merely been based on regulations subordinate to the 
Constitution. 982 The proposal,. therefore, betrayed critical part of the reform agenda: ending the 
role of the military in politics.983 In the end, this proposal was one of the drafts which was 
adjourned and further discussed in the Third and Fourth Amendment discussions. 
Closing. This section on the conduct of the Second Amendment debates demonstrates that 
the MPR failed to carry out a democratic constitution-making process. The fact that the process 
was slow, and the contamination of short-term political interests were the two factors which 
decrease the legitimacy of the MPR as the constitution-making body, as the next section 
shows. 
3. Who the Constitution-Making Body was to be 
Challenges to the role of the MPR as a constitution-making body increased during the Second 
Amendment discussions. Disappointment with the way the MPR prepared the amendment draft 
and the outcome of the Second Amendment contributed to the force of the challenges. 
a. The MPR's Position 
In the 5Qih meeting of the PAH I, Ali Masykur Musa (PKB) suggested that the PAH I should be 
open to any suggestion from the public, including the idea to form a National Constitutional 
Drafting Committee.984 His suggestion was not welcomed by the other Committee members. 
Soedijarto (FUG) argued that because the legal authority of the MPR as constitution-making 
body was fixed in the 1945 Constitution, any suggestion to create another constitution-making 
980 Anonymous, UUD 1945 setelah Amandemen Kedua tahun 2000 (2000) 59. 
981 'Amandemen UUD '45' Set Back', Media Indonesia, 4 August 2000. 
982 'Materi Amandemen UUD 1945 Mencerminkan Kemunduran', Kompas, 27 July 2000. 
983
'Amandemen UUD 1945 tidak Konsisten dengan Tuntutan Reformasi', Suara Pembaruan, 27 July"2000. 
151 
b o d y  w a s  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . 9 8 5  K a m i l  s h a r e d  S o e d i j a r t o ' s  v i e w . 9 8 6  K a m i l  w a r n e d  t h a t  t h i s  i d e a  w a s  
v e r y '  d a n g e r o u s ,  b e c a u s e  i t  l o o k e d  l i k e  a  r e s p o n s e  t o  p o p u l a r  o p i n i o n  b u t  w a s  a c t u a l l y  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
9 8 7  
K a m i l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  M P R  s h o u l d  u n i f o r m l y  
r e j e c t  t h e  i d e a  a n d  r e t a i n  t h e  M P f 3 .  a s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y . 9 8 8  T h i s  M P R ' s  r e j e c t i o n  
w a s  s o m e w h a t  i r o n i c .  ,  I f  t h e  M P R  h a d  b e e n  p r e p a r e d  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  i d e a  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
d r a f t i n g  c o m m i t t e e ,  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e d u r e  ~;~~ould h a v e  b e e n  a b l e  t o  b e  c h a n g e d .  
P D I P ' s  P r o p o s a l .  D u r i n g .  t h e  2 0 0 0  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  s o l i d i t y  o f  t h e .  M P R  f a c t i o n s  
s t a r t e d  t o  b r e a k  d o w n .  A t  t h e  2 n d  p l e n a r y  m e e t i n g ,  t h e  P D I P  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  
s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a n  e x p e r t  c o m m i s s i o n ,  w h i c h  w o u l d  c o n d u c t  a n  a c a d e m i c  r e v i e w  
o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s . 9 8 9  S i m i l a r l y ,  a t  t h e  2 n d  m e e t i n g  o f  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  t h e  K K I  
r e c o m m e n d e d  t h a t  t h e  2 0 0 0  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n  s h o u l d  e s t a b l i s h  a n  e x p e r t  c o m m i s s i o n  w h i c h  
w o u l d  a r r a n g e  w i d e  r a n g i n g  p u b l i c  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  a m e n d i n g  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
9 9 0  
H a r y a n t o  
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  M P R  f o r m  a  s t a t e  c o m m i s s i o n  w h i c h  s h o u l d  c o m p r i s e  e x p e r t s  a n d  n o n -
p a r t i s a n  p u b l i c  f i g u r e s . 9 9 t  
. . .  i t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  t h e  r e s p e c t e d  M P R  t o  s e r v e  t h e  p e o p l e  a n d  i t  s h o u l d  n o t  s t u b b o r n l y  
t o  k e e p  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  w h i c h ,  i s  m e r e l y  l e g a l i s t i c - f o r m a l i s t i c .  I n  t h e  e n d ,  t h e  
s o v e r e i g n t y  i s  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e .  9 9 2  ·  ·  
P e r m a d i  ( P D I P ) ,  h o w e v e r ,  l i m i t e d  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  p r o p o s e d  e x p e r t  c o m m i s s i o n  a s  a  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y .
9 9 3  
H e  suggeste~, r a t h e r  t h a n  b e i n g  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  b o d y ,  t h e  e x p e r t  
c o m m i s s i o n  s h o u l d  o n l y  d i s c u s s  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s  p r e p a r e d  b y  t h e  P A H  I ,  a n d  s u b m i t  
i t s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  t h e  M P R ,  w h i c h  w o u l d  r e t a i n  t h e  s o l e  p o w e r  t o  r a t i f y  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
p r o p o s a l .  9 9 4  
9 8 4  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 0 1 1 1  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  3  J u l y  2 0 0 0 .  
9 8 5
1 b i d .  
9 8 6
1 b i d .  
9 8 7
1 b i d .  
9 8 8
1 b i d .  '  
9 8 9  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 t h  P l e n a r y  M e e t i n g ,  1 0  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 9 0  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  2 n d  m e e t i n g  o f  C o m m i s s i o n  A .  1 1  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 9 1
1 b i d .  
9 9 2  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  8 1 1 1  P l e n a r y  M e e t i n g ,  1 5  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 9 3  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  8
1 1 1  
( c o n t i n u e d )  P l e n a r y  M e e t i n g ,  1 5  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
9 9 4
1 b i d ,  
1 5 2  
A Real Proposal? Despite the stronger arguments to establish an expert commission, the.fact 
that the PDIP, the KKI and the PDKB suggested the commission during the 2000 Annual 
Session -and not prior to the Session -indicated that the proposal was politically motivated. 
These three factions were concerned with the stronger pressures to totally amend the 1945 
Constitution.99s As three parties opposing to the Jakarta Charter, they were concerned with the 
increased discussions of the possibility of amending Article 29 of the Constitution.996 For the 
three parties, therefore, the proposal to form an expert commission was more as an alternative 
plan if amendment by the MPR failed to satisfy their political agenda. For the PDIP, in 
particular, the proposal was a strategy to slow down the amendment process. 
At the end of the 2000 Annual Session, the idea to establish an expert commission simply 
disappeared. The MPR unanimously passed MPR Decree No. IX of 2000 which prolonged the 
authority of the MPR's Working Body to prepare the amendment. Article 1 of the decree 
authorized: 
... the Working Body of the MPR of the Republic of Indonesia to prepare a draft of 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic lndonesia.997 
b. Public Position 
Despite acknowledging that the MPR had the constitutional authority to be a constitution-
making body, some experts and non-governmental groups argued that an expert commission 
should be. created. Ma'arif argued that. the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution must be 
delivered to experts who would really understand legal problems pertaining to the form of 
government and various other related matters.99B The National Discussion Forum argued that it 
was too risky to give full authority to the MPR to amend the Constitution.999 The forum urged 
that a National Constitutional Drafting Committee, which consisted of experts and public 
figures, should be formed.1000 The forum further argued that the Amendments to date, ratified 
995 Minutes of the 2nd meeting of Commission A, 11 August 2000. 
9961bid. ' 
997 Article 1 of MPR Decree No. IX of 2000 on the Authorization of the Working Body of the MPR to prepare the Amendment 
Draft of the 1945 Constitution. 
998 'MPR tidak Serius', Kompas, 7 August 2000. 
999 'Forum Rembuk Nasional', Kompas, 2 July 2000. 
10oo Ibid. 
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b y  t h e . 2 0 0 0  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  s h o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  d e c l a r e d  a s  a  t e m p o r a r y  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  t o o t  
T h e n ,  w i t h i n  a  .  s p e c i f i c  t i m e  a l l o c a t e d ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m i t t e e  w o u l d .  p r e p a r e  a  n e w  
a m e n d m e n t  d r a f t ,  c o n d u c t  a  w i d e - r a n g i n g  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a n d  p r o d u c e  a  ' p e r m a n e n t  
C o n s t i t u t i o n '  . 1 0 0 2  T h i s  p r o p o s a l  w a s  i n s p i r e d  b y  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  e x p e r i e n c e  w h i c h  a p p l i e d  a n  
I n t e r i m  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t o  s t a r t  i t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m .  
T h e  s h o r t - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  : c o n t a m i n a t i n g  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  w e r e  
a m o n g  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  p r e s s u r e s  f o r  a n  e x p e r t  c o m m i s s i o n  t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  M P R .  
T h e  E d i t o r i a l  o f  t h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
. . .  t h e  p i e c e m e a l  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  a m e n d m e n t ,  a n d  t h e  s t r o n g  v e s t e d  i n t e r e s t  t h a t  
a c c o m p a n i e d  t h e  d r a f t i n g  a n d  t h e  d e b a t e ,  c a l l  f o r  a  c o m p l e t e  r e v i e w  o n  h o w  t h e  n a t i o n  
s h o u l d  a p p r o a c h  t h e  i s s u e .  F o r  a  d o c u m e n t  t h a t  a f f e c t s  t h e  l i v e  o f  m o r e  t h a n ·  2 1 0  m i l l i o n  
p e o p l e ,  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t  i s  t o o  p r e c i o u s  t o  b e  l e f t  e n t i r e l y  i n  t h e  
h a n d s  o f  p e o p l e  w h o s e  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  d i c t a t e d  b y  t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f  t o d a y  . . .  t h e  M P R  w o u l d  d o  
a  g r e a t  s e r v i c e  t o  t h e  n a t i o n  i f  i t  a p p o i n t s  a  n e w  c o m m i t t e e  o f  e x p e r t s  t h a t  w i l l  l o o k  a t  t h e  
e n t i r e  i s s u e  . . .  
1
0 ° 3  
M u l y o s u d a r m o  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  i n f i l t r a t i o n  o f  s h o r t - t e r m  .  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  w a s  · p o s s i b l e  
b e c a u s e  t h e r e  w a s  n o  c l e a r  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t . 1 o o
4  
T h e  b a c k g r o u n d s  o f  t h e  M P R  
m e m b e r s  - t h e y  w e r e  p o l i t i c i a n s  a n d  n o t  a s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  e x p e r t s  - w a s  a  f a c t o r  w h i c h  r e s u l t e d  
i n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d r a f t  h a v i n g  b e e n  a p p r o a c h e d  f r o m  a  p o l i t i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  w i t h  a  l a c k  o f  
t h e o r e t i c a l  f o u n d a t i o n s . 1 o o s  
C l o s i n g .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  o n  ' w h o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  w a s '  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  t h e  s t r o n g  
u p s t r e a m  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  M P R  w a s  d e c r e a s i n g  b e c a u s e  t h e  w a y  i t  c a r r i e d  o u t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
p r o c e s s  w a s  d i s s a t i s f i e d  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  e x p e c t a t i o n .  O n e  o f  t h e  s h o r t c o m i n g s  o f  t h e  M P R ' s  w o r k  
w a s  t h e  w a y  i t  a r r a n g e d  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  a s  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  s h o w s .  ·  
1 0 0 1 1 b i d .  
1 0 0 2 1 b i d .  
1 0 0 3  ' E d i t o r i a l :  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C r i s i s ? ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  9  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
1 0 0 4  
K r i s t a n t o ,  a b o v e  n  9 7 6 .  
1 0 0 5 1 b i d .  
1 5 4  
4. How the Public Participation was organized 
The Second Amendment discussions involved more people than those of the First Amendment. 
One of the factors.which enabled this wider participation was the longer time allocated for the 
Second Amendment discussions. In addition, the PAH I realized that the public involvement 
was essential to increase the legitimacy of the amendment. Sambuaga (Golkar) argued that: 
... we should maximize the public hearings ... Our provincial consultation meetings should 
also be optimized to hear what the people's will is ... We should not restrict the meetings 
with any procedural or technical matters ... Only after the public meetings can the drafting 
process begin. 1006 
Similarly, Abdul Khaliq Ahmad (PKB) argued that: 
· ... the amendment of the 1945 Constitution ... must absorb as much as possible of the 
aspirations of the people. This inclusive absorption is necessary because the 1945 
Constitution, as the Constitution of the nation, is the reflection of the will and the struggle 
of the people of Indonesia. 1oo7 
Based on these arguments, from December until May 2000, the PAH I conducted expert 
meetings, provincial consultation meetings, international study missions and seminars.1ooa 
Table 9 Public Participation during the Second Amendment 
Source: Extracted from the progress report of the PAH I at the 6th meeting of the Working 
Body, 23 May 2000; and the final report of the PAH I at the 7 meeting of the body, 2 
August 2000. 
1006 Minutes of the 8th meeting of the PAH I, 14 December 1999. 
10°7 Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Commission A, 11 August 2000. 
1008 National Democratic Institute, above n 30, 2. 
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P u b l i c  C r i t i c i s m .  D e s p i t e  t h i s  w i d e r  p u b l i c  i n v o l v e m e n t ,  t h e  i n c l u s i v i t y  o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
r e m a i n e d  q u e s t i o n a b l e .  W i d j o j a n t o  c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a s  e x c l u s i v e  a n d  m o n o p o l i z e d  b y  
.  .  
t h e  M P R .
1 0 0 9  
H e  q u e s t i o n e d  t h e  b i a s  t o w a r d  t h e  c i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o r g a n i z e d  b y  t h e  P A H  I ,  a n d  
.  '  
c o n t r a s t e d  t h i s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  m o r e  i n c l u s i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  m a n a g e d  b y  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
.  .  
D r a f t i n g  A s s e m b l y  o f  T h a i l a n d ,  w h i c h  h a d  r e a c h e d  m a n y  p e o p l e  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s . 1 o
1
o  
I  s h a r e  W i d j o j a n t o ' s  o p i n i o n .  T a b l e  9  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n s  a r r a n g e d  b y  
t h e  P A H  I  w e r e  a c t u a l l y  n o t  a  ' r e a l '  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  p r o g r a m s .  T h e r e  w e r e  n o  e f f e c t i v e  
p r o g r a m s  w h i c h  d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e  t h e  o r d i n a r y  p e o p l e .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  p r o g r a m s  w e r e  v e r y  e x c l u s i v e  
f o r  l i m i t e d  p e o p l e  o r  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  T h e  h e a r i n g s  w i t h  t h e  s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  u n i v e r s i t i e s ,  n o n -
g o v e r n m e n t a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  r e l i g i o u s  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  w e r e  o b v i o u s  e x a m p l e s  o f  
t h e s e  e l i t i s t  p r o g r a m s .  T h e  s a m e  o c c u r r e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  p r o v i n c i a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  a n d  
s e m i n a r s  w h i c h  n e i t h e r  i n v i t e d  n o r  w e r e  a t t e n d e d  b y  o r d i n a r y  p e o p l e .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c o m p a r a t i v e  s t u d i e s  p r o g r a m s  w e r e  n o t  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  p r o g r a m .  T h e s e  p r o g r a m s  g a v e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  P A H  I  - w h o  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  p r o g r a m  - b u t  g a v e  n o  
d i s c e r n a b l e  b e n e f i t  f o r  t h e  p e o p l e .  M o r e o v e r ,  a s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  b e l o w  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t u d y  
m i s s i o n  w a s  a c t u a l l y  a  b a d  p r o g r a m .  F r o m  T a b l e  9 ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  o n l y  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  s u b m i s s i o n s  
g a v e  o r d i n a r y  p e o p l e  a  c h a n c e  t o  b e  d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e  i n  t h e .  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h e  
s u b m i s s i o n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  w e r e  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  a n d  n o t  a n  a c t i v e  p r o g r a m  a r r a n g e d  b y  
t h e  P A H  I .  
F i r s t  S h o r t c o m i n g .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e r e  w e r e  t h r e e  o t h e r  s h o r t c o m i n g s  i n  t h e  m e t h o d  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
c o o r d i n a t e d  b y  t h e  P A H  I .  F i r s t ,  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w a s  n o t  p r o p e r l y  s c h e d u l e d  i n  a d v a n c e .  T h e  
d e c i s i o n  t o  s e t  u p  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t u d y  m i s s i o n ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  w a s .  o n l y  m a d e  a f t e r  t h e  
C o m m i t t e e  l e a r n e d  t h a t  i t  s t i l l  h a d  m o n e y  l e f t  o v e r  f r o m  t h e  b u d g e t  o f  t h e  1 9 9 9  M P R  G e n e r a l  
S e s s i o n .  T h e  u r g e n c y  a n d  b o n a  f i d e s  o f  t h e  m i s s i o n  w a s  t h e r e f o r e  q u e s t i o n a b l e .  
T h e r e  a r e  s o m e  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  m i s s i o n  w a s  n o t  m e r e l y  t o  s t u d y  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m s  o f ·  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  v i s i t e d .  F r a n s  H .  M a t r u t t y  ( P D I P )  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  ·  
1 0 0 9  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  1 7 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  2 1  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 0 .  
1 0 1 0  I b i d .  
1 5 6  
mission was urgent because the balance of the budget "must be used". 1o11 Further, although it 
was not carried out in the end, there was a plan to include the wives of the Committee 
members in the mission.1o12 
. The decision to visit 21 countries was another questionable issue.1o13 The desire of all 44 
members of the Committee to participate was the main reason why so many countries were 
chosen. 1014 Subekti questioned the need to visit so many countries. She argued that if the 
mission was to be conducted, it should be limited to a few countries relevant to specific 
constitutional issues needing to be studied.1015 Mattalata urged the Committee to specify the 
issues that needed to be studied before choosing the countries to be visited.1016 In the end, 
however, the Committee decided to ignore the concerns of Subekti and Matta lata and visit all 
21 countries, without stating clear reasons for why they were chosen. 
Moreover, the need for the study mission is questionable, since no comprehensive report was 
ever presented. When asked by Hatta Mustafa (Golkar) whether the members of the 
Committee should report the result of the mission, Tobing replied that a report should be made 
but would not be discussed.1o1T 
Second Shortcoming. The second shortcoming of the public participation method was the 
very limited form of media campaign used by the PAH I to inform the public on the progress of 
the Second Amendment discussions. No television or radio programs, newsletters, telephone· 
hotlines or other means were set up to update the people on the amendment process, as had 
been the case in South Africa and Thailand. 101B Any news the public received about the 
amendment process was due more to media initiatives than to a well-planned strategy of public 
involvement managed by the Committee. 
1011 Minutes of the 12th meeting of the PAH I, 11 February 2000. 
10121bid. 
1013 Minutes of the 6th meeting of the Working Body, 23 May 2000. The members of the PAH I were divided into 9 groups. 
Each group visited 2 or three countries. The 21 countries were: Iran, Russia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, the 
People Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, the United States of America, Canada, Egypt, the United Kingdom, Greece, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, France, Denmark, Hungary and Sweden. 
1014 Minutes of the 12th meeting of the PAH I, 11 February 2000. 
1015 Minutes of the 13th meeting of the PAH I, 15 February 2000. 
10161bid. 
1017 Minutes of the 31•1 meeting of the PAH I, 15 May 2000. 
1018 Murray, above n 349, 107. 
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T h i r d  S h o r t c o m i n g .  T h i r d ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  i n a d e q u a t e  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  p r o g r a m ,  t h e r e  
w a s  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  b e t w e e n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  c o n d u c t e d  b y  t h e  P A H  I  a n d  t h e  
p e o p l e ' s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e m .  O n e  o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  w a s  t h a t  t h e  
C o m m i t t e e  f a i l e d  t o  a r r a n g e  a  s p e c i f i c  t i m e  p e r i o d  f o r  p u b l i c  f e e d b a c k  o n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
d r a f t . 1 0 1 9  O n l y  o n e  p e r i o d  o f  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w a s  o r g a n i z e d  b e f o r e  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d r a f t  w a s ·  
s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  2 0 0 0  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n .  T h i s  w a s  d i f f e r e n t  t o  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  w h i c h  
p u b l i s h e d  t w o  d i f f e r e n t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d r a f t s  f o r  p u b l i c  f e e d b a c k  b e f o r e  m a k i n g  t h e  f i n a l  d r a f t .
1 0 2
o  
T h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s  w e r e  p u b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  m e d i a ,  a t  t h e  l a s t  m i n u t e  p r i o r  t o  t h e  2 0 0 0  
M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  w h i c h  w a s  o b v i o u s l y  t o o  l a t e .
1 0 2 1  
T h e  p r o p o s a l  c o u l d  n o t  b e  a l t e r e d  a n y  
f u r t h e r .  T h e  r e s u l t i n g  a b s e n c e  o f  f e e d b a c k  f r o m  t h e  p u b l i c  w e a k e n e d  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s .  F o r  M a h f u d ,  t h e  P A H  I  w a s  n o t  s e r i o u s  a b o u t  a b s o r b i n g  t h e  i d e a s  f r o m  
t h e  c o n s u l t a t i o n  m e e t i n g s .
1 0 2 2  
T h i s  w a s  i n d i c a t e d  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o n l y  a  l i m i t e d  n u m b e r  o f  
p e o p l e  k n e w  a b o u t . t h e  m e e t i n g s ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  d i d  n o t  p u b l i s h  i t s  f i n a l  a m e n d m e n t  
d r a f t . 1 0 2 3  W i d j o j a n t o  c o m p l a i n e d  t h a t :  
I  h a v e  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  P A H  I  r e f u s e d  t o  m a k e  t h e  f i n a l  d r a f t  o f  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  [ a v a i l a b l e  f o r  p u b l i c  c o m m e n t ] .  T h i s  i s  n o t  r i g h t .  T h e  
p e o p l e  h a v e  t h e  r i g h t  t o  k n o w  a n d  t h e i r  f e e d b a c k  s h o u l d  b e  h e a r d . 1 o 2 4  
T h e  M P R ' s  E x c u s e .  I n  r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  a b o v e  c r i t i q u e s ,  S u b e k t i  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  o n e  f o r  t h e  
r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  s t r o n g  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  ~ommittee's p e r f o r m a n c e  w a s  t h e  m i n i m a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  
g i v e n  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .
1 0 2 5  
A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  c r i t i c s  w e r e  n o t  w e l l  i n f o r m e d  o f  w h a t  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  h a d  
'  .  . .  '  .  .  .  
d 0 n e . 1 o 2 6  S u b e k t i  s a i d :  
.  .  .  l a t e l y  t h e  m a s s  m e d i a  h a s  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  s o m e  g r o u p s  h a d  c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
p r o c e s s  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  t h e  P A H  I .  [ T h e s e  c r i t i c i s m s ]  a r e  d u e  t o  d i s c o n t i n u o u s  i n f o r m a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  i n  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  a n d  w h a t  w a s  h e a r d  o u t s i d e  t h i s  M P R  b u i l d i n g  
. . .  I  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  h o l d  a n  o f f i c i a l  p r e s s  c o n f e r e n c e  t o  i n f o r m  
t h e  p u b l i c  o f  w h a t  h a s  b e e n  d o n e  b y  t h e  C o m m i t t e e . 1 0 2 7  
1 0 1 9  K r i s t a n t o ,  a b o v e  n  9 7 6 .  
1 0 2 0  C o m m o n w e a l t h  H u m a n  R i g h t s  I n i t i a t i v e ,  a b o v e  n  2 4 7 ,  2 0 .  
1 0 2 1  K r i s t a n t o ,  a b o v e  n  9 7 6 .  
I  
1 0 2 2  ' P e m b a h a s a n  A m a n d e m e n  U U D  1 9 4 5  t i d a k  T r a n s p a r a n ' ,  K o m p a s ,  2 6  J u l y  2 0 0 0 .  
1 0 2 3 1 b i d .  
1 0 2 4  K r i s t a n t o ,  a b o v e  n  9 7 6 .  
1 0 2 5  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  3 1 •
1  
m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  1 5  M a y  2 0 0 0 .  
1 0 2 6 1 b i d .  
1 0 2 7  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 0 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  3  J u l y  2 0 0 0 .  
1 5 8  
Subekti, however, denied the allegations that the Committee's work lacked transparency and 
claimed that the nation-wide consultations and public hearings were more than enough to show 
the Committee's commitment to involve the people in amending the Constitution.102B Yusuf even 
replied that the protesting groups did not understand the nature of the Committee's job, and 
simply ignored the work the Committee had done.1o2g . 
Subekti and Yusufs excuses were inappropriate. They could not simply argue that it was the 
people's mistake if they did not know the amendment process developments because the 
discussions were open to the public.1o3o For a complex topic such as the Constitution, the 
Committee should have been more innovative in arranging comprehensive public participation. 
Moreover, as has been pointed out by Saunders, follow-up is cruciai.1031 If the Committee had 
arranged a strategic plan for public feedback, the information gap would have been minimized 
and the public involvement could have been more real. The NDI argues that: 
[t]he Constitution gives effect to the sovereignty of the people, and there is now no reason 
why the people cannot widely and directly be involved in the debate. The extent of the 
openness of the MPR to encouraging and promoting that process will help determine 
whether consensus develops on constitutional changes over the next one or two years.1°32 
There was a proposal from the PDIP that the MPR should wait for public feedback before 
finalizing the whole Second Amendment draftJ033 The stated intention of this proposal, 
however, was questionable for three reasons. First, PDIP limited the feedback· of the people 
only to issues which were not agreed to by the MPR. 1034 Second, the proposal was presented at 
the last stage of the Second Amendment discussions, during the 2000 MPR Annual Session. 
Third, it could be argued, therefore, that the proposal was related to PDIP strategy of delaying 
the making process of the Second Amendment. 
Closing. This section on public participation demonstrates that the MPR failed to arrange an 
inclusive and active public participation. Despite the longer period available, when compared to 
1028 'Has the MPR absorbed People's wishes?', The Jakarta Post, 12 August 2000. 
10291bid. 
1030 Ibid. 
1031 Above n 370. 
1032 National Democratic Institute, above n 30, 18. 
1033 Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Commission A, 11 August 2000. 
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t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  t h e  M P R  w a s  m e r e l y  a b l e  t o  c o n d u c t  e x c l u s i v e  a n d  l i m i t e d  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  p r o g r a m s .  T h i s  l i m i t e d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w i l l  a f f e c t  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  
A m e n d m e n t  i n  t h e  e y e s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c .  T h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  w i l l  o u t l i n e  t h e  o u t c o m e s  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  
A m e n d m e n t  i n  m o r e  d e t a i l .  
C .  T h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t :  t h e  O u t c o m e s  1 o 3 s  
I n  t h e  2 0 0 0  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A  p r i o r i t i z e d  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h e  2 1  
c h a p t e r s  p r e p a r e d  b y t h e  P A H  I  b a s e d  o n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  d i f f i c u l t y :  f r o m  p r o p o s a l s  w h i c h  w e r e  f u l l y  
a g r e e d  t o ,  t o  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  w h i c h  c o n s i s t e d  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  o r  m a j o r  d i f f e r e n c e s . 1 o 3 5  Y e t  t h e  
p r i o r i t i z a t i o n  " p r o v e d  o v e r l y  a m b i t i o u s "  .
1 0 3 7  
W i t h i n  t h e  f o u r  d a y s ,  o r  t w e n t y - o n e  e f f e c t i v e  h o u r s  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  o n l y  t w e l v e  c h a p t e r s  w e r e  d e b a t e d ,  a n d  o f  t h e s e  t w e l v e ,  o n l y  
s e v e n  c h a p t e r s  w e r e  f i n a l l y  r a t i f i e d .  
T a b l e  1 0  T h e  S t a t u s  o f  P r o p o s e d  C h a p t e r s  d u r i n g  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A  M e e t i n g s  
1 0 3 4 1 b i d .  
1
0 3 5  A l l  a r t i c l e s  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  e x c e p t  m e n t i o n e d  o t h e r w i s e ,  r e f e r  t o  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
1 0 3 6  M i n u t e s  o f  3 • d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  1 2  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
1 0 3 7  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  3 0 ,  3 .  ,  
1 0 3 8  D P D  i s  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  o f  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  D a e r a h  o r  R e g i o n a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  C o u n c i l .  
1 6 0  
The unratified chapters will be further discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, as some were, 
ultimately, ratified as part of the Third and Fourth Amendments of the 1945 Constitution. The 
following section will merely focus on the matters that formed part of the Second Amendment, 
particularly the chapters which are closely related to building a more democratic political 
system. In doing so, I adopt the classification of the NOI which divides the Second Amendment 
into four main themes: (1) the decentralization of power to the regions; (2) the Bill of Rights; (3) 
the Separation of Powers and checks and balances; and (4) civil-military relations. 1039 
1. The Regional Governments: No to Centralization 
Unde·r the New Order, Indonesia was a highly centralized political and economic system. This 
system contributed to the control of political powers and economic resources by the political 
elite in Jakarta, in particular, the Soeharto family. 1040 It was one of the pillars of. franchised 
corruption of the New Order, in which Soeharto was the 'head franchisor' .1041 Following the fall 
of Soeharto, therefore, the decentralization of power to the regions was one of the main 
demands of reform.1o42 
The transitional administration of President Habibie responded by passing Law No. 22 of 1999 
on Regional Governments It also passed Law No. 25 of 1999 on the Financial Balance 
between the Central and Regional Governments.1°43 These two laws introduced the policy of 
'wide-ranging regional autonomy', with special arrangements for Aceh, Papua and East Timor. 
For the latter the policy became irrelevant after its independence following the 30 August 1999 
referendum.1o44 
1039 National Democratic Institute, above n 30, 5. 
1040 Undsey, above n 99, 255. 
10411bid. 
10421bid. 
1043 National Democratic Institute, above n 30, 11. 
1044 1bid 11. 
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T h e  t w o  l a w s  f a i l e d  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  r e g i o n s  f o r  t w o  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  a s  a r g u e d  b y  L i n d s e y ,  t h e  l a w s  
w e r e  v a g u e  i n  d e f i n i n g  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a u t o n o m y . 1
0 4 5  
S e c o n d ,  f o r  s o m e  r e g i o n s  t h e  
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  g r a n t e d  o n  t h e  l a w s  w a s  i n s e c u r e :  i t  w a s  j u s t  a  ' g i f t '  f r o m  t h e  c e n t r a l  
g o v e r n m e n t  w h i c h  c o u l d  b e  r e v o k e d  a t  a n y  t i m e .
1 0 4 6  
I n  o r d e r  t o  m a k e  i t  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e v e r s e  
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  p r e s s u r e  t o  p r o v i d e  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g u a r a n t e e  f o r  t h e  
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  s t r e n g t h e n e d . 1 0 4 7  
T h e  D i s c u s s i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R .  A t  t h e  3 6 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H .  I ,  A l i  H a r d i  Ki~i D e m a k  ( P P P )  
a r g u e d  t h a t  b a d  e x p e r i e n c e s  u n d e r  S o e h a r t o  h a d  c r e a t e d  u n b a l a n c e d  e c o n o m i c  d i s t r i b u t i o n  




B  A t  t h e  3 r d  m e e t i n g  o f  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  w h e n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  o f  
, , _  ,  ' .  
A r t i c l e  1 8  o n  t h e  R e g i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t s  w a s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d i s c u s s e d ,  t h e  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  p o l i c y -
w a s  u n a n i m o u s l y  a g r e e d  t o . 1 0
4 9  
T h e  o r i g i n a l  A r t i c l e  1 8 ,  w h i c h  o n l y  c o n s i s t e d  o f  o n e  p a r a g r a p h ,  
w a s  a m e n d e d  t o  b e c o m e  A r t i c l e s  1 8 ,  1 8 A  a n d  1 8 8 ,  w i t h  1 1  p a r a g r a p h s  i n  t o t a l .  L i n d s e y  a r g u e s  
t h a t  t h e s e  A r t i c l e s  m i r r o r  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  t h e  L a w  N u m b e r  2 2  o n  R e g i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t .
1
o s o  
I !  
2 .  B i l l  o f  R i g h t s :  N o  t o  H u m a n  R i g h t s  V i o l a t i o n s  
T h o s e  i n  f a v o r  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s  a r g u e d  t h a t  m o r e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s  w a s  u r g e n t l y  
n e e d e d  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  s o r t  o f  v i o l a t i o n s  t h a t  h a d  h a p p e n e d  d u r i n g  S o e h a r t o ' s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
r u l e .
1
0 5 1  H a r i a n t o  a r g u e d  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  M P R  h a d  p r o m u l g a t e d  i t s  D e c r e e  N o .  X V I I  o f  1 9 9 8  
o n  h u m a n  r i g h t s  a n d  H a b i b i e ' s  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  i s s u e d  L a w  N o .  3 9  o f  1 9 9 9  a l s o  o n  h u m a n  
r i g h t s ,  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o t e c t i o n  w a s  s t i l l  n e e d e d . 1 o 5 2  




M u h a m m a d  A l i  ( P D I P )  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  l a w  a n d  M P R  d e c r e e  o n  
h u m a n  r i g h t s  w a s  m o r e  t h a n  e n o u g h .
1 0
5 4  I n  s u p p o r t i n g  A l i ,  S i t i  H a r t a r t i  M u r d a y a  o f  t h e  
1 0 4 5  L i n d s e y ,  a b o v e  n  9 9 ,  2 5 6 .  
1 0 4 6 i b i d .  
1 0 4 7 i b i d .  
1 0 4 8  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  3 6 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  2 9  M a y  2 0 0 0 .  
1 0 4 9  M i n u t e s  o f  3  ( c o n t i n u e d )  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  1 2  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  




M i n u t e s  o f  3  ( c o n t i n u e d )  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A .  1 2  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0  . .  
1 0 5 2 i b i d .  
1 0 5 3 i b i d .  
1 0 5 4
1 b i d .  
1 6 2  
Functional Group . Representatives argued that a comprehensive proposal on human rights 
might destroy the special character and the spirit of 1945, the year of Indonesia's 
independence - without elaborating what she meant by 'character' and 'spirit'.toss Murdaya 
argued that: 
... we do not need to follow other countries ... This human rights chapter is too detailed 
and overlaps. Many of the provisions can just be incorporated in an MPR decree, statute 
and- in more detail- in Government Regulation.tos6 
Impressive Amendment. Despite these differences, the MPR finally agreed to incorporate 
new provisions on human rights in Articles 28A to 28J of Chapter XA. This Chapter, like the 
MPR decree and statute on human rights, was substantially drawn from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 1057 It covers: 
• the right to life; 
• the right to family and procreation; 
• the right to self-betterment; 
• the right to justice; 
• freedom of religion, speech, education, employment, citizenship, place of 
residence, association and expression; 
• freedom of information; 
• personal security; 
• the right of well-being, including social security and health provision; 
• the right to personal property; 
• the right to seek political asylum; 
• freedom from torture and degrading treatment; 
• protection and non-discrimination, including freedom of conscience, traditional 
cultural identity, recognition under the law and unacceptability of retrospective 
criminal legislation; 
• the primary responsibility of the government to protect, advance and uphold 
human rights; 
• the obligation to uphold the human rights of others and to be bound by the law for 
this purpose; and 
• the restriction of the application of human rights provisions on justified grounds of 
moral and religious values or of security and public order.tosa 
Controversy over Retrospective Legislation. Incorporated in Chapter XA is Article 281(1) 
which stipulates that: 
10551bid. 
10561bid. 
1057 National Democratic Institute, above n 30, 13. 
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. . .  t h e  r i g h t  n o t  t o  b e  p r o s e c u t e d  u n d e r  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  l a w s  i s  a  b a s i c  h u m a n  r i g h t  t h a t  t h a t  
c a n n o t  b e  d i m i n i s h e d  u n d e r  a n y  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  
T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  i s  q u i t e  s i m i l a r  t o  A r t i c l e  1 1  ( 2 )  o f  t h e  U D H R
1
0 5 9  w h i c h  s t a t e s  t h a t :  
[ n ] o  o n e  s h a l l  b e  h e l d  g u i l t y  o f  a n y  p e n a l  o f f e n c e  o n  a c c o u n t  o f  a n y  a c t  o r  o m i s s i o n  w h i c h  
d i d  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a  p e n a l  o f f e n c e  u n d e r  a  n a t i o n a l  o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w ,  a t  t h e  t i m e  w h e n  i t  
w a s  c o m m i t t e d .  
F o r  C l a r k e ,  t h e  p h r a s e  ' c a n n o t  b e  d i m i n i s h e d  u n d e r  a n y  c i r c u m s t a n c e s '  i s  t h e  c a u s e  o f  
c o n t r o v e r s y  s u r r o u n d i n g  A r t i c l e  2 8 1 ( 1 ) .  I t  m a y  m a k e  t h e  " r i g h t  a g a i n s t  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  p r o s e c u t i o n  
a b s o l u t e " .
1
o 6 0  A m n e s t y  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  d e s c r i b e d  h o w  t h e  A r t i c l e  m i g h t  b e  u s e d  a s  a  ' b a c k d o o r '  f o r  




F o r  h u m a n  r i g h t s  a c t i v i s t s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h i s  A r t i c l e  , w a s  a  
p o l i t i c a l  d i l e m m a .
1
0 6 2  O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  i t  p r o t e c t e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  h u m a n  r i g h t ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  
h a n d ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  c o u l d  b e c o m e  a  m a j o r  b a r r i e r  t o  t h e  p r o s e c u t i o n  o f  t h e  p a s t  h u m a n  r i g h t s  
v i o l a t i o n s .
1 0 6 3  
T h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  M i l i t a r y  a n d  G o l k a r .  O n e  t h e o r y  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  2 8 1 ( 1 )  i s  
· '  
t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  i m p u n i t y  i t  e n j o y e d  u n d e r  S o e h a r t o .
1 0 6 4  
L i n d s e y  p o i n t s  o u t  
t h a t  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  p r o s e c u t i o n  m a k e s  i t  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r o s e c u t e  t h e  
a r m e d  f o r c e s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  h u m a n  r i g h t s  a b u s e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  o v e r  t h e  q u a r t e r  c e n t u r y  o f  E a s t  
T i m o r ' s  h i s t o r y  w i t h  l n d o n e s i a . 1 o 6 s  
R e f e r r i n g  t o  a  r e p o r t  m a d e  b y  S l o b o d a n  L e k i c ,  a n  A s s o c i a t e d  P r e s s  j o u r n a l i s t ,  C l a r k e  p o i n t s  o u t  
t h a t  s o m e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M P R  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e y  h a d  b e e n  i n t i m i d a t e d  b y  s o m e  h a r d - l i n e  
g e n e r a l s  w h o  h a d  t h r e a t e n e d  t h a t ,  u n l e s s  t h e  n o n - r e t r o s p e c t i v i t y  p r o v i s i o n  w a s  p a s s e d ,  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  w o u l d  p r o v o k e  v i o l e n c e  i n  A c e h ,  M a l u k u  o r  W e s t  P a p u a .
1 0 6
6  C l a r k e  a c k n o w l e d g e s  
1 0 5 8 1 b i d  1 4 .  
1 0 5 9
1 b i d  1 3 .  
1
0 6 0  R o s s  C l a r k e ,  ' R e t r o s p e c t i v i t y  a n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  V a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  B a l i  B o m b i n g  a n d  E a s t  T i m o r  T r i a l s '  ( 2 0 0 3 )  5 : 2  




A m n e s t y  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  I n d o n e s i a :  R e t r o a c t i v i t y  A m e n d m e n t  R e g r e s s i v e  t o  H u m a n  R i g h t s  ( 2 0 0 0 )  < h t t p : l / w e b . a m n e s t y . o r g /  ·  
l i b r a r y / i n d e x / E N G A S A 2 1 0 3 3 2 0 0 0 >  a t  2 2  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 3 .  
1 0 6 2  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  3 0 ,  1 3 .  
1 0 6 3  C l a r k e ,  a b o v e  n  1 0 6 0 ,  3 .  
1 0 6 4
1 b i d  6 .  
1 0 6 5  L i n d s e y ,  a b o v e  n  9 9 ,  2 5 4 - 2 5 5 .  
1 0 6 6  C l a r k e ,  a b o v e  n  1 0 6 0 ,  6 .  
1 6 4  
however that there is no strong evidence which supports the accuracy of the report, and 
therefore, confirms this military influence theory.1067 
Another theory is the influence of Golkar. The intention of Yusuf (Golkar) to amend the human 
· rights chapter was very strong. In a leader meeting of Commission A, Yusuf thumped the table 
and forced the discussion to continue overnight.1°6B The meeting was the only Second 
Amendment discussion that ended at 4 am.1°69Yusuf argues that one of the reasons behind his 
insistence on finishing the amendment was to avoid an outcome where the . Second 
Amendment is merely about the flag and the national anthem.1070Yusuf persists in arguing that 
there was no influence from his faction in drafting the non-retrospectivity Article.t0!1 He rejects 
the allegations of several human rights activists who claimed that the Article was 'sneaked 
through' by Golkar to provide impunity for past human rights violations which had mostly been 
committed by Golkar members. 1072 Yusuf even argues that the. response from the activists was 
'strange'. This was because not only the Article had been drawn from the UDHR but also it had 
previously been incorporated in the Article 37 of the Declaration of Human Rights of MPR 
Decree No. XVII of 1998, and Article 4 of Law No 39 of 1999 also on human rights. 1073 
Regardless of the lack of strong evidence of the military's interest and Yusufs defense, as 
described above, the minutes of the 43rd meeting of the PAH I shown that it was only Golkar 
and the TNI-Polri factions that, in the first place, proposed the non-retrospectivity Article. 1074 
Although there was no clear reason as to why these two factions proposed the Article, it would 
not have been just a mere coincidence that both factions have been closely linked to human 
rights violations during Soeharto's authoritarian regime. 
A Far-reaching Oversight. Despite human rights having been debated until 4 am, there was 
insufficient discussion on the non-retrospectivity Article. From the time this Article was first 
proposed in June, until it was agreed in August, none of the other factions in the MPR opposed 
1067 1bid 6- 7. 






1074 Minutes of meeting of the 43'd meeting of the PAH I, 13 June 2000. 
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t h e  non~retrospectivity d r a f t  p r o p o s e d  b y  G o l k a r  a n d  t h e  m i l i t a r y  f a c t i o n s .  T h e  t w o - m o n t h  p e r i o d  
w a s  s i m p l y  n o t  e n o u g h  t i m e  f o r  t h e  M P R  m e m b e r s  t o  c o n s i d e r  a n  a m e n d m e n t  w h i c h  w o u l d  
h a v e  h a d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  t r i a l  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s  v i o l a t o r s .  
T h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C r i s i s  G r o u p  ( I C G )  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  m e m b e r s  h a d  a l s o  b e e n  p r e o c c u p i e d  
w i t h  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  m a n e u v e r s  s u r r o u n d i n g  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  i m p e a c h  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d .
1 0 7
5  T h e  l a c k  
o f  a w a r e n e s s  o f  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M P R  o f  t h e  c r u c i a l  i s s u e  o f  r e t r o s p e c t i v i t y  i s  r e v e a l e d  i n  a n  
i n t e r v i e w  b e t w e e n  t h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t  a n d  J o k o  S u s i l o  ( R e f o r m a s 1 ) .  S u s i l o  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  n o n -
r e t r o s p e c t i v i t y  p r o p o s a l  w a s  n e v e r  s u g g e s t e d  i n  t h e  P A H  I  m e e t i n g  a n d  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  
i n t r o d u c e d  i n  a  p r i v a t e  m e e t i n g .
1 0 7 6  
T h i s  w a s  i n c o r r e c t  b e c a u s e ,  a s  m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e ,  G o l k a r  
a n d  t h e  T N I  p r o p o s e d  t h e  c l a u s e  i n  t h e  4 3 r d  m e e t i n g  o f  P A H  I  i n  J u n e . 1 0 7 7  
I f  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M P R  t h e m s e l v e s  w e r e  u n a w a r e  o f  t h e  d r a f t  o f  A r t i c l e  2 8 1 ( 1 ) ,  i t  w a s  n o t  
s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  p e o p l e ' s  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  c l a u s e  c a m e  v e r y  l a t e ,  a f t e r  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
a l r e a d y  h a d  b e e n  a g r e e d  t o  b y  t h e  M P R .  W h e n  a p p r o a c h e d  a b o u t  t h e  i s s u e  b y  M u n i r  o f  
K o n t r a s ,
1 0 7 8  
A m i e r i  R a i s  c o n c e d e d  t h a t h e  w a s  n o t  r e a l l y  a w a r e  o f  t h e  l e g a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  
t h e  A r t i c l e  2 8 1 ( 1  ) .
1 0 7
9  R a i s  f u r t h e r  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  " a m e n d m e n t  w a s  a n  o v e r s i g h t  t h a t  w e n t  
u n n o t i c e d  b y  m a n y  l e g i s l a t o r s " .
1
o 8 o  M o r e o v e r ,  R a i s  a r g u e d  t h o s e  w h o  w e r e  a s s i g n e d  t o  d i s c u s s  
t h e  a m e n d m e n t  w e r e  n o t  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  a b o u t  h u m a n  r i g h t s ·  i s s u e s ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  f a i l e d  t o  
w a r n  t h e  o t h e r  M P R  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h e  c l a u s e . 1 o 8 1  
I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  R a i s ,  K o n t r a s  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
[ t ] h e  M P R - m e m b e r s  c a n n o t  s a y  t h e y  l a c k  k n o w l e d g e  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s  a f f a i r s  o r  a r e  n o t  
a w a r e  o f  t h e  c l a u s e ' s  i m p a c t .  T h e  a r t i c l e  w a s  d e l i b e r a t e l y  m a d e  s o  a s  t o  b e n e f i t  c e r t a i n  
p e o p l e .  T h i s  i s  a l l  a b o u t  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y .
1




5 1 n t e r n a t i o n a l  C r i s i s  G r o u p ,  I n d o n e s i a :  I m p u n i t y  v e r s u s  A c c o u n t a b i l i t y  f o r  G r o s s  H u m a n  R i g h t s  V i o l a t i o n s ,  I C G  A s i a  R e p o r t  




6  ' P a s t  R i g h t s  C r i m e s  m a y  G e t  P r o t e c t i o n  u n d e r  C o n s t i t u t i o n ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 8  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  




8  K o n t r a s  i s  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  o f  K o m i s i  u n t u k  O r a n g  H i l a n g  d a n  K o r b a n  T i n d a k  K e k e r a s a n ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  M i s s i n g  
P e r s o n s  a n d  V i c t i m s  o f  V i o l e n c e .  
1 0 7 9  ' A  F a r - R e a c h i n g  O v e r s i g h t ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  2 1  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
1 0 8 0  I b i d .  
1 0 8 1 1 b i d .  
1 0 8 2  
J a m e s  C o n a c h y ,  I n d o n e s i a n  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  S e s s i o n  M a r k e d  b y  C o l l a b o r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  ' R e f o r m e r s '  a n d  S o e h a r t o ' s  G o l k a r  
( 2 0 0 0 )  W o r l d  S o c i a l i s t  W e b  S i t e  < h t t p : / / w w w . w s w s . o r a  l a r t i c l e s / 2 0 0 0 / a u g 2 0 0 0 / m p r - a 2 4 . s h t m l >  a t  1 9  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 1 .  
1 6 6  
3. National Defense and Security: Mixed Results on the Role of the Military in 
Politics 
In the New Order era, the military went beyond its usual role in security and defense matters by 
reason of the dwifungsi doctrine. One .of the key items on the post-Soeharto reform agenda 
was, therefore, to end military involvement in daily politics. The NDI argues, however, that the 
2000 Annual Session results were mixed in this regard. 1083 This mix is shown in the output of 
the Second Amendment and MPR Decree No. VII of 2000 on the Role of the TNI and Polri. 
Yes to the Military. On the one hand, the 2000 Annual Sessions showed a resurgence of 
political influence on the part of the military and the tendency of civilian politicians to continue 
looking for military support.1084 There was an attempt to incorporate a constitutional foundation 
for the military representation in the MPR, although it ultimately was not approved. The draft 
amendment to Article 2(1) of the 1945 Constitution stated that: 
' : • < • ' ' ; • 
The MPR shall consist of the members of the DPR and the DPD, who shall be elected in 
general elections, augmented by representation of specific community groups which 
because of their roles and functions shall not use their voting rights. (Emphasis added). 
The above 'specific community groups' directly referred to the members of the TNI-Polri, which 
according to Articles 5(2) and 10 (2) of MPR Decree No. VII of 2000, 'shall not be entitled to 
vote or be elected to public office'. Todung Mulya Lubis argued that the attempt to provide 
military representation went too far. 1085 Lubis further argues that: 
[a] proposed amendment that will allow the representation of the TNI and Polri in the MPR 
under the Constitution ... contradicts public aspirations, who want the MPR to be free from 
unelected representatives, either from the TNI, the police force or social groups, by 
2004.1086 
During the Second Amendment discussions, the PBB faction was the only one which expressly 
argued that the intervention of the military in politics should be ended immediately. 1o87 During 
the approval process of MPR Decree No. VII of 2000, Hartono Mardjono (PBB) and Ghazali 
1083 National Democratic Institute, above n 30, 5. 
1084 1bid. 
1085 'Writing TNI into Constitution Goes too Far', The Jakarta Post, 11 August 2000. 
10861bid. 
1087 Minutes ofthe 5th (continued) Plenary Meeting,JO August 2000. 
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A b a s  A d a n  ( P P P )  i n t e r r u p t e d .
1 0 8 8  
T h e y  o b j e C t e d  t o  t h e  M P R ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  
o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  f a c t i o n  i n  t h e  M P R . 1 0 8
9  
M a r d j o n o  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
' )  
[ i ] n  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  d i g n i t y  o f  t h e  M P R  a s  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  h i g h e s t  i n s t i t u t i o n  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  
t h e  n a t i o n ' s  m a n d a t e ,  a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  d i g n i t y  o f  s t u d e n t  a n d  r e f o r m  f i g h t e r s ,  I  d e m a n d  
t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  T N I - P o l r i  e n d  i n  2 0 0 4 . 1 0 9 0  ·  
I n  t h e  e n d ,  h o w e v e r ,  n o n e  o f  t h e  : e l e v e n  f a C t i o n s  d i s a g r e e d  t o  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  
T N I - P o l r i . 1 0 9 1 A r t i c l e s  5  a n d  1 0  o f  M P R  Decr~e N o .  V I I  o f  2 0 0 0  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  w o u l d  
r e t a i n  t h e i r  M P R  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  u n t i l  2 0 0 9 ,  a t  t h e  l a t e s t .  T h e  N D I  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h i s  m i l i t a r y  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  w a s  a  " s i g n i f i c a n t  s t e p  b a c k w a r d ' ;  f r o m  e a r l i e r  c o n s e n s u s  a m o n g  a l l '  m a j o r  
p o l i t i c a l  parti~s t o  e n d . t h e  T N I  a n d  P o l r i  m e m b e r s h i p  i n  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d i e s  ~Y 2 0 q 4 . 1 o 9 2  
'  '  
N o  t o  t h e '  M i l i t a r y .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  2 0 0 0  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n  s u c c e e d e d  i n  l a y i n g  
d o w n  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  f o u n d a t i o n  i n  w h i c h  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  a n d  D P R D s  w i l l  b e c o m e  
f u l l y  e l e c t e d ,  t h u s  e n d i n g  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t o  t h e s e  b o d i e s . 1 0
9
3  
A n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  d e v e l o p m e n t  w a s  t h a t  b o t h  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  t o  C h a p t e r  X I I  o n  D e f e n s e  a n d  
S e c u r i t y  o t ' t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  D e c r e e  N o .  V I I  o f  2 0 0 0 ,  d r a w s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  d i s t i n c t i o n  
b e t w e e n  e x t e r n a l  a n d  i n t e r n a l  d e f e n s e .  E x t e r n a l  d e f e n s e ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  T N  I ,  
. ] , "  '  .  
i s  d e f i n e d  a s  ' t h e  t a s k  o f  d e f e n d i n g ,  p r o t e c t i n g  a n d  p r e s e r v i n g  t h e  u n i t y  a n d  s o v e r e i g n t y  o f  t h e  
'  "  




I n t e r n a l  d e f e n s e ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  P o l r i ,  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  ' t h e  t a s k  o f  
p r o t e c t i n g ,  s h e l t e r i n g  a n d  s e r v i n g  t h e  c o m m u n i t y ,  a n d  u p h o l d i n g  t h e  l a w '  .
1 0 9 5  
T h i s  c l e a r  
'  .  
d i s t i n c t i o n  f u r t h e r  s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  T N I  a n d  t h e  P o l r i . 1 0 9
6  
T h e  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  V I I  o f  2 0 0 0  f u r t h e r  d i s m a n t l e d  t h e  d w i f u n g s i  d o c t r i n e J 0 9
7  
I t  a d o p t e d  a  
n e w  m e c h a n i s m  f o r  a p p o i n t i n g  a n d  d i s m i s s i n g  t h e  T N I  c o m m a n d e r  a n d  P o l r i  C h i e f ,  w h i c h  n o w  
1 0 8 8  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  9 t h  P l e n a r y  M e e t i n g ,  1 8  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
1 0 8 9 J b i d :  
1 0 9 0  I b i d .  
1 0 9 1  ' T N I - P o l r i  t e t a p  d i  M P R  h i n g g a  t a h u n  2 0 0 9 ' ,  K o m p a s ,  1 4  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
1 0 9 2  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c ,  a b o v e  n  3 0 ,  6 .  
1 0 9 3  A r t i c l e  1 9 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
1 0 9 4  A r t i c l e  3 0 ( 4 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  A r t i c l e  2  o f  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  V I I  o f  2 0 0 0 .  
1 0 9 5  A r t i c l e  3 0 ( 5 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  A r t i c l e s  6  o f  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  V I I  o f  2 0 0 0 .  
1 0 9 6  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c ,  a b o v e  n  3 o ,  6 .  
1 0 9 7  L i n d s e y ,  a b o v e  n  9 9 ,  2 5 2 .  
1 6 8  
required DPR approval rather than being just the President's prerogative.t09BThe jurisdiction of 
the military court, which had previously routinely wh_itewashed military violence, was limited to 
breaches of the Military Code rather than any offence involving members of the military, as in 
the past. 1099 The decree also stipulated that the armed forces (police fully, and military partly) 
would now be subject to ·the civil and. criminal jurisdiction of the General CourtJ100 . 
4 .. · Further Amendment to the Powers of the DPR 
The Second Amendment further clarifies the powers of the DPR and limits the power of the 
President. 
As mentioned earlier, the amendment to Article 19 of the 1945 Constitution established that the 
DPR ·would become a fully elected body .. For the NO I, the end of military and police 
representation in the DPR clarified the separation of the executive and legislative branches. 11 01 
An amendment to Article 20(5) further. strengthened the legislative power of the DPR, which 
had already been increased by the First Amendment.1102 The new amendment stipulates that if 
the DPR and President jointly agree on legislation and the President fails to sign it within 30 
days, the legislation automatically becomes law. This provision is necessary to prevent a 
President from changing his or her mind and veto a Bill after earlier agreeing to it. This, 
however, does not mean that the Indonesian President does not have a veto right. Article 22(2) 
of the First Amendment requires every Bill to be discussed and to be agreed to by both the 
DPR 'and President. This presidential consent is basically the 'veto right' of the President but 
once consent is given, the President cannot withdraw it by refusing later to sign the Bill into law: 
in 30 days it becomes law anyway. 
Further, the incorporation of Article 20A clarifies the DPR powers to include 'legislative, 
budgetary and supervisory functions' .1103 The Article provides that the DPR should hold 
1098 Articles 3 (3) and 7 (3) of MPR Decree No. VII of 2000. 
1099 Article 4 of the MPR Decree No. VII of 2000. 
1100 Articl.es 4 and 7 (4) of the MPR Decree No. VII of 2000. 
1101 National Democratic, above n 30, 8. 
1102 Lindsey, above n 99, 250. 
1103 Article 20A (1) of the 1945 Constitution. 
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i n t e r p e l l a t i o n ,  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a n d  o p i n i o n  r i g h t s . 1 1 o
4  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  D P R  m e m b e r s  h a v e  t h e  r i g h t ·  
t o  s u b m i t  q u e s t i o n s ,  · d e l i v e r  c o n v e y  s u g g e s t i o n  a n d  o p i n i o n s ,  a n d  p r e s e n t  v i e w s ·  w i t h .  
i m m u n i t y . 1 1 o s  
K a w a m u r a  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  a b o v e  a m e n d m e n t s  w e r e  i n t e n d e d  t o  f u r t h e r  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  p o w e r s  
o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  a n d  r e c t i f y  t h e  S o e h a r t o  p e r i o d ' s  p o w e r  b i a s  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  
b r a n c h .
1 1
0 6  T h e  N D I  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  D P R ' s  p o w e r s  a n d  r i g h t s  h e l p s  t o  
s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s  a n d  c h e c k s  a n d  b a l a n c e s . 1 1 o 7  
C o n c l u s i o n .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  f a c e d  s o m e  b a s i c  
p r o b l e m s .  B e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  o b j e c t i o n  t o  a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e  a n d  t h e i r  f e a r s  t h a t  t h e  d e b a t e  w a s  
l e a d i n g  t h a t  w a y ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  g r o u p s  i n  t h e  M P R  s l o w e d  d o w n  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  a n d  f o r c e d  t h e  
M P R  t o  p o s t p o n e  t h e  f i n a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  f r o m  2 0 0 0  t o  2 0 0 2 .  T h e  p r o c e s s  w a s  a l s o  
t r o u b l e d  b y  s h o r t - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  c o m p r o m i s e d  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  ·  
i n e f f e c t i v e  a n d  c o n t a m i n a t e d  p r o c e s s  m e a n t  t h a t  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  M P R  a s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n -
m a k i n g  b o d y  w a s  q u e s t i o n e d ,  a n d  t h e  p u s h  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a n  e x p e r t  c o m m i s s i o n  s t r e n g t h e n e d .  
D e s p i t e  t h i s  p r o b l e m a t i c  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  o u t c o m e s  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  c o n t i n u e d  t h e  
r e f o r m  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  O n e  o f  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t s  w a s  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  h u m a n  
r i g h t s  w h i c h  i s  f a r  m o r e  i m p r e s s i v e  t h a n  t h e  l i m i t e d  p r o t e c t i o n s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
1 1 0 4  A r t i c l e  2 0 A  ( 2 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
1 1 0 5  A r t i c l e  2 0 A  ( 3 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
1 1 0 6  K o i c h i  K a w a m u r a ,  ' T o w a r d  a  M o d e r n  C o n s t i t u t i o n :  T h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ' ,  ( 2 0 0 0 )  6 3  A j i k e n  
W o r l d  T r e n d s  3 .  
1 1 0 7  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  3 0 ,  8 .  
Chapter Six 
The Third Amendment: 
Important Reforms, Crucial Delays 
This chapter describes the process and the outcome of the Third Amendment of the 1945 
Constitution. It is divided into three sections. Section A outlines the situational background of 
the Third Amendment to show that the Third Amendment discussions were dominated by the 
conflict between President Wahid and the Parliament. Section B describes the constitution-
making process of the Third Amendment and discusses - among others - the increase in 
public skepticism about the MPR as constitution-making body, as well as the continued 
problem of limited public participation. Section C, however, argues that the resulting 
amendments were important steps in the continuing to reform the 1945 Constitution, especially 
the strengthening of preside~tial system; the adoption of provisions on election; and the 
establishment of the DPD (Regional Representative Council), Constitutional Court and Judicial 
Commission. It also considers further delays in the debate over the second round presidential 
election and proposal to introduce the Jakarta Charter to the Constitution. 
A. The Background: Abdurrahman Wahid's Impeachment 
The Third Amendment discussions were interrupted by political conflict, between President 
Wahid and the DPR and MPR. The compromise which had emerged in the 2000 MPR Annual 
Session between Wahid and his opponents - that Vice President Megawati being given a 
bigger role in daily administration,ttoa was soon abandoned. The breakdown began with 
Wahid's ·decision to replace his rainbow cabinet, and establish an 'all the President's Men' 
cabinet. 1109 This new cabinet lacked party representation. Golkar and the PPP had one position 
each, while the PDIP and PAN were excluded entirely.ttto Clearly, Megawati as the Chair of the 
PDIP did not have much influence on the formation of the cabinet, and she noticeably absented 
herself when it was announced.tttt 
1108 Article 1 of Presidential Decree No. 121 of 2000 on the Assignment from the President to the Vice President to Handle the 
Daily Government Duties. 
1109 'All the Wahid's Men' Tempo (Jakarta) No. 26/XXIX, 28 August- 3 September 2000. 
1110Uddle, above n 891,210. 
1111 'Megawati Tak Hadiri Pengumuman Kabinet', Kompas, 24 August 2000. 
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O n  2 8  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 ,  f i v e  d a y s  a f t e r  t h e  a n n o u n c e m e n t  o f  t h e  n e w  c a b i n e t ,  t h e  D P R  v o t e d  3 0 7  
t o  3 ,  w i t h  4 5  a b s t e n t i o n s ,  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  s p e c i a l  C o m m i t t e e  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  f r a u d u l e n t  
w i t h d r a w a l  o f  R p  3 5  b i l l i o n  f r o m  a  s t a t e  L o g i s t i c  A g e n c y  ( B u l o g )  b y  W a h i d ' s  m a s s e u r ,  a n d  t h e  
d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  U S $  2  m i l l i o n  d o n a t e d  b y  S u l t a n  H a s s a n a l  B o l k i a h  o f  B r u n e i .  T h e s e  t w ?  f i n a n c i a l _  
s c a n d a l s  w e r e  k n o w n  r e s p e c t i v e l y  a s  B u l o g - g a t e  a n d  B r u n e i - g a t e . 1 1 1 2  T h e  v o t e  s h o w e d  t h a t  
.  .  .  -
P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d  h a d  l o s t  D P R  s u p p o r t .  I t  f u r t h e r  s h o w e d  t h a t  W a h i d ' s  r e s h u f f l e d  c a b i n e t  
d i s a p p o i n t e d  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  D P R .  I n  f a c t ,  i n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  t h e  i m p e a c h m e n t  p r o c e s s  o f  
.  .  .  
P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d  b e g a n  w i t h  t h i s  v o t e .  
A s  th~ p r o c e s s  t o  i m p e a c h  W a h i d  c o n t i n u e d ,  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e b a t e s  a s  t o  i t s  l e g a l  s t a n d i n g  
e m e r g e d .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  e l a b o r a t e s  o n  t h e s e  i n  d e t a i l .  
1 .  T h e  L e g a l  A u t h o r i t y  f o r  P r e s i d e n t i a l  I m p e a c h m e n t  
T h e  w o r d  ' i m p e a c h m e n t '  - o r ·  t h e  l i k e  - · d i d  n o t  a p p e a r  a n y w h e r e  i n  t h e  b o d y  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  ·  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e ,  H a r u n  A l r a s i d ,  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l a w  a d v i s e r ,  a r g u e s  
t h a t  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m  d i d  n o t  r e c o g n i z e  i m p e a c h m e n t . H 1 3  
T h e  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  i m p e a c h m e n t  b a s e d  t h e i r  a r g u m e n t s  o n  t h e  e l u c i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
T h i s  e l u c i d a t i o n  p r o v i d e d  t h a t ,  i f  t h e  D P R  b e l i e v e d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h a d  t r u l y  b r e a c h e d  t h e  h a l u a n  
n e g a r a  ( s t a t e  p o l i c y ) ,  a s  s t i p u l a t e d  e i t h e r  b y  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  o r  b y  t h e  M P R ,  i t  c o u l d  c a l l  t h e  
M P R  t o  a  s p e c i a l  s e s s i o n ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  a s k  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  h i s  o r  h e r  a c t i 0 n s . 1 1 1 4  Y e t  
'  '  .  ,  .  '  
t h e r e  w a s  n o  p r o v i s i o n ,  i n  a n y  p a r t  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w h i c h  e x p r e s s l y  m e n t i o n e d  t h a t  t h e .  
!  .  
c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  s p e c i a l  s e s s i o n  w o u l d  b e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  r e m o v a l .  
M o r e  s p e c i f i c  r e g u l a t i o n  o n  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  i m p e a c h i n g  a  P r e s i d e n t  w a s  s e t  o u t  i n  t w o  M P R  
D e c r e e s .  A r t i c l e  4  o f  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  I l l  o f  1 9 7 8  o n  t h e  P o s i t i o n  a n d  W o r k i n g  R e l a t i o n s  o f  
H i g h  s t a t e  I n s t i t u t i o n s ,  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  M P R  h a d  t h e  p o w e r  t o  r e m o v e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  f o r  a  
" c l e a r  v i o l a t i o n  o f  s t a t e  p o l i c y "  b e f o r e  h i s  o r  h e r  t e r m  e x p i r e d .  A r t i c l e  4 e  o f  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  I I  o f  
1 9 9 9  o n  S t a n d i n g  O r d e r ,  a d d e d  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a s  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  g r o u n d  f o r  
d i s m i s s a l .  
1 1 1 2  ' D P R  S e t u j u  G u n a k a n  H a k  A n g k e t ' ,  K o m p a s ,  2 9  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  
1 1 1 3  
H a r u n  A l r a s i d ,  ' M u n g k i n k a h  P r e s i d e n  d i t u r u n k a n  d i  T e n g a h  J a l a n ' ,  T e m p o  ( J a k a r t a )  N o .  1 9 / X X I X ,  1 0 - 1 6  J u l y  2 0 0 1 .  
1 7 2  
Impeachment Procedure. Article 7 of MPR Decree No. Ill of1978 stipulated the impeachment 
procedure. It required two successive memoranda of censure be issued by the DPR. The first 
memorandum warned the President of the alleged violations. If, after three. months, the 
President had not ~esponded satisfactorily to it, the second memorandum would be sent. If, 
after a further month, the President still had not responded satisfactorily, the MPR would hold a 
Special Session to consider the memoranda and any reply from the President. This session 
would then decide whether or not the President should be dismissed. · 
These Indonesian impeachment procedures were unconvincing, especially when compared to. 
the impeachment in the United States. They were four differences between the two procedures. 
Table 11 shows these differences. 




More criminal. That is if the 
President is convicted of 
'treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors'. 
Involved. The Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court presides 
over the impeachment trial in 
the Senate. 
More difficult. Only an absolute 
majority vote in the Congress 
can impeach a President. 
Alrasid questions this account of the Indonesian removal procedure, arguing that the MPR 
decrees breached the Constitution and the procedure was therefore illegaJ.1115 He argues that 
the impeachment procedure should have been in the Constitution, and not in the form of an 
1114 Section VII of the Elucidation on Government System of the 1945 Constitution. 
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M P R  D e c r e e  w h i c h  h e  c a l l e d  a  h a r a m  ( i l l e g i t i m a t e )  f o r m  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n .
1 1 1
6  I  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  
A l r a s i d .  A l t h o u g h  i t  i s  r i g h t  t h a t  i m p e a c h m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s  a r e  b e t t e r  p r o v i d e d  f o r  i n  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h i s  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  i n  t h e  M P R  d e c r e e  w a s  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .  I n  
f a c t ,  N a s u t i o n  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  M P R ' s  p r o c e d u r e s  w e r e  a  v a l i d  a t t e m p t  t o  c o m p l e t e  t h e :  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .
1 1 1 7  
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  a n  M P R  d e c r e e  I  t h e r e f o r e  s h a r e  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  N D I  w h i c h  
a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e  h a s  a l w a y s  a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h a t  M P R  D e c r e e s  
w h i c h  c o u l d  r e g u l a t e  a n d  e l a b o r a t e  u p o n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  m a t t e r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
i m p e a c h m e n t . . t t t s  I n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  N D I ,  L i n d s e y  a r g u e s  t h a t :  
[ b ] e c a u s e  t h e  M P R  i s  s o v e r e i g n  a n d  i t s  p o w e r  i s  v i r t u a l l y  u n l i m i t e d ,  i t  h a s  t h e  f i n a l  s a y  o n  
h o w  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  a n d  i t  c l e a r l y  c l a i m s  t h e  p o w e r  o f  d i s m i s s a l  p u r s u a n t  t o  
t h a t  i n s t r u m e n t .  I f  i t  p u r p o r t s  t o  e x e r c i s e  s u c h  a  p o w e r ,  i t  i s  h a r d  t o  s e e  h o w  t h i s  c o u l d  b e  
r e s i s t e d  t h r o u g h  a n y  l e g a l  m e c h a n i s m . t 1 1 9  
M o r e o v e r ,  i n  1 9 6 7 ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  p r e c e d e n t  w h e n  t h e  M P R  i m p e a c h e d  P r e s i d e n t  S o e k a r n o ,  a f t e r  
h e  h a d  g i v e n  a  s p e e c h  w h i c h  t h e  t h e n  M P R S  f o u n d  " f e l l  s h o r t  o f  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
p e o p l e " . 1
1 2
o  F o r  L i n d s e y ,  t h i s  e p i s o d e  c l e a r l y  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  a  p r e s i d e n c y  w a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  a  
g i f t  o f  t h e  M P R ,  a n d  s o  i t  c o u l d  s h o r t e n  t h e  p r e s i d e n c y ,  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  a n  i n a d e q u a t e  
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  s p e e c h . 1 1 2 1  
'  .  
2 .  T h e  P r o c e s s  o f  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d ' s  I m p e a c h m e n t  
A f t e r  h a v i n g  b e e n  f o r m e d  i n  l a t e  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 ,  t h e  D P R ' s  S p e c i a l  C o m m i t t e e  c o n d u c t e d  
h e a r i n g s  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d ' s  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  b o t h  B u l o g - g a t e  a n d  B r u n e i - g a t e .  A t  
t h e  e n d  o f  J a n u a r y ,  i n  i t s  r e p o r t  t o  a  p l e n a r y  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  D P R ,  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  
i t ·  w a s  ' r e a s o n a b l e  t o  s u s p e c t '  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h a d  b e e n  i n v o l v e d  i n  b o t h  c o r r u p t i o n  
1 1 1 5 1 n t e r v i e w  w i t h  H a r u n  A l r a s i d ,  P r o f e s s o r  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  L a w  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  1 4  J u l y  2 0 0 3 .  
1 1 1 6 1 b i d .  
1 1 1 7  A d n a n  B u y u n g  N a s u t i o n ,  ' S e b u a h  L a n d a s a n  y a n g  T a k  T e r t u l i s ' ,  T e m p o ,  N o .  1 2 / X X X ,  2 1 - 2 7  M a y  2 0 0 1 .  
1 1 1
8  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  I n d o n e s i a ' s  C h a n g e  o f  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  P r o s p e c t  f o r  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m :  A  R e p o r t  o n  t h e  
J u l y  2 0 0 1  S p e c i a l  S e s s i o n  o f  t h e  P e o p l e ' s  C o n s u l t a t i v e  A s s e m b l y  a n d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  I m p e a c h m e n t  P r o c e s s  ( 2 0 0 1 ) ,  1 0 .  
1 1 1 9  T i m  L i n d s e y ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  L a w  a n d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  C r i s i s  i n  J a k a r t a :  S o m e  P r e l i m i n a r y  O b s e N a t i o n s ,  < h t t p : / / w w w . l a w .  
u n i m e l b . e d u . a u / a l c / w i p / C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r i s i s . h t m l >  a t  1 4  J u n e  2 0 0 2 .  
1 1 2 0  
I b i d .  
1 1 2 1 1 b i d .  
1 7 4  
scandaiS.1122 The report was followed by the DPR's first memorandum issued on 1st February 
2001. 
The DPR's Memoranda. The DPR voted 393 to 4 to issue the First Memorandum.1123 This 
voting followed the walkout of 48 members of the PKB. 1124 The memorandum accused the 
President of violating: (1) Article 9 of the 1945 Constitution on the oath of office, and (2) MPR 
Decree No. XI of 1998on the Implementation of Clean Government and Eradication ofthe 
KKN.112s 
On 28 March 2001, in formally responding to the First Memorandum, President Wahid 
continued to question the impeachment process, arguing that the Special Committee was 
acting illegally.1126 For Wahid, the Committee breached the presidential character of the 1945 
Constitution, by taking some parliamentary-style steps which might have lead to a vote of no-
confidence.1127 
On 30 April2001, in response to President Wahid's questioning, the DPR voted to issue the 
Second Memorandum. Of the 457 members of the DPR who were present, 363 voted for it, 52 
opposed it and 42 abstained. 112B In his formal response, President Wahid .argued that the 
Second Memorandum "failed to specify what pledge of office". he had violated.1129 Baharuddin 
Lopa, whowas Wahid's Minister of Justice, argued that the DPR's memoranda focused more 
on the President's policy, and consequently, could not be the basis o( a presidential 
removai. 1130 Moreover, on 28 May 2001, the Attorney General formally cleared President Wahid 
of any involvement in either Bulog-gate or Brunei-gate.1131 
. ' 
On 30 May 2001, however, the DPR plenary meeting decided that the President's response to 
the Second Memorandum was unsatisfactory. Therefore, it officially requested anMPR Special 
1122 'Laporan Hasil Kerja Pans us Diterima', Kompas, 30 January 2001. 
1123 1nternational Crisis Group, Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, 21 February 2001, .1. 
1124 'DPR sampaikan Memorandum', Kompas, 2 February 2001. 
11251bid. 
1126 National Democratic Institute, above n 1118, 12. 
11271nternational Crisis Group, above n 1123, 2. 
1128 'Presiden diberi Waktu selama Satu Bulan', Kompas, 1 May 2001. · 
1129 National Democratic Institute, above n 1118, 13. 
1130 Baharuddin Lopa and Arifin P. SoeryaAtmadja, 'Konstitusi dan Memorandum', Tempo, No. 10/)00(, 7-13 May 2001. 
1131 National Democratic Institute, above n 1118,7. 
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S e s s i o n . 1 1
3 2  
T h e ·  d e c i s i o n  w a s  r e a c h e d  t h r o u g h  a n  o v e r w h e l m i n g  v o t e  o f  3 6 5  t o  4  w i t h  3 9  
a b s t e n t i o n s . 1 1 3 3  T h e  . .  m e e t i n g  s t a t e d :  
[ t ] h e .  D P R  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a  d e c l a r e s  t h a t  P r e s i d e n t  A b d u r r a h m a n  W a h i d  h a s  
n o t  h e e d e d  t h e  s e c o n d  m e m o r a n d u m  o f  t h e  D P R  a n d ,  a s  s u c h ,  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  A r t i c l e  
7  p a r a g r a p h  4  o f  t h e  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  I l l  o f  1 9 7 8 ,  t h e  D P R  r e q u e s t s  t h e  M P R  t o  c o n v e n e  ·  
a  s p e c i a l  s e s s i o n  t o  a s k  P r e s i d e n t  A b d u r r a h m a n  W a h i d  f o r  h i s  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . 1 1 3 4  
P u r s u a n t  t o  A r t i c l e  3 3 ( 3 )  o f  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  I I  o f  2 0 0 0  o n  S t a n d i n g  O r d e r s ,  ' a  W o r k i n g  B o d y  o f  
t h e  M P R  s h o u l d  p r e p a r e  a  S p e c i a l  S e s s i o n  w i t h i n  a t  l e a s t  t w o  m o n t h s .  T h e  S e s s i o n  w a s ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  s c h e d u l e d  f o r  1 s t  A u g u s t  2 0 0 1 .  
T h e  Chi~f o f  P 6 1 r i  A p p o i n t m e n t .  P r i o r  t o  t h i s  d a t e ,  i n '  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  t h e  C h i e f  
o f  t h e  P o l r i ,  a  n e w  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d  a n d  t h e  D P R  a r o s e .  O n  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  
o f  G e n e r a l  C h a e r u d d i n  I s m a i l ,  w h o  r e p l a c e d  G e n e r a l  B i m a n t o r o ,  t h e  D P R  a r g u e d  t h a t  W a h i d  
h a d  b r e a c h e d  A r t i c l e  7 ( 3 )  o f  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  V I I  o f  2 0 0 0 ,  b y  f a i l i n g  t o  o b t a i n  D P R  a p p r o v a l . 1 t 3 s  
W a h i d ' s  d e f e n s e  w a s  t h a t  t h e  A r t i c l e  w a s  n o t  y e t  e f f e c t i v e ,  b e c a u s e  i t  s h o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  f u r t h e r  
r e g u l a t e d  i n  a  s t a t u t e .  T h e  d e f e n s e  w a s  i n c o r r e c t .  A r t i c l e  1 2  o f  t h e  M P R  D e c r e e  c l e a r l y  
s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  D e c r e e  w a s  e f f e c t i v e ,  s i n c e  i t  h a d  b e e n  p a s s e d  o n  1 8  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 .  T h e  n e w  
c o n f l i c t  l e d  t h e  M P R  l e a d e r s  t o  c o n s i d e r  b r i n g i n g  f o r w a r d  t h e  M P R  S p e c i a l  S e s s i o n . 1 1 3 6  
I n  r e s p o n s e ;  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  d e c l a r e  a  s t a t e  o f  e m e r g e n c y .  H e  i g n o r e d  p r o t e s t s  
f r o m  t h e .  D P R  a n d  a p p o i n t e d  G e n e r a l  C h a e r u d d i n  ·  I s m a i l  a s  A c t i n g  C h i e f  o f  t h e ,  P~lri.1137 
P r e d i c t a b l y ,  t h e . M P R  form~lly m o v e d  f o r w a r d  t h e  o p e n i n g  o f  t h e  S p e c i a l  S e s s i o n .  
T h e  M P R  S p e c i a l  S e s s i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  o p e n e d  o n  2 1  J u l y  2 0 0 1 .  E l l i s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h i s  s e s s i o n ,  
.  ,  
h a v i n g  b e e n  m o v e d  f o r w a r d ,  v i o l a t e d  t h e  M P R  D e c r e e  w h i c h  r e q u i r e d  tw~ m o n t h s  n o t i c e . 1 1 3 a 1 n  
c o n t r a s t ,  L i n d s e y  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  a s  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  w a s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  e x p r e s s e d  t o  h a v e  
1 1
3 2  ' S i d a n g  l s t i m e w a  M P R  m e m i n t a  P e r t a n g g u n g j a w a b a n  P r e s i d e n ' ,  K o m p a s ,  3 1  M a y  2 0 0 1 .  
1 1 3 3 1 b i d .  
1 1 3 4  V a n  Z o r g e  R e p o r t ,  T h e  F i n a l  C o u n t d o w n  < h t t p : / / w w w . v a n z o r g e r e p o r t . c o m / r e p o r t / p o p u p f i n d e x . c f m ? f a = S h o w R e p o r t & p k  
r p t  i d = 3 1 5 & C F I D = 3 1 5 6 0 6 & C F T O K E N = 7 1 6 8 0 8 8 8 >  a t  3  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 3 .  
1 1 3 5  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 1 8 ,  1 0 .  
1 1
3 6  ' M P R  T e a m  A g r e e s  t o  H o l d  S n a p  S e s s i o n  i f  N e c e s s a r y ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 0  J u l y  2 0 0 1 .  
1 1 3 7  
A t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  W a h i d  s t i l l  t r i e d  t o  p l a y  n o m i n a l l y  w i t h i n  t h e  r u l e s .  H e  a p p o i n t e d  G e n e r a l  I s m a i l  a s  a n  ' A c t i n g '  C h i e f ,  i n s t e a d  
o f  a  ' D e f i n i t i v e '  C h i e f  o f  P o l r i .  
1 1 3 8  E l l i s ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 2 ,  1 3 7 .  
1 7 6  
unlimited power, the MPR could amend .its own procedure.1139 This means, if the MPR was 
convened earlier than the two month requirement, the "irregularity could certainly· be 
ratified" .1140 
. The President's Emergency Declaration. For Wahid, however, the new schedule was further 
evidence that the Session was illegal, and therefore, he refused to give his accountability 
speech as invited by the MPR.1141 Instead of giving the speech on 23 July, Wahid announced 
that he was declaring a state of civil emergency. In the form of a Mak/umat, the President 
declared: 
1. the dissolving of the MPR and DPR of the Republic of Indonesia. 
2. the returning of the sovereignty to the people and the taking of action to establish 
an electoral commission to prepare a general election within one year. 
3. the rescuing of the total reform movement from the New Order faction by 
dissolving the Golkar party while awaiting the Supreme Court's decision. 
In response to a request from the DPR, the Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion that the 
Mak/umat was unconstitutional.1142 According to this opinion: the President did not have the 
power to suspend the MPR and the DPR; the holding of an election was a question for the 
legislature; and the possible suspension of Golkar was a matter for the courts.1 143 
Based on the elucidation of the Constitution, Lindsey argues that the Constitution was "clear on 
the MPR's absolute superiority to the President". 1144 With regard to the DPR, the elucidation 
stipulated that, 'The DPR is in a strong position. It cannot be dissolved by the President, unlike 
its position in a parliamentary system'. Lindsey, therefore, concludes that: 
[n]o law of any sort exists purporting to give the President the right to dissolve the MPR 
and there is no precedent for him to do so. The only conclusion to be drawn is therefore 
that President lacks the power to dissolve the MPR.1145 
1139Undsey, aboven 1119. 
1140 Ibid. 
1141 National Democratic Institute, above n 1118, 14-15. 
1142 Letter of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court No.2 of 2001. 
1143 National Democratic Institute, above n 1118, 16. 
1144 Lindsey, above n 1119. 
11451bid. 
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O n  2 3  J u l y  2 0 0 1 ,  t h e  M P R ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  o v e r w h e l m i n g l y  v o t e d  t o  r e j e c t  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  




6  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  M P R  u s e d  t h e  M a k l u m a t  a s ·  
t h e  l e g a l  g r o u n d  f o r  t h e  i m p e a c h m e n t  o f  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d .  W i t h o u t  c h a l l e n g e ,  t h e  M P R  v o t e d ·  
5 9 1  t o  0  t o  p a s s  t h e  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  I I  o f  2 0 0 1 ,  o n  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d .
1 1 4 7  
A r t i c l e  
1  o f  t h e  D e c r e e  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t :  
P r e s i d e n t  A b d u r r a h m a n  W a h i d ' s  a b s e n c e  a n d  r e f u s a l  t o  g i v e  a n  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  s p e e c h  
b e f o r e  t h e  2 0 0 1  M P R  S p e c i a l  S e s s i o n ,  a n d  h i s  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f t h e  M a k l u m a t ,  o n  2 3  J u l y  
2 0 0 1 ,  t r u l y  b r e a c h e d  t h e  h a / u a n  n e g a r a  ( s t a t e  p o l i c y ) .  
T h e  G r o u n d  o f  W a h i d ' s  I m p e a c h m e n t .  T h e  d e c r e e  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  M P R  d i d  n o t  u l t i m a t e l y  
b a s e  t h e  i m p e a c h m e n t  o n  B u l o g - g a t e  a n d  B r u n e i - g a t e .  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d  c o m p l a i n e d  a b o u t  t h i s  
c o n t i n u a l l y  c h a n g i n g  g r o u n d  o f  i m p e a c h m e n t .  T h e  f i r s t  m e m o r a n d u m  o f  t h e  D P R  w a s  b a s e d  o n  
t h e  t w o  f i n a n c i a l  s c a n d a l s ;  w h i l e  t h e  s e c o n d  w a s  m o r e  o n  t h e  p o l i c y  f a i l u r e s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
a n d  W a h i d ' s  i n e f f e c t i v e  l e a d e r s h i p .
1 1 4 8  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  N D I  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  r u l e s  d i d  n o t  p r e v e n t  
t h e  MP~ f r o m  c h a n g i n g  i t s  g r o u n d s  f o r  a c t i o n  a s  t h e  i m p e a c h m e n t  p r o c e s s  p r o g r e s s e d , 1 1 4 9 l  a m  
o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  g r o u n d  o p e n e d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f W a h i d ' s  r e m o v a l . .  
T h e  c h a n g i n g  .  o f  g r o u n d s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  i m p e a c h m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s  m i g h t  b e  e a s i l y  
p o l i t i c i z e d .  I n  a n y  c a s e ,  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  i m p e a c h m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s  s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e  u r g e n c y  o f  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m ,  a s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n .  
3 .  .  T h e  N e e d  f o r  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m  ·  ·  
W a h i d ' s  i m p e a c h m e n t  p r o c e s s  m a d e  i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  d e b a t e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e  
P a r l i a m e n t  c a m e  f r o m  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  f a i l e d  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  c l e a r  i m p e a c h m e n t  p r o c e d u r e s . 1 1 5 o  
W a h i d  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  M P R  c o u l d  n o t  r e m o v e  a  P r e s i d e n t ,  a s  I n d o n e s i a  w a s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  h i m ,  
b a s e d  o n  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m .  H o w e v e r ,  W a h i d  m i g h t  h a v e  f o r g o t t e n  t h a t  h e  w a s  e l e c t e d  b y  t h e  
M P R  a n d  n o t  d i r e c t l y  b y  t h e  p e o p l e ,  a s  h e  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  i n  a  p u r e l y  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m .  I t  
1 1 4 6  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 1 8 ,  1 6 .  
1 1 4 7 1 b i d  1 7 .  
1 1 4 B i n t e r n a t i o n a l  C r i s i s  G r o u p ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 2 3 ,  4 .  
1 1 4 9  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 1 8 ,  2 0 .  
1 1
5 0  V a n  Z o r g e  R e p o r t ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  W a r f a r e  ( 2 0 0 1 )  < h t t p : / / w w w . v a n z o r g e r e p o r t . c o m / r e p o r t / p o p u p f l n d e x . c f m ? f a , ; , S h o w R e p o r t  
& p k  r p t  i d = 1 3 & C F I D = 3 1 5 6 0 6 & C F T O K E N = 7 1 6 8 0 8 8 8 >  a t  3  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 3 .  
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was this mixed system as embodied in the Constitution, with its many interpretative loopholes, 
which contributed to the long and confused conflict between Wahid and the Parliament. 
For J. Soedjati Djiwandono, the lessons from the tug-of-war between the legislative bodies and 
the executive were the extent to which, "the 1945 Constitution contradicts democratic 
prinCiples". 1151 Djiwandono argues that the creation of the MPR as "the supreme governing 
body" was another fundamental defect of the Constitution.1152 Once elected, the MPR had 
unlimited power for five years. In the case of Wahid's removal, the MPR constitutionally used 
its power to decide that Wahid had 'truly breached the state policy', and was therefore 
impeachable. 
The problem was made worse because of the absence of a mechanism for judicial authority 
that could resolve the constitutional vagueness.1153 The Supreme Court had no power of 
constitutional review. As a result, different constitutional interpretations were simply left 
unresolved. The MPR was the sole judge of the constitutionality of its own acts. 11_54 
Wahid's removal, therefore, strengthened the necessity of constitutional reform 1155 and, indeed, 
in response the Third Amendment stipulates better impeachment procedures; limits the powers 
of the MPR; and forms a Constitutional Court which has the power of constitutional review. 
B. The Third Amendment: the Process 
Unlike the First and Second Amendment discussions, the question of when the constitution-
making should occur was not debated in the Third Amendment. The MPR was trying to finish 
the amendment by 2002 as agreed on the 2000 Annual Session. This section, therefore, only 
considers three issues: (i) how the constitution-making was conducted; (ii) who the constitution-
making body was to be; (iii) and how public participation was organized. 
1151 J. Soedjati Djiwandono, 'Lessons from Special Session: Constitutional Change Urgent', The Jakarta Post, 26 July 2001. 
11521bid. 
1153 National Democratic Institute, above n 1118, 10. 
11541bid. 
1155 1bid 24. 
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1 .  H o w  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n - M a k i n g  w a s  c o n d u c t e d  
A s  w i t h  t h e  F i r s t  a n d  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t s ,  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  d e b a t e s  w e r e  c o n d u c t e d  
i n  f o u r  s t a g e s  ( T a b l e  1 2 ) .  
•  F i r s t ,  t h e  M P R  W o r k i n g  B o d y  p r e p a r e d  m a t e r i a l s  f o r  t h e  2 0 0 1  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ;  t h i s  
b o d y  t h e n  f o r m e d  t h r e e  a d  h o c  c o m m i t t e e s .  
•  S e c o n d ,  o n e  o f  t h e  c o m m i t t e e s ,  t h e  A d  H o c  C o m m i t t e e  I  ( P a n i t i a  A d  H o c  I  o r  P A H  I  o f  
2 0 0 1  o r  t h e  C o m m i t t e e ) ,  w a s  m a d e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  c o n t i n u i n g  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .
1 1 5 6  
T h e  C o m m i t t e e  w o r k e d  f r o m  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 0  u n t i l  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 1 .  I t s  
f i n d i n g s  w e r e  t h e n  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  f o r  t h e  2 0 0 1  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n .  
•  T h i r d ,  C o m m i s s i o n  A  w a s  f o r m e d  d u r i n g  t h e  2 0 0 1  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  t o  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s  t h e  
d r a f t  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  p r e p a r e d  b y  t h e  C o m m i t t e e .  
•  F o u r t h ,  o n  9  N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 1 ,  i n  t h e  s e v e n t h  p l e n a r y  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  t h e  
M P R  r a t i f i e d  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  w e r e  t h e  s a m e  a s  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r ,  w h i l e  t h e  P A H  I  a n d  
C o m m i s s i o n  A  h a d  4 7  a n d  1 6 2  m e m b e r s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I n  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  b o d i e s ,  t h e  e l e v e n  
f a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  M P R  w e r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  t h e i r  s e a t s  i n  
t h e  M P R .  
1 1 5 6  
S e c t i o n  t w o  o f  t h e  M P R  W o r k i n g  B o d y  D e c i s i o n  N o . 4  o f  1 9 9 9  o n  t h e  F o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  A d  H o c  C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  M P R  
W o r k i n g  B o d y .  ·  
1 8 0  
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1 1 5 7  E l l i s ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 2 ,  1 3 6 .  
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i : { J r : 1 3  b;~dT 
1 1 5 8  M i n u t e s  o f  5
1 1 1  
m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  7  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 0 ,  1 9 5  - 1 9 6 .  
1 1 5 9  ' K P U  h a r a p k a n  S i d a n g  T a h u n a n  M P R  R a m p u n g k a n  T i g a  H a l ' ,  K o m p a s ,  3 0  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 1 .  
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1 1 6 0  ' P D I P  m e i i y e f u j u i  P e n i i l i h a r i  P r ' e s i d e n  L a n g ' s u n g · d a l a m  D u a  T a h a p ' , · K o m p a s ' ,  3 1  O c i o b e r 2 0 0 1 : '  . •  n  . . . . . . .  · '  " . . . ,  
1 8 2 U :  
2001, Endriartono. Sutarto, who was the Army Chief of Staff, warned certain elements of the 
nation against inserting the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 Constitution.t161 Sutarto argued that: 
p]f all elements of this nation view the Jakarta Charter as inappropriate for insertion into 
the 1945 Constitution, due to the fact that our nation consists of various religions and 
ethnic backgrounds, then, as long as the people stick to that united stance, no groups or 
elements can force their will to insert it to the Constitution. 1162 
In the same line, the PDKB, which was a Christian party, argued that the preamble of the 
Constitution should not be amended, and should be further elaborated in Articles of the 
' . . ' " . 
Constitution.t16J 
The Amendment of the preamble, and amendment of Articles {to make them} inconsistent 
with the preamble, are a breach of the social contract of the birth of the Republic of 
Indonesia, and consequently, would end the Unitary state of the Republic of lndonesia.1 164 
Although it did not specifically mention it, it was understood that the PDKB referred to the 
. . 
amendment proposal to insert the 'seven words' of Jakarta Charter into Article 29(1) on 
religion. 
Both the five basic agreements and the concern about the possible adoption of the Jakarta 
Charter into the Constitution strengthened the MPR's position on amending but not making a 
new Constitution. However, during the Third Amendment discussions, the pressure from civil 
society to have a brand-new Constitution increased, as the next section shows. 
b. An Old but Totally Renewed Constitution? 
The MPR's Position. As was the· case. with the First and Second Amendments, the MPR's 
members were firm in saying that the MPR was merely amending the .1945. Constitution. The 
Expert Team of the PAH I, however, was of the opi~ion, that the MPR was moving toward 
making a new Constitution. Ismail Suny argued that, in the case of the First and Second 
Amendments, the term 'addendum' was no longer correct.t 165 The scope did not only limited to 
1161'Army Chief Warns of Jakarta Charter Dispute', The Jakarta Post, 1 November 2001. 
11621bid. 
1163 Minutes of the 5th Plenary Meeting, 4 November 2001, 78. 
1164 1bid. 
1165 Minutes of 11th meeting of the PAH I, in the Second Book Volume 3A, 20 March 2001, 4. 
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o n e  i s s u e  a s  i t  s h o u l d  b e  f o r  a n  a m e n d m e n t .  I n s t e a d  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h e  F i r s t  a n d  S e c o n d  
A m e n d m e n t s  - a n d  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  f c i r  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t s  - c o v e r e d  m a n y  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
i s s u e s .  S u n y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  p r o p o s e d  t h e  m a k i n g  o f  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  S i m i l a r l y ,  M a s w a d i  R a u f  
a r g u e d  t h a t :  
I  d o  n o t  t h i n k  t h e  F i r s t  a n d  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t s  a r e  a d d e n d u m s .  T h e y  a d o p t e d  n e w  
A r t i c l e s ,  a d d e d  n e w  t h o u g h t s ,  r e v i s e d  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  c h a p t e r s ,  a n d  f u r t h e r  a d d e d  n e w  
c h a p t e r s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  w e  w o u l d  r e w r i t e  o u r  C o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 1 6 6  .  
I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  S u n y  a n d  R a u f ,  T o b i n g  r e p l i e d  t h a t  h e  a l s o  t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  t e r m  ' a d d e n d u m '  
w a s  n o t  s u i t a b l e  f o r  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t .
1 1 6 7  
H o w e v e r ,  h e  a d d e d  t h a t  a s  
t h i s  p r o c e s s  h a d ,  i n  f a c t ,  a l r e a d y  t a k e n  p l a c e ,  h e  s u g g e s t e d  c o n t i n u i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  w i t h o u t  
b e i n g  a n n o y e d  w i t h  t h e  u s e  o f  t h i s  t e r m . 1 1 6 B  .  
M u l y o s u d a r m o  p r o p o s e d  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  t e r m  ' r e n e w a l '  i n s t e a d  o f  t h e  t e r m  ' r e w r i t i n g ' . 1 1 6 9  H e  
argu~d t h a t  b e c a u s e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  k e p t  s o m e  o r i g i n a l  a r t i c l e s ,  r e s t r u c t u r e d  s o m e  o l d -
a m e n d e d  a r t i c l e s ,  a d d e d  b r a n d - n e w  a r t i c l e s  a n d  f i n a l l y ,  c o n s o l i d a t e d  a l l  a r t i c l e s ,  t h e  t e r m  
' r e n e w a l '  w a s  m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e . 1 1 1 o  
I n d e e d ,  t h e  E x p e r t  T e a m  a c t u a l l y  p r o p o s e d  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  b u t  i n  t h e  o l d  f o r m a t .  I n  
c o m m e n t i n g  o n t h e  E x p e r t  T e a m ' s  p r o p o s a l ,  Z o e l v a  ( P B B )  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
. . .  o b s e r v i n g  t h e  p r o p o s a l  p r e p a r e d  b y  t h e  E x p e r t  T e a m ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  e n t i r e  B o d y  o f  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  h a s  b e e n  r e s t r u c t u r e d .  I t  i s  n o t  o n l y  a n  a m e n d m e n t  b u t  a  c o m p l e t e  
r e w o r k i n g .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  c o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  B o d y  o f  t h e  
1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  '  ·  ·  
P u b l i c  P o s i t i o n :  T h e  p r e s s u r e  t o  h a v e  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  g r e w .  T h e  " N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  C i v i l  
.  S o c i e t y  M o v e m e n t "  o r g a n i z e d  a  c a m p a i g n  t o  p r e s s u r e  t h e  l e g i s l a t o r s .  A r t i c l e s  o n ·  t h e  u r g e n c y  
.  .  
o f  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w e r e  p u b l i s h e d  i n  m a n y  n e w s p a p e r s .  1 m  
1 1 6 6
1 b i d  8 .  
1 1 6
7
1 b i d  2 5 .  
1 1 6 8 1 b i d .  
1 1 6 9  M i n u t e s  o f  1 3 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  i n  t h e  S e c o n d  B o o k  V o l u m e  3 A ,  2 4  A p r i l 2 0 0 1 ,  1 5 0 .  
1 1 7 0  I b i d .  
1 1 7 1  S o m e  o f  t h e  a r t i c l e s  w e r e :  S m i t a  N a t o  S u s a n t o ,  ' K o m i s i  u n t u k  K o n s t i t u s i  B a r u ' ,  S u a r a  K a r y a ,  2 6  A p r i l 2 0 0 1 ;  T o d u n g  M u l y a  
L u b i s ,  ' K o n s t i t u s i  B a r u ,  S e k a l i  L a g i ' ,  S i n a r  H a r a p a n ,  2 4  J u n e  2 0 0 1 ;  U l i  P a r u l i a n  S i h o m b i n g ,  ' K o n s t i t u s i  B a r u :  A g e n d a  U t a m a · , ·  
1 8 4 "  
In November 2001, at the last moment of the Third Amendment discussions, Eddy O.S. Hiariej 
argued that the MPR should introduce a new Constitution. 1172 Hiariej referred to Article 2 
Paragraph 2 of the Additional Provisions of the 1945 Constitution, which stated, 'Within six 
months after the MPR has been set up, the MPR shall sit in order to determine the 
Constitution'.117J For Hiariej, 'to determine the Constitution' clearly means making a new 
Constitution. Likewise, Todung Mulya Lubis argued that, "what we need is not merely an 
amendment of the Constitution but its total reform".1 174 Lubis argued that Indonesia needed a 
new social contract . which gave more guarantees for a separation of powers, check and 
balances, human rights and the supremacy of law and social justice. 117s 
The MPR declaration. Despite all suggestions from the Expert Team and the society, the MPR 
still firmly declared that it was only amending . the Constitution, throughout the Third 
Amendment discussions. J.E. Sahetapy (PDIP), however, argued that the MPR appeared to 
amend all of the original Articles so it could not actually claim that it did not make a new 
Constitution.1176 
c. The Policy to Avoid Voting 
As the discussions touched more crucial amendment proposals, agreement among the MPR 
factions was more difficult to reach. Yet the Third Amendment discussions showed that the 
MPR tried very hard to avoid voting. 
Rais argued that, if voting was conducted for every Article to be amended, it would be long-
winded affair which would drain everyone's energy.1177 He also argued that, for fundamental 
. . . 
constitutional matters, voting was not a wise decision mechanism.1178 Although he did not 
clearly ll!ention what the fundamental constitutional matter was, it could be predicted that Rais 
Kompas, 31 July 2001; Satya Arinanto, 'Merindukan Konstitusi Baru', Koran Tempo, 8 August 2001; Saldi lsra, 'Konstitusi 
Baru: Agenda Mendesak', Republika, 24 August 2001. · 
1172 Eddy O.S. Hiariej, 'Constitutional Change not just MPR's Task', The Jakarta Post, 12 November 2001. 
11731bid. 
1174 
'Constitution needs Total Reform', The Jakarta Post, 5 April2001. 
1175 Todung Mulya Lubis, 'Reformasi Konstitusi', Tempo, No. 9/XXX, 30 April- 6 May 2001. 
1176 
'PAH I Terkesan Membuat Konstitusi Baru', Suara Pembaruan, 12 September 2001. 
1177 KPU harapkan Sidang Tahunan MPR Rampungkan Tiga Hal, above n 1159. 
1178 'Disepakati, Pemilihan Presiden Langsung', Kompas, 1 November 2001. 
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w a s  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  s t a t e  a n d  r e l i g i o n  a n d  t h u s  t h e  i s s u e  o f  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  
J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  i n t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  F o r  t h i s  s e n s i t i v e  i s s u e ,  t h e  M P R  c h o s e  t o  a v o i d  v o t i n g ,  
p o s t p o n e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  a n d  f u r t h e r  d e l i b e r a t e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l  a t  t h e  2 0 0 2  M P R  A n n u a l  
S e s s i o n .
1 1 7 9  
L a c k  o f  D e a d l o c k  M e c h a n i s m .  A n o t h e r  r e a s o n  b e h i n d  t h e  p o l i c y  t o  a v o i d  v o t i n g  w a s  t h e  f e a r  
o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e a d l o c k  l i k e  t h e  o n e  t h a t  w a s  s e e n  a s  u l t i m a t e l y  d e s t r o y i n g  t h e  K o n s t i ( u a n t e  
i n  1 9 5 9 .  I f  v o t i n g  w a s  c o n d u c t e d ,  b u t  f a i l e d  t o  f u l f i l l  t h e  a p p r o v a l  r e q u i r e m e n t  s e t  u p  i n  A r t i C l e  3 7  
o f  t h e .  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  w h o l e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  p r o c e s s  m i g h t  b e  i n  j e o p a r d y  b e c a u s e  t h e  
1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  l a c k e d  m e c h a n i s m s  t o  r e s o l v e  d e a d l o c k .  T h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f  r e f e r e n d u m ,  f o r  
e x a m p l e ,  a s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  T h a i l a n d  a n d  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  w a s  a b s e n t  i n  I n d o n e s i a .  T h i s  d a n g e r  o f  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e a d l o c k  w a s  m o r e  a p p a r e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s .  C h a p t e r  
S e v e n  c o n s i d e r s  t h i s  p r o b l e m  i n  m o r e  d e t a i l .  
F o r  J .  S o e d j a t i  D j i w a n d o n o ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c r u c i a l  p r o p o s a l s  o n  r e l i g i o n  a n d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
e l e c t i o n  w e r e  a d j o u r n e d  w a s  a  b l e s s i n g  i n  d i s g u i s e .  H e  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
. . .  i t  i s  g o o d  t h a t  t h e  s e s s i o n  f a i l e d  t o  r e a c h  a g r e e m e n t  . . . .  T h e  p r e s e n t  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  
l e a d e r s  a n d  p o l i t i c i a n s  c a n n o t  b e  r e l i e d  o n  t o  c a r r y  o n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  g e n u i n e  r e f o r m .  
T h e y  a r e  u n w i l l i n g  a n d  u n a b l e  t o  r e f o r m  t h e m s e l v e s ,  p e r h a p s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  v e s t e d  o f  
i n t e r e s t s . 1 1 s o .  
T h i s  i s s u e  o n  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  i s  h e r e b y  e l a b o r a t e d .  
· d .  S h o r t - T e r m  P o l i t i c a l  I n t e r e s t s  
A s  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  t o u c h e d  o r i  p o l i t i c a l  a g e n d a  p r o p o s a l s ,  s u c h  a s  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
e l e c t i o n ,  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  w e r e  a g a i n  a p p a r e n t .  D e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  w a s  n o t  b a s e d  
s o l e l y  o n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  b u t  w a s  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  - o r  e v e n  
p e r s o n a l  - b e n e f i t .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  t r a d e - o f f  b e t w e e n  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s  w a s  u n a v o i d a b l e  . .  
T h i s  s e c t i o n  c o n s i d e r s  t h e s e  s h o r t - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  d u r i n g  t h e  .  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  
d i s c u s s i o n  i n  d e t a i l s .  
1 1 7 9 1 b i d .  
1 1 8 0  J .  S o e d j a t i  D j i w a n d o n o ,  ' M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n  n o t  w o r t h  a  D a m n ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 2  N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 1 .  
1 8 6  
(1) . Presidential Election 
As part of the Third Amendment, the MPR approved a system of direct presidential election. It 
agreed that if a presidential candidate received over 50% of the popular vote, and no less than 
20% of the votes in a majority of provinces, the candidate would be inaugurated.1181 However, if 
none of the candidates fulfilled the requirements, the MPR factions were divided on what would 
then follow. The PDIP thought that, on the second round election, the MPR should then choose 
between the two candidates who received the biggest vote. Other factions believed, however, 
the second round should again be voted on by the people. 
The PDIP's Interest. The position of the PDIP was influenced by the imminent 2004 
presidential election. This party was not confident that, if the second round was left to the 
people, Megawati could win the election.1182 The PDIP preference for the MPR holding the 
second round election was surprising. The party had had a bad experience when in the 1999 
MPR General Session, Wahid defeated Megawati. I argue that the PDIP might have been . 
worried about Megawati's capacity. If the people were to decide the second round election, she 
would. have actively campaigned and been involved in serious debate with other presidential 
candidates. These activities might have seriously damaged Megawati's vote because of her 
propensity to silence in public forum. 
Golkar's Position. Golkar was of the opinion that the second round election should have been 
left to the people without intervention from the MPR. This preference was also influenced by 
the imminent 2004 presidential election. Golkar had believed that, with its strong political 
infrastructures in the region, its presidential candidate would win a pure direct presidential 
election.1183 
The Trade-off between Golkar and the PDIP. Yusuf (Golkar) disclosed that there was a 
trade-off amendment proposals between Golkar and the PDIP. 1184 Golkar advocated a pure 
direct presidential election and strong bicameralism. The PDIP, on the other hand, rejected 
both the pure direct presidential election and strong bicameralism. In a negotiation meeting,. 
1181 The Third Amendment, Article of 6A (3) of the 1945 Constitution. 
1182 'Pertarungan Politik dalam Proses Amandemen UUD .1945' Republika, 21 December 2001. See also Kawamura, above n 
661, 50. 
1183 Pertarungan Politik dalam Proses Amandemen UUD 1945, above 1182. 
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b o t h  p a r t i e s  a g r e e d  t o  t r a d e - o f f  t h e  t w o  i s s u e s  . .  G o l k a r  a g r e e d  w i t h  t h e  P D I P  t h a t  t h e  s e c o n d  
r o u n d  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  w o u l d  b e  i n v e s t e d  i n  t h e  M P R ;  i n  e x c h a n g e ,  t h e  P D I P  s u p p o r t e d  
G o l k a r ' s  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  t h e  D P D  ( R e g i o n a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  C o u n c i l )  w o u l d  h a v e  s o m e  l e g i s l a t i v e  
P , o w e r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  b i l l s  r e l a t e d  t o  r e g i o n a l  i s s u e s . 1 1 8 s  
A s  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  t r a d e - o f f ,  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  f i n a l l y  a g r e e d  o n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  D P D  
a n d  i t s  l i m i t e d  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r s ,  b u t  f a i l e d  t o  a g r e e  o n  t h e  s e c o n d  r o u n d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n .  
T h e  r e a s o n  o f  t h i s  f a i l u r e  w a s  M e g a w a t i  o w n  d o u b t s .  B a w a z i e r  o f  R e f o r m a s i  r e v e a l e d  t h a t ,  i n  
t h e  f i n a l  l o b b y ,  R a i s  o f f e r e d  t h a t  h e  w a s  r e a d y  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  P D I P ' s  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  
p r o p o s a l .
1 1 8
6  H o w e v e r ,  M e g a w a t i  r e p l i e d  t h a t  s h e  p r e f e r r e d  t o  a d j o u r n  t h e  m a t t e r  f o r  f u r t h e r  
d e l i b e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  2 0 0 2  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n . 1 1 8 7  
( 2 )  T h e  C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  M P R  
P r e d i c t a b l y ,  F U G  a n d  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  f a c t i o n s  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  t h e  M P R  
s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  u p  o f  t h e  D P R ,  t h e  D P D  a n d  n o n - e l e c t e d  g r o u p s '  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 1 1 8 8  T h i s  
s u p p o r t  w a s  b a s e d  o n  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s a l  w o u l d  a l l o w  F U G  a n d  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  f a c t i o n  t o  h a v e  s e a t s  i n  t h e  M P R  t h r o u g h  t h e  ' n o n - e l e c t e d  g r o u p s '  c l a u s e . 1 1 8 9  
S u t j i p t o  ( F U G )  a n d  A f f a n d i  ( T N I - P o l r i )  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  M P R  s h o u l d  n o t  o n l y  b e  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  b u t  a l s o  b y  f u n c t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
1 1 9 0  
N e i t h e r  o f  F U G  n o r  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  
f a c t i o n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  p r o p o s e d  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  s e l e c t i o n  m e c h a n i s m  f o r  t h e  n o n - e l e c t e d  
m e m b e r s .  T h i s  m e c h a n i s m  w a s  o b v i o u s l y  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a v o i d  t h e s e  f u n c t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
b e i n g  u s e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  t o  p r o l o n g  h i s  o r  h e r  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  a s  h a p p e n e d  d u r i n g  




1 n t e r v i e w w i t h  S l a m e t  E f f e n d y  Y u s u f ,  t h e  V i c e  C h a i r p e r s o n  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  1 9  J u n e  2 0 0 3 .  
1 1 8 5  
' A m a n d e m e n  U U D  D i w a r n a i  P r a k t i k  D a g a n g  S a p i ' ,  M e d i a  I n d o n e s i a ,  7  N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 1 .  
1 1 8 6 1 n t e r v i e w  w i t h  F u a d  B a w a z i e r ,  m e m b e r  o f  P A H  I ,  1 8  J u n e  2 0 0 3 .  
1 1 8 7 1 b i d .  
1 1 8
8  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  T h e  F u n d a m e n t a l  C h a n g e s  t h a t  N o b o d y  N o t i c e d :  T h e  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  N o v e m b e r  
2 0 0 1  ( 2 0 0 2 )  8 .  
1 1 8 9  K a w a m u r a ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 1 ,  5 0 .  
1 1 9 0  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  2 n d  m e e t i n g  o f  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  5  N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 1 ,  5 8 ,  8 8  - 8 9 .  
1 8 8  
(3) The Voting Requirement for Impeachment 
Another example of short-term political interest was an amendment proposal on the voting 
requirement for impeachment. After replacing President Wahid, the PDIP was afraid that 
Megawati would be easily impeached as had happened to Wahid. Therefore, the party 
advocated a more difficult voting requirement for impeachment, namely that the impeachment 
should be approved by both the DPR and MPR. 
Specifically, the PDIP proposed that for the DPR to submit an impeachment process to the 
Constitutional Court, the support of at least two-third~ of the members of the DPR in a plenary 
meeting, attended by at least two~thirds of the total number of members of the DPR, should be 
required. 1191 At the final stage of the impeachment, the decision of the MPR to remove a 
President, 'must be made in a plenary meeting of the MPRattended by at least three-quarters 
of the total numbers and with the approval of at least two-third of the number of members 
present' .1192 This impeachment voting requirement· is the highest in voting threshold MPR 
procedure. It is even more difficult than the voting requirement to amend the Constitution. 
e. The Movement to Reject the Amendment 
A letter requesting the MPR's deferral of the Third Amendment was circulated during the 2001 
Annual Session. A Kompas so"urce revealed that the letter was signed by 220 members. The 
letter sought rejection of the establishment of the DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Oaerah, Regional 
Representative's Council), which the signatories believed would damage the concept of a 
unitary state.1193 Although the letter did not affect the Third Amendment ratification, it proved 
that some members of the MPR still rejected the very idea of amending the 1945 Constitution. 
The movement to reject the amendment became stronger during the Fourth Amendment 
discussions. Chapter Seven elaborates on this issue. 
1191 Article 78 (3) of the Third Amendment. 
1192 Article 78 (7) of the Third Amendment. 
1193 
'Pasal-pasal Krusial didiskusikan tahun Depan', Kompas, 10 November 2001. 
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2 .  W h o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n - M a k i n g  B o d y  w a s  t o  b e  
T h e  p r e s s u r e  t o  h a v e  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  .  m a k e r  w a s  g r e a t e r  d u r i n g  t h e  T h i r d  
A m e n d m e n t  d e b a t e s .  O n e  e v e n t  w h i c h  s t r e n g t h e n e d  d o u b t s  a b o u t  t h e  M P R  a s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
m a k e r  o c c u r r e d  d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  2 0 0 1  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  w h e n  a  f i g h t  b r o k e  
o u t  o n  t h e  f l o o r  a n d  w a s  b r o a d c a s t e d  l i v e  b y  s o m e  n a t i o n a l  t e l e v i s i o n s  s t a t i o n s .  
a .  I n v e s t i g a t i o n  C o m m i t t e e  o n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
I n  l a t e  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 1 ,  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d  s t a t e d  t h a t  h e  w o u l d  f o r m  a  s p e c i a l  c o m m i t t e e  t o  
i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  . .  
1 1 9 4  
W a h i d ' s  i n t e n t i o n s  w e r e  q u e s t i o n a b l e  
b e c a u s e  h e  m e n t i o n e d  i t  a t  a  m o m e n t  o f  h i g h  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e  D P R .  F o r  
B u d y a t n a ,  t h i s  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  w a s ,  i n  r e a l i t y ,  l i t t l e  m o r e  t h a n  ·  W a h i d  e n g a g i n g  i n  p o l i t i c a l  
b a r g a i n i n g  w i t h  t h e  M P R . 1 1 9 s  
I n  a n y  c a s e ,  t h e  M P R  r e j e c t e d  W a h i d ' s  p r o p o s a l .  T o b i n g  ( P D I P )  c o m m e n t e d  t h a t  i f  t h e  
C o m m i t t e e  c o n s i s t e d  o f  e x p e r t s ,  i t  w o u l d  b e  b e t t e r  i f  i t  w a s  c o n s o l i d a t e d  w i t h  t h e  E x p e r t  
T e a m . 1 1 9 6  Y u s u f  ( G o l k a r )  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  w o r d  ' i n v e s t i g a t i n g '  i n  t h e  c o m m i t t e e  m i g h t  m i s l e a d . 1 1 9 7  
I t  c o u l d  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  a s  a  c o m m i t t e e  w h i c h  w o u l d  q u e s t i o n  t h e  l e g a l i t y  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  w o u l d  n o t  a c t  a s  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y .  Y u s u f  a r g u e d  t h a t  w h a t e v e r  w a s  
t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  w o r d ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  r e f o r m  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  r e m a i n e d  w i t h  t h e  M P R .
1 1 9
8  
W a h i d  n o n e t h e l e s s  i s s u e d  P r e s i d e n t i a l  D e c r e e  N o .  4 7  o f  2 0 0 1  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  I n v e s t i g a t i o n  
C o m m i t t e e .  A r t i c l e  2  o f  t h e  d e c r e e  m e n t i o n e d  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  w o u l d ,  ' i n v e s t i g a t e ,  d i s c u s s  
a n d  o u t l i n e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o b l e m '  a n d  w o u l d ,  ' g i v e  i t s  i n p u t  t o  t h e  M P R ' .  T h e  C o m m i t t e e ,  
h o w e v e r ,  n e v e r  c o n d u c t e d  a n y  a c t i v i t i e s ,  d u e  t o  t h e  l a c k  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  a n d  q u i c k l y  
b e c a m e  i r r e l e v a n t . 1 1 9 9  
1 1 9 4  
' G u s  D u r  t o  A p p o i n t  E x p e r t  t o  S t u d y  A m e n d m e n t  t o  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 9  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 1 .  
1 1 9 5  ' K e n t a l  B e r a r o m a  P o l i t i k ' ,  S u a r a  P e m b a r u a n ,  2 0  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 1 1 .  
1 1 9 6  ' S e b a i k n y a  d i i n t e g r a s i k a n  k e  B P  M P R ' ,  M e d i a  I n d o n e s i a ,  1 0  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 1 .  
1 1 9 7  
' W e w e n a n g  M e n g u b a h ,  M e n e t a p k a n  K o n s t i t u s i  d i  T a n g a n  M P R ' ,  S u a r a  P e m b a r u a n ,  1 9  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 1 .  
1 1 9 8 1 b i d .  
1 1 9
9 1 n t e r v i e w  w i t h  H a r u n  A l r a s i d ,  P r o f e s s o r  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  L a w  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  1 4  J u l y  2 0 0 3  . . .  
1 9 0  
b. Expert Team 
The establishment of the Expert Team was the response of the PAH I to public criticism of the 
MPR's performance in the First and Second Amendments. 1200 The team consisted of thirty 
experts and was divided into five fields: politics; law; economics; religion, social and culture; 
and education. 1201 The selection process of the Expert Team started when each faction 
presented experts names to the PAH I. .In the first stage, the PAH I listed 90 names of 
experts.1202 How the selection process was conducted was not so clear. Tobing stated that: · 
... the selection process was not a 'fit and proper' test ... not comparing one candidate to 
another, it is simply a process of reducing the numbers from 90 to 30, that's itJ203 
The 'Civil Society Movement for a New Constitution', therefore, argued that the PAH I formed 
the Expert Team merely to rubber-stamp its amendment process.12o4 By doing so, the PAH I 
could claim that the amendment proposals had been academically reviewed. 1205 Indeed, there 
were some indicators thatthis was true. First, during the PAH l's meetings on the 
establishment of the Expert Team, many of the members emphasized that the Team was 
merely a supporting, ad hoc, complementary team.12o6 Second, Sahetapy (PDIP) argued that 
the Team should have been dismissed.12o1 For him, the Team merely quoted theories from text 
books which could simply have been read by the PAH 1. 1208 Third, Tobing pointed out that the 
main guidance for amendment was the proposal prepared by the PAH I 2000 and attached to 
the MPR decree No. IX of 2000. 1209 This proposal contained some agreed Articles and disputed 
Articles, with alternatives. 
1200 Minutes of 1st meeting of the Working Body, 5 September 2000, 9-57. 
1201 The 30 people were: Afan Gaffar, Bahtiar Effendy, Maswadi Rauf, Ramlan Surbakti, Riswandha lmawan, Dahlan Thaib, 
Hasyim Djalal, Ismail Suny, Jimly Asshiddiqie, Maria S.W. Sumardjono, Muchsan, Satya Arinanto, Sri Soemantri 
Martosoewgnjo, Soewoto Mulyosudarmo, Bam bang Sudibyo, Dawam Rahardjo, Didik J. Rachbini, Mubyarto, Sri Adiningsih, Sri 
Mulyani, Syahrir, Azyumardi Azra, Eka Dharmaputera, Komarudin Hidayat, Nazaruddin Umar, Sardjono Jatiman, Willy Toisuta, 
Wuryadi and Jahja Umar. At the beginning of the Foruth Amendment discussions, however, Prof. Jatiman passed away. The 
Expert Team, therefore, only consisted of 29 members for the rest of its working period. 
1202 Minutes of the 7th meeting of the PAH I, 23 January 2001, 77-88. 
12°3Minutesofthe 10th meeting ofthePAHI, 7 March2001, 180-181. 
1204 
'Assembly Working Group Blasted over Constitutional Amendments', The Jakarta Post, 22 March 2001. 
1205Jbid. 
1206 Minutes of 5th meeting of the PAH I, 7 December 2000, 198-217. 
1207 Minutes of 23rd meeting of the PAH I, 3 September 2001, 129. 
1208Jbid. 
1209 
'Tim Ahli Lebih Partisan dibanding PAH', Koran Tempo, 5 September 2001. 
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B a w a z i e r  ( R e f o r m a s 1 )  a n d  S o e w a r n o  ( P D I P )  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  P A H  I  2 0 0 1  s h o u l d  o n l y  
d i s c u s s  t h e  2 0 0 0  p r o p o s a l ,  w h i c h  s t i l l  c o n t a i n e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  T h i s  m e a n t  t h e  i n p u t  o f  t h e  E x p e r t  
T e a m  o n  t h e ·  2 0 0 0  a g r e e d  a r t i c l e s  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .
1 2 1 0  
M u l y o s u d a r m o  n o t e d  t h i s  
l i m i t a t i o n ,  s a y i n g  t h a t  h e  h a d  r e c e i v e d  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  t h e  P A H  I  2 0 0 1  m e r e l y  n e e d e d  t h e  
T e a m  t o  l e g i t i m i z e  t h e  P A H  I  2 0 0 0 ' s  p r o p o s a 1 . 1 2 1 1  
F o r t u n a t e l y ,  S a m b u a g a  c h a l l e n g e d  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  o f  B a w a z i e r  a n d  S o e w a r n o .
1 2 1 2  
S a m b u a g a  
a r g u e d  t h a t  i t  w a s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  P A H  I  2 0 0 1  t o  r e c o n s i d e r  t h e  w h o l e  2 0 0 0  p r o p o s a l ,  i n  l i g h t  
o f  t h e  i n p u t  f r o m  t h e  s o c i e t y  a n d  t h e  T e a m .
1 2 1 3  
M o s t  o f  t h e  A r t i c l e s  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  w e r e  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  P A H  I  2 0 0 0  a n d  t h e  E x p e r t  T e a m ' s  p r o p o s a l ,  p l u s  
s o m e  b r a n d - n e w  A r t i c l e s  f r o m  t h e  P A H  I  2 0 0 1 .  F r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  w h i c h  o f  t h e  E x p e r t  
T e a m  a n d  t h e .  P A H  I  h a d  m o r e  i n f l u e n c e ,  t h e  o r i g i n  o f  t h e  a r t i c l e s  c o m p r i s i n g _  t h e . T h i r d  
A m e n d m e n t  c a n  b e  d i v i d e d  i n t o  s e v e n  c a t e g o r i e s  ( T a b l e  1 3 ) .  
'  .  
T a b l e  1 3  
O r i g i n  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  P r o p o s a l  
C a m e  f r o m  
r t T e a m  a n d  t h e  P A H  1 2 0 0 0  
T h e  E x p e r t T e a m  a n d  t h e  P A H  I  2 0 0 0 ,  
m o d i f i e d  b y  t h e  P A H  1 2 0 0 1  
T h e  P A H  I  2 0 0 0  b u t  m o d i f i e d  b y  t h e  P A H  I  
2 0 0 1  
T h e  P A H  I  2 0 0 0  
T h e  P A H  1 2 0 0 1  
N u m b e r s  o f  p r o p o s a l  
a c c e  t e d  
P e r c e n t a g e  
9 . 8  
1 9 . 6  
2  
3 7 . 2 "  
5 . 9  
1 7 . 7  
7 . 8  
S o u r c e :  E x t r a c t e d  f r o m  t h e  P A H  I  2 0 0 0 ' s  p r o p o s a l ,  t h e  E x p e r t  T e a m ' s  p r o p o s a l  a n d  t h e  
T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  ·  
1 2 1 o  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  2 4 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  5  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 1 ,  2 5 7 ,  2 6 2 .  
1 2 1 1  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  1 9 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  2 9  M a y  2 0 0 1 ,  1 6 5 .  
1 2 1 2  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  2 4 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  5  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 1 ,  2 6 6 .  
1 9 2  
Table 13 lists from the most influential to the least influential amendment proposal by the 
Expert Team. It shows that only 9.8% of the Third Amendment outcomes solely came from the 
Team. For the radical groups, which opposed the MPR as Constitution maker, the accepted 
proposals from the Expert Team were not sufficient. The Civil Society Movement for a New 
Constitution, therefore, argued that the amendment process should be taken over by an 
independent Constitutional Commission. 
c. Constitutional Commission 
The issue regarding the Constitutional Commission gained momentum on 16 August 2001, 
when President Megawati stressed the importance of a special commission to take charge of 
amending the Constitution. Megawati stated that the constitutional reform should be, 
"crystallized and drafted comprehensively, systematically and professionally by a Constitutional 
Commission, to be then reviewed and endorsed by the MPR" ,1214 
Megawati's suggestion was a surprise, because she was known to be quite conservative on the 
amendment issue. 1215 The PDIP had never mentioned the Commission in any of the previous 
amendment meetings in the MPR. 1216 Sutjipto, who was the General Secretary of the PDIP, 
revealed that the suggestion had not come from the party. 1217 Tobing (PDIP) differed on this 
issue saying that Megawati's proposal had come from the PDIP.121a 
(1) The PDIP's Constitutional Commission: Was it Real? 
During the 23rd meeting of the PAH I,. when the PDIP formally submitted its proposal to 
establish a Constitutional Commission, all of the other ten factions attacked the prop0sa1.1219 
12131bid. 
1214 Megawati Soekarnoputri's State-of-the-Nation Address, 16 August 2001, the translation is by Jakarta Post. 
1215 'Komisi Konstitusi seharusnya diusulkan Fraksi PDI Perjuangan', Kompas, 31 August 2001. 
1216 
'Pembentukan Komisi Konstitusi Terancam Gagal', Kompas, 30 August 2001. 
1217
'PDIP Mempelajari Pembentukan Komisi Konstitusi', Kompas, 1 September 2001. 
1218 'MPR to Set Up Team to Amend Constitution', The Jakarta Post, 23 August 2001. 
1219 Minutes of the 23'd (continued) meeting of the PAH I, 4 September 2001, 166-7. 
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F o r  B a w a z i e r  ( R e f o r m a s 1 )  t h e  p r o p o s a l  w a s  t h e  P D I P ' s  w a y  o f  b u y i n g  t i m e  t o  d e l a y  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s . t
2 2 0  
S o e d i j a r t o  ( F U G )  s t a t e d  t h a t :  
[ t ] h e  P D I P ' s  p r o p o s a l  o n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  a s t o u n d i n g  . . .  I  r e c o m m e n d  
t h a t  t h e  P A H  I  s h o u l d  c a r r y  o n  i t s  w o r k s  w i t h o u t  a n  i n t e r r u p t i o n  o f  t h e  k i n d .  P l e a s e ,  c o n v e y  
t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  a m o u n t s  t o  t h e  ·  
s a m e  a s  n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  . . .  1 2 2 1  
S o e d i j a r t o  f u r t h e r  a r g u e d  t h a t  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a i . C o . m m i s s i o n  c o n t r a d i c t e d  t h e  m u l t i - .  
p a r t y  a g r e e m e n t  t o  m e r e l y  a m e n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  F o r  h i m ,  a  c o u n t r y  w h i c h  f o r m s  a  
c o m m i s s i o n  i n t e n d s  t o  m a k e  a  t o t a l l y  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i 0 n . 1 2 2 2  
H o w e v e r ,  a f t e r  t h e  P D I P  h a d  s u b m i t t e d  a  c o m p l e t e  p r o p o s a l ,  i t  w a s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  
i n t e n d e d  b y  t h e  P D I P  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  s u c h  a  s t r o n g  a u t h o r i t y  ( s e e  T a b l e  1 4 ) .  T h e  c o m m i s s i o n ' s  
a u t h o r i t y  w a s  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  t o  t h a t  o f  t h e  E x p e r t  T e a m .
1 2 2
3  B y  p r o p o s i n g  t h a t  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  s h o u l d  n o m i n a t e  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n ;  M e g a w a t i  a n d  t h e  P D I P  i n t e n d e d  
t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n .
1 2 2 4  
B y  d o i n g  s o ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  c o u l d  t h e n  i n f l u e n c e ·  
c r u c i a l  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s  w h i c h  m i g h t  a f f e c t  h e r  p o s i t i o n ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  i m p e a c h m e n t  
p r o c e d u r e . m s  
( 2 )  T h e  P r o p o s a l s  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  ~ommission f r o m  t h e  P P P ,  P K B  a n d  G o l k a r  
A s  t h e  2 0 0 1  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n  a p p r o a c h e d ,  t h e  P P P  a n d  P K B  s t a r t e d  t o  p r o m o t e  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n .  W h e n  ' t h e  p p p ·  u n e x p e c t e d l y  s u b m i t t e d  i t s  p r o p o s a l ,  P a t a n i a r i  
S i a h a a n  ( P D I P )  c o m p l a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  P P P  w a s  j u s t  t r y i n g  t o  s t e a l  t h e  l i m e l i g h t . 1 2 2 6  I t  w a s  n o t  
c l e a r  w h a t  t h e  a g e n d a  b e h i n d  t h e  P P P ' s  p r o p o s a l  w a s .  H o w e v e r ,  a s  i t  h a d  b e e n  s u b m i t t e d  v e r y  
c l o s e  t o  t h e  2 0 0 1  A n n u a l  s e s s i o n ,  i t  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  a n  e f f o r t  o f  t h e  P P P  t o  a t t r a c t  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  
s y m p a t h y  o r  a t t e n t i o n .  T h e  P K B ' s  p r o p o s a l  w a s  a l s o  s u b m i t t e d  c l o s e  t o  t h e  2 0 0 1  S e s s i o n .  
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  P K B  r e v e a l e d  a  c l e a r e r  r e a s o n .  I t  w a s  d i s a p p o i n t e d  w i t h  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t .  Y u s u f  M u h a m m a d  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
1 2 2 0  ' F - P D I P  U s u l k a n  K o m i s i  K o n s t i t u s i ' ,  K o m p a s ,  4  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 1 .  
1 2 2 1  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  2 3 ' d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  3  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 1 ,  9 8  - 1 0 0 .  
1 2 2 2
1 b i d  9 9  - 1 0 0 .  
1 2 2 3  M i n u t e s  o f  2 3 r d  ( c o n t i n u e d )  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  4  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 1 ,  1 6 7 - 7 3 .  
1 2 2 4 1 b i d .  
1 2 2 5 1 b i d .  
1 2 2 6  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  4 1 h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y ,  2  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 1 ,  1 9 3 .  
1 9 4  
[t]he amendment discussions are half-hearted ... They are driven by short term interests. 
Therefore, we recommend that a new method .. . which widely involves public 
participation, should be adopted .. . The PKB hereby proposes a Constitutional 
Commission.1227 
Golkar was the last party to propose its Constitutional Commission. It submitted the proposal 
during the 2001 session. Golkar named its commission the National Committee for Amendment 
of the 1945 Constitution. 1228 Because the proposal was made so late, it was questionable 
whether Golkar really meant to propose the Committee, or whether it was actually just trying to 
. impress the public. 
The proposals on Constitutional Commission of some factions in the MPR and from the 
Coalition for a New Constitution were very different (Table 14). The NO!' argues that because of 
the extreme differences of this proposal, the Commission failed to be established. 1229 
MPR Remains the Constitution-Making Body. Finally, the 2001 MPR Annual Session 
rejected the establishment of the Constitutional Commission. The different proposals for· a 
Commission were blamed. 1230 The 2001 Session decided that the Working Body should again 
be responsible for preparing further amendment. 
1227 1bid 195. 
1228 Minutes of the 5th (continued) Plenary Meeting, 4 November 2001,200. 
1229 Ellis, above n 662, 144. 
1230 Minutes of the 6th Plenary meeting of the 2001 MPR Annual Session, 8 November 2001, 324- 5. 
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Table 14 The Proposals on Constitutional Commission in the 2001 MPR Annual Sessions 
Helping the MPR in amending 
the Constitution 
Nominated by the President 
and selected by the Working 
Body of the MPR. . 
From experts and province's 
representatives 
Not be a new Constitution. 
Submitted to the MPR for 
consideration 
Amending the Constitution 
50 people, consists of experts 
and province's 
representatives. 
No MPR members. 
MPR could only accept or 
reject the output. If the MPR 
rejected the constitutional 
draft, a referendum should 
have been conducted. 
Source: Extracted from minutes of meeting of the 2001 MPR Annual Session. 
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A new Constitution. 
MPR could only accept or 
reject the output. If the MPR 
rejected the constitutional 
draft, a referendum should 
have been conducted. 
3. How the Public Participation was Organized . 
In the early stages of its meetings the PAH I visited some provinces. These visits, however, 
were to inform the public of the result of amendments, rather than to ask for input into the Third 
Amendment. During the visits, the PAH I realized that many of the people were not aware that 
the Constitution had already been amended twice. Pataniari Siahaan (PDIP) pointed out that 
not only the people, but many MPR members, as well, did not know the substance of the First 
and Second Amendments.1231 
Although it then realized the importance of wider public involvement, the PAH I disappointingly 
scheduled public participation merely the last minutes of the Third Amendment discussion. 
Lukman Hakim Saifuddin (PPP) questioned the preparation for the hearings.1232 He pointed out 
that: 
... we will conduct the hearings in the regions from 3 to 9 October, they will begin the day 
after tomorrow. I do not know how prepared we are. What should we do? Who will we 
meet? What are our job descriptions ... This is not only a matter of technicality ... for me, 
the most subs~antial thing is the mechanism of the hearings. I think this mechanism will 
affect the quality of the hearings.1233 
The effectiveness of the public participation programs was, therefore, questionable. There was 
no complete report as to what the public input was and after conducting the hearings, it was 
clear that the PAH I was not serious in considering the input. This was indicated by many 
members of the PAH I who did not attend the Committee's meetings.1234 One of the members of 
the PAH I admitted that the participation program was not serious. It was conducted merely to 
spend the MPR's budget.1235 The member disclosed that: · 
[i]t .is actually all about money. By organizing the participation programs, there is a 
'legitimate' reason to distribute the money. It is fairer. Everybody can have his share. 1236 
In the PAH l's final report, Tobing listed that the Committee only conducted three seminars and 
hearings in nine provinces. 1237 According to Saifuddin, these hearings were not well organized. 
1231 Minutes of 1st meeting of the PAH I, 6 September 2000, 20. 
1232 Minutes of 37th meeting of the PAH I, 1 October 2001, 81. 
12331bid. 
1234 'Mengendur, Semangat Bahas Amandemen Ketiga UUD', Suara Pembaruan, 11 October 200{ ·. 
12351bid. • 
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C .  T h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t :  T h e  O u t c o m e s  1 2 3 8  
F o r  K a w a m u r a ,  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  s u c c e e d e d  i n  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  c h a r a c t e r  o f .  
t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
1 2 3 9  
S i m i l a r l y ,  E l l i s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  w a s  a  " f u n d a m e n t a l  
c h a n g e  i n  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  l n d o n e s i a " .
1 2 4
o  E l l i s  f u r t h e r  a r g u e s  t h a t :  
T h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  m a r k s  t h e  b a s i c  d e c i s i o n  t o  c h a n g e  I n d o n e s i a  f r o m  a  s t a t e  w i t h  a  .  
s i n g l e  a l l - p o w e r f u l  h i g h e s t  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  s t a t e  t o  b e c o m e  a  s t a t e  w i t h  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h e c k s  
a n d  b a l a n c e s .
1 2 4 1  
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  o u t l i n e s  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 .  I m p o r t a n t  R e f o r m s  A r t i c l e s  
a .  T h e  L a w  S t a t e  
T h e  s t i p u l a t i o n  t h a t  I n d o n e s i a  i s  a  s t a t e  ' r u l e d  b y  l a w '  ( n e g a r a  h u k u m  o r  r e c h t s s t a a Q  w a s  
p r e v i o u s l y  f o u n d ·  i n  t h e  e l u c i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  s t r e n g t h e n s  t h i s  
d e c l a r a t i o n  b y  a d o p t i n g  i t  i n t o  A r t i c l e  1  ( 3 ) .  
b .  L i m i t i n g  t h e  M P R ' s  p o w e r s  
T h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  M P R  w a s  w i l l i n g  t o  r e d u c e  i t s  o w n  p o w e r .  T h i s  w a s  n o t  
p r e d i c t e d  b y  m a n y  a n d  c a m e  a s  a  s u r p r i s e  t o  m o s t .  I t  w a s  s u s p e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  M P R  w o u l d  s e e k  
t o  r e t a i n .  i t s  p o s i t i o n  a s  a  s u p r e m e  a n d  .  p o w e r f u l  p a r l i a m e n t ,  r e t a i n i n g  t h e  p o w e r  i t  h a d  
e x e r c i s e d  i n  r e m o v i n g  P r e s i d e n t  W a h i d .  T h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  M P R  l i m i t e d  i t s  o w n  p o w e r ,  t h r o u g h  
t h e  a m e n d m e n t  i t  m a d e  i t s e l f ,  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  c o u l d  a l s o  r e f o r m  
i t s e l f  t h r o u g h  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s ,  p r o v i d e d  t h e r e  w a s  a  s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  t h e  
p u b l i c .  
1 2 3 6 J b i d .  
1 2 3 7  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  5 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y ,  2 3  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 1 ,  2 3 5 .  
1 2
3 8  A l l  A r t i c l e s  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  e x c e p t  m e n t i o n e d  o t h e r w i s e ,  r e f e r  t o  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
1 2 3 9  K a w a m u r a ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 1 ,  4 8 - 5 0 .  
1 2 4 0  
E l l i s ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 2 ,  1 4 0 .  
1 2 4 1 J b i d .  
1 9 8  
(1) Sovereignty of the People 
The Third Amendment ends the MPR's position as the supreme Parliament which monopolized 
and exercised the sovereignty of the people. It marked the end of the doctrine· of MPR 
supremacy. This.doctrine stipulated in the elucidation of the Constitution that, "the MPR is the 
highest authority in the conduct of state affairs ... [it] is the manifestation of the people who 
hold the sovereignty of the state" and that "since the MPR is vested with sovereignty of the 
state, its power is unlimited". The Third Amendment reversed this, taking sovereignty fro~ the 
MPR and stipulating that "Sovereignty is in the hands of the people and is exercised in 
~ ' . . ' \ ' . 
accordance with the Constitution".1242 This provision was firstly proposed by Soewoto 
Mulyosudarmo, a. m~mber of the Expert Team and is one of the rare examples of this Team 
directly affecting the amendment process.1243 
(2) The Authority of the MPR 
The Third Amendment reduces the authority of the MPR.Its power to elect the President and 
Vice President is, for example, removed. Consequently, the MPR's power to set the GBHN, 
which the President had been obliged to implement and be responsible for, is also removed .. 
The President is given the power to arrange his or her own agenda. However, the MPR retains 
the power to amend and ratify the Constitution.1244 
c. Strengthening the Presidential System 
" 
(1) Direct Presidential Election 
Another radical change was the adoption of a direct presidential election mechanism. 1245 The 
President and Vice President are, 'elected as a pair directly by the people'.1246 Political parties 
or their coalitions, which participate in general elections, propose the Presidential and Vice 
Presidential candidates.1247 The candidate who wins more than 50% of the vote, and at least 
1242 Article 1 (2). 
1243 1nterview with Sri Soemantri, Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Padjajaran, 30 June 2003. 
1244 Article 3(1 ). 
1245 Undsey, above n 99, 259. 
1246 Article 6A (1). 
1247 Article 6A (2). 
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2 0 %  o f  t h e  v o t e s  i n  m o r e  t h a n  h a l f  o f  t h e  p r o v i n c e s ,  i s  t h e  e l e c t e d  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  v i c e  
P r e s i d e n t .  
1 2 4
8  
( 2 )  I m p e a c h m e n t  P r o c e d u r e .  .  
T h e  p r o c e d u r e  t o "  i m p e a c h  t h e  Presid~nt w a s  c l a r i f i e d .  T h e  g r o u n d s  o f  t h e ·  re:~oval i n c l u d e :  
' t r e a s o n ,  corrupti~n. b~ibery, o t h e r  h i g h  c r i m e s ,  m i s d e m e a n o r s  o r  p r o v e n  t o  n o  l~nger f u l f i l l  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  o f f i c e '  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n c y .
1 2 4 9  
T h e  p r o c e s s  i s  n o w  n o t  o n l y  p o l i t i c a l ,  i n v o l v i n g ·  
t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  M P R ,  b u t  a l s o  l e g a l ,  i n v o l v i n g  a  n e w l y  c r e a t e d  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t .
1 2 5
0  T h e  
.  .  
v o t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t  t o  i m p e a c h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  s e t  u p  t o  b e  n i o r e  d i f f i c u l t  f r o m  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  t o  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y .  T h i s  i s  t o '  b e  a t t e n d e d  b y  a t  l e a s t  t h r e e - q u a r t e r s  o f  t h e  t o t a l  
n u m b e r  o f  m e m b e r s ,  a n d  w i t h  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  a t  l e a s t  two~thirds ~f t h e  M P R  ~embers 
p r e s e n t . 1 2 5 1  
( 3 )  D P R  n o n - d i s s o l u t i o n  
T h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  s t i p u l a t e d ,  ' t h e  P r e s i d e n t  m a y  n o t  s u s p e n d  a n d / o r  d i s s o l v e  t h e  D P R ' .
1 2
5 2  
Q u i t e  s i m i l a r  p r o v i s i o n  a c t u a l l y  e x i s t e d  i n  t h e  e l u c i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  n e i t h e r  
.  .  
t h e P A H  I  2 0 0 0 ,  n o r  t h e  E x p e r t  T · e a m ,  p r o p o s e d  s u c h  a  p r o v i s i o n  t o  b e  a d o p t e d  i n  t h e  b o d y  o f  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  p r o p o s a l  o n  n o n - d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  D P R  w a s  o n l y  s u b m i t t e d  - a n d  f i n a l l y  
a g r e e d  - a f t e r  W a h i d  h a d  a t t e m p t e d  u n s u c c e s s f u l l y  t o  f o r c e  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  D P R  i n  h i s  
M a k l u m a t .  
( 4 )  V a c a n t  V i c e  P r e s i d e n c y  
A  n e w  s t i p u l a t i o n  w a s  a d o p t e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  w h e r e  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  f a l l s  v a c a n t .  
T h e  M P R  i s  t o ,  ' h o : l d  a  s e s s i o n  w i t h i n  s i x t y  d a y s  t o  e l e c t  a  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  f r o m  t w o  ca~didates 
p r o p o s e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t '  . 1 2 5 3  
1 2 4 8  A r t i c l e  6 A  ( 3 ) .  
1 2 4 9  A r t i c l e  7  A .  
1 2 s o  A r t i c l e  7 8 .  
1 2 5 1  A r t i c l e  7 8  ( 7 ) .  
1 2 5 2  A r t i c l e  ? C .  
2 0 0 .  
d. The Establishment of the DPD 
A new-chapter VIlA on the DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Regional Representative's 
Council) is a further reform ofthe legislature. The DPD members act as "senator'' and are to be 
elected from each province, through a general election.1254 The DPD may 'submit to the DPR' 
and 
participate in the discussion of bills that relate to regional autonomy; the relationship 
between the centre and the regions; the management of natural resources and other 
economic resources; and the fiscal balance between the centre and the regions.12ss 
The DPD also has the right to, 'submit its advice to the DPR regarding bills concerning the 
state Budget and bills concerning taxes, education a~d religion'.12s6 Further, the DPD has the 
authority to supervise the implementation of law in any of these fields, and to submit the results 
of its supervision to the DPR, for consideration and further action.12s7 
e. Reforming the Electoral Process 
A new chapter 22E on general elections was adopted. An election is scheduled every five 
years, to elect members of the DPR; the DPD; the President and Vice President; and the 
DPRD. 125B The participants for the election of the members of the DPR and the members of the 
DPRDs are political parties,1259 and the participants in elections for the DPD are individuals.126o 
The eleCtion is to be organized by the KPU which is to have a, 'national, permanent and 
independent character' ,1261 
f. Reforming the BPK 
The Third Amendment deals with the BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, State Audit Body) in a 
new separate chapter. The BPK was redefined as a constitutional agency which is free and 
1253 Article 8(2). 
1254Article 22C (1). 
1255 Article 220 (1) (2). 
1256 Article 220 (2). 
1257 Article 220 (3). 
1258 Article 22E (1) (2). 
1259 Article 22E (3). 
1260 Article 22E {4). 
1261 Article 22E (5). 
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i n d e p e n d e n t . 1 2 6 2  T h e  B P K  i s  b a s e d  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l  o f  t h e  n a t i o n  a n d  h a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  e v e r y  
p r o v i n c e .
1 2 6 3  
T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  a n y  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a r e  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  D P R ,  t h e  D P D  a n d  D P R D s ,  
'  .  .  .  '  
r a t h e r  t h a n  s i m p l y  t o  t h e  D P R ,  a s  h a p p e n e d  i n  t h e  p a s t . 1
2
6 4  T h e  m e m b e r s  a r e  c h o s e n  b y  t h e  
D P R  w i t h  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  D P D ,  a n d  a r e  f o r m a l l y  a p p o i n t e d  b y  t h e  ' P r e s i d e n t .  T h e  B P K  
l e a d e r s h i p  i s  e l e c t e d  b y  a n d  f r o m  t h e  m e m b e r s . 1 2 6 5  
g .  R e f o r m i n g  t h e  J u d i c i a l  S y s t e m  
( 1 )  J u d i c i a l l n d e p e n d e n c e  
T h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  j u d i c i a r y  w a s  f o r m a l i z e d  a n d  t h i s  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e  w a s  m o v e d  f o r w a r d  
f r o m  i t s  p r e v i o u s  p l a c e  i n  t h e  e l u c i d a t i o n .  T h e  j u d i c i a r y  w a s  t o  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  b y  a  S u p r e m e  
C o u r t  a n d  b y  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l .  C o u r t .
1 2
6 6  T h e  C h i e f  a n d  D e p u t y  J u s t i c e s  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  
a n d  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  w e r e  e l e c t e d  b y  a n d  f r o m  t h e  j u s t i c e s  o f  e a c h  c o u r t  r e s p e c t i v e l y . 1 2 6 7  
( 2 )  .  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  
A  n e w  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t ,  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  t h e  s a m e  l e v e l  a s  t h e  S u p r e m e  
C o u r t .  T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  h a d  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o ,  ' t r y  a  c a s e  a t  t h e  f i r s t  a n d  f i n a l  l e v e l '  a n d  
h a d  
t h e  f i n a l  p o w e r  o f  d e c i s i o n  i n  r e v i e w i n g  l a w  a g a i n s t  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  d e t e r m i n i n g  d i s p u t e s  
o v e r  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  o f  s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  . . .  d e c i d i n g  o v e r  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  a  p o l i t i c a i  p a r t y ,  a n d  
d e c i d i n g  d i s p u t e s  o v e r  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s . 1 2 6 B  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  i s  o b l i g e d  t o  g i v e  i t s  l e g a l  o p i n i o n  i n  a n  i m p e a c h m e n t  
p r o c e s s .
1 2
6 9  T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  h a s  n i n e  p e r s o n s  w h o  a r e ,  ' c o n f i r m e d  i n  o f f i c e  b y  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t ,  o f  w h o m  t h r e e  s h a l l  b e  n o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t ,  t h r e e  n o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  
D P R ,  a n d  t h r e e  n o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t '  . 1 2 7 o  .  
1 2 6 2  A r t i c l e  2 3 E  ( 1 ) .  
1 2 6 3  A r t i c l e  2 3 G .  
1 2 6 4  A r t i c l e  2 3 E  ( 2 ) .  
1 2 6 5  A r t i c l e  2 3 F  ( 1 )  ( 2 ) .  
1 2 6 6  A r t i c l e  2 4 .  
1 2 6 7  A r t i c l e s  2 4 ( 4 )  a n d  2 4 C  ( 4 ) .  
1 2 6 8  A r t i c l e  2 4 C  ( 1 ) .  
1 2 6 9  A r t i c l e  2 4 C  ( 2 ) .  
1 2 7 0  A r t i c l e  2 4 C  ( 3 ) .  
2 0 2  
(3) Establishment of a Judicial Commission 
Another new institution, the Judicial Commission, possesses the authority to, 'propose 
candidates for appointment as justices of the Supreme Court' and to, 'maintain and ensure the 
honor, dignity and behavior of judges'.t271 To carry out such an important role, the members of 
the Commission are persons of integrity with a character that is not dishonorable. 1272 The 
members of the Commission are 'appointed and dismissed by the President with the approval 
of the DPR' .1273 
2. The Delay of Crucial Amendment Proposals 
Beside ratifying the fundamental constitutional change through the Third Amendment, the MPR 
also delayed some crucial amendment proposals, as hereby elaborated. 
a. The Composition of the MPR 
Although all of the factions agreed to restructure the MPR, no consensus was reached on the 
question of functional groups (Article 2(1)). It was still unclear as to whether the future MPR 
was to consist of elected members (the DPR and the DPD), and the non-elected m'embers 
(FUG and the TNI-Polri), or whether the MPR only consisted of the elected members. 
b. The Second Round of Presidential Elections 
While agreeing in principle to direct presidential elections, all factions maintained their stance 
toward a second round election being needed. The choice was whether the MPR or the people 
should have had the authority to choose between the two best presidential candidates. As a 
result of the postponement of Paragraph (4), Article 6A of the Third Amendment only contained 
paragraphs (1 }, (2), (3) and (5), leaving it Incomplete. 
1271 Article 248 (1). 
1272 Article 248 (2). 
1273 Article 248 (3). 
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c .  S i m u l t a n e o u s l y  V a c a n t  P o s i t i o n s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  
A s  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w h e r e  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  o f  b o t h  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  f e l l  v a c a n t  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  t w o  a l t e r n a t i v e s  w e r e  s t i l l  o n  t h e  t a b l e .  O n e  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  S p e a k e r s  o f  t h e  
M P R  a n d  t h e  D P R  b e c o m e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  T h e  o t h e r  p r o p o s e d  
t h a t  t h e  p r e s i d e n c y  w o u l d  b e  u n d e r t a k e n  b y  t h e  t r i u m v i r a t e  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n :  m i n i s t e r ,  h o m e  
m i n i s t e r  a n d  d e f e n s e  m i n i s t e r .  T h i s  w a s  n o t  r e s o l v e d  d u r i n g  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  d e b a t e s .  
d .  T h e  I s s u e  o f  J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  
T h e  m o s t  s e n s i t i v e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e  - o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  w~ether t h e  ' s e v e n  w o r d s '  o f  t h e  
J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  s h o u l d  b e  a d o p t e d  i n  t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  - r e m a i n e d  u n r e s o l v e d .  C h a p t e r s  
·  S e v e n  a n d  E i g h t  f u r t h e r  e l a b o r a t e  t h i s  i s s u e .  
C o n c l u s i o n .  T h e  N D I  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  w a s  a  c r i t i c a l  m o m e n t ,  i n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
r e f o r m i n g  i n  l n d o n e s i a . 1
2 7 4  
I t  a p p l a u d s  t h e  r e f o r m  o f  t h e  M P R ,  a n d  a r g u e s  t h a t :  
[ t ] h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  t o  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  m a r k s  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  c h a n g e  I n d o n e s i a  
f r o m  a  s t a t e  w i t h  a n  a l l - p o w e r f u l  h i g h e s t  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  s a t e  ( t h e  M P R )  t o  b e c o m e  a  s t a t e  
w i t h  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c h e c k s  a n d  b a l a n c e s .  
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  c r u c i a l  d e l a y s  o n  p r o p o s a l s  - - s u c h  a s  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  
J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  a n d  t h e  s e c o n d  r o u n d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n - t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  m i g h t  h a v e  
b e c o m e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t i m e  b o m b .  T h e r e  w a s  n o  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  t h e s e  i s s u e s  w o u l d  b e  r e s o l v e d  
i n  t h e  2 0 0 2  S e s s i o n .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  I n d o n e s i a  c o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  t r a p p e d  i n  a  v e r y  d a n g e r o u s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r i s i s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  t h e  p r o p o s a l  o n  t h e  s e c o n d  r o u n d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  h a d  
b e e n  d e a d l o c k e d  i n  2 0 0 2 ,  t h e r e  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  n o  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s o l u t i o n  i f .  n o n e  o f  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  w o n  a  m a j o r i t y  o n  t h e  f i r s t  r o u n d  e l e c t i o n .  
T h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  a n d  t h e  2 0 0 2  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n  w e r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  v e r y  
i m p o r t a n t  f o r  I n d o n e s i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r  d i s c u s s e s  w h e t h e r  t h e  
M P R  s u c c e e d e d  i n  d e f u s i n g  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t i m e  b o m b  l e f t  b y  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 2 7 4  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e ,  a b o v e  n  1 1 8 8 ,  1 .  
2 0 4  
Chapter Seven 
The Fourth Amendment: 
Constitutional Crisis or Constitutional Reform? 
This chapter describes the process and outcome of the Fourth Amendment of the 1945 
Constitution, the final amendment so far. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section A 
describes the political backgrou.nd of the Fourth Amendment. It focuses on the possibility of 
constitutional crisis because· of an increased !ikelihood of stronger deadlock. Section B 
. discusses the constitution-making process of the Fourth Amendment, which again focused on 
the issues of how the constitution-making should be conducted and who the constitution-
making body was to be. Section C outlines the resulting amendment which 'completed' the 
reformation of the 1945 Constitution. 
A. The Background: Towards a Constitutional Crisis? 
1. Crucial Amendment 
In 2002, the MPR was scheduled to ratify the Fourth Amendment. This amendment dealt with 
crucial proposals, such as: Article 2(1), on the composition of the MPR and Article 6A (4), on 
the second round presidential election. These. proposals were urgently required, . to form the 
constitutional basis of the 2004 election. The fate of four electoral bills (political parties, 
structure and position of the parliament, parliamentary election, and presidential election) were 
hanging in the balance, pending the outcome of the Fourth Amendment discussions. 1275 If the 
MPR had not reached an agreement, then the nation would have found itself in a constitutional 
crisis that would have jeopardized the chances of the 2004 election ever taking place. The 
outcome of Fourth Amendment was therefore critical because "it could either mark the 
beginning of the end of the democratic process that began in 1998, or the beginning of the end 
of the authoritarian system that began in 1959".1276 
Further, the Fourth Amendment discussions would also decide on the fate of a sensitive 
amendment proposal of Article 29(1), on relation between state and Islam. Together with the 
amendment proposals of Articles 2(1) and 6A (4), these three provisions were the most 
1275 
'Fate of Crucial Bills Depends on Amendment Process', The Jakarta Post, 6 August 2002. 
1276 'The Beginning of the End', The Jakarta Post, 1 August 2002. 
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c o n t e n t i o u s  A r t i c l e s  i n  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  d r a f t .  T h e  d r a f t  o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  A r t i c l e s  s t i l l  
c o n t a i n e d  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  T a b l e  1 5  s h o w s  t h e s e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
T a b l e  1 5  A l t e r n a t i v e s  o n  A r t i c l e s  2 ( 1 ) ,  S A  ( 4 )  a n d  2 9 ( 1 )  
c o n s i s t s  o f  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  
a n d  t h e  D P D  e l e c t e d  
t h r o u g h  g e n e r a l  
e l e c t i o n s  a s  ·  r e g u l a t e d  
f u r t h e r  b y  l a w .  
I n  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  n o  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d  v i c e  
P r e s i d e n t  i s  e l e c t e d ,  t h e  
p e o p l e  e l e c t s  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d  v i c e  
P r e s i d e n t  f r o m  t h e  t w o  
p a i r s  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  a n d  
v i c e  .  - p r e s i d e n t i a l  
c a n d i d a t e s  g a i n i n g  t h e  
m o s t  v o t e s .  
T h e  s t a t e  i s  b a s e d  o n  
o n e  S u p r e m e  G o d  w i t h  
t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  c a r r y  
o u t  s y a r i a h  f o r  a d h e r e n t s  
o f  I s l a m .  
T h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  f a c t i o n s  o n  t h e  a b o v e  t h r e e  a r t i c l e s  w o u l d  a f f e c t  t h e  s u c c e s s  o r  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  
F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t .  I f  t h e r e  h a d  b e e n  n o  s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e  t o  f i n i s h  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m ,  t h e  
· '  
c o n s e r v a t i v e  g r o u p s  i n  t h e  M P R  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  ,  u n i t e d  t o  b l o c k  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  
r a t i f i c a t i o n .  T h e  c o a l i t i o n  o f  t h e  P D I P ,  F U G  a n d  T N I - P o l r i ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  w o u l d  h a v e  2 8 4  s e a t s  o f  
t h e  M P R .  T h e s e  s e a t s  w e r e  m o r e  t h a n  o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  t o t a l  M P R  m e m b e r s ,  w h i c h  w e r e  6 9 5 .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  a p p r o v a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  i n  A r t i c l e  3 7  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  .  
P D I P - F U G - T N I - P o l r i  f a c t i o n s  h a d  e n o u g h  v o t e s  t o  b l o c k  a n y  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l .  
T h e  c o a l i t i o n  w a s  p o s s i b l e  b e c a u s e  t h e  P D I P  w a s  t h e  o n l y  p a r t y  w h i c h  w a s  a g a i n s t  t h e  s e c o n d  
r o u n d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  b e i n g  p u t  t o  t h e  p e o p l e  i n  a n  e l e c t i o n .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  F U G  w a s  
2 0 6 .  
the only faction which rejected the proposal that the MPR consist only of the DPR and the DPD 
(Regional Representatives' Council). If these two parties had united, they would have been 
able to refuse all of the Fourth Amendment proposals. 
2. The Voices For and Against Amendment 
With pressure on the MPR growing to ratify the Fourth Amendment, voices for and against the 
amendments began to be strongly heard in public.1277 
a. Public Position 
The pro amendment movements. The strongest advocate of the amendment agenda was the 
'Coalition for a New Constitution' group. This group; however, criticized the process and the 
outcome as being undemocratic.1278 It argued that, rather than just amending the 1945 
Constitution, a new Constitution should be formulated. 1279 Specifically, the Coalition proposed 
that a new constitution-making body formed outside the MPR ·- a Constitutional 
Commission.128o 
The Anti-amendment. Movement. On the other hand, there were at least three groups which 
called for a halt to the amendment process: (1) the Constitutional Scientific Analysis Forum; (2) 
the Armed Forces Veterans Association (Pepabri); and (3) the University of Bung Karno and 
the Indonesian National Forum. 
The Constitutional Scientific Analysis Forum, and Pepabri, rejected the constitutional reform on 
the basis that it had deviated from its original course, and therefore had to be stopped. 1281 Try 
Soetrisno, the Chairperson of the Pepabri, stated: 
12771bid. 
: .. it would be best if our time, money and energy were focused on a review of the legal 
system. The Constitution is flexible enough, it does not need to be amended.1282 
1278 NGO Coalition for a New Constitution, Critical Review and Recommendations on Amendment to the 1945 Constitution 
(2002) 1 -12. 
1279 1bid 12. 
1280 Ibid. 
1281 'Serahkan Perubahan UUD kepada Komisi Konstitusi', Kompas, 11 April 2002. 
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F u r t h e r  P e p a b r i  a r g u e d  t h a t ,  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  h a l t e d  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  i t  h a d  
.  s p a r k e d  p o l e m i c s  . w h i c h  h a d  t h r e a t e n e d  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y .  
1 2 8 3  
S y a i f u l  S u l u n  s t a t e d  ' t h a t  t h e ·  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  D P D ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  D P R ,  m e a n t  t h a t  I n d o n e s i a  a d o p t e d  a  b i c a m e r a l  
s y s t e m .  F o r  h i m ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  D P D  w a s  a  d a n g e r o u s  d e v i a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
t h e  U n i t a r y  s t a t e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  a s  i t  c o u l d  l e a d  t o  f e d e r a l i s m .
1 2 8 4  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e r e  
w a s  a  s u s p i c i o n  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  w a s  a  w e s t e r n  p l o t ,  l e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  S u l u n  s a i d  
t h a t ,  " w e  c a n n o t  a p p l y  A m e r i c a n  r u l e s  h e r e "  .
1 2 8 5  
H e  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  h a d  t o  b e  
b a s e d  o n  n a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r  a n d  w a r n e d  t h e  M P R  a g a i n s t  c r e a t i n g  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
1 2 8 6  
L i k e w i s e ,  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  B u n g  K a r n o  a n d  I n d o n e s i a n  N a t i o n a l  F o r u m ,  w h i c h  w e r e  b o t h  
c h a i r e d  b y  R a c h m a w a t i  S o e k a r n o p u t r i ,  P r e s i d e n t  M e g a w a t i ' s  s i s t e r ,  a l s o  t o t a l l y  r e j e c t e d  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t .
1 2
8 7  R a c h m a w a t i ,  h o w e v e r ,  d i d  n o t  c l e a r l y  e x p l a i n  t h e  r e a s o n s  b e h i n d  t h i s  r e j e c t i o n .  
I t  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  S o e k a r n o ,  h e r  f a t h e r  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  f i g u r e s  
b e h i n d  t h e  d r a f t i n g  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a n o t h e r  g r o u p  e m e r g e d  k n o w n  a s  t h e  K e l o m p o k  M a k l u m a t  B e r s a m a  u n t u k  
K e s e l a m a t a n  B a n g s a  ( J o i n t  D e c l a r a t i o n  f o r  N a t i o n a l  S a l v a t i o n ) .  T h i s  g r o u p  c o m p r i s e d  
a c a d e m i c s  ( S r i  S o e m a n t r i ,  A d  n a n  B u y u n g  N a s u t i o n , .  R i z a l  R a m l i ,  S u d j a n a  S y a f e i ) ,  r e l i g i o u s  
l e a d e r s  ( S y a f i i  M a a r i f ,  M u s l i m  A b d u r r a h m a n ,  S o l a h u d i n  W a h i d ) ,  a n d  i t  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  G e n e r a l  
W i r a n t o .  a n d  s o m e  m i l i t a r y  s u p p o r t e r s .  T h i s  g r o u p  s o u g h t  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  
c o m m i s s i o n  t h a t  w o u l d  t a k e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  c o n t i n u i n g  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  a n d  i t  
s u b m i t t e d  a  d e c l a r a t i o n  t o  t h i s  e f f e c t  t o  t h e  S p e a k e r  o f  t h e  M P R  o n  3 0  J u l y  2 0 0 2 .  T h i s  g r o u p  
l a c k e d  a d e q u a t e  s u p p o r t  i n  t h e  M P R ,  h o w e v e r ,  a n d  i t  p r o p o s a l  w a s  n o t  a d o p t e d .
1 2 8
8  
M i n i s t e r  o f  D e f e n s e ' s  o p i n i o n .  M a t o r i  A b d u l  D j a l i l ,  t h e n  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  D e f e n s e ,  a p p e a l e d  t o  
t h e  M P R  t o  s t o p  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  u n t i l  s u c h  a  t i m e  w h e n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w a s  ' m o r e  
c o n d u c i v e ' .
1 2 8
9  H e  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  d e b a t e  b e t w e e n  p r o  a n d  c o n  a m e n d m e n t  m o v e m e n t s  m i g h t  
1 2 8 2 1 b i d .  




' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A m e n d m e n t  M a i n  F o c u s  a t  S e s s i o n ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1 2 8 5 1 b i d .  .  
1 2 8 6 1 b i d .  
1
2 8 7  
' P e r u b a h a n  U U D  1 9 4 5  h a r u s  m e n g h i n d a r i  P o t e n s i  D i s i n t e g r a s i ' ,  K o m p a s ,  1 9  A p r i l 2 0 0 2 .  
1 2 8 8  T o  b e  c o m p l e t e d ,  K o m p a s  3 1  J u l y  2 0 0 2 .  
1
2
8 9  ' M P R  h a r u s  H o r m a t i  K e p u t u s a n n y a  S e n d i r i ' ,  K o m p a s ,  1 5  A p r i l 2 0 0 2  
2 0 8  
create political conflicts.1290 Although Djalil based his argument on the possible conflict, the 
Minister was actually concerned with the direction in which the amendments were heading.1291 
He argued that, from the articles which were being proposed, the MPR might entirely renew the 
1945 C0nstitution.1292 
b. The MPR's Position 
The Anti-amendment. The efforts to stop the Fourth Amendment came from inside the MPR 
as well. At least 199 of the 695 MPR members signed a petition urging the MPR to stop the 
constitutional reform. Most of these members had previously rejected the establishment of the 
DPD during Third Amendment ratification in the 2001 MPR Annual Session.1293 They argued 
that the proposed changes have "gone too far" and called for keeping the· original 1945 
Constitution.1294 However, they failed to provide a clear explanation as to which changes they 
were talking about. Informally, this movement named itself the 'Parliamentary . Conscience 
Movement'. Am in Aryoso (PDIP); who was the Vice-Chairperson of the PAH Ill which prepared 
the First Amendment, was one of the key leaders in this movement. 
Mixed Signals from TNI-Polri. After the retired generals (Pepabri) and the Minister of Defense 
firmly demanded a stop to constitutional reform, the military faction in the MPR sent a mixed 
signal. I Ketut Astawa (TNI-Polri) stated that his faction supported the amendment by upholding 
the nation's values. 1295 Although he did not expressly mention what the values were, 
predictably, Astawa referred to the Pancasila and Article 29 on relation between state and 
. lslam.1296 On the other hand, a more conservative signal was sent by military headquarters as 
the 2002 MPR Annual Session approached. The TNI Chief General Endriartono Sutarto argued 
that· the amendment process had deviated from its original purpose, he stated: 
[a]mending the 1945 Constitution should not be seen as an effort to establish a new 
Constitution as there are some principles that cannot be changed radically, including the 
1290 'Matori Favors Putting Off the Amendments', The Jakarta Post, 14 April2002. 
12911bid. 
12921bid. 
1293 Above n 1193. 
· 
1294 Bambang Widjojanto, 'Parliament and Constitutional Crisis', Tempo, 30 April- 6 May 2002. 
1295 'Fraksi TNI/Polri siap Antisipasi Deadlock', Kompas, 18 April2002. 
12961bid. 
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c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  u n i t a r y  R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a  a n d  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e  t o  r e s p e c t  
p l u r a l i t y  a m o n g  r e l i g i o n s  a d h e r e n t s .  1 2 9 7  . .  
O n e  c a n  r e a d  n i a n y  t h i n g s  i n t o  t h e  T N I ' s  s t a n c e ,  m a d e  p u b l i c  r i g h t  o n  t h e  e v e  o f  t h e  2 0 0 2  
.  .  
S e s s i o n .  M u l y a  L u b i s  w a r n e d  o f  a  p o s s i b l e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  v a c u u m  s h o u l d  t h e ·  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
n o t  a g r e e  t o  p r o c e e d  w i t h  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  w o u l d  a l l o w  t h e  m i l i t a r y  t o  f o r c e  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  r e i n s t a t e  t h e  o r i g i n a l  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
1 2 9
B  A l r a s i d  w a s  o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  h a d  n o  r i g h t  t o  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  t h e  o n g o i n g  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s  i n  t h e  M P R .  F o r  A l r a s i d ,  t h e  
T N I - P o l r i  f a c t i o n  s h o u l d  s t i c k  t o  i t s  s e c u r i t y  a n d  d e f e n s e  r o l e s .
1 2 9 9  
H e  a r g u e d  t h a t : ·  
[ a ] s  p a r t  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  p o w e r ,  t h e .  m i l i t a r y  a n d  t h e  p o l i c e  a r e  u n d e r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  T h e y  
s h o u l d  o n l y  f o l l o w  o r d e r s  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  a n d  n o t  d i c t a t e  t h e  M P R ' s  p e r f o r m a n c e  
. . .  T h e y  a l s o  s h o u l d  n o t  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  i s s u e  a  d e c r e e  s h o u l d  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
p r o c e s s  b e c o m e  d e a d l o c k e d  d u e  t o  p o l i t i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  t h e  p a r t i e s . 1 3 0 0  
T h e  D u a l  S t a n c e  o f  t h e  P D I P .  I t  w a s  d i s t u r b i n g  t h a t  t h e  a n t i - a m e n d m e n t  m o v e m e n t s  i n  t h e  
M P R w e r e  m o b i l i z e d  b y  m a n y  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  P D I P .  I t  p r o v e d  t h a t  t h i s  p a r t y  w a s  i n t e r n a l l y  s p l i t  
o n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  a g e n d a :  w h i l e  A r y o s o  a n d  s o m e  o t h e r  s e n i o r  p a r t y  l e a d e r s  w e r e  
c a m p a i g n i n g  f o r  d i s c o n t i n u i n g  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  o t h e r  p a r t y  l e g i s l a t o r s  p r e p a r e d  t h e  
F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t ,  i n c l u d i n g T o b i n g ,  w h o  c h a i r e d  t h e  P A H  1 . 1 3 0 1  T h i s  d i v i s i o n  i n  t h e  P D I P  w a s  
a n  i n d i c a t o r  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  w a s  n o t  r e a l l y  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m .  I n  o n e ·  o f  t h e  
P D I P  m e e t i n g s ,  M e g a w a t i  s t a t e d :  ·  
[ i ] f  I  w e r e  o n l y  t h e  C h a i r p e r s o n  o f  t h e  P D I P  I  w o u l d  g i v e  a n  i n s t r u c t i o n  t o .  r e j e c t  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t .  B u t  b e c a u s e  o f  I  a m  a l s o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  I  m u s t  a l s o  p r o t e c t  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  
f o r c e s .  i 3 o 2  ·  ·  
L i k e w i s e ,  S u t j i p t o ,  w h o  w a s  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  o f t h e  P D I P ,  s t a t e d :  
[ f j r o m  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  w e  h a d  s t a t e d  t h a t  i f  p o s s i b l e  w e  s h o u l d  n o t  a m e n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
b u t  t h e  p a r t y  d e c i d e d  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  p r o c e s s  a n d  s u p p o r t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t . 1 3 0 3  
1 2 9 7  ' M i l i t a r y ,  P o l i c e  C a l l  f o r  R e t u r n  t o  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  3 1  J u l y  2 0 0 2 .  
1 2 9 8  ' T o d u n g  W a r n s  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  V a c u u m ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1 2 9 9  M i l i t a r y ,  P o l i c e  c a l l  f o r  r e t u r n  t o  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 2 9 7 .  
1 3 0 0  
I b i d .  
1 3 0 1  ' P o l i t i c i a n s  D e m a n d  A m e n d m e n t  D e l a y ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 6  J u l y  2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 0 2  ' B u l l s  E y e  o n  a  D e c r e e ' ,  T e m p o ,  6  - 1 2  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 0 3  
' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A m e n d m e n t  M u s t  G o  A h e a d  a s  P l a n n e d ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 0  A p r i l 2 0 0 2 .  
2 1 0  
These statements from the two party leaders show that the .PDIP still took a conservative 
stance concerning the constitutional amendments. This stance encouraged the anti-
amendment camp in the PDIP. They felt that they held a 'trump card': Megawati's blessing. 
Therefore, Aryoso and the other PDIP members actively interrupted the Fourth Amendment 
discussions in the 2002 Session. In the 1st meeting of Commission A, which was responsible 
for the amendment, conflict among the PDIP members. became open. 13°4 Although Tobing had 
been formally proposed by the PDIP faction as Chairperson of the Commission, Marah Simon 
Muhammad Syah (PDIP) refused to accept him. 13os Indeed, Ellis and Yudhini note that, during · 
the Commission A discussions, there was actually a challenge by 14 members of the 
Commission from the PDIP to the nomination of Tobing, despite the fact that To bing was finally, 
chosen as the Chair of the Commission A.1306 
The Middle Position of MPR? The leaders of the MPR realized that, on the one hand, there 
were some groups which wanted the process of constitutional reform to be stopped altogether. 
On the other hand, there were groups in society which demanded the drafting of a completely 
new Constitution.1307 Ami en Rais, the Speaker of the MPR, claimed that: 
[w]hat is being done by the [MPR] members is a manifestation of the expectation of 
everyone. It is in the middle of the extreme opinions.13oa 
Rais rejected any attempt to block the amendment. He argued that, if the amendment of the 
Constitution had failed to materialize, it would have been a setback to the reform movement 
and might have led to a constitutional crisis.13o9 Rais further argued that: 
I hope that those parties who aspire to stop the amendments will review their position and 
start thinking in a clearer way. The interests of the nation should not be sacrificed in favor 
of short-term political passions.131o 
1304 Minutes of the 1st meeting of the Commission A, 4 August 2002, 6- 63. 
13°5 1bid 21. 
1306 Andrew Ellis and Etsi Yudhini (National Democratic Institute), Indonesia's New State Institutions: The Constitution 
Completed, Now for the Detail (2002). 
1307 'Backroom Deals May Spoil Amendment Process', The Jakarta Post, 17 May 2002. 
13081bid. 
1309 Constitutional Amendment must Go Ahead as Planned, above n 1303. · 
131°'Jangan Hentikan Amandemen UUD 1945', Kompas, 17 Apri12002. 
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I n  a d d i t i o n ,  R a i s  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  a n t i - a m e n d m e n t  m o v e m e n t  w a s  p o s s i b l y  t r i g g e r e d  b y  f e a r  
t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t - c o u l d  l e a d  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e . t 3 1 1  F o r  R a i s ,  t h i s  f e a r  
w a s  b a s e l e s s  b e c a u s e  t h e  M P R  h a d  a l r e a d y  a g r e e d  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e  p r e a m b l e ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  
c h o s e  t h e  P a n c a s i l a  a s  t h e  s t a t e  i d e o l o g y  r a t h e r  t h a n  l s l a m . t 3 1 2  
A l t h o u g h  R a i s  d i d  n o t  m e n t i o n  a n y  g r o u p s ,  b u t  i n  r e a l i t y  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  a n d  P D I P  w e r e  t h e  t w o  
f a c t i o n s  w h o  w e r e  m o s t  c o n c e r n  a b o u t  t h e  p r o s p e c t ,  h o w e v e r  r e m o t e ,  o f  a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e  i s s u e .  
T h e  T N I  C h i e f  G e n e r a l  S o e t a r t o  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  s h o u l d ,  " r e s p e c t  p l u r a l i t y  a m o r i g  




3  T h e  P D I P  h a d  t h e  s a m e  v i e w :  R o y  B B  J a n i s  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  
h i s  p a r t y  h a d  n o  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  a m e n d i n g  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h r e e  p r o v i s i o n s  s h o u l d  b e  p r e s e r v e d :  
t h e  p r e a m b l e ,  t h e  s t a t e  i d e o l o g y  o f  P a n c a s i l a ;  a n d  A r t i c l e  2 9 . 1 3 1
4  
M e g a w a t i  c o n f i r m e d  t h i s  b y  
s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  b e  c o n t i n u e d  b u t  t h e  p r e a m b l e ,  w h i c h  c o m p r i s e s  
t h e  P a n c a s i / a ,  s h o u l d  b e  p r e s e r v e d . 1 3 1 5  
3 .  P r e s i d e n t i a l  D e c r e e  
T h e  m o v e m e n t s  f o r  a n d  a g a i n s t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  a n d  P D I P ' s  
u n c l e a r  s t a n c e  t o w a r d  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m ,  c r e a t e d  f e a r  o f  t h . e  p o t e n t i a l  d e a d l o c k  i n  t h e  
F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  r a t i f i c a t i o n  p r o c e s s .  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  D e c r e e  . .  A s  s u g g e s t e d  e a r l i e r ,  i f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  h a d  b e c o m e  d e a d l o c k e d ,  
.  .  .  
t h e  c o u n t r y  w o u l d  h a v e  t h e n  p l u n g e d  i n t o  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r i s i s ,  a n d  t h e r e  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  n o  




6  T h i s  w o u l d  h a v e  c r e a t e d  p r o b l e m s  b e c a u s e  M e g a w a t i ' s  t e r m  w a s  t o  e n d  i n  
O c t o b e r  2 0 0 4 .  U n d e r  s u c h  a  c r i t i c a l  c o n d i t i o n ,  i t  w a s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  P r e s i d e n t  M e g a w a t i  m i g h t  
i s s u e .  a  D e c r e e  t o  r e a p p l y  t h e  o r i g i n a l  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  s a m e  s o r t  o f  D e c r e e  w a s  i s s u e d  
b y  P r e s i d e n t  S o e k a r n o ,  M e g a w a t i ' s  f a t h e r ,  w h e n  i n  1 9 5 9  t h e  K o n s t i t u a n t e  f a c e d  a  p o s s i b l e  
d e a d l o c k .  
1
3 1 1  ' A m i e n  R a i s :  M e m b a t a l k a n  H a s i l  A m a n d e m e n  a d a l a h  S u b v e r s i ' ,  F o r u m ,  1 4  A p r i l 2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 1 2 1 b i d .  




' A m e n d m e n t  P r o c e s s  i n  D a n g e r  o f  F a i l i n g ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 7  A p r i l 2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 1 5  M e g a w a t i  C a l f s  f o r  M i n o r  A m e n d m e n t ,  a b o v e  n  1 2 8 3 .  
1 3 1 6  
R i c h e l  L a n g i t ,  I n d o n e s i a ' s  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m  i n  J e o p a r d y  ( 2 0 0 2 )  A s i a  T i m e s  O n l i n e ,  < h t t p : / / w w w . a t i m e s . c o m / s e - ·  
a s i a / D D 2 3 A e 0 4 . h t m l >  a t  1 7  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 2 .  
2 1 2  
If issued, a Decree of this sort would be a death blow for constitutional reform. It would not only 
have blocked the Fourth Amendment ratification, but it would have also nullified all three 
previous amendments. Therefore, Anhar Gonggong strongly opposed this idea. He argued that 
if a Decree were issued, it would not have been a good politicallesson1317 and would confirm a 
bad precedent: every time the country failed to settle a political problem, a President would 
issue a Decree.131B 
The possible deadlock overshadowed the preparation of the Fourth Amendment, from late 
2001- to August 2002. The following section discusses how the. Fourth Amendment draft 
developed and was finally ratified. 
B. The Fourth Amendment: the Process 
1.- When the Constitution-Making should occur 
The MPR's Plan to Change the Schedule. In 2000, the MPR decided to finish the whole 
amendment process in 2002, at the latest.1319 With the uncertainty surrounding the Fourth 
Amendment ratification was at its height, there were discussions about changing the 2002 
deadline. Ram be Kamarulzaman (Golkar) argued that, if the amendments had not completed in 
2002, they would have continued in the 2003 MPR Annual Session. 1320 Although the Fourth 
Amendment was finally ratified in 2002, this intention to change the deadline is, of course, 
further evidence that the MPR was very loose in their attitude to deadline for amendment. At 
the ouset the MPR agreed to finish the amendment in August 18, 2000. The 2002 deadline was 
the second, much extended, deadline set up by the MPR. 
Public Position. The 'Coalition for a New Constitution' disagreed with the MPR's plan to 
postpone the Fourth Amendment ratification from 2002 to 2003. 1321 It urged ·the MPR to 
complete the amendment by the 2002 deadline.1322 The Coalition proposed, however, that, 
1317 MPR harus Hormati Keputusannya Sendiri, above n 1289. 
13181bid. 
1319 Article 3 of MPR Decree No. IX of 1999 on the Authorization of the Working Body of the MPR to prepare the Amendment 
Draft of the 1945 Constitution. 
1320 'Perpanjangan Sidang Tahunan MPR hingga 2003 merupakan Langkah Antisipasi MPR', Kompas, 6 June 2002. 
f321 1nterview with Mochtar Pabottingi, member of the Coalition for a New Constitution, 15 July 2003. 
13221bid. 
213 
w h e n  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  w a s  c o m p l e t e ,  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s  s h o u l d  b e  f u r t h e r  r e f o r m e d  
b y  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n . 1 3 2 3  
A l o n g  t h e  s a m e  l i n e s ,  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e  A s s o c i a t i o n  a r g u e d  t h a t ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  
t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  h a d  · b e e n  s u c c e s s f u l l y  r a t i f i e d ,  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  s h o u l d  b e c o m e  a  
t r a n s i t i o n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  f u r t h e r  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  
w e r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  a n d  w e r e  t a i n t e d  w i t h  t h e  v e s t e d  i n t e r e s t s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .
1 3 2 4  
T h e y  s h o w e d  




s  T h e  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  s h o u l d  b e  f u r t h e r  r e f o r m e d  b y  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n . 1 3 2 6  
T i m e  L i n e  f o r  D i s c u s s i o n s .  A s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s . t h r e e  a m e n d m e n t s ,  t h e  F o u r t h  
A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  w e r e  c o n d u c t e d  i n  f o u r  s t a g e s  ( T a b l e  1 6 ) :  
•  F i r s t ,  t h e  M P R  W o r k i n g  B o d y  p r e p a r e d  a l l  o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l s  f o r  t h e  2 0 0 2  M P R  A n n u a l  
S e s s i o n .  T h i s  b o d y  f o r m e d  t h r e e  a d  h o c  c o m m i t t e e s  . .  
•  S e c o n d ,  o n e  o f  t h e  c o m m i t t e e s ,  t h e  A d  H o c  C o m m i t t e e  I  ( P A H  1 ) ,  w a s  m a d e  r e s p o n s i b l e  
.  .  
.  f o r  c o n t i n u i n g  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 3 2 7  
•  ·  .  T h i r d ,  C o m m i s s i o n  A  w a s  f~rmed d u r i n g  t h e  2 0 0 2  S e s s i o n  t o  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s  t h e  d r a f t  o f  
t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  p r e p a r e d  b y  t h e  P A H  I .  
•  .  F o u r t h ,  o n  1 0  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 ,  i n  ~he 6 t h  ( c o n t i n u e d )  p l e n a r y  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  2 0 0 2  S e s s i o n ,  t h e  
M P R  r a t i f i e d  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t .  ·  
T h e  t o t a l  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  w e r e  n i n e t y ,  w h i l e  t h e  P A H  I  a n d  C o m m i s s i o n  A  h a d  
4 8  a n d  2 4 3  m e m b e r s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I n  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  b o d i e s ,  t h e  t w e l v e  f a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  M P R  
w e r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e .  n u m b e r  o f  t h e i r  s e a t s  i n  t h e  M P R .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  t h e  
f a c t i o n s  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  e l e v e n  t o  t w e l v e ,  d u e  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  R e g i o n a l  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f a c t i o n ,  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  2 0 0 1  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n .  
1 3 2 3
1 n t e r v i e w  w i t h  T o d u n g  M u l y a  L u b i s ,  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  C o a l i t i o n  f o r  a  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  1 8  J u l y  2 0 0 3 .  
1
3
2 4  
' P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n t i s t s  C a l l  f o r  T r a n s i t i o n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 2 5 1 b i d .  
1 3 2 6 1 b i d .  
1
3
2 7  
S e c t i o n  t w o  o f  t h e  M P R  W o r k i n g  B o d y  D e c i s i o n  N o . 4  o f  1 9 9 9  o n  t h e  F o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  A d  H o c  C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  M P R  
W o r k i n g  B o d y .  
2 1 4  
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2 .  H o w  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n - M a k i n g  w a s  c o n d u c t e d  
~·-~.~ . . .  ·  n " ' · : . " · ' ;  . .  ~.~~ . . .  ····:~.1 . . . . . . . . . .  ~:; r 1 r . . · · n t " " ' : l  . . . .  ~c:::.~·q··:. t '  -~"'1" ;~·.· . . . .  ~i.-- "s~'·"'!~t . . - . . .  ~'1'.. ."'~'·· :~~ · r  
T h e  F o u r t h ·  A m e n d . r n e n t  d 1 s c u s s 1 o n s  w e r e  c o l o r e d  b y ·  t h r e e ' 1 s s u e s ;  s o m e  o f  w h 1 c h  h a d  b e e n  
i n h e r i t e d  f r o m  .  t h e .  p r e v i o u s  .  a m e n d m e n t  .  d i s c u s s i o n s :  . .  ( i )  w h e t h e r  J o  _ a m e n d  o r  r e n e w  t h e  
:  ~·:· . .  ~J-~::::;c··:· :~-~:·::· · · :  . .  · ;  _ , ; ·  ~ 
C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  ( i i )  w h e t h e r  t o  h a v e  o p e n  o r c l o s e d · m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  M P R ;  a n d  ( i i i )  c o n t a m i n a t i o n  
t  1  : : :  ·
1
1  ~~ : · : : ;  7  ;  ;  i  ' " '  ' ; :  f  - •  · · :  
b y  s h o r t  t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s : · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·  ·  
~ ·---~~-. . .  -~-·-··--·~- ~ 
: :  , ·  . .  ;  ;  t  f •  . . . .  ! - . ;  ) j  ~-~-
.7.\~c.~; ,-;~"::~;.11 ~- - . .  ·r~~:r.:.~_.ij:· 
I  
a .  F o u r  A m e n d m e n t s ,  O n e  N e w  C o n s t i t U t i o n ? : \  
~: . .  - : : - r::~ ~:~----. ·.:~:~ ~.: ' \ .  · " . :  
P u b l i c  Positi~n. D e s p i t e  t h e  ~mendmenfproceJs' h a v i n g  J a k e n  p l a c e  o v e r  m o r e  t h a n  t h r e e  
;  ~ " , ' " ' ·  . . •  ':·:.-:~ ;·,{·~1::':l , _  . '  ) :  . .  ·  . .  ',,·~ '  
y e a r s  s i n c e  199~; _ i _ l i J Q _ Q 2 , - t n e  ide9~()f.~ri@·g-aJgtally_new:G9n$titutiC>ti. afo~~_again d u r i n g  t h e  
.  i~-\::.-i·_ .:::-.·~~~.-.'~:-\ . .  ·  ":'\·:-~-··.:: : · · ; f {  :  
F o u r t h  Amend~ent d i s c u s s i o n s .  T h e  ~()~lltiqrffor P . N e i J I { . C o n s t i t u t i o n  s u p p o r t e d \ t h i s  m o v e m e n t  
: ·  f l  . . . . . . . . . . .  -~ . .  ' ·  . , _  . . . . .  ~ . .  ·  _ . , . ; , " ' : - l • •  .,~~- _  . . . .  , , " ·  ··-~~ . . . .  :~ . ' •  . ,  , ·  \  
t o  w r i t e  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n : · l t  h a d '  s t a r t e d  t h e  c a m p a i g ' r i  i n '  2 0 0 0 , ' a r i d  u p  t o  2 0 0 2 ,  t h e  C o a l i t i o n  
h a d  p e r s i s t e n t l y  a r g u e d  t h a t  amendingitt1e.··19d5"Con'stituti~n w a s  ~at-e n - o u g h .  - I t  w a s  u n h a p p y  
:  ' .  ~: . \  .  · ,  \ .  · - ·  ~- l  
w i t h  t h e  amendJ!I~ntsm'!~-~ b y _  th~ _ M F > R .  . I t  a r g u e d  _ t h a t  b o t i } J h e  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  
I  
t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  w e r e  n o t  democratic~132a.: . :  : , : . i , .  . .  : :  ·  ~-~ : ; , ;  ~ . •  - - · ·  ·  
'  •  .  •  ' .  : ' I  •  '  •  .  <  . .  "  . . .  ' '  .~' -~ . .  •  '  ' '  •  I  4  
T h e  s o c i e t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  . w a s  d i v i d e d .  i n  suppo~ing t~e n~w C o n s t i t u t i o n .  i d e a .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  
' . q : : · · :  , : · , :  ' I  ' , ,  : : •  :.~ l . !  · : : ;  ~.:: : •  •  ~ •  ' > : . ' . : ' !  , ,  ' o  • ;  •  :  :  \  
S a b a m  S i a g i a n  q u e s t i o n e d  w h e t h e r  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n ' f r o m  S o e h a r t o  w a s  a  c o n d u c i v e  t i m e  f o r  
~- ~~~.:···i.~:.~; :t.··:·.:-~.~~:...:.~~.Yi.<:~ !  
w r i t i n g  a  n e w - C o n s t i t u t i o n :  
1 3 2 9  
S i a g i a n  r e c a l l e d  t h e  d i f f i c u l t - c o n a i t i o l l s "  s u r r o u n d i n g  t h e  
· - · · · - · · ·  ' ' " _ . _ _  ···-·~··· . . .  -~-~--- . .  -~·--·"---~- - - ·  . , .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  - .  . . .  - · - ~ . . . . .  -~~·-·----""1 
'j'·.~:• , : . , I '  ' , " - t  L '  • ,  .:;•"t~'"l•''f', ,;,,,.,,,_'•'':1~:"" , ' •  • :  
K o n s t i t u a n t e  ( C o n s t i t u e n t  A s s e m b l y )  · i n  1 9 5 { ) - j  959.~ T h e  ' K o n s t i t u a n t e ,  w h i c h  w a s  r e s p o n s i b l e  
~ -~ f  , ,  . . .  . . .  •  •  •  •  •  •  '  !  "  \  
f o r  w r i t i n g  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  c o u l d  r i o f f e ' a c h '  a n ·  a g ' r e e r r i e r 1 t :  d u e  t o  c l e a r  d i f f e r e n c e s  r e g a r d i n g  
i  
t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e : 1 3 3 o ; ; A U h a F t i m e ,  i t h e  c o u n t r y . w a s ·  w e a k e - n e - c f  b y - a  s e r i o u s  r e g i o n a l  
:  ;  . . . . . . .  • •  ' . " '  : < .  . .  ~ • •  ~ •  r  '  :  ,  l  
r e v o l t .  B a s e d  o n  a  r e l a t i v e l y  similarsituati·a~~ ( g i v e n : t h e  -~ecent l o s s  o f  E a s t  T i m o r ;  a n d  r e b e l l i o n s  
- - . . . . . . . . . . . .  , _ , - - ; , _ ,  . .  - • .  - - · · - - . . .  " ' [  - - "  . . .  - . . . .  - - - - - - - - .  • · · " · - - - · - - - - - - · - · - · " " " '  
i n  A c e h  a n d  P a p u a ) _ . S i a g i a n  d o u b t e d  . w h e t h e r - I n d o n e s i a ;  . a f t e r . : S g e h . a r t o ;  · " w i t h  a  s l u g g i s h  
~ ;  . .  • 1 . : : ; , ' , ' ,  ; . _  1 :  • •  ~,'·'\, •  ),~ \ . , · \ · . :  ..,:.'~I I  · , , ' · •  ,  . , · , .  ; ,  ' • ,  .~ - I  • '  :  
e c o n o m y  a n d  r a i s e d  p ! ) v e r t y _ l i n e "  ~as.s_tf<?ng-eM~9r t o  c o p e  ~ith t h e j q t e n s e : e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
~ <·!~~.,.,:;f;':·:,\:·· .  . - ·  . ! . :  • . .  , ,  . .  ~·:..:·,; ,;,,~··;·.;::.,, . . . .  ' 1 ;  . •  '.•,).)~1 . . .  • ' · ,  · ,  \  
d r a f t i n g  a  n e w  Qonstitu-t!qn:13~! _  -. . .  --~-- ~--· - - . . . . . .  · - - - :  · ·  - - ·  - - - - - ·  
;  · : . , . . : : · ' : : : : : : '  . .  ::··.':·\.·>·~:!···-· . : · · . : . · r . ' · · { . .  .:-;:_./~: :~.~:.~ 
i  : . c . ' · · · : · - ' . _ , ' ; '  . .  ·  . .  : : c _ i , ' : ' :  · : , :  . .  · . : ·  · ,  l  
T h e  M P R ' s  P o s i t i o n :  D u r i n g  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  m e e t i n g s ,  t h e  f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  P A H  I  k e p t  
d e c l a r i n g  t h e i r  a g r e e m e n t  t o  m e r e l y  a m e n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  I n  r e a l i t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  M P R  c o u l d  
n o t  h i d e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  ha~ l o n g  since~aparlcJ~med t h e  ' m e r e l y  ~ith t h e  a~end'~ent' c o n c e p t .  
--~---1 
1 3 2 8  N G O  C o a l i t i o n  f o r  a  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  abov~'ri '12l8;~ . .  - - :  1 ? .  
1 3 2 9  S a b a m  S i a g i a n ,  ' H o p e  i n  2 0 0 2 ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  3 1  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 1 .  
1 3 3 0  
I b i d .  
·::.:~:-_/ : ,  . . .  - · o  ~(.:: . .  r ; t " . t _ : . f ; / \  1 H  ~ (;~:; ! o  2£Y1;!::·{:.~ ~~: 
2 1 s : s  
t r  ~!T ;~- - · ·  1  
i1l2~'tt 
When discussing the proposal for new transitional provisions to deal with transition to the new 
dispensation created by the amendments without creating legal vacuum, Asshidiqie argued that 
the necessity of the provision demonstrated that the MPR had made a new Constitution. 1332 
Further evidence that the MPR was not consistent in its approach to the amendments concept 
is found in the close relation between the previous amendments and the Fourth Amendment. 
Each constitutional amendment was supposed to be independent, but they we:re, in fact 
. . 
interdependent. This was mentioned several times by the leaders of the MPR. Amien Rais, the 
chair, stated for example: 
... in relation to the continuation of one packet constitutional reform, we have to 
complete the last amendment, the Fourth Amendment. This amendment has a very 
strategic role to conclude the constitutional amendments as well as to finalize the 
constitutional reform.1333 [Emphasis added]. 
Tobing, who was th~ Chair of the PAH I, pointed out that this ~d Hoc Committee:. 
... in finishing the amendment draft of the 1945 Constitution, had been. using a 
comprehensive approach. By doing so, the First, Second, Third and the current Fourth 
·Amendment draft are considered as a united amendment which is systemic, 
connected and comprehensive in order to regulate the life of the state. 1334 [Emphasis 
added]. 
Yusuf, vice chair of the PAH I, stated: 
[w]e are in the final stages. We passed the First Amendment in 1999, the Second in 2000 
and the Third last year. Now, we are in the fourth stage. This latest amendment is one 
in a series.1335 [Emphasis added]. 
The CSIS Team, evaluating the previous three amendments of the 1945 Constitution, 
. . . 
concludes that what happened was not, in fact, amendment. Although it is still named the 1945 
Constitution, the substance of the document has been completely changed.1336 
13311bid. 
1332 Minutes of the 341h meeting of the PAH I, 27 June 2002, 272. 
1333 Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the Working Body, 4 June 2002, 163. 
1334 Minutes of the 4111 meeting of the Working Body, 25 July 2002, 241. 
1335 Van Zorge Report, Go/kar Was Not A 'Ruling Party', But A 'Ruler's Party' (2002) <http://www.vanzorgereport.com/report/ 
popup/index.cfm?fa=ShowReport&pk rpt id=412&CFID=315606&CFTOKEN=71680888> at 3 October 2003. 
1336 The CSIS Team, 'Catalan Kritis Terhadap Proses Amandemen UUD 1945', (2002) 1 Ana/isis CS/S 23: 
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b .  T h e  T r a n s p a r e n c y  o f  t h e  M P R  M e e t i n g s  
I n  a l l  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s e s , .  t h e  M P R  h a d  t w o  t y p e s  o f  m e e t i n g s :  o p e n  a n d  c l o s e d  
"  '  ' .  '  '  .  .  
d i s c u s s i o n s .  T h r o u g h o u t  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t ,  t h e  f o r m a l  a n d  i n f o r m a l  
c l o s e d  m e e t i n g s  w e r e  c o n d u c t e d  m o r e  o f t e n  t h a n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  a m e n d m e n t s .  T h e  a g r e e m e n t  i n  
th~ M P R  t o  a v o i d  v o t i n g  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  fact~rs w h i c h  h a d  h i g h l i g h t e d  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  c l o s e d  
m e e t i n g s .  I f  d u r i n g  t h e s e  m e e t i n g s  n o  a g r e e m e n t  h a d  b e e n  r e a c h e d ,  t h e r e  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  n o  
o t h e r  alte~native b u t  t o  h o l d  a  v o t e  i n  t h e  M P R  s e s s i o n  a n d  t h u s  w o u l d  co~sequently h a v e  
o p e n e d  a  w i d e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e a d l o c k .  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  choi~e o f  c l o s e d  m e e t i n g s  w a s  a  r e a s o n a b l e  s t r a t e g y  t o  p r e v e n t  d e a d l o c k ,  i t  w a s  
w i d e l y  c r i t i c . i z e d  b y  t h e  p u b l i c .  T h e  C o a l i t i o n  f o r  a  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  c o m p l a i n e d  t h a t  b e c a u s e  o f  
t h e  ' c l o s e d  d o o r '  a g r e e m e n t s ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M P R  h a d  n o t  b e e n  e n g a g e d  
i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .
1 3 3 7  
R o b e r t s  w r o t e  t h a t  t h e  M P R  t o o k  n o  v o t e s  i n  t h e  p l e n a r y  
m e e t i n g  b e c a u s e  t h e  s e n s i t i v e  a r t i c l e s  h a d  b e e n  d e c i d e d  b y  " c o n s e n s u s " :  t h a t  i s  t h r o u g h  d e a l s  




B  F o r  R o b e r t s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s  w a s  u n d e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  m o s t  o f  t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  h a d  b e e n  
k e p t  o u t  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  e y e s . 1 3 3 9  
D e s p i t e  t h e  c r i t i c i s m ,  t h e  c l o s e d  m e e t i n g  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  
r a t i f i c a t i o n .  I t  a l l o w e d  t h e  f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R  t o  b e  m o r e  o p e n  t o w a r d  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t  d r a f t s .  F o r  Y u s u f  ( G o l k a r ) ,  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  m e e t i n g  w a s  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  i n  r e a c h i n g  
. .  
t h e  a g r e e m e n t .  H e  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t :  
[ i ] t  s e e m s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  s t r o n g  w i l l  a m o n g  f a c t i o n s  [ t o  r e a c h  a n  a g r e e m e n t ] .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  
d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h e  P A H  I  i s  m o v i n g  v e r y  s l o w l y ,  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  m e e t i n g s  s h o w t h a t  e a c h  
f a c t i o n  i s  m o r e  o p e n  [ t o  g i v e  a n d  t a k e ] .  T h e r e f o r e ,  [ a g r e e m e n t ]  w i l l  b e  r e a c h e d  e a s i e r . 1 3 4 o  
T h e  P D I P  a n d  G o l k a r .  O n e  e x a m p l e  o f  a  s u c c e s s f u l  c l o s e d  m e e t i n g  w a s  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  t h e  P D I P  a n d  G o l k a r ,  b e f o r e  t h e  2 0 0 2  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n .  T h e  t w o  l a r g e s t  f a c t i o n s  .  
1 3 3 7  N G O  C o a l i t i o n  f o r  a  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 2 7 8 ,  2 .  
1 3 3 8  J o h n  R o b e r t s ,  I n d o n e s i a n  P a r l i a m e n t  P u t s  a  D e m o c r a t i c  G l o s s  o n  a n  A u t o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n  ( 2 0 0 2 )  W o r l d  S o c i a l i s t  W e b  
S i t e  < h t p p : / / w w w . w s w s . o r g / a r t i c l e s l 2 0 0 2 1  a u g 2 0 0 2 / i n d o - a 2 7 . s h t m l >  a t  1 2  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 3 .  
1 3 3 9 1 b i d .  .  
1 3 4 0  ' P e m i l i h a n  Putar~n K e d u a  L a n g s u n g  d i k e t n b a l i k a n  k e  R a k y a t ' ,  K o m p a s ,  1 2  J u l y  2 0 0 2  . .  
2 1 a · ·  
agreed in a backroom deal that the deadlock must be avoided. 1341 Further, Golkar succeeded 
in persuading the PDIP to hand over the second round of presidential elections to the public, 
instead. of to the MPR.1342 Both parties further agreed on two other crucial issues. On the 
composition of the MPR, they agreed to eliminate the non-elected members, and to dissolve 
the DPA (the Supreme Advisory Council).1343 
The Moslem-based Parties. The meeting between the two nationalist factions triggered a 
counter meeting among Moslem-based parties: the PBB, PPP, PAN, PKB and PK. 1344 They 
agreed to support alternative revision 3 of Article 31 which stated: 
The national education system should be aimed at improving people's religious faith and 
devoutness and their character as well as sharpening their minds'. 
However, the parties were divided on the alternatives in Article 29(1). The PKB, PAN and PK 
supported ~he alternative three which stated that 
The state is based on one Supreme God with the obligation for adherents to practice their 
religions. 
Meanwhile, the PPP and PBB continued to support the second alternative, which was to insert 
the 'seven words' of the Jakarta charter - on the application of syariah, Islamic law - into 
Article 29(1).1345 
The Trade-off between Article 29(1) and Article 31. The Moslem-based parties meeting was 
an embryo of the agreement to maintain the original Article 29(1}, without inserting the 'seven 
words' of the Jakarta Charter. Later, in a negotiation meeting of the Commission A, in 
exchange for the above alternative of Article 31 being ratified, the PPP, PBB and PDU agreed 
to withdraw their proposal to insert the syariah (Islamic law) into Article 29(1}. 1346 Yet the three 
parties requested, however, that the withdrawal not be revealed to the open meeting of the 





'Muslim Politicians Meet to Counter Nationalist Alliance', The Jakarta Post, 16 July 2002. 
13451bid. 
1346 Minutes of a negotiation meeting of Commission A. 7 August 2002, 105 ::..,_ 113. 
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u n t i l  t h e  l a s t  m i n u t e  o f  t h e  M P R ' s  P l e n a r y  M e e t i n g .
1 3 4 7  
T h i s  w a s  b e c a u s e  t h e  I s l a m i c  p a r t i e s  f e l t  
t h e  n e e d  t o  s h o w  t o  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s  t h a t  t h e y  h a d  b e e n  f i g h t i n g  f o r  t h e  I s l a m i c  l a w  t h r o u g h o u t  
t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s .  
R i s w a n d h a  l m a w a n  c r i t i c i z e d  t h e s e  t r a d e - o f f .  H e  a c c u s e d  s o m e  p a r t i e s  o f  t a k i n g  h o s t a g e  




a  l m a w a n  a r g u e d  F U G  
h a d  t a k e n  h o s t a g e s  t h e  d r a f t s  o f  A r t i c l e s  3 1  a n d  1 6  ( o n  t h e  D P A )  i n  a  t r a d e - o f f  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e i r  
e x i s t e n c e  i n  t h e  M P R .
1
3
4 9  
H e  a l s o  a r g u e d  t h e  I s l a m i c  p a r t i e s  h a d  t a k e n  A r t i c l e  2 9  h o s t a g e  i n  a  
.  b i d  t o  m a k e  n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t i e s  l o w e r  t h e i r  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  i n  s o m e  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  
p r o p o s a l s . 1 3 5 o  
C l o s e d  D i s c u s s i o n s  a n d  P o l i t i c a l  ' H o r s e  T r a d i n g ' .  T h e  r e a c h i n g  o f  a  c o n s e n s u s  t h r o u g h  
c l o s e d  m e e t i n g s  b e t w e e n  p a r t i e s  w a s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  a p p r e c i a t e d .  M a n y  w e r e  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  




I n  
c o m m e n t i n g  o n  c o n s e n s u s  r e a c h e d  b e t w e e n  t h e  P D I P  a n d  G o l k a r  d u r i n g  t h e  2 0 0 2  d e b a t e s ,  
t h e  e d i t o r i a l  o f  t h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t  p o i n t e d  o u t  i t s  c o n c e r n s  t h a t :  
[ w ] h a t e v e r  c o n c e s s i o n s  w e r e  m a d e  . . .  t h e  p u b l i c  h a v e  b e e n  e x c l u d e d  f r o m  t h e  p r o c e s s  . . .  
[ t h e ]  l e a d e r s  a r e  e n c o u r a g i n g  a  d u m b i n g - d o w n  p r o c e s s  t h r o u g h  t h e i r  b a c k r o o m  d e a l i n g s  
a n d  c a t t l e - t r a d i n g  p r a c t i c e s . 1 3 5 2  ·  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e r e  w e r e  n o  m e e t i n g  m i n u t e s  w h i c h  r e c o r d e d  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  
p a r t i e s .  T h i s  m e e t i n g  w a s  i n f o r m a l l y  c o n d u c t e d  o u t s i d e  t h e  M P R  a g e n d a .  I t  w a s  t h e r e f o r e  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  p r o v e  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  'hors~ t r a d i n g '  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  p a r t i e s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a n o t h e r  
e d i t o r i a l  o f  t h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t  c l a i m e d  t h a t : · .  
[ n ] o  d o u b t  s o m e  h o r s e s  w e r e  t r a d e d  b e t w e e n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  o n e  
w i t h  t h e  m o s t  c l o u t ,  o n  t h e  w a y  t o  r e a c h i n g  a  c o m p r o m i s e .  W e  w i l l  p r o b a b l y  b e  h e a r i n g  
a b o u t  w h a t  e x a c t l y  t h e s e  f a c t i o n s  c o m p r o m i s e  o r  g a v e  u p  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .




1 b i d  1 0 8 .  
1 3 4 8  ' B a r g a i n i n g  f o r  a  F i n a l  P r i c e  a t  t h e  M P R ' s  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  6  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 4 9 1 b i d .  
1 3 5 0  I b i d .  
1 3 5 1  ' M e g a w a t i  d a n  H a m z a h  H a z  S e p a k a t  t i d a k  A d a  V o t i n g ' ,  K o m p a s ,  1 3  J u l y  2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 5 2  ' P o l i t i c a l  D u m b i n g - D o w n ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 8  J u l y  2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 5 3  ' T h e  H a l f w a y  R e f o r m '  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 2  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
2 2 0  
In relation to the 'horse trading', the following section elaborates on how some of the short-term 
political interests colored the Fourth Amendment discussions. 
c. Short-Term Political Interests · 
Although the following amendment proposals were never adopted, they show how, in drafting 
the amendment, some factions in the MPR were motivated strongly by their short-term political 
interests. 
(1) Direct Presidential Election 
In the event that a second round presidential election is needed, the MPR factions were divided 
between whether the MPR or the people who should elect the President. The PDIP and TNI-
Polri supported election by the MPR. This alternative was questioned on the ground that the 
final decision would be taken by a small group of the MPR, and the legitimacy questions would 
appear if the MPR's decision overturned the first round presidential election outcome. 1354 On 
the other hand, Golkar, the PPP, PKB and PAN back a second round election by the people. 
This alternative was questioned on the grounds of cost and possible security implications. 1355 
Interest of the PDIP. At the beginning of the Fourth Amendment discussions, the PDIP 
seemed to believe that Megawati would stand a better chance to make back-door deals with 
the MPR members in the 2004 presidential elections than if she went to the public. 1356 In the 
end, however, the PDIP agreed to support the alternative proposal, that is, that the second 
round election would be voted on by the people. Ellis and Yudhini note that the PDIP's change 
of position raised public questions as to what it had received in exchange.1357 For Meilono 
. Soewondo (PDIP), the reason behind this changed position was merely that the PDIP was 
finally the only party which supported the MPR retaining the role in the election of a President. 
The party, therefore, came under considerable pressure, both. from the other factions and the 
public, to change its position.13sa 
1354 Ellis and Yudhini, above n 1306. 
13551bid. 
1356 
'PDI Perjuangan Lacks Confidence', The Jakarta Post, 8 July 2002. 
1357 Ellis and Yudhini, above n 1306. 
1358 Van Zorge Report, Anything In Parliament Is Tradable (2002) <http://WYffl.vanzorgereport.cem/report/popuplindex.efm?fa 
=ShowReport&pk rpt id=450&CFID=315606&CFTOKEN=71680888> at 3 October.2003. 
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F r o m  i n s i d e  t h e  M P R ,  G o l k a r  p l a y e d  a  m a j o r  r o l e  i n  c h a n g i n g  t h e  P D I P ' s  s t a n c e .  Y e t  G o l k a r ' s  
s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  s e c o n d  r o u n d  d i r e c t  e l e c t i o n  a r o s e  m a i n l y  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  c a l c u l a t i o n  t h a t  i t s  
c a n d i d a t e  h a d  b e t t e r  c h a n c e  t o  w i n  t h e  b a t t l e .
1
3 5 9  F r o m  o u t s i d e  t h e  M P R ,  t h e  C e t r o  ( C e n t r e  f o r  
E l e c t o r a l  R e f o r m )  a d v o c a t e d  a  s y s t e m a t i c  c a m p a i g n  t o  s u p p o r t  d i r e c t  e l e c t i o n .  S a i f u d d i n  ( P P P )  
o f  t h e  P A H  I  a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h a t  C e t r o ' s  c a m p a i g n  h a d  a  s t r o n g  i n f l u e n c e  o n  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  
d i r e c t  e l e c t i o n  o p t i o n . 1 3 6 o  
G o l k a r ' s  P r e s i d e n t i a l  E l e c t i o n  P r o p o s a l .  D u r i n g  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  G o l k a r  
o f f e r e d  a  n e w  p r o v i s i o n  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  d i r e c t  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n s .  M a t t a l a t a  ( G o l k a r )  
p r o p ? s e d  t h a t  o n l y _  t h e  l a r g e s t  a n d  s e c o n d  l a r g e s t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  o r  a  c o a l i t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  




G o l k a r  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s a l  w a s  a n  
a l t e r n a t i v e ,  t o  a v o i d  t h e  d e a d l o c k  o f  s e c o n d  r o u n d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n s .  S i n c e  G o l k a r  c a m e  
s e c o n d  i n  t h e  1 9 9 9  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n ,  o n e  m i g h t  s u s p e c t  t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s a l  w a s  G o l k a r ' s  a t t e m p t  
t o  l i m i t  i t s  c o m p e t i t o r s  a n d  w i n  t h e  2 0 0 4  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n s .  P r e d i c t a b l y ,  t h i s  p r o p o s a l  w a s  
m e t  w i t h  s u s p i c i o n  b y  t h e  o t h e r  f a c t i o n s .  P a t r i a l i s  A k b a r  ( R e f o r m a s 1 ) .  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s a l .  
d i s c r i m i n a t e d  a g a i n s t '  t h e  s m a l l e r  p a r t i e s ,  a n d  c o n t r a d i c t e d  t h e  d i r e c t  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  
p r i n c i p l e .
1 3 6 2  
( 2 )  T h e  C o m p o s i t i o n  o f t h e  M P R  
O n  t h e  i s s u e  o f  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  M P R ,  m o s t  f a c t i o n s  a g r e e d  t o  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l  
t h a t ,  b e g i n n i n g  i n  2 0 0 4 ,  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  m u s t  b e  e l e c t e d .  T h i s  w o u l d  b e  t h e  c a s e  
w h e t h e r  t h e y  w e r e  t o  s i t  i n  t h e  D P R  o r  t h e  D P D .  T h i s  w o u l d  a l s o  m e a n  t h a t ,  a f t e r  t h e  2 0 0 4  
e l e c t i o n ,  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  n o  m o r e  a u t o m a t i c  s e a t s  a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  n o n - e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  
T h i s  p r o p o s a l  w a s  s t r o n g l y  r e j e c t e d  b y  F U G ,  f o r  f e a r  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  l o s e  t h e i r  s e a t s  i n  t h e  
M P R .  I n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  a m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  T N I - P o l r i  h a d  a l s o  o b j e c t e d  t o  t h e  p r o p o s a l ,  
b e c a u s e  i t  w o u l d  s h u t  t h e m  o u t  o f  t h e  M P R . 1 3 6 3  
1
3 5 9  ' P o l i t i c a l  I n t e r e s t s  T h r e a t e n  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  3 0  J u l y  2 0 0 2 .  
1
3 6 0  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  L u k m a n  H a k i m  S a i f u d d i n ,  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  2 0  J u n e  2 0 0 3 .  
1 3 6 1  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  3 3 ' d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  2 5  J u n e  2 0 0 2 ,  1 7 5 .  
1 3 6 2 1 b i d  1 8 7 .  
1 3 6 3  K a w a m u r a ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 1 ,  5 0 .  
2 2 2  
The Position of FUG. Concerning the composition of the MPR, FUG was the only faction 
which defended its own existence, in the midst of opposition from the other factions. 1364 FUG 
consistently proposed what was named the "bicameral plus" system, i.e. the DPR, DPD and the 
delegates group (FUG). Siswono Yudo Husodo, for example, was of the opinion that the MPR's 
composition still needed FUG representation. FUG members should be elected from the 
community groups which were difficult to ,represent in the MPR through a general election 
process. 136s 
Harun Kamil, one of the members of the PAH I from FUG, stated: 
... we believe that a democratic Indonesian constitutional system should encompass 
· representation off all people. [Therefore], we will not withdraw, we will fight and vote at the 
plenary meeting .1366 · 
FUG kept its promise. It pushed the MPR to vote between the two alternatives for the 
composition of the MPR (Article 2(1)). Out of the 600 members who attended the session, 475 
supported the exclusion of the non-elected members of the MPR, 122 were against and 3 
abstained. 1367 The PDIP was divided, with 80 votes for exclusion and 64 for retention. This vote 
was the only one which took place in the whole amendment ratification process, from the First 
to the Fourth Amendments:· 
Position of the TNI-Polri. Based on the MPR Decree No. VII of 2000 on the Role of the TNI-
Polri, the military faction were to forfeit their seats in the DPR by 2004, but would retain the 
seats in the MPR until at least 2009. However, in 2002, this position no longer held: all now 
depended on the Fourth Amendment outcome. If the MPR's composition would only consist of 
elected members of the DPR and DPD, there could be no more 'free' seats ·for the TNI-Polri in 
the MPR (and DPR). This meant the Decree No. VII of 2000 was abandoned and the military 
be excluded from the legislature, effective from the formulation of the new MPR to be formed 
by the 2004 election. 
1364 Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Commission A, 5 August 2002, 150-200. 
1365 
'FUG Terancam Hilang dari MPR', Kompas, 6 August 2002). 
1366ibid. 
136l Minutes of the 61h (continued) Plenary Meeting, 10 August 2002, 825. 
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I n  · t h e  2 0 0 2  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  t h e  m i l i t a r y  f a c t i o n  c h a n g e d  i t s  p o s i t i o n ,  w h i c h  w a s  
p r e v i o u s l y  t h e  s a m e  p o s i t i o n  a s  F U G ' s .  I t s  n e w  p o s i t i o n  f o l l o w e d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  f a c t i o n s  t o  




B  A g u s  W i d j o j o  ( t h e  T N I - P o l r i )  s a w  t h i s :  
. . .  a  l o g i c a l  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  T N I ' s  n e w  p a r a d i g m ,  w h i c h  i n c l u d e s  v o l u n t a r i l y  e x i t i n g  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  . . .  T h e  m i l i t a r y  a n d  t h e  p o l i c e  a r e  b e i n g  r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e i r  f u n d a m e n t a l  
d u t i e s  . . .  o u r  p r e s e n c e  i n  t h e  M P R  i s  n o  l o n g e r  r e l e v a n t . f 3 6 9  
T h e  s p e c i a l  m o m e n t  o c c u r r e d  i n  o n e  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A  m e e t i n g s .  S l a m e t  S u p r i y a d i ,  a  
S p o k e s p e r s o n  f o r  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  f a c t i o n ,  i n v i t e d  a p p l a u s e  w h e n  h e  s t a t e d :  .  
[ t ] h e  T N I  a n d  P o l r i  . . .  h a v e  d e c i d e d  t o  r e t u r n  t o  t h e i r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  r o l e s ,  a s  t o o l s  o f  s t a t e  
d e f e n s e  a n d  s e c u r i t y .  W e  w i l l  n o t  b e  i n v o l v e d  i n  p o l i t i c s .  I n  d o i n g  s o ,  w e  d o  n o t  a s k  f o r  a n y  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  t o  s i t  i n  t h e  M P R  . . .  W i t h  a l l  s i n c e r i t y  a n d  a w a r e n e s s ,  w e  h a v e  d e c i d e d  t o  
l e a v e  t h e  M P R . 1 3
7
o  
N o t  e v e r y b o d y  s a w  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  b o w i n g  o u t  o f  p o l i t i c s  a s  a  p o s i t i v e  s i g n .  T h e r e  w e r e  
q u e s t i o n s .  T h e  e d i t o r i a l  o f  t h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t  w r o t e :  
[ p ] e r h a p s ,  i t  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  a  f u t i l e  e x e r c i s e  f o r  t h e  T N I  t o  h a v e  p u t  u p  a  f i g h t  w h e n  i t  
w a s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o p i n i o n  w a s  f o r  t h e  m i l i t a r y  t o  . e n d  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  p r i v i l e g e s .  
P e r h a p s ,  t h i s  w a s  a  s i g n  o f  t h e  g e n u i n e  d e s i r e  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  T N I  t o  r e f o r m  i t s e l f . 1 3 7 1  
T h e  q u e s t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  s i n c e r i t y  o f  t h e  T N I ' s  d e c i s i o n  w a s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e .  I n i t i a l l y ,  t h e r e  h a d  
b e e n  a  p l a n  t o  i n s e r t  a  ' t r a n s i t i o n a l  c l a u s e  i n  t h e .  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  t o  a l l o w  t h e  T N I - P o l r i ' s  
p r e s e n c e  i n  t h e  M P H  u n t i l  2 0 0 9 ,  · i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  V I I  o f  2 0 0 0 .  T h i s  w a s  
d r o p p e d  i n  o n e  o f  t h e  l a s t  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  P A H  I  2 0 0 2 . 1  K e t u t  A s t a w a  ( T N I - P o l r i )  s t a t e d  t h a t  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  f a c t i o n  w i t h d r e w  t h e  m i l i t a r y  t r a n s i t i o n a l  c l a u s e  o n .  t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  t h e .  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
s h o u l d  n o t  r e g u l a t e  s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h  w a s  o n l y  t e m p o r a r i l y  v a l i d .
1
3
7 2  
E l l i s  a n d  Y u d h i n i  a r g u e  t h a t  
t h e  r e a l  r e a s o n  w a s .  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  r e a l i z e d .  t h a t  t h e  p o w e r s  o f  t h e  M P H  a f t e r  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
w e r e  l i m i t e d .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  s m a l l  n u m b e r s  o f  m i l i t a r y  i n · t h e  M P R  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n ,  ' m o r e  o f  
l i a b i l i t y  a s  a  f o c u s  o f  u n p o p u l a r i t y '  , 1 3 7 3  
1 3 6 8  P o l i t i c a l  I n t e r e s t s  T h r e a t e n  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 5 9 .  
1 3 6 9  V a n  Z o r g e  r e p o r t ,  O u r  P r e s e n c e  I n  T h e  M P R  I s  N o  L o n g e r  R e l e v a n t  ( 2 0 0 2 )  < h t t p : / / w w w . v a n z o r g e r e p o r t . c o m l r e p o r t /  
p o p u p / i n d e x . c f m ? f a = S h o w R e p o r t & p k  r p t  ·  i d = 4 6 3 & C F I D = 3 1 5 6 0 6 & C F T O K E N = 7 1 6 8 0 8 8 8 >  a t  3  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 3 .  
1 3 7 0  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  2 n d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  5  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 ,  1 9 6 .  
1 3 7 1  A  G r a c e f u l  E x i t ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 3  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 7 2  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  3 2 " d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  2 4  J u n e  2 0 0 2 ,  6 5 - 6 6 .  
1 3 7 3  E l l i s  a n d  Y u d h i n i ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 0 6 .  
2 2 4  
3. Who the Constitution-Making body was to be 
The debates on whether a Constitutional Commission should be established resurfaced during 
the Fourth Amendment discussions. In fact, compared to the previous amendment discussions, 
the debates were now more extensive. The Coalition for a New Constitution (the lead 
proponent of the Commission) worked together with the media to, once again advocate the 
establishment of the commission. 
a. The Pro Commission Movement 
The movement for the Constitutional Commission could be divided into two, very different 
groups. The first group consisted of those who had supported the idea, starting from the 
previous amendments. These included the Coalition for A New Constitution and some 
'' 
constitutional law and political experts. The second group was those who proposed the 
commission in the last stage of the Fourth Ame~dment discussions. These were the groups 
which previously demanded that the amendment proposal be stopped, groups coordinated by 
Amin Aryoso and Pepabri headed by Tri Soetrisno. 
Widjojanto of the Coalition argued that the commission should be established, because the 
MPR had failed to carry out the constitutional reform in a democratic way. Widjojanto further 
argued that the failure was because the MPR itself was part of the problem. That is why he 
said, "those to be reformed cannot reform themselves, the reformers should come from the 
outsiders". 1374 The, coalition called for an independent commission with full authority to draw up 
a new Constitution, whereby the MPR's endorsement would merely be a formality. Further the 
Coalition stated that: 
[t]he process and results of the ongoing amendment to the Constitution are in violation of 
the spirit of reform. A Constitutional Commission is a must and the, MPR has to endorse it 
in the 2002 Annual Session.1375 
The Coalition's position was echoed by the Alumni of Gadjah Mada University (Kagama), and 
the Indonesian Political Science Association (AIPI).1376 The Kagama proposed that the 
establishment of the commission should be inserted into Article 37 of the Constitution, on the 
amendment procedure.1377 
1374 Minutes of the 7th meeting of the PAH I, 27 February 2002, 442. 
1375 'Constitutional Commission is a Must', The Jakarta Post, 1 August 2002. 
1376 'MPR Terus didesak Bentuk Komisi Konstitusi', Kompas, 7 August 2002. 
1377 1bid. 
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P o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  F a c t i o n .  I n  t h e  l a s t  s t a g e  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  f a c t i o n  s u d d e n l y  p r o p o s e d  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n .  T h e  T N I - P o l r i  f a c t i o n  w a s  o f  
t h e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  c o n t i n u e d  b y  t h e  M P R .  T h e  
a m e n d m e n t s  n e e d e d  f u r t h e r  s u b s t a n c e  h a r m o n i z a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  a  c o m m i s s i o n  w a s  
n e e d e d ;  1 3 7 8  E l l i s  a n d  Y u d h i n i  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  p o s i t i o n  w a s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e  
b r o u g h t  b y  r e t i r e d  g e n e r a l s  t o  s t o p  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  c o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  a c h i e v e d  b y  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  w h i c h  w o u l d  r e a p p l y  t h e  o r i g i n a l  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 3 7 9  
T h e  M P R ' s  P o s i t i o n .  l r i  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  d , i s c u s s i o n s , t h e r e  w e r e  p r o p o s a l s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  f r o m  t h e  T N I - P o l r i ,  P K B ,  F U G ,  G o l k a r ,  P D I P  a n d  P P P .  T h e s e  
f a c t i o n s  o f f e r e d  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e t a b l e s  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n ,  a n d  d i f f e r e d  o n  
i  
'  '  '  i  
t h e ·  C o m m i s s i o n  f o r m  a n d  p o w e r s  ( s e e  T a b l e  1 7 ) . 1 3 8 o  
T h e  M P R ,  h o w e v e r ;  a g r e e d  t o  r e j e c t  a  p r o p o s a l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
C o m m i s s i o n  t o  d r a f t  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  M P R  l i m i t e d  t h e  p o w e r  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  t o  
s i m p l y  s y n c h r o n i z e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  m a d e  b y  t h e  M P R .  I t  a l s o  r e j e c t e d  d e m a n d  f r o m  t h e  
r e f o r m  g r o u p s ,  t o  g i v e  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  a  d e g r e e  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  b y  f o r m a l i z i n g  i t s  r o l e  i n  t h e  
.  .  : \  '  '  ' • '  '  '  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
I n  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  2 0 0 2  A n n u a l ,  S e s s i o n ,  t h e  M P R  i s s u e d  a  D e c r e e  N o .  1  o f  2 0 0 2 ,  o n  t h e  
E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  w h i c h  g a v e  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  t h e  M P R  W o r k i n g  
B o d y  t o  est~blish t h e  C o m m i s s i o n .  T h e  B o d y  w o u l d  b e  g i v e n  a  y e a r  t o  c o m p l e t e  t h e  
a s s i g n m e n t .  I t  w o u l d  d e c i d e  t h e  f o r m  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ,  a n d  s u b m i t  t h e  r e s u l t s  t o  t h e  2 0 0 3  
M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n .  P u r s u a n t  t o  t h e  M P R  D e c r e e ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  m e r e l y  a u t h o r i z e d  t o  
d o  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  r e s e a r c h  o n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n . f 3 8
1  
1 3 7 8  ' T i g a  F r a k s i  B e s a r  D e s a k  B a h  a s  K o m i s i  K o n s t i t u s i ' ,  K o m p a s ,  5  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 7 9  E l l i s  a n d  Y u d h i n i ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 0 6 .  ,  ,  
1
3
8 0  
' F a c t i o n s  P r e v a r i c a t e ,  A g r e e  t o  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  8  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1
3 8 1  ' K o m i s i  K o n s t i t u s i  d i k u k u h k a n ' ,  K o m p a s ,  9  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
2 2 6  
Table 17 
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Ratified by the MPR 
If rejected, 
referendum 
The Proposals on Constitutional Commission in the 2002 MPR Annual Session 
Commission 
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reform the 1 sf4th 









Ratified by the MPR 
If rejected, 
referendum 






Source: Extracted from Cetro's Notes and Proposals of Each Faction. 
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Commission 
To harmonize and 
reform the 1 sf4th 
amendments of the 
1945 Constitution 
After 2002, the 
Fourth Amendment 
Unclear 
b .  A  ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  commissi~n', b u t  n o t  a  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n '  
T h e  2 0 0 2  M P R  D e c r e e  o n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  n o t  i s s u e d  
w i l l i n g l y  b y  t h e  M P R ,  b u t  i t  w a s  a  r e l u c t a n t  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  t h e  p u b l i c .  
U n s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h e  M P R  l i m i t e d  t h e  p o w e r  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n .  I n  a n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  V a n  
Z o r g e  R e p o r t ,  T o b i n g  r e v e a l e d :  
[ i ] f  y o u  e x a m i n e  t h e  M P R  D e c r e e  o n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  c a r e f u l l y ,  y o u  w i l l  s e e  
t h a t  t h i s  c o m m i s s i o n  i s  n e i t h e r  m e n t i o n e d  i n  a  [ s i c ]  n a m e ,  n o r  g i v e n  a n y  s p e c i f i c  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  T h e  w o r d s  u s e d  t o  d e s c r i b e  i t  a r e  a c t u a l l y  w r i t t e n  i n  l o w e r  c a s e ;  i t  c o u l d ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  h a v e  b e e n  f o r m e d  a s  a  s t a t e  c o m m i t t e e ,  a n  a d j u s t m e n t  c o m m i s s i o n ,  o r  a  p a n e l  
o f  e x p e r t s .  T h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o m m i s s i o n  w a s  d e s i g n e d  t o  b e  s u b o r d i n a t e  t o  t h e  M P R  




B a d j e b e r  ( P P P )  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  t h i s  M P R  d e c r e e  w a s  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  a c c o m m o d a t e  t h o s e  w h o  
w e r e  a g a i n s t  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  t h o s e  w h o  r e q u i r e d  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n ,  w i t h o u t  c o n c e d i n g  r e a l  p o w e r .
1
3 8 3  L u k m a n  H a k i m  S a i f u d d i n  ( P P P )  
a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o u l d  n o t  b e  g i v e n  s t r o n g e r  a u t h o r i t y ,  b e c a u s e  i t  c o u l d  b e  u s e d  b y  
t h e  a n t i - a m e n d m e n t  f a c t i o n ,  t o  s t o p  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  a g e n d a .
1 3 8 4  
H a p p y  B o n e  
Z u l k a r n a e n  ( G o l k a r )  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  2 0 0 2  M P R  d e c r e e  w a s  a  c o m p r o m i s e  b e t w e e n  t h e  
M P R  f a c t i o n s .  I f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n .  h a d  h a d  t o  b e  a d o p t e d  i n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e r e  w o u l d  n o t  
h a v e  b e e n  a n y  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  a t  a l l . 1 3 8 s  
c .  T h e  C o a l i t i o n :  t h e  M P R ' s  C h e a t i n g  
I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  2 0 0 2  M P R  d e c r e e  o n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n ,  t h e  C o a l i t i o n  f o r  a  N e w  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  a c c u s e d  t h e  M P R  o f  c h e a t i n g .  W i d j o j a n t o  t o r e  u p  a  c o p y  o f  t h e  d r a f t  o f  t h e  M P R  
d e c r e e  o n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  a n d  s h o u t e d  t h a t :  
S u c h  a  p r o p o s a l  i s  i n d e c e n t !  I t  i s  t o t a l l y  w r o n g !  I t  i s  u n t h i n k a b l e  t h a t  t h e y  h a v e  t h e  h e a r t  t o  
f o o l  t h e  p u b l i c  b y  o f f e r i n g  t h i s  k i n d  o f  c o m m i s s i o n .  T h e y  a r e  m a n i p u l a t i v e .
1
3
8 6  
1 3 8 2  
V a n  Z o r g e  R e p o r t ,  M o s t  P e o p l e  D i d n ' t  R e a l i z e  W h a t  W a s  H a p p e n i n g  U n t i l  I t  W a s  T o o  L a t e  ( 2 0 0 2 )  
< h t t p : / / w w w . v a n z o r g e r e p o r t . c o m / r e p o r t ! p o p u p f l n d e x . c f m ? f a = S h o w R e p o r t & p k  r p t  i d = 4 6 2 & C F I D = 3 1 5 6 0 6 & C F T O K E N = 7 1 6 8 0 8 8  
! ! >  a t  3  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 3 .  
1 3 8
3  ' S h a r i a  L a s t  P o i n t  o f  C o n t e n t i o n  i n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A m e n d m e n t s ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 0  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 8 4  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  4  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  7  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 ,  4 8 7 - 4 8 8 .  
1 3 8 5  K o m i s i  K o n s t i t u s i  d i k u k u h k a n ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 8 1 .  
1 3 8 6  ' M P R  A c c u s e d  o f  C h e a t i n g  o n  R e f o r m  D e m a n d s ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  1 0  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
2 2 8  
Rizal Mallarangeng criticized Widjojanto's action. Although he agreed that the amendments 
were still problematic, Mallarangeng argued that the MPR's effort should be appreciated. He 
further argued that the MPR had made a Constitution which could be used as the institutional 
backbone for a better democratic transition.1387 
d. The TNI-Polri's Hidden Agenda? 
The TNI-Polri argued that the draft of the MPR Decree on the Constitutional Commission was a 
document full of uncertainties. Therefore, at the very last moment in the Fourth Amendment 
ratification process, the TNI-Polri proposed to emphasize the legal basis of the Commission, in 
the Additional Articles of the Constitution. The proposed article was: 
The First, Second, Third and Fourth Amendments of the 1945 Constitution shall be 
effective, since they are promulgated until 2004, for the basis of the general election; and 
will be reviewed by a commission established by the MPR in 2002. The commission shall 
report its work to the MPR formed as a result of the 2004 election.13BB 
The ratification process was heated because of this military proposal. There was a possibility 
that the proposal could block the Fourth Amendment ratification, and led the process to a 
constitutional deadlock. The situation was therefore very critical. AM Fatwa (Reformas1) 
accused the TNI-Polri of having a hidden agenda. 1389. He challenged the military faction to 
reveal that agenda. Similarly, Husni Thamrin, one of the Vice Chairs of the MPR, emotionally 
stated: 
I am sorry, I have to say this. This might be a bit emotional, but there must be something 
behind this. The TNI-Polri should disclose what is hidden behind its proposal. What is 
going to happen after 2004? We have to be frank. We are all leaders. If we are imprisoned 
because of this we are ready. So, there is nothing to fear. Even if we have to die, now is 
the time.1390 
Slamet Supriyadi of the representative of the TNI-Police, however, was silent on these 
accusations. 
1387 Rizal Mallarangeng, 'Kaum Aktivis Kebablasan', Tempo, 20-26 August 2002. 
1388 Minutes of closed meeting between the leaders of the MPR and the leaders of the factions, 10 August 2002, 269- 270. 
13891bid 284. " 
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C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  c r i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  A r i f i n  P a n i g o r o  ( P D I P )  p r o p o s e d  t h a t :  
[ b ] e c a u s e  t h i s  i s  a  v e r y  s e r i o u s  p r o b l e m ,  w e  s h o u l d  c o n t i n u e  t h i s  n e g o t i a t i o n  u n t i l 4  a m ,  o r  
5  a m .  W e  s h o u l d  d i s m i s s  t h e  c u r r e n t  p l e n a r y  m e e t i n g .  T h e n ,  w e  h a v e  t o  r e s c h e d u l e  o n e  
o r  t w o  d a y s  e x t e n s i o n  [ o f  t h e  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ] .  I f  w e  w a n t  t o  b e  r e a l l y  s e r i o u s ,  l e t s  d i s c u s s  
i t  f o r  2 4  h o u r s  w i t h o u t  a n y  s l e e p .  W e  j u s t  h a v e  t o  b e  h e r e .  A l l  o f  u s  h a v e  t o  s i t  h e r e .  
N o b o d y  i s  a l l o w e d  t o  l e a v e  u n t i l  t h i s  p r o b l e m  i s  r e s o l v e d . 1 3 9 1  
T h e  c l o s e d  n e g o t i a t i o n  m e e t i n g  e n d e d  w i t h o u t  a n y  a g r e e m e n t .  F o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  m i d n i g h t  
p l e n a r y  m e e t i n g  e n d e d  w i t h  r e l i e f  a f t e r  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  f i n a l l y  w i t h d r e w  i t s  p r o p o s a l ,  w i t h o u t  g i v i n g  
a n y  c l e a r  r e a s o n .  A g u s  W i d j o j o  ( T N I - P o l r i )  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a n  i n s t r u c t i o n  f r o m  t h e  Chief~ 
o f - S t a f f  o f  t h e  M i l i t a r y ,  b u t  h e  d i d  n o t  c l a r i f y  t h e  r e a s o n  b e h i n d  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n .  W i d j o j o  o n l y  
s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  T N I - P o l r i  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  i t s  p r o p o s a l  w a s  r e j e c t e d  b y  m o s t  o f  t h e  f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  
M P R  a n d  t h a t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  w a s  w i s e r  t o  w i t h d r a w  t h e  p r o p o s a l .
1 3 9 2  
W h a t e v e r  t h e  r e a s o n ,  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  p a v e d  t h e  w a y  f o r  a  s m o o t h e r  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  r a t i f i c a t i o n .  T h e  s e s s i o n  c l o s e d  w i t h  
a l l  o f  t h e  M P R  m e m b e r s  s i n g i n g  t h e  n a t i o n a l  a n t h e m  a n d  p r a y i n g  t o  G o d  f o r  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  
r a t i f i c a t i o n .
1 3 9 3  
4 .  ·  ·  H o w  t h e  P u b l i c  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  w a s  o r g a n i z e d  
C o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  p r e v i o u s  a m e n d m e n t s ,  i n  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
w a s  b e t t e r .  I t  w a s  o n l y  i n  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  p r e p a r a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  w a s  g i v e n  a  w i d e r  
c h a n c e  t o  g i v e  t h e i r  f e e d b a c k  t o  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d r a f t .
1 3 9 4  
T h i s  w a s  p o s s i b l e  b e c a u s e  p u b l i c  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  p r o g r a m s  w e r e  h e l d  b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  t h e  P A H  I  m e e t i n g s .  T h e  s c h e d u l e  o f  t h e  
P A H  I  s h o w e d  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  h e a r i n g s  w e r e  c o n d u c t e d  f r o m  2 9  J a n u a r y  t o  6  M a r c h  2 0 0 2 . 1 3 9 5  




T h e n ,  b e f o r e  
t h e  f i n a l  d r a f t  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  w~s d i s c u s s e d ,  f r o m  5  J u n e  t o  2 4  J u l y  2 0 0 2 ,  s e c o n d  
p u b l i c  h e a r i n g s  w e r e  c o n d u c t e d  i n  s o m e  p r o v i n c e s .  
1 3 9 0  I b i d  2 8 1  - 2 8 2 .  
1 3 9 1 1 b i d  2 7 9  - 2 8 0 .  
1 3 9 2  ' A d a  T e l e p o n  d a r i  C i l a n g k a p ' ,  K o r a n  T e m p o ,  1 2  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1 3 9 3  E l l i s  a n d  Y u d h i n i ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 0 6 .  
1 3 9 4  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  3 r d  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y ,  4  J u n e  2 0 0 2 ,  1 7 5 .  




2 3 0  
Table 18 shows the summary of participants in the public participation meetings. In addition to 
these meetings, the PAH I received 127 letters from various organizations and individuals. 1397 
Table 18 The Summary of Public Participations in the Fourth Amendment 1398 
The better arrangement of public participation program was the response of the PAH I to the 
critics from the civil society, over the public involvement in the previous amendments. Agun 
Gunandjar Sudarsa (Golkar) suggested: 
.. . the Fourth Amendment deliberations should be more open, allowing wider public 
involvement. We should be more· proactive to visit and invite various society elements to 
be involved in the discussions ... [therefore], the program to absorb public aspirations 
should be more systematic ... in so doing, the Fourth Amendment would truly involve the 
people.t399 . 
Yusuf (Golkar) reminded the members of the PAH I that the public participation was not just a 
formality. Yusuf urged the members to seriously consider popular inputs. 14oo He stressed that 
the report of public participation program should be made seriously, so that it could stand as 
evidence that the program was for reai.14D1 
Critics from the Public. Regardless of, the broadened scop~ of the participation program, the 
critics remained. For some, the range of participation was still limited. An editorial in the Jakarta 
Post stated: 
1397 Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Working Body, 25 July 2002, 232. 
13981bid. 
1399 Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the PAH I, 28 January 2003, 111. 
1400 Minutes ofth~ 12th meeting of the PAH I, 19 March 2002, 50. 
14011bid. 
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. . .  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  w e r e  e n a c t e d  w i t h  l i t t l e  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  r e f l e c t  ·  
m o r e  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  m a j o r  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t i o n s  i n  s e c u r i n g  t h e i r  p l a c e s  a f t e r  2 0 0 4 . 1 4 0 2  
T h e  C S I S  ( C e n t r e  f o r  S t r a t e g i c  a n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t u d i e s )  T e a m  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  . p u b l i c  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w a s  s t i l l  e l i t i s t . 1
4
0 3  B y  r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  s c h e d u l e  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  t h e  t e a m  a r g u e d  t h a t  
t h e  t i m e  a l l o c a t e d  f o r  p u b l i c  h e a r i n g s  w a s  v e r y  l i m i t e d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  l o n g e r  t i m e  
a s s i g n e d  f o r  t h e  c l o s e d  n e g o t i a t i o n  m e e t i n g s .
1 4 0 4  
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  C o a l i t i o n  f o r  a  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
.  '  ~ . .  , .  
a r g u e d  t h a t :  
, .  
[ p ] u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  o n l y  s y m b o l i c  s i n c e  m o s t  i n p u t  f r o m  p u b l i c  h a s  n o t  b e e n  
c o n s i d e r e d  o r  a c c o m m o d a t e d  i n  d i s c u s s i o n s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s .  A l l  f i n a l  
d e c i s i o n s  r e m a i n  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  f e w  m e m b e r s  [ o f  t h e  M P R ]  . . .  L i k e w i s e  t h e  p u b l i c  
h e a r i n g s  p e r f o r m e d  . . .  i n  t h e  r e g i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  o f  o n e - w a y  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  a n d  f o r  
t h e  m o s t  p a r t  h a s  i n v o l v e d  [ v e r y  l i m i t e d ]  p e o p l e . 1 4 0 5 '  
I n  o r d e r  t o  e n s u r e  m o r e  e x t e n s i v e  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  p r o p o s e d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
o f  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n .  I t  a r g u e d  t h a t ,  t h e  T h a i l a n d ,  S o u t h  A f r i c a  a n d  
P h i l i p p i n e s ,  c o m m i s s i o n s  h a d  s u c c e e d e d  i n  a r r a n g i n g  e f f e c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 1 4 0 6  I t  s h o u l d  b e  
n o t e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  i n  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  c a s e ,  t h e r e  w a s  n o  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n .  I t  w a s  i t s  
p a r l i a m e n t ,  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c a l l y  e l e c t e d  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  a n d  t h e  S e n a t e ,  w h i c h  h a d  b e c o m e  




I t  w a s  t h i s  a s s e m b l y  w h i c h  h a d  s u c c e s s f u l l y  a r r a n g e d  t h e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
C .  T h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t :  t h e  O u t c o m e s  1 4 o a  
1 .  T h e  A m e n d e d  A r t i c l e s  
a .  T h e  C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  M P R  
T h e  a m e n d e d  A r t i c l e  2 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s t i p u l a t e s  t h a t  t h e  M P R  w o u l d  c o n s i s t  o f  t w o  
c h a m b e r s ,  t h e  D P R  a n d  t n e  D P D :  T h e  a r r i e n d m e n t  c o m p l e t e s  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  D P D  
1 4 0 2  T h e  H a l f w a y  R e f o r m ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 5 3 .  
1 4 0 3  T h e  C S I S  T e a m ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 3 6 ,  2 3 .  
1 4 0 4 1 b i d .  
1 4 0 5  N G O  C o a l i t i o n  f o r  a  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 2 7 8 ,  2 .  
1 4 0 6  ' G e t t i n g  N a t i o n ' s  R e f o r m  B a c k  o n  T r a c k ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  2 2  J u l y  2 0 0 2 .  
1 4 0 7  S e c t i o n  6 8 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  I n t e r i m  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
1 4 0
8  A l l  a r t i c l e s  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  e x c e p t  m e n t i o n e d  o t h e r w i s e ,  r e f e r  t o  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
2 3 2  
which previously had been adopted in the Third Amendment This changed the composition of 
the MPR which had formerly consisted of the elected DPR, plus appointed members from 
various functional groups, including the military faction. These appointed members would be 
dismissed after the 2004 general election. 
Lindsey appraised the abolishment of the appointed members as a 'very significant reform' .1409 
He, however, argued that some basic problems remained. There were questions in relation to 
the limited power of the DPD, especially when compared' to the DPR. The membership 
relationship between the DPD, DPR and MPR was also vague. 141o Chapter Eight further 
elaborates on this problem. 
b. The Second Round Presidential Election 
After it was postponed and debated. for more than one year, the second round presidential 
election draft was finally agreed on by unanimous vote. Article 6A (4) stipulates that if none of 
the candidates receive 50 percent + 1 of the votes cast, as well as at least 20 percent of the 
vote in half the provinces, then a second direct election will be held between the two highest-
scoring candidates. 
. I ' 
Lindsey praises this amendment for preventing the political horse trading which characterized 
the selection of the presidents under the old system, when the President was elected by the 
". , . 
MPR. 1411 He also argues that this direct presidential election in the first and second elections is 
further evidence of the MPR voluntarily reforming its on power. 1412 
Related to these issues, Article 8(3) clarifies that in the event that both the position of President 
and Vice President are vacant, the country will be governed by a troika of th~ Foreign· Minister, 
the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Defense Minister. This will be a temporary government 
until the MPR can assemble to select new leaders to, fill the. balance of the term from 
candidates 'proposed by the political parties or groups of political parties whose Presidential 
1409 Undsey, above n 99, 267. 




a n d  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  p a i r s  r e c e i v e d  t h e  f i r s t  a n d  s e c o n d  h i g h e s t  n u m b e r  o f  v o t e s  i n  
t h e  p r e v i o u s  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n ' .  
c .  T h e  L i q u i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  D P A  
T h r o u g h  i n t e n s i v e  d e b a t e s  a l o n g  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  M P R  f i n a l l y  a g r e e d  t o  e n d  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  D P A  ( D e w a n  P e r t i m b a n g a n  A g u n g ,  S u p r e m e  A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l ) .  T h e  o r i g i n a l  
c h a p t e r  o n  t h e  D P A  w a s  d e l e t e d .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  p r o v i d i n g  c o u n s e l  f o r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
r e m a i n s ,  t h i s  a d v i s o r y  c o u n c i l  n o  l o n g e r  s t a n d s  o n  a n  e q u a l  p o s i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  p r e s i d e n c y  a n d .  
t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  I n s t e a d ,  i t  w i l l  o n l y  b e  p a r t  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e .  F o r  L i n d s e y  t h e  r e d u c e d  p o s i t i o n  o f  
t h e  D P A  i s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  C o u n c i l  ' n e v e r  f u l f i l l e d  i t s  i n t e n d e d  r o l e ' ,  b e i n g  ' m o r i b u n d ' . 1 4 1 3  
L i n d s e y  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  t h e  D P A  w a s  u s e d  t o  a c c o m m o d a t e  s e n i o r  o f f i c e r s  o r  g e n e r a l s  
w h o  w e r e  t o o  o l d  t o  b e  a c t i v e  i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  b u t  w e r e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  S o e h a r t o  l o y a l i s t s . 1 4 1 4  
d .  T h e  C u r r e n c y  a n d  t h e  C e n t r a l  B a n k  
A f t e r  l o n g  t e c h n i c a l  d e b a t e s ,  t h e  M P R  f i n a l l y  a g r e e d  t o  a v o i d  m e n t i o n i n g  t h e  w o r d  ' R u p i a h ' ,  i n  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  A r t i c l e  2 3 B  s t a t e s ,  ' T h e  f o r m s  a n d  d e n o m i n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n c y  s h a l l  b e  
r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w ' .  T h i s  f l e x i b i l i t y  p r o v i s i o n  w a s  a d o p t e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  f u t u r e  s c e n a r i o s  
i n v o l v i n g  t h e  A s i a n  c o u n t r i e s  h a v i n g  t h e  s a m e  p o l i c y  t o  f o r m  a  r e g i o n a l  c u r r e n c y ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  
' E u r o '  i n  E u r o p e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  M P R  a v o i d e d  u s i n g  t h e  w o r d  ' B a n k  I n d o n e s i a '  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  
' '  .  '  '  .  '  :  • · '  '  '  ~ 
c e n t r a l  b a n k .  T h e  B a n k ,  h o w e v e r ,  e n j o y s  a  g r e a t e r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o t e c t i o n  a s  A r t i c l e  2 3 0  
.  .  ;  .  .  .  .  .  .  
e x p l i c i t l y  m e n t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  B a n k  s h o u l d  b e  i n d e p e n d e n t  i n  n a t u r e .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  d o e s  
n o t  c l a r i f y  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  ' i n d e p e n d e n t ' ,  a s  i t  o n l y  s t a t e s  t h a t  f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s  w i l l  b e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  
s t a t u t e .  
e .  T h e  E d u c a t i o n  a n d  C u l t u r e  
M o s t  o f  t h e  p a r a g r a p h s  i n  A r t i c l e s  3 1  o n  e d u c a t i o n  a r e  s y m b o l i c .  A r t i c l e  3 1 ( 4 ) ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  
'  .  · .  
s t i p u l a t e s  t h a t  2 0 %  o f  s t a t e  a n d  r e g i o n a l  b u d g e t s  s h o u l d  b e  d e v o t e d  t o  e d u c a t i o n .  E l l i s  a r g u e s  
t h a t  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  m e r e l y  f i g u r a t i v e ,  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  i s  n o  c l e a r  s a n c t i o n  w h i c h  
1 4 1 3 1 b i d  2 6 9 .  
1 4 1 4 1 b i d .  
2 3 4  
· '  .  
can be applied against the government, regional authorities and/or the DPR if the budgets do 
not comply with this. 1415 Boediono, who was the Minister of Finance, argued that: 
[t]he 20% specified in the Constitution is too binding, especially in the current financial 
problem that we are facing. We all, I think, agree that the education should be our priority. 
However, I do not think inserting an exact number into the Constitution is a good idea.1416 
In addition, Article 31 (2) states that 'The government shall develop and maintain a national 
system of education that increases faith, God-consciousness and noble conduct, in the course 
of educating the people, which is regulated by law'. In the last minute of the Fourth Amendment 
discussions, this paragraph was traded off by the PPP, PBS and PDU in exchange for the 
withdrawal of the 'seven words' of the Jakarta Charter from the draft of Article 29(1 ). 
Article 32 stipulates that the state should respect the national culture of Indonesia and respect 
the regional languages as a national cultural treasure. 
f. . The Compromised Economic Provision 
One of the hottest fundamental debates is related to the economic system. In the Third 
Amendment discussions, this debate could not be resolved. It caused Mubyarto, one of the 
members of the Expert Team, to withdraw from the Team.1417 The amended Article 33 now 
retains the three original paragraphs including the reference to 'common endeavor based upon 
the principles of family system'. It adds further paragraphs relating to natural resources and 
economic democracy. 
For Susanti, the debates over Article 33 were driven by competing ideas of nee-liberalism and 
socialism. Susanti concludes that the nee-liberalism faction lost the battle, in symbolic terms at 
least. Although the nee-liberalism supporters in the Expert Team outnumbered the supporters 
of socialism, the MPR rejected the draft of the expert team which deleted state control over 
important sectors and introduced the market economy. 1418 Susanti agrees that the additional 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Article confirm social justice and prepare the Indonesian economy to 
1415 Ellis, above n 662, 146. 
1416 Minutes of the 5th meeting of the PAH I, 25 February 2002, 275. 
1417 Ellis and Yudhini, above 1306. 
1418 Susanti, above n 697, 84- 85. 
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f a c e  g l o b a l i z a t i o n . 1
4 1
9  E l l i s  a n d  Y u d h i n i  a r g u e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  c o m p r o m i s e  f o r m u l a  o n  t h e  
e c o n o m y  r e s u l t e d  i n  " t h e  f i n a l  t e x t  b e i n g  p e r h a p s  a  v a g u e  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  d i s c o n t e n t  t o w a r d  
c a p i t a l i s t  g l o b a l i z a t i o n " .
1 4 2
0  E i t h e r  w a y  t h e  o u t c o m e  w a s  i n c l u s i v e .  
g .  P r o c e d u r e  t o  A m e n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  ,  
A r t i c l e  3 7  p a r a g r a p h s  ( 1 )  t o  ( 4 )  s t i p u l a t e  t h a t t o  a m e n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  r e q u i r e s  a  p e t i t i o n  b y  
o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M P R ,  a n d  r e q u i r e s  t h e .  s u p p o r t  o f  o v e r  h a l f  i t s  t o t a l  
m e m b e r s h i p ,  w i t h  t w o  t h i r d s  o f  t h e  m e m b e r s  p r e s e n t .  T h i s  n e w  p r o c e d u r e  i s  e a s i e r  t h a n  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  o n e  w h i c h  r e q u i r e d  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t w o  t h i r d s  o f  t h e  m e m b e r s h i p ,  o u t  o f  t h e  t w o  t h i r d s  o f  
t h e  m e m b e r s  p r e s e n t .  
Non~amendable P r o v i s i o n .  O n  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  a .  n e g o t i a t i o n  c o n d u c t e d  b y  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  A  c o n t a i n e d  a  s u r p r i s e  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  A r t i c l e  3 7 ( 5 ) .
1 4
.
2 1  
T h e  a m e n d e d  f o r m u l a  i s ,  
' T h e  f o r m  o f  t h e  U n i t a r y  s t a t e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a  m a y  n o t  b e  a m e n d e d ' .  T h i s  i s  a  
c h a n g e  f r o m  t h e  d r a f t  f o r m u l a  w h i c h  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  u n i t a r y  s t a t e  c o u l d  b e  a m e n d e d  t h r o u g h  
r e f e r e n d u m .  N u r d i a t i  A k m a  ( R e f o r m a s t )  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  n o n - a m e n d a b l e  p r o v i s i o n  c l e a r l y  
o p p o s e d  d e m o c r a t i c  p r i n c i p l e s  a s  i t  d i c t a t e d  t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a t i o n .
1 4 2 2  
S a i f u d d i n  ( P P P )  a r g u e d  
t h a t  t h e  M P R  w o u l d  f a c e  h u g e  o p p o s i t i o n  f r o m  s o c i e t y  i n  r e l a t i o n ·  t o  t h e  n o n - a m e n d a b l e  
p r o v i s i o n .  P e o p l e  w o u l d  a s k  w h y  t h e  M P R  s o u g h t  t o  r e s t r a i n  o f  t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a t i o n ' s  
a s p i r a t i o n s . i m  
T h e  P r e a m b l e  i n s t e a d .  M o h .  A s i k i n  ( R e f o r m a s t )  s t a t e d  i t  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  p r e a m b l e  w h i c h  i s  n o n -
a m e n d a b l e  a s  i t  c o n t a i n s  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
1 4 2 4  
C o m m e n t i n g  o n  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t ,  
T o b i n g  e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  p r e a m b l e  w a s  n o t  m a r k e d  f o r  c h a n g e .  A m e n d m e n t  w o u l d  o n l y  b e  
m a d e  i n  t h e  t e x t  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 4 2 s  
1 4 1 9
i b i d  8 5 .  
1 4 2 0  E l l i s  a n d  Y u d h i n i ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 0 6 .  
1 4 2 1  M i n u t e s  o f  c l o s e d  m e e t i n g  o f  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  7  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 ,  7 2 - 8 5 .  
1 4 2 2  M i n u t e s  o f  4 t h  m e e t i n g  ( c o n t i n u e d )  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  8  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 ,  5 4 0 - 5 4 1 .  
1 4 2 3  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  3 1 • t  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  2 0  J u n e  2 0 0 2 ,  4 1  . .  
1 4 2 4  
M i n u t e s  o f  4 t h  m e e t i n g  ( c o n t i n u e d )  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  A ,  8  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 ,  5 3 9 - 5 4 0 .  
1 4 2 5  K o m i s i  K o n s t i t u s i  d i k u k u h k a n ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 8 1 .  
2 3 6  
h. Transitional and Additional Provisions 
Articles I and II of the transitional provisions stipulate that all regulations and state bodies 
should continue to function until the new ones are in place. Article Ill requires the establishment 
of the Constitutional Court at the latest by 17 August 2003. 
In the Additional provisions, Article I gives the MPR the power to review the legal statutes of all 
of its decrees. While Article II declares that the elucidation is no longer in effect, it does not 
mention the term. 'elucidation' at all. It states, 'With the finalization of this amendment of the 
Constitution, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is comprised of the preamble 
and the Articles.' This wording was proposed by Jimly Asshidiqie, to avoid controversy on the 
status of the elucidation. 1426 Asshidiqie argued that rather than explicitly mentioning that the 
elucidation is deleted, it is better to mention that the Constitution only consists of the preamble 
and the body of Articles. In this way, those who question the legality of the elucidation in the 
first place,' and might therefore argue that it cannot be deleted as it was never included, will 
have no reason to dispute the new provision.1427 
2. The Important Rejected Proposal: Article 29 
Lindsey correctly argues that: 
[a]s important as the am.endments that were passed, was one that was not passed. By an 
overwhelming majority, the MPR rejected the proposal that Article 29 be amended to 
make the practice of Islamic law or syariah ... 1428 
The proposal to re-insert the 'seven words' of the Jakarta Charter was put forward at the very 
beginning of the amendment process in 1999. It became stronger and peaked during the 
Fourth Amendment discussions. However only three Islamic factions- the PPP, PBB and PDU 
-supported this proposal, making it unlikely that the Jakarta Charter would be introduced. 
1426 Minutes of the 6th meeting of the PAH I, 26 February 2002, 359. 
14271bid. 
1428 Lindsey, above n 99, 270. 
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P u b l i c  P o s i t i o n .  · T h e  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  d i d  n o t  s u p p o r t  t h e  p r o p o s a l  e i t h e r .  T h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  
R e l i g i o u s  A f f a i r s  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  A r t i c l e  2 9  s h o u l d  b e  p r e s e r v e d  f o r  t h r e e  r e a s o n s :  f i r s t ,  
b e c a u s e  i t  w a s t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a  n a t i o n a l  c o n s e n s u s  a m o n g  t h e , f o u n d e r s ;  s e c o n d ,  b e c a u s e  i t  
'  .  '  .  '  .  :  '  .  , ,  .  
s e r v e s  a s  a  u n i f y i n g  f a c t o r  f o r  t h e  c o u n t r y  a n d .  i f  i t  w e r e  c h a n g e d ,  t h e  c o u n t r y  m i g h t  
d i s i n t e g r a t e ;  t h i r d ,  b e c a u s e  i t  a c t s  a s  t h e  c o m p r o m i s e  a m o n g  a l l  t h e  r e l i g i o n s  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y .
1 4 2
9  
I n d e e d ,  i n  t h e  e a r l y  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h e  2 0 0 2  P A H  I ,  H a t t a  M u s t a f a  ( F U D )  w a r n e d  t h a t  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  A r t i c l e  2 9  i s  t h e  m a i n  p i l l a r  o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e .  F o r  t h e  s a k e  o f t h e  u n i t y  o f  t h e  
s t a t e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  p r e s e r v e d .
1 4 3 0  
M u s t a f a  s t a t e d  t h a t  h e .  h a d  h e a r d  t h a t  t h e  N o r t h  
S u l a w e s i ,  C e n t r a l  K a l i m a n t a n ,  E a s t  N u s a  T e n g g a r a ,  B a l i  a n d  P a p u a - a l l  a r e a s  w i t h  r e l a t i v e l y  
h i g h  C h r i s t i a n s  p o p u l a t i o n ,  e x c e p t  f o r  B a l i  w h i c h  m o s t l y  H i n d u s - w o u l d  a s k  f o r  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i f  
t h e  a r t i c l e  w e r e  c h a n g e d . 1 4 3 1  
P r e d i c t a b l y ,  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  C o m m u n i o n  o f  C h u r c h e s  ( P G I )  s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  r e j e c t  t h e  




M o r e  i n t e r e s t i n g ,  p e r h a p s ,  t h e  
c o u n t r y ' s  l a r g e s t  I s l a m i c  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t h e  N a h d l a t u l  U l a m a  ( N U )
1 4
3 3  a n d  M u h a m m a d i y a h ,  
w e r e  a l s o  a g a i n s t  t h e  p r o p o s a l .  H a s y i m  M u z a d i ,  n o w  t h e  c h a i r  o f  t h e  N U ,  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t  o u t c o m e  s h o u l d  a v o i d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n .
1 4 3 4  
M u z a d i  f u r t h e r  a r g u e d  
t h a t :  
I  c a n  o b s e r v e  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  v a l u e s  . . .  w h i c h  m a y  n o t  b e  c h a n g e d ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  
o f  t h e  s t a t e  . . .  W e  a r e  n o t  c a p a b l e  s t e m m i n g  a  f i g h t  t h a t  w i l l  c e r t a i n l y  f o l l o w  i f  [ A r t i c l e  2 9 ]  
i s  c h a n g e d .  I t  w i l l  a l m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  i n s t i g a t e  a  c l a s h  b e t w e e n  t h e  f a r  r i g h t  a n d  t h e  f a r  
l e f t . 1 4 3 s  
A b d u r r a h m a n  W a h i d ,  a n  i n f l u e n t i a l  r e l i g i o u s  l e a d e r  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  f o r m e r  P r e s i d e n t ,  a r g u e d  t h a t  
t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  ' J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  p h r a s e  i n t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s :  
1 4 2 9  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  6 t h  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  2 6  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 2 ,  3 5 9 .  
1 4 3 0  M i n u t e s  o f  1 7 t h  m e e t i n g  o f t h e  P A H  I ,  2 1  M a r c h  2 0 0 2 ,  3 2 8 - 3 2 9 .  
1 4 3 1 1 b i d .  
1 4 3 2  S e r a h k a n  P e r u b a h a n  U U D  k e p a d a  K o m i s i  K o n s t i t u s i ,  a b o v e  n  1 2 8 1 .  
1 4 3
3  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  I s l a m i c  S c h o l a r s .  T h i s  i s  a  t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  M o s l e m  o r g a n i z a t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1 9 2 6 .  I t  i s  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  l a r g e s t  
M o s l e m  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  e v e n  m a y  b e  i n  t h e  w o r l d .  T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  N a h d l a t u l  U l a m a  i s  e s t i m a t e d  t o  b e  a r o u n d  4 0  m i l l i o n  p e o p l e .  
1 4 3 4  P e r u b a h a n  U U D  1 9 4 5  h a r u s  m e n g h i n d a r i  P o t e n s i  D i s i n t e g r a s i ,  a b o v e  n  1 2 8 7 .  
1 4 3 5 1 b i d .  
2 3 8  
· ... contradictory to the preamble of the Constitution. The Preamble and original Article 29 
put people on the same footing, for all citizens. But by adopting this charter, that will give 
the Moslems advantage over the othe·rs, the others will be second class. So we have to 
avoid that.1436 
Similarly, J. Soedjati Djiwandono argued that: 
[i]n the light of our diversity ... we can only continue to remain a united nation if we are 
bound by common universal human values .. . the institution of the state is never 
established to implement any particular religious laws ... If [the MPR agreed to insert the 
Jakarta Charter]; it would be the beginning ... of the disintegration of this nation.1437 · · 
The MPR's Position. Because of the extensive rejection both outside and within the MPR, the 
Jakarta Charter proposal was, as mentioned, finally withdrawn during the dosed meeting of the 
Commission A.1438 However, the withdrawal was kept secret until the very end of the ratification 
process of the Fourth Amendment. Some Islamic members of the MPR openly disagreed with 
the withdrawal. Hartono Mardjono declared he had not participated in the decision to keep the 
current Article 29. 1439 Similarly, Mutaminul'ula (Reformas1) from the Justice Party stated that 
seven members of this party had also withdrawn from the decision-making process. 1440 Najib 
Ahjad (PBB) stated: 
· [t]his time we are in front of a great wall that cannot be penetrated, but we will not 
surrender ... We vow before God and the Moslem society that we will keep on fighting.1441 
Syafriansyah (PPP) stated: 
... as an Islamic party, the PPP will continue to fight for syariah in democratic ways, that is 
through the MPR as the constitution-making body. The PPP will continue to try to 
convince other factions to follow the syariah ... 1442 
Earlier, Hamzah Haz, the PPP Chair, had said the party would continue to fight for the inclusion 
of Islamic law in to the Constitution. He said, "for the PPP, the syariah will always be a 
1436 'INDONESIA: Proposed Constitutional Reforms under Fire', Radio Australia, Transcript, 2 August 2002. 
1437 
'MPR Annual Session 2002: Some Crucial Issues', The Jakarta Post (Jakarta) 9 August 2002. 
1438 Minutes of negotiation meeting of Commission A, 7 August 2002, 105-113. 
1439 Minutes of the 6th (continued) Plenary Meeting, 10 August 2002, 751. 
1440 Ibid 7 49. 
1441 1bid 744. 
1442 1bid 7 43. 
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dem~nd" .
1 4 4 3  
·Similarly~. t h e  P B S  C h a i r p e r s o n ,  Y u s r i l .  l h z a  M a h e n d r a ,  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  w o u l d  
" c o n t i n u e  w i t h  t h e  " f i g h t  a l t h o u g h  w e  w i l l  b e  t h e  o n l y  p a r t y  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  s t a n c e  ( f o r  t h e  
i n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  p h r a s e ) " . 1 4 4 4  
C o n c l u s i o n .  A m i e n  R a i s  c l a i m e d  t h a t  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
w a s  l i k e  m a k i n g  a  g i a n t  l e a p  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  n a t i o n .
1 4 4 5  
H e  s t a t e d  t h a t :  
[ w ] i t h  p a s s i n g  t h e  ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s ,  t h e  M P R  h a s  r e f o r m e d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  . . .  
w i t h  t h e  a m e n d e d  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w e  a r e  f a c i n g  a  n e w  I n d o n e s i a  . . .  w h i c h  i s  m o r e  
d e m o c r a t i c  a n d  m o r e  a d v a n c e d . 1 4 4 6  
L i k e w i s e ,  t h e  O b s e r v e r  p r a i s e d  t h e  a m e n d m e n t .  
I n d o n e s i a  t o o k  i t s  b i g g e s t  s t e p  f o r  a l m o s t  3 0  y e a r s  . . .  o n  i t s  o f t e n  b u m p y  r o a d  t o w a r d s  
d e m o c r a c y .  T h e  [ M P R ]  k i c k e d  t h e  o n c e  v i r t u a l l y  o m n i p o t e n t  m i l i t a r y  o u t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
a s s e m b l i e s  a n d  s u r r e n d e r e d  t o  t h e  p e o p l e  i t s  r i g h t  t o  e l e c t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  v i c e -
P r e s i d e n t . 1 4 4 7  
I n d e e d ,  t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  h a s  s a v e d  I n d o n e s i a  f r o m  a  p o t e n t i a l  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r i s i s  a n d  s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  reform~ I n  t t i i s  l a s t  a m e n d m e n t ,  t h e .  
M P R  h a s  f i n a l l y  s o l v e d  s o m e  o f  t h e  c r u c i a l  a n d  s e n s i t i v e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e s  b y  a g r e e i n g  o n  
t h e  s e c o n d  pr~sidential e l e c t i o n  a n d  · r e j e c t i n g .  t h e  i n s e r t i o n  o f  ' s e v e n  w o r d s '  o f  t h e  · J a k a r t a  
C h a r t e r  i n t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
T h e  ' g i a n t  s t e p '  c l a i m ,  h o w e v e r ,  n e e d s  t o  b e  t e s t e d .  C h a p t e r  E i g h t  e v a l u a t e s  t h e  w h o l e  p r o c e s s  
a n d  o u t c o m e s  o f  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s ,  a n d  c o n c l u d e s  w h e t h e r  t h e  c l a i m  i s  v a l i d  o r  n o t .  
1 4 4 3  ' P P P  w i l l  F i g h t  f o r  S h a r i a  L a w ,  H a m z a h  s a y s '  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  2 9  J u l y  2 0 0 2 .  
1 4 4 4
1 b i d .  
1 4 4 5  ' P e r u b a h a n  U U D  1 9 4 5  L o m p a t a n  B e s a r ' ,  K o m p a s ,  1 2  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1 4 4 6 1 b i d .  
1 4 4 7  ' I n d o n e s i a  T a k e s  a  G i a n t  S t e p  D o w n  t h e  R o a d  t o  D e m o c r a c y ' ,  T h e  O b s e r v e r ,  1 1  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
2 4 0  
PART FIVE: · 
EVALUATION, RECO_MMENDATIONS AND 
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C h a p t e r  E i g h t  
A n  U n d e r s t a n d a b l y  M e s s y  P r o c e s s ,  M o r e  D e m o c r a t i c  O u t c o m e s  
T h e  r e s u l t i n g  C o n s t i t u t i o n  f a l l s  f i r m l y  w i t h i n  a  d e m o c r a t i c  f o r m  r e c o g n i z e d  w o r l d w i d e .  T h e  
c o n c l u s i o n  i s  p e r h a p s  t h a t  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  s u b s t a n c e  a n d  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  p r o c e s s  
d o  n o t  a l w a y s  p u l l  i n  t h e  s a m e  d i r e c t i o n ,  a n d  t h e r e  i s  a  l e g i t i m a t e  d e b a t e  a s  t o  t h e  b a l a n c e  
b e t w e e n  t h e m .
1 4 4 8  
T h i s  c h a p t e r  e v a l u a t e s  t h e  p r o c e s s  a n d  o u t c o m e s  o f  a l l  o f  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  I t  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  f o u r  s e c t i o n s .  S e c t i o n  A  f o c u s e s  o n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t s  a n d  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s  l a c k s  w h a t  w 9 u l d  u s u a l l y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  k e y  
f e a t u r e s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  S e c t i o n  B ,  h o w e v e r ,  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  
c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  a  h e a v i l y  s y m b o l i c  d o c u m e n t  f o r  t h e  
c o u n t r y  - c h i e f l y  b e c a u s e  i t  c o n t a i n e d  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  s t a t e  i d e o l o g y ,  t h e  P a n c a s i / a  - t h e  m e s s y  
p r o c e s s  w a s  u n a v o i d a b l e .  S e c t i o n  C  c o n c e n t r a t e s .  o n  t h e  o u t c o m e s  o f  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s ,  
a n d  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  a m e n d m e n t s  h a v e .  s u c c e e d e d  i n  t r a n s f o r m i n g  t h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n t o  a  m o r e  d e m o c r a t i c  t e x t ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  i s  s t i l l  f a r  f r o m  p e r f e c t .  T h i s  l a s t  s e c t i o n  
a l s o  c o n t a i n s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  f u r t h e r  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  c h e c k s  a n d  b a l a n c e s  
d e v e l o p e d  i n  t h e  a m e n d e d  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  s e c t i o n  D  p r e s e n t s  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h i s  
t h e s i s .  
A .  T h e  F o u r  A m e n d m e n t s :  t h e  P r o c e s s  
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  I  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  M P R  f a i l e d  t o  c o n d u c t  a  t r u l y  d e m o c r a t i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  
p r o c e s s  i n  a m e n d i n g  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  T h e  s e c t i o n  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  f o u r  p a r t s :  ( i )  w h e n  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  o c c u r ;  ( i i )  h o w  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  w a s  c o n d u c t e d ;  ( i i i )  
w h o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  w a s  t o  b e ;  a n d  ( i v )  h o w  t h e  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w a s  
o r g a n i z e d .  
2 4 2  
1. · When the Constitution-Making should occur 
a. The Pre-Amendment Period 
Formally, the MPR started the amendment process in 1999 and ended in 2002. However, the 
embryo of the amendments was born in the earlier period between Soeharto's forced 
resignation in May 1998 and the passing of the First Amendment in 1999,1449 that is, during 
Habibie's presidency. This corresponds to Bonime-Bianc's concept of a 'pre-constitutional 
period': the period after the turning point from the authoritarian regime to the new transitional 
· government and before the constitution-making process.14so 
During this period, Habibie's administration set up popular initiatives such as better protection 
for human rights, release of political prisoners and reform of electoral laws. These initiatives 
contributed to the making of effective pre-amendment period. This is consistent with Bonime-
Bianc's view. He argues that a limited pre-amendment period occurs if: (i) control of basic 
freedoms is not revoked; (ii) the process of illegalization of the most arbitrary authoritarian 
instruments is not in place; and (iii) the democratization of the electoral process does not 
succeed. 1451 
An example of Habibie's initiative to protect human rights was his revocation of Ministerial 
Regulation Number 01 of 1984 on Publication Licenses. This regulation had been previously 
used by Soeharto's government to prevent the media from criticizing him. It limited the 
discussion on sensitive political issues, including constitutional reform. The repeal of this 
regulation delivered much greater freedom to the press. It was this extensive media coverage 
which supported the distribution of information on the amendment process. For example, 
Widjojanto admitted that the support of the media helped the Coalition for a New Constitution to 
strongly advocate the idea of an independent Constitutional Commission. 1452 
Habibie's policy of releasing some political prisoners also supported the development of a 
conducive political environment for healthy constitutional discussions among factions in the 
1448 Ellis and Yudhini, above n 1306. 
1449 Bonime-Bianc, above n 64, 139. 
1450 Ibid. 
14511bid 140. 
1452 1nterview with Bambang Widjojanto, member of the Coalition for a New Constitution, 15 July 2003. 
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M P R  a n d  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y .  T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  M P R  w e r e  f r e e  t o  d e b a t e  i m p o r t a n t  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i s s u e s  w i t h o u t  f e a r  o f  b e i n g  j a i l e d ,  a s  t h e y  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  u n d e r  S o h a r t o ' s  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  T h i s  f r e e d o m  s t i m u l a t e d  d y n a m i c  d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R  t h r o u g h o u t  a l l  f o u r  
a m e n d m e n t  d e b a t e s .  
H a b i b i e ' s  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  b r i n g i n g  f o r w a r d  . t h e  e l e c t i o n  f r o m  2 0 0 2  t o  1 9 9 9  w a s  a n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  
p r e - a m e n d m e n t  d e c i s i o n .  A s  S a u n d e r s  a r g u e s ,  a n  e l e c t i o n  e a r l y  i n  a  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p e r i o d  m a y  b e  
n e e d e d  t o  r e f r e s h  t h e  m a n d a t e  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  i f  t h e y  h a v e  l o s t  t h e i r  t r u s t  i n  t h e  s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
o f  a  p r e v i o u s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e .
1 4 5
3  I n  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  c o n t e x t ,  t h e  1 9 9 9  G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n  w a s  
c r u c i a l ,  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e q u i r e m e n t  t o  b u i l d  a  l e g i t i m a t e  M P R  t h a t  c o u l d  t h e n  a m e n d  
t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
T o  p r e p a r e  t h e  1 9 9 9  G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  e l e c t o r a l  r e f o r m s  w a s  c o n d u c t e d  t o  
c r e a t e  a  c o m p l e x  m u l t i p a r t y  s y s t e m .  F o r t y - e i g h t  p a r t i e s  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  E l e c t i o n ,  w h i c h  w a s  
g e n e r a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  f a i r  a n d  j u s t .
1 4 5 4  
T h i s  m u l t i p a r t y  s y s t e m  c o n t r i b u t e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  t h e  
v a r i e t y  a n d  c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s  o f  i d e a s  d u r i n g  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  a n d  w i d e  
r a n g i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  c o n s e n s u a l  p r o c e s s  t a k i n g  
p l a c e .  B o n i m e - B i a n c  d e f i n e s  a  c o n s e n s u a l  p r o c e s s  a s  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  w h i c h  i s  
m o r e  i n c l u s i v e  t h a n  a  d i s s e n s u a l  p r o c e s s . 1
4
5 5  I t  r e q u i r e s  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  a l l  - o r  a t  l e a s t  m o s t  
- p o l i t i c a l  g r o u p s .
1 4 5
6  I n  I n d o n e s i a ,  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  _ p r o c e s s ,  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  w a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  
c o n s e n s u a l  p r o c e s s  a m o n g  a l l  o f  t h e  f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R .  T h i s  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
.  '  .  
M P R  d e f i n i t e l y  a f f e c t e d  t h e  w a y  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  w a s  c a r r i e d  o u t .  T h i s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  W h e a r e ' s  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  n o t  o n l y  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  l e g a l  p r o v i s i o n s ,  b u t  
a l s o  o n  t h e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  g r o u p s . 1 4 5 7  
D e s p i t e  a  f a i r  a n d  j u s t  e l e c t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  v i c t o r y  o f  t h e  t h r e e  o l d  p a r t i e s  o f  t h e  N e w  
O r d e r - t h e  P D I P ,  G o l k a r  a n d  P P P - w a s  n o t  r e a l l y  a  p o s i t i v e  s i g n  f o r  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  
a g e n d a .  T h e  P D I P  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  c o n s e r v a t i v e  f a c t i o n s  i n  r e g a r d  t o  a m e n d m e n t .  E l l i s  
.  .  .  
a r g u e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e s e  p a r t i e s  t e m p o r a r i l y  p u t  t h e  d e b a t e  o n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
1 4 5 3  S a u n d e r s ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 6 ,  6 .  
1 4 5 4  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e  a n d  t h e  C a r t e r  C e n t e r ,  a b o v e  n  7 5 5 .  
1 4 5 5  B o n i m e - B i a n c ,  a b o v e  n  6 4 ,  1 3 .  
1 4 5 6 1 b i d .  
1 4 5 7  W h e a r e ,  a b o v e  n  7 5 ,  2 3 .  
2 4 4  
reform "onto the back burner". 145B Yet, the fact that 77% of the MPR 1999 ~ 2002 members 
were new 1459 gave rise to hope that reform might still have a good chance. 
b. The 1999- 2002 Transitional Period: the Golden Moment 
The 1999 - 2002 constitutional amendments were conducted after Soeharto's authoritarian 
regime collapsed in May 1998 amid rioting and economic crisis. They were therefore colored by 
political conflicts and economic crisis.146° In 1999, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono tried to 
challenge the amendment process arguing that a constitutional amendment in the midst of 
turmoil would only create problems. 1461 This kind of challenge, however, was not enough to stop 
the MPR and, despite all these difficulties, it decided to press ahead with constitutional reform. 
The MPR's decision was right. Although the transition created a difficult situation, it was a real 
opportunity to reform the Constitution, not least because during transition, public political 
euphoria can facilitate effective constitutional discussions. In Elster and McWhinney's words a 
transitional period is a golden moment for constitutional reform. 1462 
c. The 1999- 2002 Amendment Period: A Changing Schedule 
The MPR, however, did not complement its decision to carry out the constitutional amendment 
with a clear timetable. In fact, the amendment schedule set up by the MPR changed almost 
every year from 1999 to 2002. This is different to the experiences of both South Africa and 
Thailand. The South African Assembly had two years to prepare its amendment draft, while the 
Thai Constitutional Drafting Assembly was allocated 240 days to draft the new Constitution. 1463 
These two constitution-making bodies were far more disciplined in their scheduling than 
Indonesia's MPR. 
1458 Ellis, above n 662, 125. 
1459 Suryadinata, above n 584, 119. 
1460 Above n 889- 906. 
1461 ABRI Supports Habibie, Rejects Presidium, above n 781. 
1462 Elster, above n 69, 347, McWhinney, above n 111, 15. 
1463 Article 211 of the 1991 Constitution, Section 73 Subsection (1) of the Interim Constitution. 
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O r i g i n a l l y ,  t h e  M P R ,  t h r o u g h  D e c r e e  N o .  I X  o f  1 9 9 9  o n  t h e  A u t h o r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  
o f .  t h e  M P R  t o  . C o n t i n u e  t h e  A m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  c o m p l e t e d  b y  1 8  A u g u s t  2 0 0 0 ,  a t  t h e  l a t e s t .
1 4
6 4  T h i s  g a v e  t h e  W o r k i n g  
B o d y  1 0  m o n t h s  t o  p r e p a r e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d r a f t .  I n  t h e  2 0 0 0  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  
t h i s  d e a d l i n e  w a s  n o t  m e t .  T h e  M P R  d i d  n o t  f i n i s h  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  b u t  i n s t e a d  i t  i s s u e d  
M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  I X  o f  2 0 0 0  o n  t h e  A u t h o r i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  t o  p r e p a r e  d r a f t  
a m e n d m e n t s  t o  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  2 0 0 0  d e c r e e  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  d r a f t  a m e n d m e n t s  
m u s t  b e  r e a d y  b y  t h e  2 0 0 2  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  a t  t h e  l a t e s t .
1 4
6 s  T h i s  g a v e  t h e  M P R  a n o t h e r  
t w o  y e a r s  f o r  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  t o  p r e p a r e  f o r  d e b a t e  o n  t h e  d r a f t  a m e n d m e n t s .  
I n  i t s  2 0 0 2  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  t h e  M P R  f a c e  a  p o s s i b l e  d e a d l o c k  o v e r  t h e  i s s u e s  o f  h o w  t o  
c o n d u c t  a  s e c o n d  r o u n d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  a n d  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  ' s e v e n  w o r d s '  o f  t h e  
J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r .  T h e r e  w e r e  c a l l s  f r o m  m e m b e r s  t o  a g a i n  d e l a y  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  f r o m  2 0 0 2  t o  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r .
1 4 6
6  I n  t h e  e n d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h r e e  y e a r s  l a t e r  t h a n  s c h e d u l e d ,  t h e  F o u r t h  ( a n d ,  
s o  f a r ,  f i n a l )  A m e n d m e n t  w a s  f i n a l l y  s u c c e s s f u l l y  r a t i f i e d .  
T h e  M P R ' s  t e n d e n c y  t o  f r e q u e n t l y  c h a n g e  i t s  a m e n d m e n t  s c h e d u l e  w a s  e x p l o i t e d  b y  s o m e  
f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R  a s  a n  e x c u s e  t o  s l o w  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  w a s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  o b v i o u s  d u r i n g  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s .  T h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  s t a n c e  o f  
t h e  P D I P  a n d  T N I - P o l r i  f a c t i o n s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  s l o w  p r o g r e s s  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  
d i s c u s s i o n s . 1
4
6 7  T h i s  s u p p o r t s  A r a t o ' s  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  o f  a  s p e c i f i c  t i m e  p e r i o d  i s  
n e c e s s a r y  i n  o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  d e l a y i n g  t a c t i c s  b y  c o n s e r v a t i v e  g r o u p s . 1 4 6 B  
M o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  t h e  c o n t i n u a l l y - c h a n g i n g  a m e n d m e n t  s c h e d u l e  .  a f f e c t e d  t h e  w h o l e  
a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  w a y  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  w a s  c o n d u c t e d .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  
s e c t i o n  n o w  c o n s i d e r s  t h i s  i s s u e  i n  m o r e  d e t a i l .  
1 4 6 4  A r t i c l e  2  o f  t h e  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  I X  o f  1 9 9 9 .  
1 4 6 5  A r t i c l e  3  o f  t h e  M P R  D e c r e e  N o .  I X  o f  2 0 0 0 .  
1 4
6 6  P e r p a n j a n g a n  S i d a n g  T a h u n a n  M P R  h i n g g a  2 0 0 3  m e r u p a k a n  L a n g k a h  A n t i s i p a s i  M P R ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 2 0 .  
1 4
6 7  K i n g ,  a b o v e  n  9 2 4 .  
1 4 6 8  E l s t e r ,  a b o v e  n  6 9 ,  3 9 5 .  
2 4 6  
2. How the Constitution-Making was Conducted 
a. The 1945 Constitution as a Transitional Constitution 
To start the constitutional reform process, one of the initial agreements in the MPR was to 
retain the 1945 Constitution as a 'transitional Constitution'. In 1999, by choosing only to amend, 
rather than replace, the Constitution, the MPR effectively agreed that the 1945 Constitution was 
the "institutional and procedural framework within which the transition took place" .1469 This was 
different to the case of South. Africa, where it was decided to apply the 1994 Interim 
Constitution as its transitional Constitution before drafting its new Constitution. 1470 It was also 
different to Thailand, which amended Article 211 of the Thai 1991 Constitution on amendment 
procedure before it started drafting its new Constitution. The approach of South Africa and 
Thailand provided a more democratic constitution~making process with clearer guidelines on 
how the constitution-making should be conducted - and eventually produced more democratic 
people's constitutions. 
No other Choice. On the one hand, Indonesia's decision to retain the Constitution 'lias ironic, 
because the authoritarian 1945 Constitution was supposed to be the first target of reform .. 
Liddle argues that: 
[t]he positive role played by the 1945 Constitution in Indonesia's democratic transition is 
an extraordinary irony of history, a striking instance of the way in which authoritarian 
institutions and ideologies can be turned against politicians who have spent decades 
fashioning them as instruments of autocratic power.1471 
Likewise, I argue that Indonesia merely had: 
... procedures to amend a Constitution based on the prov1s1ons available in . the 
Constitution which, in fact, was the target of the amendment itself ... [and this] 
demonstrated the absurdity of the transitional constitutional reform in lndonesia.1472 
On the other hand, Liddle also argues that the application of the 1945 Constitution as the legal 
basis during the transition from Soeharto's authoritarian regime was not surprising 1473 and it, in 
1469 Uddle, above n 30, 381. 
1470 Ramaphosa, above n 336, 79. 
1471 Liddle, above n 30, 23- 24. 
1472indrayana, above n 183,-102. 
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f a c t ,  p r o v e d  u s e f u l  a s  a  w a y  o f  m a n a g i n g  t h e  e x t r e m e  u n c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  t h e  
t r a n s i t i o n  e r a .
1 4 7
i  f o r  L i d d l e ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  a  g u a r a n t e e  f o r  b o t h  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  
o p p o s i t i o n  f o r c e s :  
[ b ] y  m a i n t a i n i n g  a  s e t  o f  f a m i l i a r  r u l e s  i n  a  t i m e  o f  g r e a t  t u r m o i l ,  t h e  c o n t e s t a n t s  f o r  p o w e r  
c o u l d  m o r e  e a s i l y  p r e d i c t  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  r e s p o n d  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  t o  e a c h  o t h e r ' s  b e h a v i o r  
d u r i n g  t h e ·  s u c c e s s i v e  c r i s e s .  T h e y  a l s o  w e r e  r e a s o n a b l y  c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  n o t  b e  
a r r e s t e d  o r  k i l l e d . 1
4
7 5  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  c h o o s e  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a s  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  
b e c a u s e  o f  I n d o n e s i a ' s  l i m i t e d  c h o i c e s .  T h e r e  w e r e  n a t i o n a l i s t  g r o u p s  - i n c l u d i n g  t h e  m i l i t a r y : _ '  
i n  I n d o n e s i a n  p o l i t i c s  w h i c h  f e a r e d  t h a t ' a  ' r a d i c a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o · r m  m i g h t  l e a d  t o  t h e  
p r e l i m i n a r y  s t a g e  o f  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e .  F o r  t h e s e  g r o u p s ,  e m p l o y i n g  t h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ·  a s  t h e  ' t r a n s i t i o n a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n '  w a s  a  s o r t  o f  g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  a  r a d i c a l  c h a n g e  
w o u l d  n o t  t o o k  p l a c e .  
B e c a u s e  o f  t h i s  f e a r  o f  I s l a m i c  s t a t e  o f  t h e  p a r t  o f  d o m i n a n t  n a t i o n a l i s t ,  t h e  b a s i c  a g r e e m e n t s  
r e a c h e d  b y  M P R  m e m b e r s  f o c u s e d  o n  r e t a i n i n g  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  s y m b o l i s m  i n  t h e  1 9 4 5  
C o n s t i t u t i o n . ,  
b .  T h e  F i v e  B a s i c  A g r e e m e n t s  
U n l i k e  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  w h i c h  a g r e e d  o n  t h e  t h i r t y - f o u r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  b e f o r e  s t a r t i n g  i t s  
"  .  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m ,  
1 4 7
6  I n d o n e s i a  h a d  n o  c l e a r  d i r e c t i o n  a s  t o  w h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  s h o u l d  
s e e k  t o  a c h i e v e .  T h e  o n l y  d i r e c t i o n  w h i c h  g u i d e d  t h e  M P R  w a s  t h e  o b v i o u s  n e e d  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n  t h e  f i v e  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  t h e  M P R  m e m b e r s  a l l  a g r e e d  o n :  
•  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e  p r e a m b l e  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  . •  
•  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  u n i t a r y  s t a t e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a ;  
•  t o  k e e p  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m  g o v e r n m e n t ;  
.  .  
•  t o  i n s e r t  t h e  n o r m a t i v e  p r o v i s i o n s  t h e n  i n  t h e  e l u c i d a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  b o d y  t e x t  o f  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  a n d  
1 4 7 3  L i d d l e ,  a b o v e  n  3 0 ,  3 7 4 - 3 7 5 .  
1 4 7 4 1 b i d .  
1 4 7 5 1 b i d .  
2 4 8  
• to process the amendments through the form of 'addenda', without deleting the original 
text of the 1945 Constitution. 
Not all of these five agreements were made before the First Amendment. Agreement on the 
unitary state, the presidential system and the insertion of some of the elucidation provisions 
was not reached until the Second Amendment discussions. The consensus on the 'addenda' 
approach was the consequence of the choice to amend the Constitution. The agreements on 
the unitary state and the presidential system were more a product of the intense symbolic value 
of the 1945 Constitution - there was actually never any intensive debate in the MPR on these 
two issues. The terms 'federal state' and the 'parliamentary system' were simply rejected 
because of historical reasons.1477 
These five ·agreements, whatever their· origins and timing, meant, however, that making a 
totally new Constitution VIas · impossible, especially as the MPR ·· refused to amend the 
preamble. The Preamble, with the Pancasila included within it, was the essential constitutional 
guarantee for the nationalist groups. lfthe preamble was amended, this group would not be 
satisfied, and would possibly reject the system established based on such an amendment. Yet, 
in reality, the agreement to merely amend, and not renew, the Constitution was not consistent. 
. . 
c. Four Amendments, a New Constitution 
Inconsistent Amendments. It soon became clear that the claim that the MPR would only 
. . 
amend, but ~ot renew the 1945 Constitution did not reflect reality. Anton Djawamaku concludes 
that the four amendments that were eventually passed were actually inconsistent with the 
'mere.amendment' concept itself. 1478 As Wheeler argues, one of the specific characteristics of a 
constitutional amendment is thatit deals with a limited scope ofconstitutional is~Lies. 1479 On the 
. . . 
other hand, constitutional changes which . cover the major portion of the Constitution are 
something more and are not usually described as ame~dments.14B0 In Indonesia, the four 
1476 Murray, above n 349, 105. 
1477 Ellis, above n 934. 
1478 Anton Djawamaku, 'Problema Reformasi Konstitusi: Mengubah ataukah Mengganti UUD 1945', (2001) 4 Ana/isis CSIS, 
461. 
1479Wheeler, above n 104, 50. 
1480 Ibid. 
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a m e n d m e n t s  h a d  u l t i m a t e l y  d e a l t  w i t h  a  l a r g e  r a n g e  o f  i s s u e s ,  a n d  c h a n g e d  a l m o s t  t h e  w h o l e  
o r i g i n a l  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
T a b l e  1 9  · s h o w s  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s .  - I t  
d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  m o s t  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w e r e  e i t h e r  a m e n d e d  o r  d e l e t e d .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  w e r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  a  t o t a l  r e v i s i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  I n  o t h e r  
w o r d s ,  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  w e r e  a n '  a t t e m p t  t o  m a k e  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  b y  u s i n g  a  step~by-step 
a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s .  
.  .  .  
T a b l e  1 9  
T h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n :  b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  t h e  A m e n d m e n t s  
8 { 7 3 =  1 1 % .  
6 5  2 9 / 1 9 4 =  1 5 %  
T a b l e  1 9  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  9 5 %  o f  t h e  c h a p t e r s , ·  8 9 %  o f  t h e  A r t i c l e s  a n d  8 5 %  o f  t h e  
p a r a g r a p h s  a r e  e i t h e r  n e w  o r  w e r e  a l t e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l s .  C h a p t e r  X I ,  o n  R e l i g i o n ,  i s  t h e  
o n l y  o n e  w h i c h  h a s  n o t  b e e n  c h a n g e d .  T h i s  a g a i n  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  I s l a m  
a n d  t h e  s t a t e  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  s e n s i t i v e  i s s u e s  d e a l t  w i t h  d u r i n g  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s .  
D j a w a m a k u  a r g u e s  t h a t  b e c a u s e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  h a v e  b o t h  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  a n d  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  
r e p l a c e d  t h e  o r i g i n a l  . 1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s  o f  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  h a v e  
'  '  .  
a c t u a l l y  d e l i v e r e d  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
1 4 8 1  
H e  f u r t h e r  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h i s ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  
'  .  .  '  .  
s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  p u b l i c  a s p i r a t i o n  o f  m a k i n g  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  t h e .  r e s u l t  
o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s .
1 4 8 2  
K a w a m u r a  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  " t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  h a s  a l m o s t  n o  t r a c e  o f  i t s  
.  .  
o r i g i n a l  f o r m " . t 4 8 3  
T h e  f a c t ,  t h a t ,  w h a t e v e r  i t s  r h e t o r i c ,  t h e  M P R  h a d ,  i n  f a c t ,  m a d e  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  a l s o  




T e m p o  l n t e r a k t i f w r o t e  
1 4 8 1  A n t o n  D j a w a m a k u  a n d  M .  S u d i b j o ,  ' P e r u b a h a n  U U D  1 9 4 5 :  S o l u s i  a t a u  P r o b l e m a  K o n s t i t u s i ? ' ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3  A n a / i s i s  C S / S  2 9 1 .  
1 4 8 2 J b i d .  
1 4 8 3  K a w a m u r a ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 1 , 5 2 .  
1 4 8 4  ' M P R  S e s u n g g u h n y a  S a h k a n  K o n s t i t u s i  B a r u ' ,  K o m p a s ,  1 9  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 ;  ' H U T  R l  d e n g a n  K o n s t i t u s i  B a r u ' ,  S u a r a  
P e m b a r u a n ,  1 6  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
2 5 0  
that at the end of the 2002 MPR Annual Session, Indonesia faced a new constitutional era 1485 
- Goenawan Mohamad even named the Constitution after the amendments as 'the 2002 
Constitution' 1486 and Denny J.A. wrote an article welcoming a new Constitution, claiming that: 
[a]lthough the post amendment Constitution still has the same name, the 1945 
Constitution, we effectively have a new Constitution.1487 
This thesis argues therefore that the four amendments were a step-by-step process to write a 
new Constitution, but without reopening the question of the national symbolism of the original 
1945 Constitution: the rejection of Islamic state and the nationalist state ideology, the 
Pancasila. It was an evolutionary constitutional renewal. As Kelsen argues, it does not matter 
how fundamental alterations in the substance of a Constitution are, so long as the continuity of 
the legal system is not interrupted, a constitutional renewal should be classified as an 
evolutionary process.1488 
This evolutionary process, however, happened by accident, not by design, as is explained in 
the following part. 
d. A Process by Accident not Design 
As Saunders argues, an agenda-setting stage should address the question of what the basic 
agreements on the constitutional reform actually are. 1489 Unfortunately, agenda setting during 
the Indonesian amendments .was limited. The MPR failed to give detailed direction on what 
should be reformed. Even if there were five basic agreements, they were not made before the 
First Amendment, as they should have been, but were made later during the four amendment · 
discussions. 
Therefore, Asshidiqie criticized the amendment process for the absence of an academic draft 
to guide the process. 149° For him, the paradigm was only found much later, when the MPR · 
1485 Indonesia Memasuki Konstitusi Baru (2002) Tempo lnteraktif <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/harian!fokus/115/2.1.6Jd 
.html> at 2 Apri12003. 
1486 Goenawan Mohamad, 'Konstitusi 2002', Tempo, No. 26/XXXI26 August -1 September 2002. 
1487 Denny JA, 'Selamat Datang Konstitusi Baru', Koran Tempo, 13 August 2002. 
1488 Kelsen, above n 87, 117. 
1489 Saunders, above n 166, 5. 
1490 'Seharusnya Dibuat Naskah Baru UUD 1945', Kompas, 2 July 2002. 
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b e c a m e  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  s e r i o u s  a m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s .
1 4 9 1  
L u b i s  a g r e e s  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s  w a s  
. c o n d u c t e d  w i t h o u t  c l e a r  p a r a d i g m  · " w i t h o u t  a n y  c l e a r  c o n c e p t ,  b e i n g  a d  h o c  a n d  p a r t i a l  i n  




V e r y  l a t e  o n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  i n  2 0 0 2 ,  d u r i n g  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  
H a p p y  B o n e  Z u l k a r n a e n  ( G o l k a r )  a d m i t t e d  t h i s  p r o b l e m .  H e  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
. . .  I  t h i n k  w e  d o  n e e d  a n  a c a d e m i c  d r a f t  [ f o r  g u i d i n g  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s ] .  . . .  t h i s  
d r a f t  c o n s i s t s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n c e p t s .  I t  a l s o  p r o v i d e s  a r g u m e n t s  a s  t o  w h y  a n  
a m e n d m e n t  i s  n e e d e d ,  a n d  w h a t  t h e  r e a s o n  i s  b e h i n d  a n  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l .
1 4
9 3  
L i k e w i s e ,  F r a n s  H .  M a t r u t t y  ( P D I P )  a r g u e d  t h a t :  
[ i ] f  w e  h a d  t h e  t e r m s  o f  r e f e r e n c e  o f  w h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  s h o u l d  b e ,  w e  w o u l d  n o t  b e  
e x p e r i e n c i n g  t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  . . .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  w e  d o  n o t  h a v e  t h i s  g u i d a n c e .  W e  d o  n o t  
k n o w  w h a t  o u r  l i m i t a t i o n s  a r e  . . .  o r  w h i c h  p a r t s  w e  s h o u l d  a m e n d .  W e  h a v e  m a d e  a  f a t a l  
m i s t a k e . 1 4 9 4  
T o b i n g ,  t h e  C h a i r p e r s o n  o f  t h e  P A H  I  o f  2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 2 ,  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  a g e n d a  s e t t i n g  f o r  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t  a p p e a r e d  t o  h a v e  b e e n :  
. . .  b y  c o i n c i d e n c e .  E a c h  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  ( P A H  I )  h a d  d i f f e r e n t  g o a l s .  B u t  a f t e r  
t h r e e  y e a r s  o f  i n t e n s e  n e g o t i a t i o n  a n d  w o r k i n g  t o g e t h e r  . . .  ' w e  h a d  f i n a l l y  a c h i e v e d  t h e  
c o m m o n  g o a l s  t h a t  w e  h a d  b e e n  f i g h t i n g  f o r  t o g e t h e r . 1 4 9 5  
e .  T h e  P o l i t i c a l  I n t e r e s t s  
M a n y  c r i t i c s  c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s  h a d  b e e n  i n t r o d u c e d  o n l y  i n  a  p a t c h y  f a s h i o n ,  
a n d  m a n y  w e r e  p r o d u c t s  o f  s h o r t - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  i n  b a d  f a i t h .  I n d e e d ,  L u k m a n  H a k i m  
S a i f u d d i n  ( P P P )  a d m i t t e d  t h e  m o r e  c r u c i a l  t h e  a r t i c l e s  b e i n g  d i s c u s s e d  w e r e ,  t h e  s t r o n g e r  t h e  
v e s t e d  i n t e r e s t s  i n v o l v e d J
4
9 6  L u b i s  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t :  
1 4 9 1 1 b i d .  
1 4 9 2  T o d u n g  M u l y a  L u b i s ,  T h e  U r g e n c y  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m  ( 2 0 0 1 )  < h t t p : / / w w w . v a n z o r g e r e p o r t . c o m / r e p o r t / p o p u p f l n d e x .  
c f m ? f a = S h o w R e p o r t & p k _ r p t _ i d = 1 6 & C F I D = 3 1 5 6 0 6 & C F T O K E N = 7 1 6 8 0 8 8 8 >  a t  3  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 3 .  
1 4 9 3  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  3 r d  M e e t i n g  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y ,  4  J u n e  2 0 0 2 ,  1 9 8 .  
1 4 9 4  M i n u t e s  o f  t h e  3 2 n d  M e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  2 4  J u n e  2 0 0 2 ,  1 2 2 .  
1 4 9 5  V a n  Z o r g e  R e p o r t ,  a b o v e  1 3 8 2 .  
1 4 9 6 1 n t e r v i e w  w i t h  L u k m a n  H a k i m  S a i f u d d i n ,  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  P A H  I ,  2 0  J u n e  2 0 0 3 .  
2 5 2  
.. . in many aspects the amendments were an attempt at political accommodation of the 
various social and political pressures coming from certain political groups. In other words, 
what actually happened in the amendment process was political horse-trading.1497 
Table 20 gives examples of the sort of proposals Lubis criticizes. 









As the above table. shows, however, four out of the six amendment proposals were seen as 
contaminated by short-term political interests and therefore were rejected. The different political 
interests among the factions in the MPR, in fact, became an effective quality control system, 
because there was no single political faction which held an absolute majority in the MPR. 
1497 Lubis, above n 1492. 
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I n  a d d i t i o n ,  c r i t i c i s m s  f r o m  o u t s i d e  t h e  M P R  w e r e  a ' l s o  e f f e c t i v e  i n  h e l p i n g  b l o c k  m o s t  o f  s h o r t -
t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s .  P u b l i c  c o m m e n t  p r e s s u r e d  s o m e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  t o  r e c o n s i d e r  t h e i r  
p o s i t i o n s .  W i t h o u t  m o n i t o r i n g  b y  t h e  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  g r o u p s ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  M P R  m i g h t  
h a v e  b e e n  l e s s  r e s t r a i n e d  i n  p r o p o s i n g  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s .  I n  t h i s  w a y ,  p u b l i c  c r i t i c i s m  
p l a y e d  t h e  r o l e  o f  e x t e r n a l  b u f f e r  t o  s t o p  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s  f r o m  b e i n g  c o m p l e t e l y  
p o l i t i c i z e d .  
:  I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  c o m p a r e d  t o  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  e x p e r i e n c e ,  I n d o n e s i a ' s  
·  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s e s  w e r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  m o r e  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  b a d  f a i t h  m a n i p u l a t i o n  b y  p o l i t i c a l  
· i n t e r e s t s .  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  r a t i f i c a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  i n c l u d e d  t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
·  d r a f t s  b e f o r e  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t .  T h e  C o u r t  c o n s i d e r e d  w h e t h e r  t h e  d r a f t s  w e r e  c o n s i s t e n t  
.  o r  n o t  w i t h  t h e  3 4  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  a g r e e d  u p o n  e a r l i e r .  T h i s  e x a m i n a t i o n  p r o c e s s  a n d  
.  t h e  a g r e e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  w e r e  e f f e c t i v e  m e t h o d s  t o  p r e v e n t  s h o r t - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  d e a l s  
b e i n g  i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  S o u t h  A f r i c a ' s  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
1 4
9 B  
·  f .  T r a n s p a r e n c y  
A n o t h e r  i s s u e  w h i c h  i n v i t e d  m u c h  c r i t i c i s m  w a s  t h e  t r a n s p a r e n c y  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s .  T h e  c r i t i c i s m  
- - .  - .  '  "  
.  d i d  n o t  r e l a t e  t o  t h e  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  M P R ,  w h i c h  w e r e  m o s t l y  o p e n  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  b u t  t o  t h e  
·  negoti~tion m e e t i n g s ,  w h i c h  w e r e  c l o s e d  a n d  i n  w h i c h  w e r e  m a n y  o f  t h e  c r u c i a l  a m e n d m e n t  
p r o p o s a l s  w e r e  a g r e e d  t o .  G u m a y  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e y  h a d .  a  n e g a t i v e  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  
.  a m e n d m e n t s .
1 4 9 9  
L i k e w i s e ,  W i d j o j a n t o  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  m e e t i n g s  b e c a m e  t h e  p l a c e  w h e r e  t h e  
•  p a r t i e s  ' t r a d e d  o f f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s , t 5 o o  
T h e s e  a r g u m e n t s  m a y  w e l l  b e  t r u e ,  b u t  t h e y  n e e d  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  . .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  a n  a m e n d m e n t  
p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  b e  t r a n s p a r e n t .  I t  i s  a l s o  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  s h o u l d  h a v e  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  
p r o c e s s .
1 5 0 1  
H o w e v e r ,  i t  i s  n o t  a l s o  t r u e  t h a t  n e g o t i a t i o n  m e e t i n g s  w e r e  u n n e c e s s a r y ,  e v e n  l e s s  
.  .  .  
t h a t  t h e y  s h o u l d  h a v e .  b e e n  t o t a l l y  p r o h i b i t e d .  T h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  m e e t i n g s  w e r e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
s o m e t i m e s  a v o i d  a  d e a d l o c k  o n  d i f f i c u l t  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s .  I n d e e d ,  d u r i n g  t h e  T h i r d  a n d  .  
1 4 9 8  M u r r a y ,  a b o v e  n  3 4 9 ,  1 2 0 - . : . 1 2 1 .  
1 4 9 9
1 n t e r v i e w  w i t h  H a d a r  N .  G u m a y ,  t h e  D e p u t y  E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r  o f  C e n t r e  f o r  E l e c t o r a l  R e f o r m ,  2 4  J u l y  2 0 0 3 .  
1 5 0 0  
I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  B a m b a n g  W i d j o j a n t o ,  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  C o a l i t i o n  f o r  a  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  1 5  J u l y  2 0 0 3 .  
1 5 0 1  C o m m o n w e a l t h  H u m a n  R i g h t s  I n i t i a t i v e s ,  a b o v e  n  2 4 7 ,  1 3 .  
2 5 4  
Fourth Amendment discussions, the closed meetings were more effective than open meetings 
in resolving these difficult proposals: The issue of the second round direct presidential election, 
and the amendment of Article 29, on the state and Islam were two highly contentious issues 
which were effectively and carefully settled behind closed doors. 
On this issue, I share the opinion of Elster who argues that amendment debates should be 
balanced between publicity and secrecy.t502 Elster argues that a closed meeting tends to 
improve the quality of discussion, because it makes it easier for a party to change its opinion, 
when persuaded of the truth of another party's view.tso3 On the other hand, a fully open 
discussion, while it "drives out any appearance or bargaining", encourages "stubbornness,· 
overbidding, and grandstanding in ways that are incompatible with genuine discussions". 1504 
It should be noted, however, that in the Indonesian context a 'closed meeting' does not mean 
that the content of the discussions among the parties is not available to the public. Here, the 
term 'closed meeting' is a technical one, that is, during such meetings the media and the public 
are not present, however, the discussions are still recorded and the minutes are still available· 
to the public. This record is important for the public to understand the reasons behind the 
agreement of an amendment proposal, particularly in any future debate on the same' issues. 
'· 
Closing. Indonesian post-Soeharto constitution-making process was conducted in an ad hoc, 
slow and patchy way. It took four years for the MPR to complete the constitutional 
amendments. Despite this, Indonesia finally has a new and more democratic Constitution, 
albeit one that maintains the provisions on the relationshi-p between Islam and the state and 
which keep the old Preamble and thus preserve the national state ideology, the Pancasila. 
3. Who the Constitution-Making Body was to be 
The question of 'who the constitution-making body should be' overshadowed the four 
amendment processes. The role of the MPR was constantly challenged by the possibility of 
establishing a Constitutional Commission. During the first . Amendment discussions, this 
1502 Elster, above n 69, 395. 
15031bid. 
1504 1bid 388. 
c h a l l e n g e  w a s  n o t  s o  s t r o n g . 1 5 o 5  I t  c o n t i n u e d  t o  g r o w ,  h o w e v e r ,  o v e r  t h e  S e c o n d  t o  F o u r t h  
A m e n d m e n t s  d e b a t e s .  
I n  t h e  e n d ,  t h e  M P R  c o u l d  n o t  r e s i s t  t h e  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  t h e  p u b l i c  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  C o m m i s s i o n  . .  
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  i t  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  2 0 0 3  a f t e r  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s  w e r e  c o m p l e t e d  w a s ,  
h o w e v e r ,  g i v e n  o n l y  l i m i t e d  a u t h o r i t y  t o  ' r e v i e w '  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s  a n d  s u b m i t  i t s  f i n d i n g s  t o  
t h e  M P R .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n ·  c o n s i d e r s  w h y  t h e  M P R  f a i l e d  t o  w i n  t h e  p e o p l e ' s  t r u s t  i n  i t s  
c a p a c i t y .  a s  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y .  ' I t  a l s o  c o n s i d e r s  w h y  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  
f a i l e d  t o  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 9 9  - 2 0 0 2  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s ,  a r i d  w h y  t h e  2 0 0 3  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  M P R  w a s  n o t  a  ' r e a l '  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n .  
a .  T h e  M P R  
A s  n o t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  T w o ,  E l s t e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w i l l  h a v e  s t r o n g  l e g i t i m a c y  i f  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y  i s  d e m o c r a t i c a l l y  s e l e c t e d .
1 5 0 6  
A t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
p r o c e s s e s ,  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 4  M P R  w a s  s t r o n g .  T h i s  w a s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  




T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  
M P R  w e r e  m o s t l y  e l e c t e d  - e x c e p t  f o r  t h e  3 8  m e m b e r s  f r o m  T N I - P o l r i  w h o  w e r e  a p p o i n t e d :  
L i n d s e y  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h i s  M P R  w a s  " t h e  f i r s t  t r u l y  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  e l e c t e d  p a r l i a m e n t  i n  
I n d o n e s i a n  h i s t o r y ' ' .
1 5 0 8  
T h e  p o s i t i v e  i m a g e  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  s t r o n g  m a n d a t e  o f  
'  '  .  .  .  '  -
t h e  M P R  t o  c a r r y  o u t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m . 1 5 o 9  
' - : .  '  
S o ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  H a d a r  N .  G u m a y  · w h o  l a t e r  b e c a m e  o n e  o f  t h e  l e a d i n g  c r i t i c s  o f  t h e  M P R ' s .  
'  .  .  •  . • .  , : 1  .  .  · ;  '  
p e r f o r m a n c e  i n  a m e n d i n g  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  - i n  1 9 9 9  c o n f i r m e d  h i s  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  M P R .  
G u m a y  a r g u e s  t h a t :  
. . .  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s ,  w e  a c t u a l l y  t r u s t e d  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  M P R ,  w h i c h  w a s  i n d e e d  i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  o u r  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  h a v i n g  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a m e n d  [ t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ] . 1 5
1 0  
1 5 0 5  Y u s u f  a n d  B a s a l i m ,  a b o v e  n  6 ,  9 7 - 9 8 .  
1 5 0 6  J o h n  E l s t e r ,  A b o v e  n  2 6 9 ,  1 7 8 .  
1 5 0 7  N a t i o n a l  D e m o c r a t i c  I n s t i t u t e  a n d  T h e  C a r t e r  C e n t e r ,  a b o v e  n  7 5 5 ,  1 .  
1 5 0 8  L i n d s e y ,  a b o v e  n  9 9 ,  2 4 6 .  
1 5 0 9 J b i d .  
1 5 1 0  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  H a d a r  N .  G u m a y ,  t h e  D e p u t y  E x e c u t i v e .  D i r e c t o r  o f  C e n t r e  f o r  E l e c t o r a l  R e f o r m ,  2 4  J u l y  2 0 0 3 .  
2 5 6  
The MPR's legitimacy, however, became progressively weaker throughout the four amendment 
discussions. There were two reasons behind this: first, the way in which the MPR carried out 
the amendment was, for its critics, overshadowed by short-term political interests; and second, 
public disappointment at the performance of the DPR members. This second factor will now be 
discussed. 
The DPR's Negative Image. The performance of the DPR directly influenced the image of the 
MPR. The public could not separate the two institutions, because all members of the DPR were 
automatically members of the MPR. Problems in the DPR therefore discredited the MPR too. 
f',' . ' ' : .: . ' ' 
One of the biggest problems was the absence of many members of the_ DPR during its 
important sessions. For example, in one debate, on the Bill on Money Laundering, although 
' ~ ( c '. 
309 members signed the attendance list, only 49 members physically attended the meeting.1511 
Predictably, a poll by Kompas recorded that 84% of the 845 respondents argued that the 
performance of the DPR members in addressing the country's problems, was unreliable.1512 
' l ) '• ' ' . 
Further, 64% of the respondents stated that the att!tude of the members of the DPR was not a 
good example of democracy in practice.1513 In another_ Kompas' poll, 85% of the 830 
. . 
respondents claimed that the DPR did not represent their interests.1s14 
This negative image of the DPR paralleled the weakening legitimacy of the political parties. In 
the three polls conducted by Kompas in 2000, 2001 and 2002, the image of the parties became 
' , ) ' ' 
progressively more negative in the public eyes. The 2000 poll showed that 41% of the 
respondents were satisfied with the performance of the DPR. This number, , however, 
decreased to 19% in 2001 and then to 12% in 2002.1515 This loss of trust was also reflected in. 
the declining number of correspondence submitted to the DPR. In 2000, the DPR received 
1,878 letters, 1,048 in 2001 and 725 letters in November 2002.1516 
There was a public perception that the members of the DPR preferred to represent their party 
interests rather than the people. In addition, the assumption that many of the members were 
involved in 'money politics' (bribery and other corruption) contributed to a loss of trust of the 
1511 'Mangkirnya Demokrasi di Legislatif, Kompas, 1 April2002. 
1512ibid. 
1513ibid. 
1514 'Citra DPR Tidak Kunjung Membaik', Kompas, 10 June 2002. 
1515 'Sebelah Mat a bagi Partai Politik', Kompas, 8 Apri12002. 
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p e o p l e . 1 5 1 7  T h e  f a c t  t h a t  1 5 5  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  f a i l e d  t o  r e p o r t  t h e i r  w e a l t h  t o  t h e  K P K P N  1 5 1 8  
f u r t h e r  a g g r a v a t e d  t h i s .
1 5 1
9  B e n n y  K .  H a r m a n · a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  s h o w e d  t h e  w e a k n e s s  o f  
c o m m i t m e n t  o f  t h e  m e m b e r s  a n d  · t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  t o  c o m b a t  c o r r u p t i o n . 1 5 2 o  S i m i l a r l y ,  
S y a m s u d d i n  H a r r i s  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  w a s :  ·  
. . .  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e  m o r a l  d e c a d e n c e  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e s .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e y  d o  n o t  h a v e  a n y  
m o r a l i t y  a t  a l l .  S o ,  t h e y  h a v e  n o  r i g h t  t o  h o l d  a n y  p u b l i c  o f f i c e . 1 5 2 1  
T h e  l a c k  o f  t r u s t  w a s  e v e n  w o r s e  b e c a u s e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  D P R  m e m b e r s  a n d  i t s ·  
c o n s t i t u e n t s  w a s  a  dista~t o n e  .  I n  a n o t h e r  n a t i o n w i d e  p o l l  c o n d u c t e d  b y  T a y l o r  Nelso~ S o f r e s  
.  '  .  .  .  
I n d o n e s i a ,  o n l y  4 %  o f  t h e  3 , 5 8 0  r e s p o n d e n t s  w e r e  a b l e  t o  n a m e  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
1 5 2 2  
A n o t h e r  9 %  c o u l d  ' n a m e  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y  t h e y  c a m e  f r o m .  
'  
A n  a s t o n i s h i n g  8 6 %  c o u l d  n o t  n a m e  e v e n  o n e  s i n g l e  · l e g i s l a t o r . 1 5 2 3  
T h i s  a l i e n a t i o n  c o u l d  b e  p a r t i a l l y  e x p l a i n e d  b y  t h e  m e m b e r s  · o f  t h e  D P R  h a v i n g  f a i l e d  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  e f f e c t i v e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i t h  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  T h e  l a s t  p o l l  c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y ·  
o f  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t s  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e y  h a d  n e v e r  b e e n  c o n t a c t e d  b y  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  
w h o m  t h e y  h a d  e l e c t e d  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e m .
1 5 2 4  
E v e n  t h o s e  w h o  h a d  b e e n  i n  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e m  
s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  h a d  c o m e  f r o m  t h e m ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  f r o m  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R .
1 5 2 5  
O n l y  4 %  s a i d  t h e y  h ' a d  b e e n  c o n t a c t e d  b y  t h e  m e m b e r s ,  w h e r e a s  8 7 %  s a i d  t h a t  t h e y  h a d  n e v e r  
b e e n  c o n t a c t e d . 1 5 2
6  
C h o z i n  C h u m a i d y  ( P P P )  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  s o m e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  h a d  
l a r g e l y  i g n o r e d  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s , ·  b u t  s h i f t e d  t h e  b l a m e  f o r  t h i s  n e g l e c t  t o  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  
e l e c t o r a l  s y s t e m J 5
2 7  
S m i t a  N o t b s u s a n t o  h a s ,  h o w e v e r ,  d i s p u t e d  t h i s · ,  a r g u i n g  t h a t  t h e  i g n o r a n c e  




5 1 6  ' M e n u r u n  D r a s t i s ,  S u r a l  P e n g a d u a n  k e  D P R ' ,  K o m p a s ,  1 0  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 2 .  
1 5 1 7  ' W a k i l  R a k y a t  j a u h  d a r i  R a k y a t ' ,  K o m p a s ,  2 8  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 2 .  
1 5 1 8  K P K P N  i s  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  o f  K o m i s i  P e m e r i k s a  K e k a y a a n  P e n y e l e n g g a r a  N e g a r a  o r  P u b l i c  S e r v a n t s '  W e a l t h  A u d i t  
C o m m i s s i o n .  
1 5 1 9  ' 1 5 5  A n g g o t a  D P R I M P R  b e l u m  S e r a h k a n  D a f t a r  K e k a y a a n ' ,  K o m p a s ,  2 3  Augu~t 2 0 0 2 .  
1 5 2 0  B e n n y  K .  H a r m a n ,  ' M e m b u r u  1 5 5  A n g g o t a  M P R I D P R ' ,  K o m p a s ,  2 6  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
1 5 2 1  ' M a s y a r a k a t  b i s a  a j u k a n  C l a s s  A c t i o n ' ,  K o m p a s ,  2 6  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  ·  
1 5 2 2  S e k r e t a r i a t  J e n d e r a l  M P R I D P R  R l ,  L a p o r a n  S u r v e i  O p i n i  P u b l i k  N a s i o n a / 2 0 0 2 ,  M a y  2 0 0 2 ,  2 5 .  
1 5 2 3 1 b i d .  
1 5 2 4 1 b i d  2 4 .  
1 5 2 5 1 b i d .  
1 5 2 6 1 b i d .  
1 5 2 7  ' L e g i s l a t o r s  A d m i t  t o  H a v i n g  I g n o r e d  T h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n t s ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  P o s t ,  2 6  J u n e  2 0 0 2 .  
2 5 8  
All of the above problems ultimately contributed to the negative assessment of the public on the 
DPR's performance. The same poll showed only 32% of the respondents were satisfied with 
the DPR's work. 52%, however, said they were unsatisfied.1529 Although popular satisfaction 
with the performance of the MPR was greater (45% satisfied and 39% unsatisfied), negative 
assessments of the DPR inevitably affected popular assessments of the MPR as the 
constitution-making body. A Kompas in 2002, for example, poll suggested that 68% of the 815 
respondents would prefer an independent Constitutional Commission to carry out the 
amendment process. Only 21% still trusted the MPR to reform the 1945 Constitution. 1530 
The MPR's Achievement. It should be noted that, in spite of the strong criticism of the MPR, 
no one can deny its achievement in ratifying the four amendments. Few predicted that the 
MPR, a body with "a justified reputation for party political in-fighting and horse trading"1531 would 
ever succeed in achieving a majority decision to approve the amendment drafts. 
One of the reasons behind the success of the MPR was its willingness to reduce its own power. 
For Ellis, the MPR has made an exceptional international precedent by agreeing to abandon its 
previously all-powerful status.1532 The original Article 1 (2) of the 1945 Constitution stated that 
MPR was the sole representative of the sovereignty of the people. This monopoly on 
sovereignty had become the legal basis for the MPR to be a supreme parliament. It was also 
the foundation for all other MPR powers including appointing and removing the President. 
Extraordinarily, this power was relinquished by the MPR by the Third Amendment of Article 1 (2) 
which now stipulates that, "Sovereignty is in the hands of the people and is exercised in 
accordance with Constitution". 
Extensive Constitutional Debates. According t6 Ellis, by its performance in reforming the 
1945 Constitution, the MPR had transformed itself from a 'rubber stamp' parliament during the 
authoritarian New Order, to become an institution which debated in detail almost all 
15281bid. 
1529 Sekretariat Jenderal MPR!DPR Rl, above n 1522,20. 
1530 'Dukungan Proses Amandemen UUD 1945 Memudar', Kompas, 1 July 2002. The Research and Development division of 
Kompas conducted the poll by asking 815 respondents who lived in Jakarta, Surabaya, Yogyakarta, Medan, Palembang, 
Samarinda, Man ado and Makasar. 
1531 Lindsey, above n 99, 244. 
1532 Ellis, above n 934. 
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c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s .
1 5
3 3  E l l i s  f u r t h e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  d y n a m i c  d e b a t e s  i n  t h e  
M P R  i n v o l v e d  a  . c r e a t i v e  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  p o l i t i c a l  e u p h o r i a ,  a f t e r  a  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p e r i o d  o f  a n  
a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e ,  a n d  t h e  r i g h t  o f  i t s  m e m b e r s  t o  e x p r e s s  d i f f e r e n t  o p i n i o n s .
1 5 3 4  
E l l i s  p r a i s e s  
t h e  p r o c e s s  s a y i n g  t h a t  " t h e  f o u r  M P R  s e s s i o n s  t h a t  h a v e  d e a l t  w i t h  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e v i e w  
d e m o n s t r a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t  t o w a r d s  e f f e c t i v e  p l u r a l i s t  d e b a t e  i n  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  
s o c i e t y "  . t 5 3 5  E x t e n s i v e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e b a t e  o b v i o u s l y  a d d e d  t o  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s .  
b .  T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  
A s  m e n t i o n e d  p r e s s u r e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  s t r e n g t h e n e d  o v e r  t h e  c o u r s e  
o f  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t  p h a s e s .  T h e  C o a l i t i o n  f o r  a  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  t h e  p i o n e e r  a d v o c a t e  
o f  s u c h  a  b o d y .  I n  2 0 0 0 ,  t h e  C o a l i t i o n  o n l y  c o n s i s t e d  o f  s e v e r a l  n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  I n  2 0 0 1 - 2 0 0 2 ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  h a v e  a  w i d e r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  i t  b r o u g h t  a  r a n g e  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  a n d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l a w  e x p e r t s  a n d  c o a l i t i o n  w o r k e d  h a n d - i n - h a n d  w i t h  t h e  m e d i a  t o  
d i s s e m i n a t e  i t s  c o m m i s s i o n  p r o p o s a l . t 5 3 6  
Y e t ,  t h r e e  f a c t o r s  m a d e  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  i n  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2 .  F i r s t ,  t h e  p r o p o s a l  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  f a i l e d  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  M P R ' s  f o r m a l  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  i t  
r e j e c t e d  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  F o r  t h e  M P R ,  t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  w h o l e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  
i m p o s s i b l e .  T h e  f e a r .  o f  a  c o m p l e t e  c h a n g e  o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  p r e a m b l e ;  t h e  
a l t e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e  o f  i d e o l o g y ;  a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a n  I s l a m i c  
.  .  
s t a t e  m a d e  t h e  m e r e  n o t i o n  o f  t h e  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a  n i g h t m a r e  f o r  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  M P R  
m e m b e r s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  E l l i s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  C o a l i t i o n  m a d e  a  m i s t a k e  w h e n  i t  c o m b i n e d  i t s  
d e m a n d  f o r  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  w i t h  t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
1 5 3 7  
I f  t h e  
c o a l i t i o n  h a d  n o t  d e m a n d e d  a  n e w  Constituti~n. i t s  p r o p o s a l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  m i g h t  
h a v e  b e e n  s e r i o u s l y  d i s c u s s e d  b y  t h e  M P R .  
S e c o n d ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  C o m m i s s i o n  h a d  l o s t  m o m e n t u m .  I n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  
C o m m i s s i o n s  w e r e  u s u a l l y  f o r m e d  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  p r o c e s s .  F o r  
e x a m p l e ,  i n  T h a i l a n d ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D r a f t i n g  A s s e m b l y  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  s t a r t  t h e  1 9 9 6 .  
J : } -
1 5 3 3 1 b i d  
1 5 3 4
1 b i d .  
1 5 3 5 1 b i d .  
·~· 
1 5 3 6 1 n t e r v i e w  w i t h  B a m b a n g  W i d j o j a n t o ,  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  C o a l i t i o n  f o r  a  N e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  1 5  J u l y  2 0 0 3 .  
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constitutional reform. 1538 In Indonesia, the strong legitimacy of the MPR made the idea to 
establish a Constitutional Commission unworkable during the First Amendment discussions. 
Alrasid argues that to establish a Constitutional Commission after the amendment had taken 
place was too late.1539 In Kawamura's words, it is clear that the Commission had "lost its 
chance" .1540 
The late timing of the idea to establish the Commission made it an object of political bargaining, 
especially during. the Fourth Amendment discussions. Some groups, both inside and outside 
the MPR, supported the Commission, but for a paradoxically very different reason: to reject the 
constitutional amendments. Permadi (PDIP) revealed that he would support a Constitutional 
Commission, but as a tool to reapply the original 1945 Constitution.1541 This obviously directly 
threatened the original concept of a Constitutional· Commission to reform the Constitution. 
During the 2002 MPR Annual session, therefore, six factions in the MPR found themselves 
rejecting the establishment of the Commission.1542 So, for example, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin 
(PPP), who in the 2001 MPR Annual Session supported the Commission, worried in 2002 that 
the commission would annul the output of the four amendments.1543 
The third reason why it was so difficult to establish the Commission was that although the 
pressure to form the Commission steadily increased from the Second to the Fourth amendment 
discussions, rejection from the MPR was also consistent. The proposal from the Coalition for a 
New Constitution to form the Constitutional Commission, without any members from the MPR, 
was unacceptable to most MPR members. As Ellis states, "It was unlikely that the MPR would. 
I . . ' 
accept a proposal to take the process almost fully out of their hands".1544 
For Ellis, excluding all of members of the MPR from being members of the proposed 
Constitutional Commission to avoid political influence, was unrealistic. He argues that every 
· Constitution mirrors political choices.1545 He further argues that: 
15371bid 145. 
1538 Article 211 of the Thai Constitution of 1991. 
1539 'Komisi Konstitusi tidak tepa! dibentuk 2003', Media Indonesia, 10 August 2002. 
1540 Kawamura, above n 661, 53. 
1541 1nterviewwith Permadi, member of the MPR/DPR from the PDIP, 19 June 2003. 
1542 'Six Factions Reject Demand for Constitutional Commission', The Jakarta Post, 8 August 2002. 
1543 'Komisi Konstitusi dikhawatirkan Anulir Hasil Amandemen', Suara Pembaruan, 7 August 2002. 
1544 Ellis, above n 662, 144. 
15451bid. 
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[ i ] t  i s  a  m i s t a k e  t o  b e l i e v e .  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  ' t a k e  t h e .  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o u t  o f  p o l i t i c s '  a n d  
h a n d  i t  o v e r  c o m p l e t e l y  t o  '  i n d e p e n d e n t '  e x p e r t s :  p o l i t i c a l  j u d g m e n t s  a n d  c h o i c e s  a r e  n o t  
o n l y  i n e v i t a b l e  b u t  a n  e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  . 1 5 4 6  
c .  T h e  F a k e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  M P R  f i n a l l y  i s s u e d  a  D e c r e e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n ,  a t  t h e  e n d  
•  '  •  I  •  
o f  t h e  2 0 0 2  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n ,  t h i s  C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  f a r  f r o m  w h a t  w a s  e x p e c t e d .  T o b i n g  
d i s c l o s e d  i t  w a s  m e r e l y  a  p o l i t i c a l  c o m p r o m i s e  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  t h e  
.  .  
p u b l i c .  H e  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  M P R  m e r e l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  a  ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o m m i s s i o n '  ( w i t h  a  
l o w e r  c a s e  ' c ' s )  b u t  n o t  a  'Constituti~nal C o m m i s s i o n '  ( w i t h  c a p i t a l l e t t e r s } .
1
5 4 7  T h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  
t h i s  ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o m m i s s i o n ' ,  e f f e c t i v e l y  s e t  u p  i n  2 0 0 3 ,  w a s  d e s i g n e d  t o  b e  v e r y  l i m i t e d .  I  
a r g u e  t h a t :  ·  
[ a ]  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  M P R  . . .  m a d e  t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  i t  w a s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  a n a l y z e  a l l  t h e  c o m m a s  
a n d  p e r i o d s  i n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  w h e t h e r  t h e y  w e r e  i n  t h e  r i g h t  p l a c e !  S u c h  l i m i t e d  
a u t h o r i t y  w i l l  s u r e l y  d i s t o r t  t h e  e x a c t  m e a n i n g  o f  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n .  H e n c e  t h e  
c o m m i s s i o n  i s  n o t  d e s e r v i n g  o f  i t s  n a m e ;  i t  i s  l i t t l e  m o r e  t h a n  a  f o c u s  g r o u p  t o  s t u d y  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  .
1 5 4 8  
'  
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  i t s  v e r y  l i m i t e d  a u t h o r i t y ,  t h e  m a n d a t e  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  a l s o  
v e r y  w e a k .  I t  w a s  s u b o r d i n a t e  n o t  o n l y  t o  t h e  M P R  b u t  a l s o  t o  t h e  W o r k i n g  B o d y  o f  t h e  M P R .
1
5 4 9  
'  •  ' . 1  "  '  '  · '  •  
T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  w o u l d  m e r e l y  b e  a  p o w e r l e s s  a s s i s t a n t  t o  t h e  M P R  I n  t h i s  
f o r m ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  w o u l d  h a v e  n o  p o w e r  t o  d e s i g n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a n y  n e w  a m e n d m e n t .
1
5 5 o  
W i t h  s u c h  a n  i n f e r i o r  p o s i t i o n ,  i t  w a s  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  M P R  t o  r e j e c t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e p o r t ,  
w h i c h  t h u s  b e c a m e  a  u s e l e s s  d o c u m e n t . 1 5 5 1  
~ .  .  . .  
C l o s i n g .  D u r i n g  t h e  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  M P R  f a i l e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  i t s  
'  .  
i n i t i a l  s t r o n g  l e g i t i m a c y  a s  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y .  T h e  f l a w e d  p r o c e s s  d a m a g e d  t h e  M P R ' s  
r e p u t a t i o n .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  p r o p o s e d  b y  t h e  p u b l i c  d i d  n o t  
1 5 4 6 1 b i d .  
1 5 4 7  V a n  Z o r g e  R e p o r t ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 8 2 .  
1
5
4 8  




1 b i d .  




A s  a t  t h e  d a t e  o f  w r i t i n g  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  i n  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 5 ,  t h e  M P R  h a s  n e v e r  s e r i o u s l y  o o n s i d e r e d  t h e  r e p o r t  s u b m i t t e d  b y  
t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n .  
2 6 2 .  
have sufficient political support to be established. In the end, however, continual criticism of the 
MPR and the pressures to establish· a Constitutional Commission together created an effective 
public form of check and balance on the MPR as it went about reforming the 1945 Constitution. 
4. The Public Participation: Limited and badly Organized. 
Public participation in the four amendments can be divided into two categories: the participation 
arranged by the MPR and that of the civil society (media and non-governmen.tal organizations). 
The MPR failed to conducted comprehensive public participation and the participation it 
' • ' • I ' 
allowed was often partial and ad hoc. Fortunately, however, the civil society covered this 
shortcoming through active advocacy. 
MPR's Initiatives. In the First Amendment, public participation arranged by the MPR was 
almost non-existent. The time limitation placed on the First Amendment discussions meant that 
participation could not be organized properly. During the Second Amendment discussions, the 
MPR was allowed a longer time for amending the Constitution and some of the. time was used 
to involve the public in the amendment process and seminars and hearings were conducted. 1552 
The members of the PAH I of 2000 visited 21 countries as part. of a program called 
"international comparative studies". These studies, however, were more of a 'picnic' as, 
incredibly, there was no obligation for the members to make a comprehensive report after they 
had completed the visit.1553 During the Third Amendment discussions, the MPR, responding to 
criticism from the civil society, formed an 'Expert Team', to help the amendment process. Yet 
most of this Team's recommendations were not adopted by the MPR. 1554 Lastly, during the 
Fourth Amendment discussions, public participation programs worked better than in the ca~e of 
the previous amendments. It was only during this last amendment debate that the public had a 
wide opportunity to comment on the amendment proposals. 1555 
In short, the way that the MPR arranged the participation program continuously improved but 
did not leave the public sufficient time to discuss the ~mendrl)ent drafts. The MPR's seminars 
were mostly held in big hotels in metropolitan cities and people in rural areas - where most 
1552 See Table 9. 
1553 Minutes of the 121" meeting of the PAH I, 11 February 2000. 
1554 See Table 13. 
1555 Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the Working Body, 4 June 2002, 175. 
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I n d o n e s i a n s  l i v e - h a d  n o  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  j o i n  t h e  s e m i n a r s .  C o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  i n v o l v e m e n t  
i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a  a n d  T h a i l a n d ,  w h e r e  h e a r i n g s  w e r e  h e l d  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s ,  t h e  M P R ' s  p r o g r a m s  
f a i l e d  t o  r e a c h  m a n y  p e o p l e .  ·  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  f o r m  o f  t h e  m e d i a  u s e d  b y  t h e  M P R  t o  i n f o r m  t h e  p u b l i c .  a b o u t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  
w a s  a l s o  l i m i t e d .  T h e r e  w e r e  n o  n e w s l e t t e r s ,  t e l e v i s i o n  o r  r a d i o  p r o g r a m s  o r  h o t l i n e s  o n  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t ,  a s  h a d  b e e n  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  c a s e . 1 5 5 6  C r e a t i v e  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  o n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d r a f t s  d i d  n o t  e x i s t .  T h i s  w a s  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  
o f  S o u t h  A f r i c a ,  w h i c h  h a d ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  p u b l i s h e d  h u m a n  r i g h t s  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a  
c o m i c  b o o k . 1 5 5 7  T h e  o n l y  f o r m  o f  m e d i a  d e v e l o p e d  b y  t h e  M P R  t o  i n f o r m  t h e  p u b l i c  w a s  t h e  
M P R  w e b s i t e .  T h i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  w a s  o n l y  l a u n c h e d  i n  2 0 0 1  - v e r y  l a t e  g i v e n  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
p r o c e s s  h a d  s t a r t e d  i n  1 9 9 9 .  M o r e o v e r ,  a  w e b s i t e  w o u l d  n o t  b e  a n  e f f e c t i v e  f o r m  o f  m e d i a  f o r  
t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  p u b l i c ,  m o s t  o f  w h o m  h a v e  n o  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  i n t e r n e t .  
W i t h  t h e s e  d i s o r g a n i z e d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  p r o g r a m s ,  a n d  g i v e n  t h e  v e r y  l i m i t e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o v i d e d  
t o  t h e  p e o p l e ,  p u b l i c  i n v o l v e m e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s  w a s  i n s u f f i c i e n t .  T h e  p u b l i c  w a s  
.  .  
t r e a t e d  m o r e  a s  a n  o b j e c t  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a s  a  s u b j e c t ,  d e s p i t e  i t  b e i n g  
s u p p o s e d l y  t h e  o w n e r  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  S a u n d e r s ' s  o b j e c t i v e  t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e ·  
i n c l u s i v e  a n d  a c t i v e
1
5 5 a  w a s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  n o t  a c h i e v e d  d u r i n g  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t  s t e p s .  T h e r e  
w e r e  n o  c o n s u l t a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  s o u g h t  g o  b e y o n d  j u s t  e d u c a t i n g  a  p a s s i v e  p u b l i c .  1 5 5 9  
I n d o n e s i a  w a s  u n s u c c e s s f u l  i n  m i r r o r i n g  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  a n d  T h a i  e x p e r i e n c e s  o f  a r r a n g i n g  
p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
C i v i l  S o c i e t y  I n i t i a t i v e s .  F o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n a l  p e r i o d  b r o u g h t  w i t h  i t  m o r e  o p e n  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n d i t i o n s .  T h i s  a l l o w e d  m o r e  i n v o l v e m e n t  f r o m  c i v i l  s o c i e t y  t o  a c t i v e l y  m o n i t o r  t h e  · f o u r  
a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s e s .  T h e  m e d i a  s h o u l d  b e  a p p l a u d e d  f o r  a c t i v e l y  r e p o r t i n g  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
d e b a t e s .  I n  t h e  M P R  S e s s i o n s  o n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s ,  l i v e  b r o a d c a s t i n g  b y  t h e  e l e c t r o n i c  m e d i a  
a n d  s p e c i a l  c o l u m n s  a l l o c a t e d  b y  t h e  p r i n t e d  m e d i a  e n a b l e d  v i e w e r s  a n d  r e a d e r s  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  
t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s .  T h i s  m e d i a  i n v o l , v e m e n t  t r a n s f e r r e d  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d e b a t e s  f r o m  
t h e  e l i t e  i n  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t  b u i l d i n g  t o  t h e  o r d i n a r y  p e o p l e  o n  t h e  s t r e e t .  
1 5 5 6  C o m m o n w e a l t h  H u m a n  R i g h t s  I n i t i a t i v e ,  a b o v e  n  2 4 7 ,  1 9 .  
1 5 5 7
1 b i d  2 0 .  
1 5 5 8  S a u n d e r s ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 6 ,  1 1 .  
2 6 4  
Among the NGOs, the Coalition for a New Constitution was the champion 'sparring partner' for 
the MPR. The NGO activists and political and constitutional law experts who joined the coalition 
played a significant role in coloring the amendment process and outcomes. Goenawan 
Mohamad comments that: 
to produce a Constitution ... we need an extra-parliamentary movement that initiates and 
pushes for fresh ideas that are praiseworthy, something new, usually controversial, and 
inspiring .t56o 
Ali Masykur Musa acknowledged that, on the direct presidential election proposal, the intensive 
campaign of CETRO had influenced the decision of the MPR.1561 Strong pressure from the 
coalition to establish an independent Constitutional Commission was also behind the intense 
debates on the Commission in the 2001 and 2002 MPR Annual Sessions. It was, likewise, the 
reason why at the end of 2002 the MPR finally issued a Decree on establishing the 
Commission, although the Decree gave the Commission very limited authority. 1562 
. . . 
In sum, without the support of the media and the civil society, public participation in the four 
amendments would have mostly been very limited even then, the participation program was not 
fully successful. The MPR's failure to arrange a comprehensive participation program has 
resulted in limited public acceptance of the four amendments. Further, the chance was-missed 
for the public to acquire a greater sense of ownership of the Constitution 1563 through greater 
public consultation. 
Conclusion. The· Indonesian constitution-making process of 1999-2002 was not a truly 
democratic one. Some clear indications of the flawed process were the continually changing 
' . . . 
amendment schedule; contamination of the debate by some short-term political interests acting 
in bad faith; the MPR's failure to win the people's trust in its c,apacity as a constitution-making 
body; and limited and badly organized public participation. 
. . 
1559 Rosen, above n 127, 294. 
1560 Goenawan Mohamad, 'Konstitusi 2002' (2002 Constitution), Tempo, 26 August -1 September 2002 .. 
15611nterview with Ali Masykur Musa, member of the PAH I, 23 July 2003. 
1562 Van Zorge Report, above n 1382. 
15631honvbere, above n 188, 346-347. 
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B .  A n  U n a v o i d a b l y  M e s s y  P r o c e s s  
T h i s  s e c t i o n  a r g u e s  t h a t  o n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  m e s s y - a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  w a s  
b e c a u s e  o f  f u n d a m e n t a l  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  c e r t a i n  k e y  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f .  
.  .  .  
A l t h o u g h  t h i s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  w i d e l y  a n d  p a s s i o n a t e l y  c r i t i c i z e d  a s  u n d e m o c r a t i c  t e x t ,  i t  w a s ,  
a n d  i s  s t i l l ,  s e e n  b y  n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n s  - i n c l u d i n g  t h e  m i l i t a r y  - a s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  d o c u m e n t  
w h i c h  c o n t a i n s  t w o  c r u c i a l  a s p e c t s  f o r  t h e  s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y :  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  a n  I s l a m i c  
'  .  
s t a t e ;  a n d  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  i n  i t s  p l a c e  o f  a  n a t i o n a l i s t  s t a t e  i d e o l o g y ,  t h e  P a n c a s i l a ,  c o n t a i n e d  i n  
t h e  p r e a m b l e  t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
P r e s e r v i n g  t h e  p r e a m b l e .  A g r e e m e n t  t o  k e e p  t h e  p r e a m b l e  w a s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a t  t h e  h e a r t  o f  a l l  
o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s .  A n d r e w  E l l i s  o f  t h e  N D I  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  p r e a m b l e  s h o u l d  b e  
m a i n t a i n e d  a s  i t  i s  a  " s t a t e m e n t  o f  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  n a t i o n  a n d  t h e  l e g a c y  o f  t h e  f o u n d i n g  
p a r e n t s "  , 1 5 6 4  T o b i n g  a r g u e s  t h a t :  
. . .  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  b a s e d  o n  i d e a s ,  a n d  h a v e  a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  I n  t h i s  
c a s e ,  t h e  i d e a  i s  t h e  p r e a m b l e  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  i s  t h e  c o u n t r y .  T h u s ,  
a n y  c h a n g e s  s h o u l d  b e  b a s e d  o n  t h e  p r e a m b l e ,  w h i c h  e m b o d i e s  t h e  g o a l s  o f  s o v e r e i g n t y  
a n d  w e l f a r e  f o r  t h e  p e o p l e . 1 5 6 5  
A s  t h e  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  c a m p ,  P r e s i d e n t  M e g a w a t i  o f  t h e  P D I P  w a s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  k e e n  t o  
r e t a i n  t h e  p r e a m b l e  i n  i t s  p r e s e n t  f o r m . 1 5 6 6  S h e  a r g u e d  s t r o n g l y  t h a t :  
[ t ] h e  p o s i t i o n  t o  k e e p  t h e  p r e a m b l e  i s  n o n - n e g o t i a b l e .  T h i s  P r e a m b l e  d o e s  n o t  m e r e l y  
c o n s i s t  o f  w o r d s ,  i t  m i r r o r s  t h e  n a t i o n a l  s p i r i t ,  s o u l  a n d  f e e l i n g s  o f  t h e  f o u n d e r s  a n d  t h e  
f r e e d o m  f i g h t e r s .
1 5 6 7  
·  
T h e  P r e a m b l e  w a s  t h u s  m o r e  t h a n  j u s t  a  s y m b o l i c  t e x t :  i t  w a s  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  p r i n c i p l e .  W i t h o u t  
t h e  a g r e e m e n t  t o  k e e p  i t ,  a m e n d m e n t  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  d i f f i c u l t  i f  n o t  p e r h a p s  i m p o s s i b l e .  
M e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M P R ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f r o m  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n ,  r e j e c t e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c h a n g i n g  
t h e  p r e a m b l e ,  s a y i n g  i t  e m b r a c e d  w h a t  t h e y  b e l i e v e d  t o  b e  t h e  s a c r o s a n c t  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  
1 5 6 4  A n d r e w  E l l i s ,  R e f l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  F o r t h c o m i n g  M P R  A n n u a l  S e s s i o n  ( 2 0 0 0 )  < h t t p : l l w w w . v a n z o r g e r e p o r t . c o m / r e p o r t / p o p u o l  
i n d e x . c f m ? f a = S h o w R e p o r t & p k  r p t  i d = 1 3 5 & C F I D = 3 1 5 6 0 6 & C F T O K E N = 7 1 6 8 0 8 8 8 >  a t  3  O c t o b e r  2 0 0 3 .  
1 5 6 5  V a n  Z o r g e  R e p o r t ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 8 2 .  
1 5 6 6  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C h a n g e :  T h e  C h a r t e r  A g a i n ,  L a k s a m a n a . n e t  ( 2 0 0 2 )  < h t t p : / / w w w .  l a k s a m a n a . n e t >  a t  2 3  A p r i l 2 0 0 2 .  
1 5 6 7  M e g a w a t i  d a n  H a m z a h  H a z  S e p a k a t  t i d a k  A d a  V o t i n g ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 5 1 .  
2 6 6  
-- - ----------
country: the Pancasila state ideology and the unitary state of the Republic of lndonesia.1568 For 
them, the preamble should never be changed as it acknowledges· the presence and urges the 
peaceful existence of diverse ethnic groups, cultures and religions in this country.1569 
The Nationalist and Islamic Political Streams. The debate on maintaining the preamble 
again revealed two fundamental but different ideological groups in Indonesian politics: the 
nationalists and Islamic groups. 1570 In the 1999-2004 MPR, the nationalist groups consisted of 
the PDIP, TNI-Polri, Golkar, and PDKB (the Christian faction). The Islamic groups included the 
PPP, PBB and PDU, all strong advocates of the insertion of the 'seven words' of Jakarta 
Charter into the Constitution. The other four factions: the PKB, Reformasi, FUG and KKI, 
politically supported the stance of the nationalist groups, which rejected the Charter. 
In fact, lrman G. Lanti argues that although there had been some changes in the political 
landscape after the 1999 elections, the basic Indonesian political streams remain 
unchanged.1571 Likewise, Lindsey argues that despite having been independent for more than 
fifty years, and having enjoyed spectacular economic growth prior to the 1997 economic crisis, 
Indonesia's: 
... basic political allegiances remain remarkably unchanged. They are still tightly 
structured around a characteristic combination of ethnic, religious and political loyalties 
that are historically little affected by political detail or particular political events. 1572 
The conflict. between the two political streams, especially on the issue of the state· and Islam, 
had been evident in the constitution-making process in 1945 and in the Konstituante of 1956-
1959. Therefore, in the 1999-2002 amendment process, the nationalist faction was again afraid 
that the Islamic parties would use the momentum of constitutional reform to establish a 
preliminary constitutional basis for an Islamic state. This fear influenced almost all of the 
decision-making during the four amendment processes, including the decision to amend and 
not make a new Constitution,· although in reality this amendment decision was inconsistent. 
1568 'Indonesia Needs to Rewrite Constitution: Coalition', The Jakarta Post, 6 August 2002. 
1569 'Should We Amend or Replace the Basic Law', The Jakarta Post, 31 December 2001. 
1570 Constitutional Change: The Charter Again, above n 1566. 
1571 1rman G. Lanti, 'Back to the (Slightly Different) Future: Continuity and Change in Indonesian Politics' (Visiting Researchers 
Series No. 2, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001 ). 
1572 Lindsey, above n 99, 274. 
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T h e  f o l l o w i n g  p a r a g r a p h s ,  h o w e v e r ,  a r g u e  t h a t  t h i s  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  i s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e ,  o r  e v e n  
n e c e s s a r y .  
N e c e s s a r y  I n c o n s i s t e n c y .  A s  a r g u e d  e a r l i e r  i n  s e c t i o n  A ,  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s  h a v e  
e f f e c t i v e l y  p r o d u c e d  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  b u t  o n e  t h a t  k e e p s  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  p r o v i s i o n s  a n d  
s y m b o l i s m  o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h i s  n e w  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  m e t h o d  d e c l a r e d  b y  t h e · .  M P R  t o  r e f o r m  t h e  
1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  I  w o u l d  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  s t e p - b y - s t e p  a m e n d m e n t s  w e r e  a  
s a f e r  w a y  t o  r e n e w  t h e  s y m b o l i c  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  I f  t h e  g o a l  o f  m a k i n g  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
w a s  d i s c l o s e d  e x p l i c i t l y  f r o m  t h e  v e r y  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  w o u l d  
h a v e  f a i l e d  b e c a u s e  o f  s t r o n g  r e a c t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R .  
W h i l e  m o s t l y  a c k n o w l e d g i n g  t h a t  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  v a g u e l y  w o r d e d ,  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e s e  
n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n s  w e r e  n o t  p r e p a r e d  t o  h a v e  i t  d i s c a r d e d  c o m p l e t e l y ,  m o r e .  f o r  e m o t i o n a l  




3  F o r  t h e m ,  r e p l a c i n g  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w o u l d  m e a n  t h e  
' d e a t h  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y '  . 1 5
7 4  
T h e  s t r o n g e r  r e j e c t i o n  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  F o u r t h  
A m e n d m e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  w h i c h  m i g h t  h a v e  l e d  t o  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e a d l o c k ,  w a s  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  
t h e s e  n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n s  h a d  r e a l  p o w e r  b u t  t h a t  t h e y  r e a l i z e d  t o o  l a t e  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  
p r o c e s s  h a d  e f f e c t i v e l y  p r o d u c e d  a  n e w  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T o b i n g  p o i n t s  o u t :  
[ t ] o  b e  h o n e s t  m o s t  o f  t h e  M P R  m e m b e r s  d i d  n o t  u n d e r s t a n d  ( t h e  a m e n d m e n t s ) .  T h a t  i s  
w h y .  m a n y  o f  t h e m  w e r e  s t a r t l e d  w h e n  t h e  c h a n g e s  w e r e  a p p r o v e d  . . .  I n  m a n y  o f  t h e  
p l e n a r y  m e e t i n g s ,  n o b o d y  r a i s e d  a n y  r e a l  o b j e c t i o n s  . .  .  M a n y  o f  t h e m  d i d  n o t  r e a l i z e  
t h a t . 1 5 7 5  ·  
E l l i s  a r g u e s  t h a t  i f  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  g r o u p s  h a d  r e a l i z e d  w h a t  w a s  g o i n g  o n  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  
p r o c e s s ,  f u n d a m e n t a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s  m i g h t  w e l l  h a v e  b e e n  d e a d l o c k e d  s i n c e  t h e  




6  T h i s  w a s  b e c a u s e  m a n y  P D I P  m e m b e r s  ( t h e  b i g g e s t  f a c t i o n  i n  t h e  M P R )  w e r e  
s u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e s e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  g r o u p s .  R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e s e  g r o u p s ,  T o b i n g  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  
r e s i s t a n c e  o f  s o m e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  P D I P  t o  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  w a s  f o r  i d e o l o g i c a l  r e a s o n s .  H e  
s a i d :  
1 5 7 3  S h o u l d  W e  A m e n d  o r  R e p l a c e  t h e  B a s i c  L a w ,  a b o v e  n  1 5 6 9 .  
1 5 7 4 1 n d o n e s i a  N e e d s  t o  R e w r i t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n :  C o a l i t i o n ,  a b o v e  n  1 5 6 8  . .  
1 5 7 5  V a n  Z o r g e  R e p o r t ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 8 2 .  
1 5 7 6  E l l i s ,  a b o v e  n  9 3 4 .  
2 6 8  
... for some members, the very structure of the original Constitution, which symbolized our 
struggle for freedom, was part of the ideology. With this in mind we have to be very careful 
... the strongest resistance would come from within my own party (PDIP).1577 
Tobing therefore argued that the declaration to amend rather than make a new Constitution 
was actually a strategy to secure the constitutional reform. 1578 
... the idea of amending the Constitution did not just arise suddenly - the intent and 
direction of the changes were set from the very beginning. We did it in stages, since we 
knew that if we tried to force these changes, the opposition would be much fiercer.1579 
In this regard, the Indonesian situation was very different that of South Africa, Thailand and the 
Philippines. These countries were able to make completely new constitutions. The.NDI argues 
that this is because in these three countries the previous Constitution had little or no. 
credibility. 1580 The· South African Constitution had been introduced by the apartheid regime;. the 
Thai Constitution by the military; and· the Philippines Constitution by former President Marcos. 
By contrast, in Indonesia, there are many who respect the 1945 ·Constitution as a symbol of 
Indonesia's independence.1581 Goenawan Mohamad argues that: 
[n]o matter what, we cannot make a completely new Constitution without dismissing the 
current parliament. We are not in a revolutionary phase. Indonesia is not like Thailand and 
South Africa in their early years after dictatorship. The 2002 Constitution1582 was [drafted] 
following an election in which, with all its faults, we participated, and which we 
accepted.1583 
Tobing, therefore, might have been right when he argued that: 
... what we can do arid must do is to optimize the opportunity brought forward by the 
amendment. To make use of the opportunity this country right now possesses, instead of 
wishing for something else, such as making a totally new Constitution, which had no 
1577Van Zorge Report, above n .1382. 
15781bid. 
15791bid. 
1580 National Democratic Institute, above n 1188, 7. 
15811bid. 
1582 Mohammad names the 1945 Constitution after the four amendments as the 2002 Constitution. 
1583 Mohamad, above n 1486. 
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p o l i t i c a l  c o n s e n s u s  a t  a l l  t o  b e g i n  w i t h .  W h a t  m a t t e r s  t h e  m o s t  i s  t h e  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  
s u b s t a n c e ,  a n d  n o t  t h e  f o r m a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t . 1 5 8 4  
T h e  C o m p r o m i s e  P o l i t i c a l  I n t e r e s t s  i s  u n a v o i d a b l e .  B e c a u s e  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n s  w e r e  
a f r a i d  t h a t  r a d i c a l  c h a n g e  w o u l d  h a v e  e n d a n g e r e d  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  p r e a m b l e  a n d  o p e n e d  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e ,  t h e  s l o w ,  p a t c h y  a n d  t e n t a t i v e  p r o c e s s  
m a r k e d  b y  c o n s t a n t  n e g o t i a t i o n  w a s  u n a v o i d a b l e  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  
c o n d u c t e d  b y  t h e  M P R .  A s  L i n d s e y  p o i n t s  o u t :  
[ c ] o m p r o m i s e ,  d e a l - m a k i n g  ' a n d  u n e v e n  p a t c h w o r k  a p p r o a c h  a r e  t h u s  i n e v i t a b l e ,  a s  
d e m o c r a c y  i s  n e g o t i a t e d  c l a u s e  b y  c l a u s e . 1 5 8 5  
I  s h a r e  L i n d s e y ' s  o p i n i o n  a n d  f u r t h e r  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o m p r o m i s e  h a s  t w o  s i d e s :  
n e g a t i v e  a n d  p o s i t i v e .  I t  c a n  b e  n e g a t i v e  w h e n  u s e d  t o  a c c o m m o d a t e  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  a  s t r o n g  p a r t y  i n  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y .  O n  t h ' e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i t  c a n  b e  p o s i t i v e  i n  
a c c e l e r a t i n g  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  b e t w e e n  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t i e s  o n  d i f f i c u l t  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s .  
A l o n g  t h e  s a m e  l i n e s ,  G o e n a w a n  M o h a m a d  a r g u e s  t h a t :  
[ i ] d e a s  t h a t  a r e  p r o c e s s e d  b y  p e o p l e  a s  a  g r o u p  c a n n o t  b e  k e p t  " n e a t  a n d  r o u n d " ,  b u t t h e  
" e l o n g a t i o n "  c a n  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  a  g r o u p ,  s o m e t h i n g  o w n e d  b y  t h e  g r o u p ,  
a n d  t h u s  f i t t i n g  t o  b e  u p h e l d  b y  t h e  g r o u p  . . .  t h r o u g h  t h e  c o m p r o m i s e  t h a t  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  
t h a t  " e l o n g a t e d "  s e n t e n c e ,  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  a c c e p t e d  a n d  d e f e n d e d  b y  a l l  a n d ,  
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  o t h e r  c o m p r o m i s e s  - p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  t h e  J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  - t h e  
R e p u b l i c  c o u l d  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d ; f 5 8 6  
F u r t h e r  M o h a m a d  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  M P R  w a s  n o t  m e r e l y  a  ' d i s c u s s i o n  r o o m ' .  T h e  M P R  
r e s e m b l e d  m o r e  a  m a r k e t  w h e r e  i d e a s  a r e  " b a r g a i n e d  f o r ,  a n d  b o u g h t " .  
1 5 8 7  
I n  t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  a  
c o m p r o m i s e  b e t w e e n  p a r t i e s  i s  u n a v o i d a b l e .  L i k e w i s e ,  E l l i s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n  I n d o n e s i a  a r e :  
. . .  s i m i l a r  t o  m o s t  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  T h r e a t s  n o t  t o  a g r e e  a r e  t r a d e d  i n  a d v a n c e  o f  t h e  f i n a l  
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  m e e t i n g s  . .  .  T h e  b i g g e s t  c o n c e s s i o n s  m a y  b e  m a d e  o n l y  i n  t h e  l a s t  
m i n u t e  i n  m a r a t h o n  l o b b y i n g  a n d  d r a f t i n g  s e s s i o n s .  1 5 8 8  
1 5 8 4  J a k o b  T o b i n g ,  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A m e n d m e n t s :  A  B r i e f  N o t e  o n  I n d o n e s i a ' s  C a s e '  ( P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
S y m p o s i u m  o n  ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a n d  H u m a n  R i g h t s  i n  a  G l o b a l  A g e :  a n  A s i a - P a c i f i c  P e r s p e c t i v e ' ,  C a n b e r r a ,  1 •
1
- 3 • d  D e c e m b e r  
2 0 0 1 ,  3 .  
1 5 8 5
1 b i d  2 7 6 .  
1 5 8 6  G o e n a w a n  M o h a m a d ,  a b o v e  1 4 8 6 .  
1 5 8 7 1 b i d .  
1 5 8 8  E l l i s ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 2 ,  1 5 0 .  
2 7 0  
This kind of last minute negotiation was evident during the Third and Fourth amendment 
discussions. The compromise in the negotiation meetings saved the constitutional reform 
agenda. If the negotiation meetings had failed to reach a compromise, a deadlock could have 
. - ' ' jeopardized the whole amendment process. Applauding the compromise at the end of the 
Fourth Amendment discussions, especially in relation to the rejection of the 'seven words' of 
':. . 
the Jakarta Charter (the expanded implementation of syariah), the Business Times wrote: 
... through consensus and horse-trading rather than outright voting, the changes pave the 
way for direct presidential election in 2004; force the powerful military out of Parliament, 
and, therefore, from frontline politics also by 2004; and reiterate the secular and ethnically 
diverse underpinnings of the nation's social fabric. To its credit, the ... MPR rejected calls 
for the inclusion of Islamic shariah law in the Constitution ... 1589 
The urgency of the compromise is more significant, in relation to the last stage of the 
constitution-making process: approval. The difficulties of the approval process for the four 
amendments progressively increased . as the substance of the amendment touched more 
crucial constitutional provisions. The First Amendment approval process was the easiest, while 
the Fourth Amendment ratification was the most difficult. In this most difficult approval process, 
the closed negotiation meetings, and compromise among the factions in the MPR, were 
unavoidable if the Fourth Amendment was to be ratified. 
Closing. The constitutional reform process adopted in South Africa and Thailand was certainly 
a better model than the method adopted in Indonesia, if viewed in an absract sense. However, 
neither of these countries faced the complex and explosive political issues of long-standing 
aspirations for an Islamic state and a history of half a century of political conflcit between 
proponents of an Islamic state and supporters of the dominant ideology of a state based on 
non-Muslim nationalist principles. In the circumstances, the often-messy, uncertain and slow 
step-by-step process adopted in lndon.esia was both a .reasonable political compromise and 
perhaps the only way real change. could be delivered to Indonesia's constitutional 
arrangements without major crisis. 
1589 
'A New Chance to Get It Right in Indonesia', Business Times (Singapore), 13 August 2002. " 
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C .  T h e  F o u r  A m e n d m e n t s :  t h e  O u t c o m e s  t s 9 0  
T h i s :  s e c t i o n  e v a l u a t e s  t h e  o u t c o m e s  o f  t h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s .  T h e  a m e n d e d  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n , '  
i s  c l e a r l y  a  mo~e d e m o c r a t i c  t e x t  t h , a n  i t .  w a s ·  b e f o r e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s .  T h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o n  t h e  
l e g i s l a t u r e ,  e x e c u t i v e  a n d  j u d i c i a r y  a n d  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o n  B i l l  o f  R i g h t s  w i l l  b e  t h e  f o c u s  o f  t h i s  
e v a l u a t i o n  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d e d  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a l l o w s  f o r  a  c l e a r e r  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  
<  •  '  ~ •  _ .  •  •  '  '  
p o w e r s  a n d  b e t t e r  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  h u m a n  r i g h t s  t h a n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  t e x t .  A s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  C h a p t e r  
T w o ,  t h i s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t '  a  d e m o c r a t i c  Constitutio~ s h o u l d ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
d e f i n e  h o w  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  i s  e f f i c i e n t l y  c o n t r o l l e d .  a n d  h o w  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  s o c i e t a l  r i g h t s  a r e  
p r o t e c t e d .  
T h i s  s e c t i o n  a l s o  c o m p a r e s  t h e  r e l e v a n t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t s  a n d  c r i t i c i z e s  s o m e  s h o r t c o m i n g s  o f  t h e  o u t c o m e s  t o  s h o w  t h a t  f u r t h e r  r e f o r m  i s  
s t i l l  n e e d e d .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i t  o u t l i n e s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  f u r t h e r  r e f o r m  t o  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  c h e c k s  
a n d  b a l a n c e s .  
1 .  L e g i s l a t i v e  R e f o r m  
a .  S t r u c t u r a l  R e f o r m ·  
T h e  f o u r  a m e n d m e n t s  h a v e  c h a n g e d  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t .  T h e  M P R ,  w h i c h  h a d  
p r e v i o u s l y  c o n s i s t e d  o f  t h e  D P R  a n d  a d d i t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n a l  g r o u p s  - i n c l u d i n g  t h e  m i l i t a r y  - h a s  
c h a n g e d  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  D P D  ( t h e  R e g i o n a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
C o u n c i l ) :  1 5 9 1  T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D P R  r e p r e s e n t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s '  i n t e r e s t s ,  w h i l e  t h e  m e m b e r s  
o f  t h e  D P . D  r e p r e s e n t  r e g i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s .
1 5 9
2  I m p o r t a n t l y ,  a l l  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  t w o  c h a m b e r s  a r e  
n o w  e l e c t e d  b y  t h e  p e o p l e .  T h i s  h a s  m e a n t t h e  e n d ' o f  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  r e s e r v e d  s e a t s  f o r  t h e '  
m i l i t a r y  a n d  o t h e r  f u n c t i o n a l  g r o u p s  . .  · ·  
b .  F u n c t i o n a l  R e f o r m  
T h e  M P R  a n d  S o v e r e i g n t y .  A  m o n u m e n t a l  c h a n g e  o c c u r r e d  w h e n  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  
s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  ' s o v e r e i g n t y  i s  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  a n d  i s  e x e r c i s e d  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  
1
5 9 0  A l l  t h e  A r t i c l e s  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  e x c e p t  o t h e r w i s e  m e n t i o n e d ,  r e f e r  t o  t h e  A r t i c l e s  i n  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  
w h e t h e r  a n  a r t i c l e  i s  t h e  o r i g i n a l  ( b e f o r e  a m e n d m e n t ) ,  o r  t h e  F i r s t ,  S e c o n d ,  T h i r d  a n d  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  w i l l  b e  c l e a r  f r o m  t h e  
f o o t n o t e .  
1 5 9 1  A r t i c l e  2 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 5 9 2  A r t i c l e  2 2 C  ( 1 ) j u n c t o  2 2 E  ( 3 )  a n d  ( 4 ) .  
2 7 2  
with the Constitution'. 1593 This had the effectthat the MPR is no longer thesole holder of 
sovereignty, is no longer the highest institution in the Republic and no longer holds unlimited 
powers. 1594 
The sovereignty amendment was followed by other functional reform of the MPR. Table 21 
shows the MPR's power before and after the amendments. It demonstrates that the MPR now 
has more limited powers than it did to before the amendments. This highlights the fact that the 
MPR, as the constitution-making body, has been able to reform and limit its own powers. 
Table 21. The MPR: Before and After the Amendments 
Removed by the MPR. The procedure 
was not explicitly stipulated in the 
Constitution. 
The Constitution was silent on this. 
1593 Article 2(1) of the Third Amendment. 
1594 Komisi Konstitusi, 'Buku 1: Naskah Akademik Kajian Komprehensif Komisi Konstitusi tentang Perubahan Undang~undang 
Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 (2004) 56. 
1595 Article 2 (1) of the 1945 Constitution. 
1596 Article 2 (1)of the Third Amendment. 
1597 Article 3 (2) of the 1945 Constitution. 
1598 Article 3 (2) of the Third Amendment. 
1599 Article 3 of the 1945 Constitution. 
1600 Articles 3 and 37 of the 1945 Constitution. 
1601 Articles 3 (1) and 37 of the Third and Fourth Amendments. 
1602 Articles 7 A and 78 (5), (6) and (7) of the Third Amendment. 






D P R  R e f o r m .  S i n c e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s ,  t h e  D P R  h a s  b e c o m e  a  v e r y  p o w e r f u l  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d y .  




a n d  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  h a s  t h u s  s h i f t e d  f r o m  b e i n g  a n  e x e c u t i v e - h e a v y  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t o  a  D P R - h e a v y  
C o n s t i t u t i o n . 1
6 0
5  I  s h a r e  l s r a ' s  o p i n i o n  a n d  w o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  m o d i f y  t h e  a r g u m e n t  o f  t h e  C S I S  
T e a m  t h a t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s  h a v e  r e s u l t e d  i n  a  l e g i s l a t i v e - h e a v y  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
1 6
0 6  T h e  p h r a s e  
' l e g i s l a t i v e - h e a v y '  a s s u m e s  t h a t  b o t h  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d i e s , .  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  D P D ,  n a v e  s t r o n g e r  
p o w e r s  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r  b r a n c h e s .  T h e  f a c t  i s ,  t h e  D P D  h a s  f a r  f e w e r  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r s  t h a n  t h e  
D P R .  
A s s h i d d i q i e  p o i n t s  o u t  t o  t h e .  D P R ' s  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  f o r e i g n  a m b a s s a d o r s  1 6 0 7  
a s  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  h o w  m u c h  m o r e  p o w e r f u l  t h e  D P R  h a s  b e c o m e  s i n c e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s .  H e  
a r g u e s  t h a t  t h i s  A r t i c l e  i s  n o t  p r a c t i c a l  a n d  b r e a c h e s  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c u s t o m s  o f  d i p l o m a c y .  
1 6 0 8  
L i k e w i s e ,  F a l a a k h  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f .  D P R  a d v i c e  i n  a p p o i n t i n g  t h e  
.  a m b a s s a d o r s  r e p r e s e n t s  a n  u n w a r r a n t e d  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d y  i n  a n  e x e c u t i v e  
m a t t e r . 1
6 0 9  
F u r t h e r ,  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  r e c e i v i n g  t h e  f o r e i g n  a m b a s s a d o r s ,  F a l a a k h  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  




o  A s s h i d d i q i e  w a r n s  
t h a t  t h i s  i s  a n  o v e r r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  e x c e s s i v e l y  p o w e r f u l  p r e s i d e n c y  u n d e r  S o e h a r t o  a n d  i s  
d a n g e r o u s ,  a s  i t  m a y  c a u s e  a  l e s s - e f f i c i e n t  d i p l o m a t i c  s y s t e m .
1
6
1 1  
I n d e e d ,  a s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  
C h a p t e r  F o u r ,  t h e  r e a s o n  b e h i n d  t h e  D P R ' s  r o l e  i n  r e c e i v i n g  a m b a s s a d o r s  w a s  a  r e a c t i v e  
r e s p o n s e  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  i n c i d e n t  b e t w e e n  I n d o n e s i a  a n d  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  
a  c o n s i d e r e d  p o l i c y  c h a n g e . 1 6 1 2  
T a b l e  2 2  s h o w s  h o w  t h e  D P R  h a s  s h i f t e d  f r o m  a  ' r u b b e r  s t a m p '  t o  a  ' s u p r e m e '  o r g a n  o f  s t a t e .  
1 6
0 4  
S a l d i  l s r a ,  ' P e n a t a a n  L e m b a g a  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t :  S i s t e m  T r i k a m e r a l  d i  T e n g a h  S u p r e m a s i  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t '  
( 2 0 0 4 )  1 : 1  J u r n a l  K o n s t i t u s i  1 2 8 .  
1 6 0 5 1 b i d .  
1 6 0 6 T h e  C S I S  T e a m ,  a b o v e  n  1 3 3 6 , 2 6 0 .  
1 6 0 7  A r t i c l e  1 3  ( 3 )  o f  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t .  .  
1 6 °
8  
J i m l y  A s s h i d d i q i e ,  ' T e l a a h  A k a d e m i s  A l a s  P e r u  b a h  a n  U U D  1 9 4 5 '  ( 2 0 0 1 )  1 : 4  J u r n a l  D e m o k r a s i  d a n  H A M ,  2 2 .  
1
6
0 9  
M o h a m m a d  F a j r u l  F a l a a k h ,  P r e s i d e n s i  d a n  P r o s e s  L e g i s l a s i  P a s c a  R e v i s i  K o n s t i t u s i  ( P a r l e m e n t a r i s m e  L e w a t  P i n t u  
B e l a k a n g ? ) ,  ( P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  N a t i o n a l  S e m i n a r  o n  M e l u r u s k a n  J a l a n  R e f o r m a s i ,  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y o f  G a d j a h  M a d a ,  
Y o g y a k a r t a ,  2 5 - 2 7  S e p t e m b e r  2 0 0 3 )  a t  h t t p : / / u q m . a c . i d / s e m i n a r / r e f o r m a s i f l - f a j r u l l f a l l a k h . p h p  a t  1  J u l y  2 0 0 4 .  
1 6 1 0  I b i d .  
1 6
1 1  
J i m l y  A s s h i d d i q i e ,  ' R e f o r m a s i  M e n u j u  I n d o n e s i a  B a r u :  A g e n d a  R e s t r u k t u r i s a s i  O r g a n i s a s i  N e g a r a ,  P e m b a r u a n  H u k u m  d a n  
M a s y a r a k a t  M a d a n i '  ( P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  W o r l d  C o n f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  S t u d e n t  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  C h i c a g o ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  
1 6 1 2  S e t e / a h  K o s o n g  L i m a  B u l a n ,  a b o v e  n  8 7 6 .  
2 7 4  
Table 22 . The DPR: Before and After the Amendments 
The Constitution did not stipulate that each of the 
members of the DPR had the right to submit 
questions, to convey suggestions and opinions, 
and a right of immunity. 
The Constitution stipulated that the DPR's 
agreement was required to declare war, make 
peace and conclude treaties; and to promulgate a 
government regulation in lieu of law to become a 
statute. 
The Constitution did not stipulate that the DPR's 
agreement was required: to make an international 
agreement; to approve and confirm the candidate 
judges of the Supreme Court; to appoint and 
remove the members of the Judicial Commission. 
The Constitution did not stipulate that the DPR's 
advice is required: to appoint ambassadors and 
receive ambassadors of other countries; and to 
grant amnesties and abolition. 
The Constitution did not stipulate that the DPR 
selected the members of the state Audit Board, 
and three judges of the Constitutional Court. 
The stipulated that the DPR received 
the report from the state Audit Board. 
The Constitution did not clearly stipulate 
DPR's role in an impeachment process. 
The elucidation of the Constitution stipulated that 
the President could not dissolve the DPR . 
1613 Article 20A (1) of the Second Amendment. 
1614 Article 20A (2) of the Second Amendment. 
1615 Article 20A (3) of the Second Amendment. 
1616 Articles 11 (1) and 22 of the 1945 Constitution. 
1617 Articles 11 (2), 24A (3) and 24B (3) of the Second and Third Amendments. 
1618 Articles 13 (2) (3) and 14 (2) of the First Amendment. 
1619 Article 23F (1) of the Third Amendment. 
1620 Article 23E (2) of the Third Amendment. 
1621 Articles ?A and 7B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) of the Third Amendment. 
1622 Article 7C of the Third Amendment. 
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A n o t h e r  o f  t h e  m o n u m e n t a l  a c h i e v e m e n t s  o f  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  o c c u r r e d  w h e n  t h e  F i r s t  
A m e n d m e n t  w i t h d r e w  t h e  p o w e r  t o  m a k e  s t a t u t e s  f r o m  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  a n d  g a v e  t h e  p o w e r  t o  
t h e  D P R .  M a n a n  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h i s  a m e n d m e n t  e s t a b l i s h e d  c l e a r e r  c h e c k s  a n d  b a l a n c e s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  a s  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  b o d y ,  a n d  t h e  D P R ,  a s  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d y .
1
6 2 3  I t  a l s o  
a d d r e s s e d  t h e  p r e v i o u s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  s i t u a t i o n ,  w h e r e b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h a d  t h e  s t r o n g e r  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  m a k e  s t a t u t e s .  T h i s  c o n c e p t  h a d  r e s u l t e d  i n  w i d e - s p r e a d  a b u s e  o f  p o w e r s  u n d e r  
S o e h a r t o ' s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e .
1 6 2 4  
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  r o l e  o f  t h e  D P R  r e m a i n s  
v u l n e r a b l e .  A l l  t h e  B i l l s  m u s t  b e  a p p r o v e d  b y  b o t h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e  D P R  t h r o u g h  
d i s c u s s i o n  t o  b e c o m e  l a w
1 6 2 5  
a n d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  r e t a i n s  a n  a b s o l u t e  v e t o  p o w e r  t o  r e j e c t  a n y  
B i l l s  a t  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  s t a g e ,  
1 6 2 6  
a l t h o u g h  a s  e x p l a i n e d  l a t e r ,  o n c e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a g r e e s  h e  o r  
s h e  c a n n o t  l a t e r  v e t o  b y  r e f u s i n g  t o  s i g n  a  B i l l :  w i t h i n  3 0  d a y s  i t  w i l l  b e c o m e  l a w  r e g a r d l e s s  
s u c h  a  r e f u s a l  ( A r t i c l e  2 0 ( 5 ) ) .  
T h e  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  D P D .  A  f u r t h e r  l e g i s l a t i v e  r e f o r m  w a s  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  
r e g i o n a l  ' s e n a t e '  ( D P D ) .  T h i s  n e w  i n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  i n t e n d e d  t o  g i v e  r e g i o n a l  c o m m u n i t i e s  a  m o r e  
a c t i v e  r o l e  i n  t h e  g o v e r n a n c e ,  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  i d e a  t o  a p p l y  t h e  r e g i o n a l  a u t o n o m y . 1 6 2 7  T h e  D P D ,  
h o w e v e r ,  w a s  g i v e n  a  v e r y  l i m i t e d  a u t h o r i t y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w h e n  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  D P R .  T h i s  i s  y e t  
a n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  o f  c o m p r o m i s e  i n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s .  
c .  S h o r t c o m i n g s  
T h r o u g h o u t  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  i d e a  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  s t r o n g  b i c a m e r a l  p a r l i a m e n t  
w a s  w i d e l y  a d v o c a t e d .  T h e  i d e a  w a s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  c l e a r e r  c h e c k s .  a n d  b a l a n c e s  s y s t e m  i n  t h e  
p a r l i a m e n t .  T h i s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  S a r t o r i ' s  a r g u m e n t  t h a t :  
[ b ] i c a m e r a l i s m  i s  u p h e l d  a g a i n s t  u n i c a m e r a l i s m  o n  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  t w o  H o u s e s  a r e  a  
s a f e t y  v a l v e ,  a n d  t h a t  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f f  a l l  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r  i n  j u s t  o n e  b o d y  i s  n o t  o n l y  
d a n g e r o u s  b u t  a l s o  u n w i s e :  f o r  t w o  e y e s  a r e  b e t t e r  t h a n  o n e . 1 6 2 B  
1 6 2 3  B a g i r  M a n  a n ,  D P R ,  D P D  d a n  M P R  d a l a m  U U D  1 9 4 5  B a r u  ( 2 0 0 3 )  2 0 - 2 2 .  
1 6 2 4
1 b i d  2 1 .  
1 6 2 5  A r t i c l e  2 0  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  o f  t h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 2 6  
F a l a a k h ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 0 9 .  
1 6 2 7
1 b i d  5 3 .  
1 6 2 8  S a r t o r i ,  a b o v e  n  7 1 ,  1 8 4 .  
2 7 6  
In the end, however, a strong bicameral parliament was not achieved as, for its opponents, it 
meant that Indonesia might effectively become a federal state, an option they strongly oppose 
for entrenched ideological reasons. 1629 Yusuf (Golkar) reveals that his party initially supported 
the proposal of a strong bicameral parliament. However, as part of a compromise with PDIP 
. (many of the members of which opposed the proposal) Golkar agreed to adopt a 'soft' 
bicameral system.163o 
As a result, the DPD now lacks strong legislative powers. 1631 It can only submit Bills to the DPR 
and then participate in the discussion of Bills related to regional autonomy; central-region 
relations; the formation, expansion and merger of regions; the management of natural 
resources and other economic resources; and the financial balance between the central and 
the regions. 1632 The DPD can also advise the DPR on Bills on the state Budget, taxation, 
education and religion.1633 However, it is not involved in the ratification process of any of these 
Bills. This is a matter solely for the DPR and the President.1634 Further, the DPD has the 
authority to supervise the implementation of the laws of these matters, but does not have the 
authority to take further action. This action is a matter for the DPR, to which the DPD submits 
the results of its supervision. 1635 Consequently, Manan argues that the DPD is only a 
complementary, rather than supplementary, chamber to the DPR.1636 
Another potential problem regarding the DPD is the absence in the amended 1945 Constitution 
,.. \r, 
of any detailed provisions regarding the DPD's rights and, in particular, the rights of its 
members. This is seen, for example, in the absence of any articles granting immunity to DPD 
members to match that enjoyed by members of the DPR. 
Not a Bicameral but a Tricameral Parliament. lsra therefore argues that the amendments 
have not resulted in a bicameral parliament· 1637 but have created a strange tricameral 
1629 Bima Arya Sugiarto, 'Sidang Tahunan MPR 2002: Menuju Jnstitusionalisasi, Menyelamatkan Transisi' (2002) 2 Ana/isis 
CS/S, 167-168. 
1630 Interview with Slamet Effendy Yusuf, the Vice Chairperson of the PAH I, 19 June 2003. 
1631 Denny Jndrayana, 'Ancaman Tirani DPR', Kompas, 2 September 2002. 
1632 Article 220 (2) of the Third Amendment. 
1633Jbid. 
1634 Article 20 of the First Amendment. 
1635 Article 220 of the Third Amendment. 
1636 Manan, above n 1623, 56. 
1637 The CSJS Team, above n 1403, 260. 
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p a r l i a m e n t  w i t h  t h e  M P R ,  D P R  a n d  D P D  a s  t h e  t h r e e  c h a m b e r s .
1
6 3 a  L i k e w i s e ,  M a n E m  a r g u e s  
t h a t  t h e  M P R  i s  n o t  a  j o i n t  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  D P D ,  
1 6 3
9  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  n o t  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  
o f  t h e  D P R  a n d  O P D  a s  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  b u t  m e r e l y  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f t h e i r  m e m b e r s  i n  a  t h i r d  
i n s t i t u t i o n ;  
1
6 4 o  b e c a u s e  t h e  M P R  s t i l l  h a s  i t s  o w n  p o w e r s ,  e x c l u s i v e  o f  t h o s e  o f  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e  
D P D . 1 6 4 1  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  i n  r e a l i t y ,  I n d o n e s i a  n o w  h a s  t h r e e  c h a m b e r s  - D P R ,  D P D  a n d  M P R  -
w i t h  t e n s i o n  i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e a l  p o w e r  a m o n g  t h e m ,  b u t  w i t h  t h e  D P R  a p p a r e n t l y  
d o m i n a n t .  
d .  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
T o  a d d r e s s  t h e s e  s h o r t c o m i n g s ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  f u r t h e r  r e f o r m  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  
p o w e r s  o f  t h e  M P R ,  D P R  a n d  D P D .  T h e  D P D  s h o u l d  b e  g i v e n  s t r o n g e r  p o w e r s ,  c o m p a r e d  t o  
w h a t  i t  h a s  u n d e r  t h e  c u r r e n t  a m e n d m e n t s .  A s  i s  c u r r e n t l y  t h e  c a s e  w i t h  t h e  D P R ,  t h e  D P D  
s h o u l d  b e  g r a n t e d  s o m e  r i g h t s  t o  e x e r c i s e  i t s  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  i m m u n i t y  r i g h t s  f o r  
i t s  m e m b e r s .  T h e  M P R  s h o u l d  t h e n  b e c o m e  m e r e l y  a  j o i n t  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  t w o  c h a m b e r s ,  a n d  
n o t  a  s e p a r a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n .  O n l y  i n  t h i s  w a y  c a n  t h e  i d e a  o f  a  s t r o n g  b i c a m e r a l  s y s t e m  f o r  
I n d o n e s i a n  b e  c l e a r l y  a c h i e v e d .  T h i s  w o u l d  a l l o w  a  s t r o n g e r  D P D  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  n e w . c h e c k s  
a n d  b a l a n c e s  s y s t e m  b y  p r e v e n t i n g  t h e  D P R  f r o m  b e i n g  a  v i r t u a l l y  u n c o n t r o l l a b l e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  
2 .  E x e c u t i v e  R e f o r m  
a .  T o w a r d s  a  C o n v e n t i o n a l  P r e s i d e n t i a l  S y s t e m  
E l l i s  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  b e f o r e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s ,  I n d o n e s i a ' s  s o - c a l l e d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m  w a s  n o t  
' p r e s i d e n t i a l '  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h e  t e r m  i s  u n d e r s t o o d  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s ,  
b e c a u s e  I n d o n e s i a n  p r e s i d e n t s  w e r e  n o t  d i r e c t l y  e l e c t e d  a n d  c o u l d  b e  d i s c h a r g e d  b y  M P R  
v o t e . 1 6 4 2  S i n c e  t h e  a m e n d m e n t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  I n d o n e s i a  h a s  a d o p t e d  t h i s  m o r e  ' c o n v e n t i o n a l  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m '  m o d e l .
1 6 4 3  
I t  f i t s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  s e t  b y  A r e n d t  L i j p h a r t  a n d  G i o v a n n i  
S a r t o r i .  L i j p h a r t  a r g u e s  t h a t  a  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m  h a s  t h r e e  s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  ( i )  a  s i n g l e  
1 6 3 B i s r a ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 0 4 ,  1 2 9 .  
1 6 3 9  M a n a n ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 2 3 ,  7 5 .  
1 6 4 0  A r t i c l e  2 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t .  
1
6
4 1  
J i m l y  A s s h i d d i q i e ,  F o r m a t  K e l e m b a g a a n  N e g a r a  d a n  P e r g e s e r a n  K e k u a s a a n  d a l a m  U U D  1 9 4 5  ( 2 0 0 4 )  1 4 ;  M a n a n ,  a b o v e  
n  1 6 2 3 ,  5 ,  5 5 .  
1 6 4 2  E l l i s ,  a b o v e  n  6 6 2 ,  1 1 9 - 1 2 0 .  
1 6 4 3 i b i d  1 5 2 .  
2 7 8  
person, rather than collegiate, executive; (ii) an executive directly elected by the people; and 
(iii) a fixed tenure that cannot be discharged by a parliamentary vote. 1644 Sartori argues that a 
political system is presidential if the President: (i) is selected by a popular election; (ii) cannot 
be discharged by a parliamentary vote, during his or her tenure; and (iii) leads the government 
that he or she appoints.1645 
Table 23 shows the Indonesian presidential system before and after the amendments. 
Table 23 The Presidential System: Before and After the Amendments 
Chief of Executive. 
Indirect, by the MPR. 
Unlimited, could be re-elected every 5 
years.f649 
Not fixed, easily removed. 
More dominant than the DPR. 
Not clearly stipulated. In practice, these 
powers are, therefore, unlimited. 
Generally mentioned in the elucidation of·-
the Constitution, and was mostly stipulated 
in an MPR Decree. 
More political than legal: if the President 
'truly breached' state policy and the 
Constitution. 
1644 Arendt Lijphart, Pattern of Democracy (1999) 116-142. 
1645 Sartori, above 71, 84. 
1646 Article 4 of the 1945 Constitution. 
1647 Article 4(1) of the 1945 Constitution. 
1648 Article 6A of the Third and Fourth Amendments. 
1649 Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution. 
1650 Article 7 of the First Amendment. 
1651 Articles 7, 7A and 78 of the First and Third Amendments. 
1652 Articles 7 A and 78 of the Third Amendment. 
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N o t  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s .  ,  
E a s i e r .  A  s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  v o t e ,  w h i c h  
r e j e c t s  t h e  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  s p e e c h ,  c o u l d  
i m p e a c h  a  P r e s i d e n t .  
E x e c u t i v e  P o w e r s .  T a b l e  2 3  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  I n d o n e s i a  n o w  e n j o y s  a  b e t t e r  s y s t e m  o f  
c h e c k s  a n d  b a l a n c e s  o n  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  d i r e c t  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  
s t r e n g t h e n s  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  t h i s  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  t h e  p o w e r  o f  P r e s i d e n t  w i l l  
· b e  u n l i m i t e d .  T h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  r e m o v a l  a n d  a p p o i n t m e n t  p o w e r  o f  h i g h  r a n k i n g  s t a t e  o f f i c i a l s  i s  
b e t t e r  r e g u l a t e d .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  u n d e r  t h e  o r i g i n a l  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e r e  w e r e  n o  p r o v i s i o n s  
o n  h o w  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M P R ,  D P R ,  B P K  a n d  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  J u d g e s  w e r e  t o  b e  e l e c t e d  o r  
a p p o i n t e d .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  P r e s i d e n t  S o e h a r t o  m a n a g e d  t o  c h o o s e  l o y a l i s t s  a s  m e m b e r s  o f  
t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  T h e s e  " P r e s i d e n t ' s  m e n "  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  a  g e n e r a l  a b s e n c e  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
c o n t r o l s  o v e r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  f o r  m o s t  o f  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  p e r i o d .  T h e  a m e n d m e n t s  d i r e c t l y  
a d d r e s s e d  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s .  N o w ,  f o r  e x a m p l e :  
.  •  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  M P R ,  D P R  a n d  D P D  s h a l l  b e  e l e c t e d  b y  t h e  p e o p l e ;  1 6 5 6  
·  •  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  B P K  s h a l l  b e  c h o s e n  b y  t h e  D P R ,  t a k i n g  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t h e  a d v i c e  o f  
t h e  D P D ,  a n d  a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ;  1 6 5 7  a n d  
•  t h e  n a m e s  o f  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  a p p o i n t m e n t  a s  a  j u s t i c e  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  s h a l l  b e  
s u b m i t t e d  b y  t h e  J u d i c i a l  C o m m i s s i o n  t o  t h e  D P R  a n d  t h e n  b e  c o n f i r m e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  
1 6 5 8  
L e g i s l a t i v e  P o w e r s .  T h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r ,  w h i c h  w a s  p r e v i o u s l y  m a i n l y  d o m i n a t e d  b y  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t ,  h a s  n o w  s h i f t e d  t o  b e c o m e  a  p o w e r  o f  t h e  D P R ,  
1
6 5 9  w i t h  l i t t l e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  b y  t h e  
1 6 5 3  A r t i c l e  7  A  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 5 4  A r t i c l e  7 8  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 5 5  A r t i c l e  7 8  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 5 6  A r t i c l e  2 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 5 7  A r t i c l e  2 3 F  ( 1 )  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 5 8  A r t i c l e  2 4 A  ( 3 )  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
2 8 0 .  
DPD (as mentioned). The President, however, still has a significant legislative power. Bills are 
discussed and must be assented to by both the DPR and President at this stage. 1660 This 
Presidential consent requirement is basically the 'veto right' for the President. This right is 
stronger than the veto right of the President of the United States. In Indonesia, if the President 
rejects a Bill there is no mechanism by which the DPR and/or the DPD can overrule such a 
rejection. However, if the President does give assent at this stage he or she may not later 
change his or her mind and refuse to sign the Bill into law. Article 20(5) provides that a Bill 
agreed upon by both the President and DPR will. become law in 30 days, in such 
circumstances. To strengthen the system of checks and balances, however, the President's 
legislative powers should therefore be further reformed by being reduced or limited by giving 
the DPR and DPD an American-style right to counter veto a discussion stage refusal by the 
President. The section beloW that deals with recommendations will address this reform. 
Judicial Powers. As to the judicial branch, the potential for Presidential intervention has been 
reduced by the amendments. For example, the President's power to grant pardons and 
restoration of rights is now limited by the Supreme Court's advice; the President's power to 
grant amnesties and abolition is restricted· by the DPR's advice;1661 the President is only 
. . 
granted the power to appoint and remove members of the Judicial Commission, with the 
agreement of the DPR;1662 the President has only limited power in confirming Supreme Court's' 
judges because the names of candidates must be previously submitted by the Judicial 
Commission to the DPR for approval; and the President has to share the power to appoint the 
nine judges of Constitutional Court with the DPR and Supreme Court, each of which has the 
authority to appoint three. judges.1663 
Impeachment. The impeachment process created by the amendments is much more detailed 
than before. The:current Indonesian procedure is similarto_that of the United States. Table 23 
and Table 11, on impeachment, demonstrate this similarity. In terms of the reasons for 
impeachment, Indonesia has adopted almost the same criteria as the United States, with only 
'corruption' added as an additional ground. 
1659 Article 5(1) and 20 (1) (5) of the First Amendment. 
1660 Article 20(2) (3) of the First Amendment. 
1661 Article 14(1) (2) of the First Amendment. 
1662 Article 24B (3) of the Third Amendment. 
1663 Article 24C (3) of the Third Amendment. 
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b .  S h o r t c o m i n g s  
T h e r e  a r e  t w o  p o l i t i c a l  c o m p r o m i s e s  w h i c h  h a v e  r e s u l t e d  i n  s h o r t c o m i n g s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
e x e c u t i v e  b r a n c h  a n d  b o t h  r e l a t e  t o  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  T h e  f i r s t  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  b e c o m i n g _  a  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e .  T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s t i p u l a t e s  t h a t  a  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  " m u s t  b e  1 1 1 e n t a U y  a n d  p h y s i c a n y  a b l e  t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  d u t i e s  a n d  
o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t '  .
1 6 6 4  
T h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  w a s  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
b l i n d n e s s  o f  A b d u r r a h m a n  W a h i d .  I n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  d e b a t e s ,  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p r o p o s a l  r e q u i r e d  
m e n t a l  a n d  p h y s i c a l  ' h e a l t h ' :  I n  t h e  e n d , t h e  f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  M P R  f i n a n y  a g r e e d  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  
w o r d  ' h e a l t h '  t o  ' a b i l i t y '  b u U h i s  ' a b i l i t y '  r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  a m b i g u o u s ,  a n d  t e n d s  t o  d i s c r i m i n a t e  
a g a i n s t  p e o p l e  w i t h  disability~ T h e  d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  A b d u r r a h m a n  W a h i d  a s  a  candid~te i n  t h e  
2 0 0 4  P r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  b y  t h e  E l e c t o r a l  C o m m i s s i o n  i s  a  c l e a r  e x a m p l e  o f  t h i s .  
T h e  s e c o n d  s h o r t c o m i n g  i s  t h e  m o n o p o l y  h e l d  b y  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  i n  p r o p o s i n g  p r e s i d e n t i a l .  
c a n d i d a t e s . 1 6 6 s  T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  b l o c k s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  a n d  
w e a k e n s  t h e  i d e a  o f  a  ' d i r e c t '  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  c a n d i d a t e s  m u s t  f i r s t  b e  a p p r o v e d  
b y  a  p a r t y .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  i s  a n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  b i a s  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n -
m a k i n g  b o d y  ( M P R ) ,  m o s t  m e m b e r s  ofwhic~ c a m e  f r o m  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  t h e m s e l v e s .  
c .  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
F u r t h e r  · l i m i t a t i o n  o f  P r e s i d e n t i a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  P o w e r s .  A s  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  e n a b l e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  b l o c k  a n y  B i n s  w h i c h  h e  o r  s h e  d o e s  n o t  
s u p p o r t .  T h e  D P R  a n d  D P D ,  a s  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d i e s ,  d o  n o t  h a v e  a  m e c h a n i s m  t o  o v e r r u l e  
t h i s  p r e s i d e n t i a l  ' v e t o  r i g h t ' .  T o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  s y s t e r r i  ' o f  c h e c k s  · a n d  b a l a n c e s , _  i t  i s  c r u c i a l ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  g r a n t  t h e  D P R  a n d  D P D  a r i  A m e r i c a n - s t y l e  r i g h t  t o  c o u n t e r - v e t o  a  d i s c u s s i o n  
s t a g e  r e f u s a l  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a c y  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  T o  a v o i d  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ;  t h e  m e n t a l  a r i d  p h y s i c a l  a b i l i t y  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  s h o u l d  b e  r e m o v e d .  I n d o n e s i a  s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  o n l y  m e n t i o n i n g  c o m m o n  
1 6 6 4  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  
1 6 6 5  A r t i c l e  6 A  ( 2 )  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t  
2 8 2  
requirements such as citizenship and minimum age, as stipulated in the United States' and the 
Philippines' constitutions.1666 
Independent Presidential Candidate. Independent presidential candidates should be given 
the opportunity to run for the presidency. The monopoly of political parties over the nomination 
of a presidential candidate should be ended. This is essential to strengthen participatory 
democracy.1667 
3. Judicial Reform 
a. Structural Reform 
There are two mainjudicial reforms: first, in addition to Article 1(3) of the Third Amendment, 
which expressly stipulates that Indonesia is a state based on Law, 1668 the Third Amendment 
further strengthens judicial reform by explicitly inserting the ·'independence of the judiciary' 
principle into the Constitution.1669 This principle had previously only been stipulated in the 
elucidation of the Constitution and not in the text. 
Second, compared to the executive and legislative bodies, the structural reforms to the 
judiciary are more comprehensive. The Third Amendment established two new institutions: the 
Constitutional Court and Judicial Commission. The Court has an equal position to the Supreme 
Court, but with a different jurisdiction. The decision to form a new court is a better solution than 
giving the new judicial powers to the Supreme Court, given the acute corruption problems in 
the Supreme and existing lower level courts. As Lindsey points out, concern about the integrity 
of existing courts was, in fact, one of the key reasons for the establishment of the new Court.167o 
·Table 24 shows the judicial branch before and after the amendments. 
1666 Article II Section 1 of the United States America and Article VII Section 2 of the Philippines' Constitution. 
1667 Komisi Konstitusi, above n 1594, 51. 
1668 Article 1(3) of the Third Amendment. 
1669 ArtiCle 24(1) of the Third Amendment. 
1670 Lindsey, above n 99, 261. 
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T a b l e  2 4  
T h e  J u d i c i a r y :  B e f o r e  a n d  A f t e r  t h e  A m e n d m e n t s  
T h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  
l o w e r  l e v e l  c o u r t s .  
U n c l e a r ,  i n  p r a c t i c e  w a s  
m o n o p o l i z e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  
b .  J u d i c i a l  R e v i e w  
T h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o w e r s  g i v e n  t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  s y s t e m  
o f  c h e c k s  a n d  b a l a n c e s .  L i n d s e y  a r g u e s  t h a t :  
1 6 7 1  A r t i c l e  2 4 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 7 2  A r t i c l e s  2 4 ( 2 )  a n d  2 4 8  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 7 3  A r t i c l e  2 4 C  ( 1 )  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 7 4 1 b i d .  
1 6 7 5 1 b i d .  
1 6 7 6 1 b i d .  
1 6 7 7  A r t i c l e  2 4 C  ( 2 )  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 7 8  A r t i c l e  2 4 A  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 7 9  A r t i c l e  2 4 C  ( 3 )  o f  t h e  T h i r d  A m e n d m e n t .  
2 8 4  
... the new Constitutional Court has the potential to radically transform the Indonesian 
judicial and legislative relationship and create a new check on the conduct of lawmakers 
and the presidency.168o · 
One of the crucial powers newly granted is judicial review of statute, something which was non-
existent prior to the Third Amendment. Indeed, within one year of its establishment in 2003, the 
Constitutional Court had "won a reputation for competence and independence" through its 
exercise of this new power.1681' 
Communists' Decision. One of the new Court's most significant decisions related to the 
question of the status of former communists .. The Court ruled that Article 60g of Law No. 12 of · 
2003, on legislative elections, was repugnant to the Constitution, which guarantees equality 
before the law and equal rights for all citizens. 1682The Article stipulated that, "members of the 
outlawed Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), including its mass organizations, or individuals 
who are either directly or indirectly involved in the G30S/PKP683 movement or other outlawed 
organization" are barred from becoming legislators at all levels of state administration. The 
Jakarta Post applauded the striking down of this provision, arguing that, "a milestone has been 
laid in Indonesia's contemporary history that could well have far-reaching implications for the 
future of democracy in this country" ,1684 
Prospectivity Decision. However, it is important to note that the litigants in the communists' 
case still could not be elected in the 2004 elections, despite the Court's ruling. This is because 
the Court also ruled that its decision could only apply prospectively, and therefore could not 
apply to the litigants who actually won the decision. The Court relied on Article 58 of the Law 
No. 24 of 2003, on the Constitutional Court which provided that a, " ... statute that is being 
reviewed by the Constitutional Court remains in force, before there is a decision that declares 
that the statute conflicts with the Constitution". 
1680 Lindsey, above n 99, 261. 
1681 Tim Lindsey, Simon Butt and Ross Clarke, 'Review is not a Release', The Australian, 27 July 2004. 
1682 Mahkamah Konstitusi, Putusan Perkara Nomor 011-017/PUU-1/2003, 28-32. 
1683 This is a reference to the so called Gerakan 30 September (30 September Movement) arid the PKI (Partai Koriwnis 
Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party), both alleged to have launched a supposed coup attempt on 30 September 1965. 
This incident was followed with mass killings and jailing of leftists by military and Islamic organizations. It also lea to Soeharto's 
rise to power. The widely accepted allegations of PKI involvement have, however, been openly questioned, especially, since 
the fall of Soeharto. 
1684 'PKI One Barrier Removed', The Jakarta Post, 26 February 2004. 
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T h i s  p r o s p e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  a p p l i e s  t o  a l l  o f  t h e  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  a n  i m p o r t a n t  l a t e r  
'  '  
d e c i s i o n ·  r e l a t e d  t e  t h e  B a l i  b o m b i n g s  i n  2 0 0 2 .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  M a s y k u r  A b d u l  K a d i r ,  o n e  o f  t h e  
p e r s o n s  a c c u s e d  o f  t h e  b o m b i n g s ,  t h e  C o u r t  r u l e d  t h a t  t h e  L a w  N o  1 6  o f  2 0 0 2 ,  w h i c h  
r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y  a p p l i e d  t h e  L a w  N o .  1 5  o n  T e r r o r i s m  t o  t h e  B a l i  b o m b i n g  c a s e ,  w a s  
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .  T h e  C o u r t  d e c i d e d  t h a t  L a w  N o .  1 6  w a s  t h u s  i n  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  A r t i c l e  2 8 1  o f  t h e  
S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t ,  w h i c h  e x p r e s s l y  s t i p u l a t e s  t h a t  t h e ,  " r i g h t  n o t  t o  b e  p r o s e c u t e d  u n d e r  
r e t r o s p e c t i v e  l a w s  a r e  b a s i c  h u m a n  r i g h t s  t h a t  m a y  n o t  b e  i n t e r f e r e d  w i t h  u n d e r  a n y  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a t  a l l " .  
I n  c o m m e n t i n g  o n  t h i s  K a d i r ' s  c a s e ,  L i n d s e y  a n d  B u t t  q u e s t i o n  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  e x c l u s i v e  
p r o s p e c t i v e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  d e c i s i o n s .
1 6 8 5  
T h e y  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  o n  2 8 ( 1  ) ,  a s  
u n p a l a t a b l e  a s  i t  m i g h t  b e ,  c a l l i n g  i t ,  " a  r e a s o n a b l e  f i n d i n g  t o  m a k e " ,  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  l a w . 1 6 8 6  
H o w e v e r ,  t h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  o n l y  a p p l y i n g  t h a t  d e c i s i o n  p r o s p e c t i v e l y  ( a s  s t i l l  o c c u r s  i n  s o m e  c i v i l  
.  .  .  
l a w  c o u n t r i e s )  c r e a t e s  a n  a b s u r d  s i t u a t i o n .  I t  m e a n s  t h a t  a  l i t i g a n t  c a n  n e v e n e c e i v e  t h e  b e n e f i t  
o f  w i n n i n g  h i s  o r  h e r  c a s e ,  a n d  s o  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  n o  p o i n t  f o r  h i m  o r  h e r  t o  t r y  h i s  o r  h e r  c a s e .  
J u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  m a y  t h u s  r e n d e r e d  l a r g e l y  u s e l e s s  b y  t h i s  r u l i n g . 1 6 8 7  
c .  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n  
J u d i c i a l  R e v i e w ' s  d e c i s i o n .  J u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  o f  s t a t u t e  g i v e s  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  a  p o w e r  
t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r s  o f  t h e  D P R ,  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e  D P D .  H o w e v e r ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  
C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  .  t o  a p p l y  i t s  d e c i s i o n  o n l y  p r o s p e c t i v e l y  w i l l  : s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r e d u c e  t h e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h i s  r e v i , e w  p o w e r .  T h i s  p r o s p e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  p o l i c y  s h o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  b e  
c h a n g e d .  A  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  C o u r t  s h o u l d  a n n u l  a n  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l a w ,  s t a r t i n g  
f r o m  t h e  m o m e n t  i t  w a s  p r o m u l g a t e d .  T h i s  s h o u l d  b e  c l e a r l y  s t i p u l a t e d  i n  t h e  L a w  o n  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  o r  e v e n  i n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f .  
- - - - - - - - - - - - : - . - .  .  
1
6 8 5  T i m  L i n d s e y  a n d  S i m o n  B u t t ,  'lndepende~ce o f  t h e  J u d i c i a r y  a t  S t a k e ,  n o t  t h e  B a l i  B o m b e r s '  F a t e ' ,  T h e  S y d n e y  M o r n i n g  
H e r a l d ,  3 0  J u l y  2 0 0 4 ;  T i m  L i n d s e y  a n d  S i m o n  B u t t ,  ' I n d o n e s i a n  J u d i c i a r y  i n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C r i s i s  ( P a r t s  1  a n d  2 ) ' ,  T h e  J a k a r t a  
P o s t ,  6 - 7  A u g u s t  2 0 0 4 .  
1 6 8 6  L i n d s e y ,  B u t  a n d  C l a r k e ,  a b o v e  n  1 6 8 1 .  
2 8 6  
4. Human Rights Reform 
a. Impressive Reform 
The original1945 Constitution lacked sufficient human rights provisions. 1688 This was one of the 
biggest shortcomings addressed through the amendments. Kawamura, for example, argues 
that: 
[i]f Indonesia intends to become a democratic state, establishment of constitutional 
guarantee of human rights and freedom as inalienable rights of human beings certainly is 
one of the top priority tasks.1689 
,' 
Indeed after the Second Amendment, the human rights protections were more impressive, on 
paper at least. Clarke argues that the amendment on the Bill of Rights is "the first meaningful 
protection of human rights in Indonesia's 1945 Constitution" .169o Clarke further argues that the 
amendment represents "a radical shift in Indonesia's constitutional philosophy from essentially 
authoritarian to a more .liberal-democratic model".1691 Similarly, Lindsey argues that the long 
and, impressive Chapter XA on Human Rights succeeds in shifting ·the original 1945 
Constitution from a document which guaranteed few human rights, to one which, in a formal 
sense at least, provides more extensive human rights protection than do many developed 
states.1692 
b. Shortcomings 
There are, however, two shortcomings in the human rights provisions. The first is relatively 
minor, in relation to duplication of provisions: for example, both Articles 27(1) and 280 (1) 
stipulate equality before the law. 1693 The second, however, is a major shortcoming. It relates 
another aspects of Article 281 (1) (the non-retrospectivity provision), discussed earlier. 1694 
1687 Undsey and Butt, above n 1685. 
1688 Susanti, above n 697, 3. 
1689 Kawamura, above 1106, 2. 
1690 Clarke, above n 1060, 3. 
16911bid. 
1692 Undsey, above n 99, 254. 
1693 Komisi Konstitusi, above n 1594, 90. 
1694 This non-retrospective provision has been discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
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N o n - r e t r o s p e c t i v i t y .  T h e  p r o b l e m  i s  n o t  t h e  n o n - r e t r o s p e c t i v i t y  p r o v i s i o n  i t s e l f .  D e s p i t e  b e i n g  
w i d e l y  d e b a t e d ,  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a  l a w  n o t  b e i n g  a p p l i e d  r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y  h a s  b e e n  a d o p t e d  i n  m a n y  
c o u n t r i e s  a n d  i s  a  n o r m  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w ,  a l t h o u g h  w i t h  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .
1
6 9 s  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  a t  t h e  
l e v e l  o f  a  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  A r t i c l e  I  S e c t i o n  8  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  s t i p u l a t e s  t h a t ,  
" N o  B i l l  o f  A t t a i n d e r  o r  e x  p o s t  f a c t o  L a w  s h a l l  b e  p a s s e d " .  T h e  p r o b l e m  f o r  I n d o n e s i a  i s  t h a t  
t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t  s t i p u l a t e s  t h a t  t h e  n o n - r e t r o s p e c t i v i t y  p r o v i s i o n  " m a y  n o t  b e  i n t e r f e r e d  




T h i s  i s  a g a i n s t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  n o r m s ,  w h i c h  a r e  u s u a l l y  
r e a d  b y  C o u r t s  a s  g r a t i f y i n g  r e t r o s p e c t i v i t y  p r o h i b i t i o n s .  C l a r k e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  a r g u e s  t h a t ,  " [ t h e ]  
m o s t  e s t a b l i s h e d  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  ·  p r i n c i p l e  . .  o f  n o n - r e t r o s p e c t i v i t y  i s  _  c r i m e s  a g a i n s t  
h u m a n i t y "  , 1 6 9 7  T h i s  e x c e p t i o n  c a n n o t  a p p l y  i n  I n d o n e s i a  a s  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  n o w  s t a n d s  a n d  t h i s  
h a s  s e r i o u s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  h u m a n  r i g h t s  p r o s e c u t i o n s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a b u s e s  c o m m i t t e d ,  f o r  
~xample, u n d e r  t h e  N e w  O r d e r  b y  t h e  milita~y. 
c .  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
B e c a u s e  o f  t h e s e  t w o  s h o r t c o m i n g s ,  f u r t h e r  r e f o r m  o f t h e  B i l l  o f  R i g h t s  p r o v i s i o n s  i s  n e e d e d .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  d u p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  h u m a n  r i g h t s  p r o v i s i o n s  . .  s h o u l d  b e  f i x e d ;  s e c o n d ,  t h e  n o n -
r e t r o s p e c t i v i t y  p r o v i s i o n  p h r a s e  ( " m a y  n o t  b e  i n t e r f e r e d  w i t h  u n d e r  a n y .  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a t  a l l " )  
s h o u l d  b e  d e l e t e d  . .  T h i s  d e l e t i o n  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  n o n - r e t r o s p e c t i v i t y  i s  n o t  
r e c o g n i z e d  u n d e r  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  I t  s i m p l y  a l l o w s  f o r  e x c e p t i o n  i n  s p e c i a l  c a s e s ,  s u c h  a s  
c r i m e s  a g a i n s t  h u m a n i t y .  
5 .  T h e  N a t i o n a l i s m  v . l s l a m i c  S t a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  D e b a t e s  
C h a p t e r  X I ,  A r t i c l e  2 9  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  o n  R e l i g i o n ,  w a s  t h e  o n l y  c h a p t e r  w h i c h  w a s  n o t  
a l t e r e d  b y  t h e  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m s .  T h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t o  i n s e r t .  t h e  
' s e v e n  w o r d s '  o f  t h e  J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  i n t o  A r t i c l e  2 9 ( 1 )  w a s  mar~ e v i d e n c e . t h a t  t h e  d e b a t e s  o n  
n a t i o n a l i s m  a n d  I s l a m i c  s t a t e  a r e  s e n s i t i v e  a n d  c r u c i a l  i s s u e s  i n  I n d o n e s i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
h i s t o r y .  T h e  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e b a t e s  o n  t h e  i n s e r t i o n  o f  t h e  J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r ,  i n  f a c t ,  
r e p e a t e d  t h e  s a m e  d e b a t e s  w h i c h  h a d  t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  1 9 4 5  a n d  1 9 5 6 - 1 9 5 9 . - F r o m  t h e s e  t h r e e  
d e b a t e s  t h e  o u t c o m e  h a s  a l w a y s  b e e n  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  p r e a m b l e  ( P a n c a s i / a )  a n d  r e j e c t i o n  o f  
1 6 9 5  C l a r k e ,  a b o v e  n  1 0 6 0 ,  8 - 1 4 .  
1 6 9 6  A r t i c l e  2 8 1  ( 1 )  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  A m e n d m e n t .  
1 6 9 7  C l a r k e ,  a b o v e  n  1 0 6 0 ,  1 1 .  
2 8 8  
the insertion of syariah into the Constitution. This same outcome is a strong evidence that the 
demands to maintain the nationalist state ideology Pancasila and Article 29 as they currently 
stand is the preferred option of the majority of social groups in Indonesia. 
The possibility that both the preamble (Pancasila) and Article 29 should be entrenched in their 
current forms to try to resolve the difficult relationship between Islam and state should therefore 
be given careful consideration. This would mean that the preamble and Article 29 should 
explicitly be identified as non-amendable provisions. This kind of provision is legitimate from a 
constitutional law perspective. For example, in France, the form of Republic "shall not be the 
object of an amendment". 1698 In Indonesia, the Fourth Amendment has stipulated that the form 
of the unitary state may not be amended.t699 
Conclusion. It is clear that much remains to be done. However, the basic conditions are in 
place to make the constitutional system work. 17oo The Jakarta Post has stated that whatever 
shortcomings one finds in the four amendments, "they still stand a better chance then the 
original text in sparing Indonesia from being plunged back into darkness once again". 1701 Ellis 
and Yudhini argue that the, "complete package of amendment is consistent and is good 
enough". 1702 ln commenting on the process and the outcome, Lindsey argues that: 
... despite all the difficulties, progress is being made: the 1945 Constitution after the 
Fourth Amendment has many shortcomings but it is an incomparably better document ... 
historically few countries have ever managed to adopt constitutional reforms as effective 
as Indonesia's purely through parliamentary debate. 
Lindsey further argues that, in a country denied constitutional debate for the last four decades, 
perhaps the messy process is necessary to build a national understanding.t7o3 Hopefully, this 
'muddling through', 1704 in its search for a more effective Constitution, will guide Indonesia's 
transition to becoming an even more democratic country. . 
1698 Article 89 of the France Constitution. 
1699 Article 37(5) of the Fourth Amendment. 
1700 Ellis, above n 934. 
1701 The Beginning of the End, above n 1276. 
1702 Ellis and Yudhini, above n 1306. 
1703 Undsey, above n 99, 276- 277. 
1704!bid. 
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D .  .  C o n c l u s i o n  
T h e  f o u r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s  t h a t  w e r e  p a s s e d  f r o m  1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  w e r e  r e f o r m s  c a r r i e d  
o u t  i n  t h e  t r o u b l e d  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  S o e h a r t o ' s  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  r e g i m e .  A s  w i t h  o t h e r  t r a n s i t i o n a l  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s e s  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  t u r b u l e n t  p o l i t i c a l  c l i m a t e  c o l o r e d  t h e  
a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  i n  I n d o n e s i a .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  w a s  a  g o l d e n  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  
I n d o n e s i a  t o  d e - m y s t i f y  t h e  s y m b o l i c  t e x t  o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h e  F i r s t  A m e n d m e n t  i n  
1 9 9 9  w a s  t h e  i n i t i a l  s u c c e s s  w h i c h  ' o p e n e d  u p '  t h e  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  d o c u m e n t  a n d  m a d e  p o s s i b l e  
f o r  f u r t h e r  a m e n d m e n t s .  
C o m p a r e d  t o  o t h e r  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s e s  ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r  S o u t h  A f r i c a  a n d  T h a i l a n d )  t h e  .  
1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 2  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  i n  I n d o n e s i a  l a c k e d  s e v e r a l  k e y  f e a t u r e s  o f  a  d e m o c r a t i c  
c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s :  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  s c h e d u l e  c o n s t a n t l y  c h a n g e d ;  t h e r e  w a s  _ n o  c l e a r  
p l a n  o r  o b j e c t i v e ;  s h o r t - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  c o n t a m i n a t e d  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o p o s a l s ;  t h e  .  
'  '  
M P R  f a i l e d  t o  w i n  t h e  p e o p l e ' s  t r u s t  i n  i t s  c a p a c i t y  a s  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  b o d y ;  a n d  p u b l i c  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a r r a n g e d  b y  t h e  M P R  w a s  l i m i t e d  a n d  b a d l y  o r g a n i z e d .  
H o w e v e r ,  a f t e r  h a v i n g  d e c a d e s  o f  n o  d e b a t e  o n  t h e  a m e n d m e n t  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  f l a w s  i n  t h e  .  
p r o c e s s  w e r e  u n a v o i d a b l e .  D e s p i t e  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  b e i n g  u n d e r s t o o d  a s  a n  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
d o c u m e n t ,  i t  w a s  s t i l l  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  a  g u a r a n t e e  o f  t w o  f u n d a m e n t a l  e l e m e n t s  
o f  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  s t a t e :  ( i )  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e ;  a n d  ( i i )  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  i n  i t s  p l a c e  o f  
a  n a t i o n a l i s t  s t a t e  i d e o l o g y ,  t h e  P a n c a s i l a ,  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  p r e a m b l e  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  M P R ' s  a g r e e m e n t  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  p r e a m b l e  w a s  t h e  k e y  c o n s e n s u s  w h i c h  m a d e  
t h e  a m e n d m e n t  p r o c e s s  p o s s i b l e .  ·  
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  t o  k e e p  t h e  p r e a m b l e ,  t h e  I s l a m i c  f a c t i o n s  k e p t  f i g h t i n g  f o r  t h e  
i n s e r t i o n  o f  t h e  ' s e v e n  w o r d s '  o f  t h e  J a k a r t a  C h a r t e r  i n t o  A r t i c l e  2 9  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h a t  i s ,  
f o r  a n  e x p a n d e d  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  s y a r i a h :  T h i s  w a s  u n d e r s t o o d  b y  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  g r o u p s  a s  a n  
i n i t i a l  s t e p  t o w a r d s  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a n  I s l a m i c  s t a t e ,  s o m e t h i n g  t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  g r o u p s  
( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  m i l i t a r y )  s a w ,  a n d  s t i l l  s e e ,  a s  n o n - n e g o t i a b l e .  T h i s  t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  
n a t i o n a l i s t  a n d  I s l a m i c  g r o u p s  c o n s e q u e n t l y  l e d  t o  a  s l o w ,  p a t c h y  a n d  t e n t a t i v e  p r o c e s s  m a r k e d  
b y  c o n s t a n t  n e g o t i a t i o n  a n d  d e a l - m a k i n g .  
2 9 0 .  
In the end, the insertion of the 'seven words' of the Jakarta Charter was rejected, just as it was 
during the constitutional debates of 1945 and 1956-1959. There was a key difference however: 
in 1945 the rejection was as a result of Mohammad Hatta's intervention, while in 1956-1959 it 
was as a result of the intervention of Soekarno's 5 July 1959 Presidential Decree. In 1999-
2002 the rejection of the 'seven words' of the Jakarta Charter was agreed upon during the final 
minutes of the 2002 MPR Annual Session, without intervention from outside the Parliament. 
This was, therefore, the first Indonesian experience of addressing this longstanding and very 
sensitive issue in a more democratic way. 
Further, despite the often-chaotic amendment process, Indonesia has effectively produced a 
new Constitution. Evolutionary step-by-step amendment has at last ended the temporary 
character of Indonesia's previous constitutions. The amended 1945 Constitution is the first 
Indonesian Constitution which does not explicitly mention that it is a provisional Constitution. 
Additionally, at the end of the process, the four amendments has created a far more democratic 
Constitution. In particular, the amendments established a clearer separation of powers between 
the executive, legislature and judiciary; and far more impressive human rights protections. 
One reason that the new Constitution is better is because the euphoric transitional period from 
Soeharto provided a setting that encouraged open constitutional debates in the MPR and 
allowed public participation in these debates, despite serious flaws in the MPR's system for 
public engagement. Wide media coverage and active advocacy by non-governmental 
organizations became a sort of public control system which prevented the amendment outcome 
from being overly politicized hy the politicians in the MPR. 
Yet the MPR as a political institution could not be immune from political interests. On the one 
hand, compromise among the factions in the MPR saved the amendment process from a 
possible deadlock; on the other hand, the compromise has created shortcomings in the 
amended Constitution. This thesis has, therefore, presented recommendations to strengthen 
the system of checks and balances, for example: the empowerment of the DPD. It also 
proposes that to resolve the difficult relationship between Islam and the state - for the 
immediate future at least - the preamble and Article 29 should be made as a non-amendable 
and 'entrenched'. 
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F i n a l l y , ·  f r o m  I n d o n e s i a ' s  e x p e r i e n c e ,  b e s i d e  o b s e r v i n g  t h e  g e n e r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  
constitution~making p r o c e s s  i n  t r a n s i t i o n ,  · s c h o l a r s  s h o u l d  n o t e  h o w  t h e  s y m b o l i c  v a l u e  o f  t h e  
1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s t r o n g l y  o v e r s h a d o w e d .  t h e  w a y  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m  t o o k  p l a c e .  D e s p i t e  
a  p r o c e s s  t h a t  w a s  d i f f e r e n t  t o  d e m o c r a t i c  p r o c e s s e s  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  I n d o n e s i a ' s  s l o w ,  
p a t c h y  a n d  t e n t a t i v e  p r o c e s s  m a n a g e d  t o  l e a d  t h e  c o u n t r y  t o  a  m o r e  d e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
a n d  c o n t r i b u t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  I n d o n e s i a ' s  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  o v e r t  a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m .  A s  T h e  A s i a  
T i m e s  w r o t e  a f t e r  t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  i n  2 0 0 2 :  
[ t ] h e  p r o c e s s  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  m e s s y  a n d  c i r c u i t o u s ,  b u t  I n d o n e s i a ' s  a d o p t i o n  o f  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t s  u n d e r l i n e  h o w ,  i n  t h e  e n d ,  t h e  . . .  c o u n t r y  r e m a i n s  v e r y  m u c h  
o n  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n a l ,  i f  b u m p y ,  r o a d  t o  d e m o c r a c y J 7 o s  
1 7 0 5  ' I n d o n e s i a :  A  S t e p  o n  D e m o c r a c y ' s  B u m p y  R o a d ' ,  T h e  A s i a  T i m e s ,  1 4  A u g u s t  2 0 0 2 .  
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A p p , e n d i c e s  
A p p e n d i x  1 :  T h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  B e f o r e  a n d  A f t e r  t h e  F o u r  A m e n d m e n t s . t
7
o 6  
'  '  
T H E  1 9 4 5  C O N S T I T U T I O N  O F  T H E  
R E P U B L I C  O F  I N D O N E S I A ,  A S  
A M E N D E D  B Y  T H E  F I R S T ,  S E C O N D ,  
T H I R D  A N D  F O U R T H  A M E N D M E N T S 1 1 o 1  
T H E P R E A M B L E T O T H E  
C O N S T I T U T I O N  
: N o  c h a n g e .  
1
7
0 6  T h i s  t a b l e  i s  t a k e n  · w i t h  s o m e  r e v i s i o n s  f r o m  t h e  A s i a n  L a w  C e n t e r ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M e l b o u r n e ,  
< h t t p : / / w w w . l a w . u n i m e l b . e d u . a u / a l c /  a s s e t s / 1 9 4 5  I n d o  C o n s t i t u t i o n . p d f >  a t  3 1  J u n e  2 0 0 4 .  
1 7 0 7  T h e  s y m b o l s  * ) ,  * * ) ,  * * * )  a n d  * * * * )  i n d i c a t e  t h e  F i r s t ,  S e c o n d ,  T h i r d  a n d  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
3 3 0  
331 
C h a p t e r  I l l .  T h e  E x e c u t i v e  P o w e r  
A r t i c l e  4  
1 .  T h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  
I n d o n e s i a  s h a l l  h o l d  t h e  p o w e r  o f  
g o v e r n m e n t  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  ( N o  C h a n g e )  
2 .  I n  e x e r c i s i n g  h i s  d u t i e s ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
s h a l l  b e  a s s i s t e d  b y  a  Vice~President. 
( N o  C h a n g e )  
A r t i c l e  5  
1 .  T h e  P r e s i d e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  s u b m i t  
B i l l s  t o  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t .  
* )  
2 .  T h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  m a k e  g o v e r n m e n t  
r e g u l a t i o n s  t o  ·  e x p e d i t e  t h e  
e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  l a w s .  ( N o  C h a n g e )  
A r t i c l e  6  
3 3 2  
1 .  C a n d i d a t e s  f o r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e  
V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  m u s t  h a v e  b e e n  
I n d o n e s i a n  c i t i z e n s  s i n c e  b i r t h ,  m u s t  
n e v e r  h a v e  t a k e n  o t h e r  c i t i z e n s h i p  o f  
t h e i r  o w n  a c c o r d ,  m u s t  n e v e r  h a v e  
c o m m i t t e d  r e a s o n ,  a n d  m u s t  b e  
m e n t a l l y  a n d  p h y s i c a l l y  a b l e  t o  c a r r y  
o u t  t h e  d u t i e s  a n d  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t .  * * * )  
2 .  F u r t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  b e c o m i n g  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  b e  
r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  * * * )  
6 A  
T h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e  V i c e  
P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  b e  e l e c t e d  a s  a  
p a i r  d i r e c t l y  b y  t h e  p e o p l e .  * * * )  
2 .  T h e  p a i r s  o f  P r e s i d e n t i a l  a n d  V i c e  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  s h a l l  b e  
p r o p o s e d  b y  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  o r  
g r o u p s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  t h a t  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  
b e f o r e  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  a r e  
c o n d u c t e d .  * * * )  
3 .  T h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  a n d  V i c e  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  p a i r  t h a t  
r e c e i v e s  m o r e  t h a n  f i f t y  p e r  c e n t  
o f  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  v o t e s  i n  t h e  
g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  a n d  r e c e i v e s  n o  
l e s s  t h a n  t w e n t y  p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  
v o t e s  i n  a  p r o v i n c e  i n  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,;,;,, 
President and Vice President. ***) 
4. In the event that no Presidential 
and Vice Presidential candidate 
pair is elected, the people shall 
directly choose between the two 
candidate pairs that received the 
most number of votes in the 
general elections, and the pair 
that receives the highest number 
of votes shall be appointed 
President and Vice President. 
****) 
5. Further procedures for conducting 
the election of the President and 
the Vice President shall be 
regulated by law. ***) 
Article 7 
The President and Vice-President shall hold 
office for a term of five years, and shall be 
eligible for re-election to the same office for 
one further term. *) 
The President and/or the Vice President may 
be removed from office during their term by 
the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat on the 
advice of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, if 
they are either proven to have violated the law 
by engaging in treason, corruption, other high 
crimes or misdemeanors or, or proven to no 
7::,r~II~'Y:I!~ longer fulfill the requirements of the office of President and/or Vice President. ***) 
;c,f,;:di&ik:;i;Zii Article 78 
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1. An advice to remove the President 
and/or Vice President from office may 
only be submitted by the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat to the Majelis 
Perwakilan Rakyat if it has already 
requested the Constitutional Court to 
investigate, try, and decide on the 
opinion of the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat that the President and/or the 
Vice President has violated the law by 
engaging in treason, corruption, 
bribery, another serious criminal 
offence, or disgraceful conduct, 
and/or the opinion that the President 
3 3 4  
a n d / o r .  t h e  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  n o  l o n g e r  
f u l f i l l  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d / o r  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t .  * * * )  
2 .  T h e  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
R a k y a t  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d / o r  t h e  
V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  h a v e  c o m m i t t e d  s u c h  
v i o l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  l a w  o r  n o  l o n g e r  f u l f i l l  
t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d / o r  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  i n  
t h e  c o u r s e  o ( - . - - c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e  
s u p e r v i s o r y  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  D e w a n  
P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t .  * * * )  
3 .  A  r e q u e s t  b y  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
R a k y a t  t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  
m a y  o n l y  b e  s u b m i t t e d  w i t h  t h e  
s u p p o r t  o f  a t  l e a s t  t w o - t h i r d s  o f  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D e w a n  
P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  p r e s e n t  a t  a  
p l e n a r y  m e e t i n g  t h a t  i s  a t t e n d e d  b y  a t  
l e a s t  t w o - t h i r d s  o f  t h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
R a k y a t .  * * * )  
4 .  T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Q o u r t  i s  o b l i g e d  t o  
i n v e s t i g a t e ,  t r y  a n d  d e c i d e  w i t h  t h e  
g r e a t e s t  p o s s i b l e  j u s t i c e  a n d  f a i r n e s s  
o n  t h i s  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  D e w a n  
P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  n o  m o r e  t h a n  
n i n e t y  d a y s  a f t e r  t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  t h e  
D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  i s  r e c e i v e d  
b y  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t .  * * * )  
5 .  I f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  h a s  
d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d / o r  t h e  
V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  h a s  b e e n  p r o v e n  t o  
h a v e  v i o l a t e d  t h e  l a w  b y  e n g a g i n g  i n  
t r e a s o n ,  c o r r u p t i o n ,  b r i b e r y ,  a n o t h e r  
s e r i o u s  c r i m i n a l  a c t ,  o r  d i s g r a c e f u l  
c o n d u c t ,  a n d / o r  i t  i s  p r o v e n  t h a t  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d / o r  t h e  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  
n o  l o n g e r  f u l f i l l  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  
t h e  o f f i c e  o f  P r e s i d e n t  a n d / o r  V i c e  
P r e s i d e n t ,  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
R a k y a t  s h a l l  h o l d  a  p l e n a r y  m e e t i n g  
t o  s u b m i t  a d v i c e  f o r  t h e  r e m o v a l  f r o m  
o f f i c e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d / o r  t h e  V i c e .  
P r e s i d e n t  t o  t h e  M a j e l i s '  
P e r m u s y a w a r a t a n  R a k y a t .  * * * )  
6 .  T h e  M a j e l i s  P e r m u s y a w a r a t a n  R a k y a t  
i s  o b l i g e d  t o  h o l d  a  s e s s i o n  t o  d e c i d e  
o n  t h i s  a d v i c e  o f  t h e  D e w a n  
P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  n o  l a t e r  t h a n  t h i r t y  
days after the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat receives 
the advice. ***) 
7. The decision of the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat on the 
advice for the removal from office of 
the President and/or Vice President 
must be made in a plenary meeting of 
the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
that is attended by at least 
threequarters of the total number of 
members and with the approval of at 
least two-thirds of the number of 
members present, after the President 
and/or Vice President· has had an 
opportunity to provide an explanation 
in a plenary meeting of the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat. ***) 
President· may not suspend and/or 
dissolve the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. ***) 
Article 8 
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1. If the President should die, resign, be 
removed from office, or become 
unable to perform his or her duties 
during his or her term of office, then 
he or she shall be replaced by the 
Vice President for the remainder of 
the term. ***) 
2. If the office of Vice President 
becomes vacant, the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall hold a 
session within sixty days to elect a 
Vice President from two candidates 
proposed by the President. ***) 
3. If the President and the Vice 
President should die, resign, be 
removed from office, or become 
unable to perform their duties during 
their term of office at the same time, 
the joint executors of presidential 
duties shall be the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, the Minister for 
Internal Affairs, and the Minister of 
Defense. Within thirty days, the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
must hold a session to elect a 
President and a Vice President from 
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t w o  p a i r s  o f  P r e s i d e n t i a l  a n d  · V i c e  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  p r o p o s e d  b y  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  o r  g r o u p s  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  w h o s e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  
a n d  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  p a i r s  
r e c e i v e d  t h e  f i r s t  a n d  s e c o n d  h i g h e s t  
n u m b e r  o f  v o t e s  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n ,  f o r  t h e  r e m a i n d e r  o f  
t h e  c u r r e n t  t e r m  o f  o f f i c e .  * * * * )  
A r t i c l e  9  
1 .  B e f o r e  a s s u m i n g  o f f i c e ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
a n d  t h e  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  t a k e  t h e  
o a t h  o f  o f f i c e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  
r e l i g i o n s ,  o r  s o l e m n l y  p r o m i s e  b e f o r e  
t h e  M a j e l i s  P e r m u s y a w a r a t a n  R a k y a t  
o r  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  a s  
f o l l o w s :  
T h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  ( V i c e  P r e s i d e n t ' s )  
O a t h  
" I n  t h e  n a m e  o f  G o d  A l m i g h t y ,  I  s w e a r  
t h a t  I  w i l l  p e r f o r m  t h e  d u t i e s  o f  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  ( V i c e - P r e s i d e n t )  o f  t h e  
R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a  t o  t h e  b e s t  o f  
m y  a b i l i t y  a n d  a s  j u s t l y  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  
a n d  t h a t  I  w i l l  s t r i c t l y  o b s e r v e  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  c o n s i s t e n t l y  
i m p l e m e n t  t h e  l a w  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  
t h e  s e r v i c e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a n d  t h e  
p e o p l e . "  
.  T h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  ( V i c e  P r e s i d e n t ' s )  
P r o m i s e  
" I  s o l e m n l y  p r o m i s e  t h a t  I  w i l l  p e r f o r m  
t h e  d u t i e s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  ( V i c e -
P r e s i d e n t )  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  
I n d o n e s i a  t o  t h e  b e s t  o f  m y  a b i l i t y  a n d  
a s  j u s t l y  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  a n d  t h a t  I  w i l l  
s t r i c t l y  o b s e r v e  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  i m p l e m e n t  t h e  l a w  a n d  
r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r y  a n d  t h e  p e o p l e . "  * )  
2 .  I f  t h e  M a j e l i s  P e r m u s y a w a r a t a n  
R a k y a t  i s  u n a b l e  t o  h o l d  a  s e s s i o n ,  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  
s h a l l  s w e a r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  r e l i g i o n  
3 3 6  
~(~~icle 1~/):;i~fffftf:;; )i£5)> , \;,h;,;; >,J Article 13 
!"; ';; c1~ }h~, f;feside9~;~~RPe>,int~j~p1p?~sCI~9f~~~ 1. The President appoints ambassadors 
if and consuls:;ffiifi!', ; '<Y:j}l!/L ':!ffi:jh11 and consuls. (No Change) 
,. ::~;?,~ ~The / Pr~sidents,' ;r~~~ive~h:}th~' 2. In appointing ambassadors, President 
~djf'1'1'< , cre,d~ntials offor~ign amb?~sadors./;;::~ shall have regard advice of the 
, , · ; C!fff:i:< ¥!1!'!/1 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. *) 
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3. The President shall receive 
appointment of ambassadors other 
countries, having the advice of the 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. *) 
A r t i c l e  1 4  
1 .  T h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  g r a n t  p a r d o n s  
a n d  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  r i g h t s ,  h a v i n g  
r e g a r d  t o  t h e  a d v i c e  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  
C o u r t . * )  
2 .  T h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  g r a n t  a m n e s t i e s  
a n d  a b o l i t i o n s ,  h a v i n g  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  
a d v i c e  o f  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
R a k y a t .  * )  
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C h a p t e r  I V .  T h e  S u p r e m e  A d v i s o r y  
C o u n c i l  
( D e l e t e d )  * * * * )  
C h a p t e r  V .  T h e  M i n i s t e r s  o f  s t a t e  
A r t i c l e  1 7  
1 .  T h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  b e  a s s i s t e d  b y  
M i n i s t e r s  o f  s t a t e .  ( N o  C h a n g e )  
2 .  T h e s e  M i n i s t e r s  s h a l l  b e  a p p o i n t e d  
a n d  d i s m i s s e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  * )  
3 .  E a c h  M i n i s t e r  s h a l l  h o l d  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
p o r t f o l i o  i n  g o v e r n m e n t .  * )  
4 .  T h e  f o r m a t i o n ,  m o d i f i c a t i o n  a n d  
d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e  M i n i s t r i e s  s h a l l  
b e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  * * * )  
Chaptery~.;Jhe ~egio~~l )  ; ,  C h a p t e r  V I .  T h e  R e g i o n a l  
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3 3 8 .  
1 
divided into Regencies (kabupaten) 
and Towns, and each of these 
Provinces, Regencies and Cities shall 
have Regional Governments, 
regulated by law. **) 
2. The Regional Governments of 
Provinces, Regencies and Towns 
shall' themselves regulate and 
administer matters of government on 
the basis of autonomy and the duty of 
assistance. **) 
3. The Regional Governments of 
Provinces, Regencies and Towns 
shall have Regional People's 
Representative Councils (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) whose 
members are elected in general 
elections. **) 
4. Governors, Regents and Mayors shall 
be the respective heads of the 
Regional Governments of the 
Provinces, Regencies and Towns and 
shall be democratically elected.**) 
5. The Regional Governments . shall 
implement autonomy to the fullest 
extent except in matters of 
government that are determined by 
law to be matters for the Central 
· Government. **) 
6. The Regional Governments have the 
right to enact regional regulations and 
other regulations in order to 
implement autonomy and the duty of 
assistance.**) 
7. The structures and procedures for the 
administration of regional government 
shall be regulated by law. **) 
Article 18A 
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1. The relationship between the 
authority of the Central Government 
and that of the Regional Governments 
of Provinces, Regencies and Towns, 
or between the authority of the 
Provinces and that of the Regencies 
and Towns, shall be regulated by law, 
having regard to the uniqueness and 
diversity of the regions. **) 
2. The relationships of finance, public 
s e r v i c e s ,  a n d  t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  n a t u r a l  
r e s o u r c e s  a n d  o t h e r  r e s o u r c e s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  C e n t r a l  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  
t h e  R e g i o n a l  G o v e r n m e n t s  s h a l l  b e  
r e g u l a t e d  a n d  i m p l e m e n t e d  j u s t l y  a n d  
h a r m o n i o u s l y  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  l a w .  
* * )  
r e c o g n i z e s  a n d  r e s p e c t s  
p a r t i c u l a r  P r o v i n c i a l  G o v e r n m e n t s  
w h i c h  h a v e  a  s p e c i a l  o r  u n i q u e  s t a t u s  
t h a t  i s  r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  * * )  
2 .  T h e  s t a t e  r e c o g n i z e s  a n d  r e s p e c t s  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o m m u n i t i e s  o f  
t r a d i t i o n a l  l a w  a n d  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  
r i g h t s  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e y  s u r v i v e ,  a n d  i n  c  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  !  
t h e  c o m m u n i t y  a n d  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  
U n i t a r y  s t a t e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  
I n d o n e s i a ,  a s  r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  * * )  
C h a p t e r  V I I .  T h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
R a k y a t  
A r t i c l e  1 9  
3 4 0  
1 .  T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D e w a n  
P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  s h a l l  b e  e l e c t e d  i n  
a  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n .  
2 .  T h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  D e w a n  
P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  s h a l l  b e  r e g u l a t e d  
b y l a w .  
3 .  T h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  s h a l l  
m e e t  a t  l e a s t  o n c e  a  y e a r .  
T h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  s h a l l  
h a v e  t h e  p o w e r  t o  m a k e  l a w s .  * )  
2 .  E v e r y  B i l l  s h a l l  b e  d i s c u s s e d  b y  t h e  
D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  a n d  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  i n  o r d e r  t o  r e a c h  m u t u a l  
a s s e n t . * )  
3 .  I f  a  B i l l  d o e s  n o t  o b t a i n  m u t u a l  a s s e n t ,  
t h e  B i l l  s h a l l  n o t  b e  r e s u b m i t t e d  
d u r i n g  t h e  s a m e  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  
D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t .  * )  
4 .  T h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  s i g n  i n t o  l a w  
t h o s e  B i l l s  t h a t  h a v e  o b t a i n e d  m u t u a l  
a s s e n t . * )  
5 .  I n  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  a  B i l l  t h a t  h a s  
assent not signed 
into law by the President within thirty 
days from the time it was mutually 
assented to, the Bill may legitimately 
become law and must be enacted as 
law.**) 
Article 20A 
1. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall 
have legislative, budgetary, and 
supervisory functions. **) 
2. In carrying out its functions, besides 
the rights provided for elsewhere in 
this Constitution, the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat has the right of 
interpellation, the right of angket [that 
is, the right to carry out inquiries], and 
the right to express its opinion. **) 
3. Besides the rights provided for 
elsewhere in this Constitution, each 
member of the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat has the right to submit 
questions, the right to convey 
suggestions and opinions and a right 
of immunity. **) 
4. Further stipulations concerning the 
rights of the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat and the rights of the members 
of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall 
. be regulated by law. **) 
The members of the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat have the right to submit a bill. *) 
Article 22 
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1. In the event of a compelling 
emergency, the President has the 
right to issue government regulations 
in lieu of laws. (No Change) 
2. Such regulations must obtain the 
assent of the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat during its subsequent session. 
I  
'  
i !  
l  
( N o  C h a n g e )  
3 .  W h e r e  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  D e w a n  i s  
n o t  o b t a i n e d ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
r e g u l a t i o n s  s h a l l  b e  r e v o k e d .  ( N o  
C h a n g e )  
A r t i c l e  2 2 A  
F u r t h e r  s t i p u l a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  
p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  t h e  e n a c t m e n t  o f  l a w s  s h a l l  b e  
r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  * * )  
A r t i c l e  2 2 8  
T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
R a k y a t  m a y  b e  r e m o v e d  f r o m  o f f i c e ,  i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  
p r o v i d e d  b y  l a w .  * * )  
P e r w a k i l a n  
'  A r t i c l e  2 2 C  
1 .  T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D e w a n  
P e r w a k i l a n  D a e r a h  a r e  e l e c t e d  f r o m  
e a c h  P r o v i n c e  t h r o u g h  g e n e r a l  
e l e c t i o n s .  * * * )  
2 .  T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D e w a n  
P e r w a k i l a n  D a e r a h  f r o m  e a c h  
P r o v i n c e  s h a l l  b e  o f  e q u a l  n u m b e r ,  
a n d  t h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  m e m b e r s  o f  
t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  D a e r a h  s h a l l  
b e  n o  . m o r e  t h a n  o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e ·  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
R a k y a t .  * * * )  
3 .  T h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  D a e r a h  s h a l l  
s i t  i n  s e s s i o n  a t  l e a s t  o n c e  a  y e a r .  * * * )  
4 .  T h e  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  
D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  D a e r a h  s h a l l  b e  
r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  * * * )  
A r t i c l e  2 2 0  
3 4 2  
1 .  T h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  D a e r a h  c a n  
s u b m i t  B i l l s  t o  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
R a k y a t  t h a t  r e l a t e  t o  r e g i o n a l  
a u t o n o m y ;  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  .  
t h e  c e n t r e  a n d  t h e  r e g i o n s ;  t h e  
f o r m a t i o n ,  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  i n c l u s i o n  
o f  t h e  r e g i o n s ;  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  
n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  o t h e r  e c o n o m i c  
r e s o u r c e s ;  a n d  t h e  f i s c a l  b a l a n c e  
b e t w e e n  t h e  c e n t r e  a n d  t h e  r e g i o n s .  
r···· 
***) 
2. The Dewan Perwakilan Daerah 
participates in the discussion of Bills 
that relate to regional autonomy; the 
relationship between the centre and 
the regions; the formation, 
development and inclusion of the 
regions; the management of natural 
resources and other economic 
resources; and the fiscal balance 
between the centre and the regions; 
and it also submits its advice to the 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat regarding 
Bills concerning the state Budget and 
Bills concerning taxes, education and 
religion.***) 
3. The Dewan Perwakilan Daerah may 
supervise the implementation of laws 
concerning: regional autonomy; the 
formation, development and inclusion 
of the regions; the relationship 
between the centre and the regions; 
the management of natural resources 
and other economic resources; the 
implementation of the state Budget; 
taxes; education; and religion; and to 
submit the results of its supervision to 
the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat as 
material for consideration and further 
action. ***) 
4. The members of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Daerah may be removed 
from office in a manner that complies 
with conditions and procedures 
regulated by law. ***) 
VIIB. General Election 
· Article 22E 
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1. General Elections shall be conducted 
in a direct, general, free, secret, 
honest and fair manner once every 
five years. ***) · 
2. General elections, shall be conducted 
to elect the members of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan 
Perwakilan Daerah, the President and 
Vice-President, and the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah. ***) 
3. The - participants in the general 
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
R a k y a t  a n d  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e ·  
D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  D a e r a h  
a r e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  * * * )  
4 .  T h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  ·  g e n e r a l  
e l e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  
D a e r a h  a r e  i n d i v i d u a l s .  * * * )  
5 .  T h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  s h a l l  b e  
o r g a n i z e d  b y  a  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  o f  a  
n a t i o n a l ,  p e r m a n e n t ,  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  
c h a r a c t e r .  * * * )  
6 .  F u r t h e r  p r o v i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  g e n e r a l  
e l e c t i o n s  s h a l l  b e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  
* * * )  
C h a p t e r  V I I I .  F i n a n c e  
A r t i c l e  2 3  
1 .  T h e  s t a t e  B u d g e t ,  a s  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  
t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  f i n a n c e s  o f  
t h e  s t a t e ,  s h a l l  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  e a c h  
y e a r  b y  l a w  a n d  i m p l e m e n t e d  o p e n l y  
a n d  w i t h  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  
g r e a t e s t  p r o s p e r i t y  o f  t h e  p e o p l e .  * * * )  
2 .  T h e  s t a t e  B u d g e t  B i l l  i s  s u b m i t t e d  b y  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  b e  d i s c u s s e d  w i t h  t h e  
D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  a n d  t a k i n g  
i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t h e  a d v i c e  o f  t h e  
D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  D a e r a h .  * * * )  
3 .  I f  t h e  D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  d o e s  
n o t  a g r e e  t o  t h e  s t a t e  B u d g e t  B i l l  
s u b m i t t e d  b y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  t h e  
G o v e r n m e n t  s h a l l  a d o p t  t h e  s t a t e  
B u d g e t  o f  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  y e a r .  * * * )  
T a x e s  a n d  o t h e r  l e v i e s  f o r  t h e  n e e d s  o f  t h e  
•  s t a t e  t h a t  a r e  c o m p u l s o r y  i n  n a t u r e  s h a l l  b e  
r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  * * * )  
A r t i c l e  2 3 8  
T h e  f o r m s  a n d  d e n o m i n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n c y  
s h a l l  b e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  * * * )  
A r t i c l e  2 3 C  
O t h e r  m a t t e r s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  f i n a n c e s  o f  t h e  




'"',"'",/f",, The state possesses a central bank, the 
structure, position, authority, responsibilities, 
and independence of which are regulated by 
law.****) 
Article 23E 
1. In order to review the management of 
and responsibility over the finances of 
the state, a free and independent 
Audit Body shall be formed.***) 
2. The results of an audit of the finances 
of the state shall be submitted to the 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the 
Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, and the 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, in 
accordance with their respective 
authority. ***) 
3. The results of such an audit shall be 
acted on by a representative body 
and/or another board in accordance 
with the law. ***) 
Article 23F 
1. The members of the Audit Body are 
chosen by the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, taking into consideration the 
advice of the Dewan Perwakilan 
Daerah, and approved by the 
President. ***) 
2. The Chairperson of the Audit Body 
shall be elected from and by its 
members. ***) 
Article 23G 
1. The Audit Body shall be located in the 
capital city, and have representative 
offices in each province. ***) 
2. Further provisions regarding the Audit 
Body shall be determined by law. ***) 
Chapter IX. The Judicial Power 
Article 24 
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1. The judicial power is the independent 
power to maintain a system of courts 
with the objeCtive of upholding law 
a n d  j u s t i c e .  * * * )  
2 .  T h e  j u d i c i a l  p o w e r  i s  e x e r c i s e d  b y  a  
S u p r e m e  C o u r t  a n d  t h e  c o u r t s  b e l o w  
i t  i n  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  e n v i r o n m e n t s  o f  
p u b l i c  c o u r t s ,  r e l i g i o u s  c o u r t s ,  m i l i t a r y  
c o u r t s ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o u r t s  a n d  b y  a  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t .  * * * )  
3 .  O t h e r  b o d i e s  w i t h  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  r e l a t e  
t o  j u d i c i a l  p o w e r  a r e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  
* * * )  
T h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  h a s  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  
t o  h e a r  m a t t e r s  a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
c a s s a t i o n ,  t o  r e v i e w  r e g u l a t i o n s  t h a t  
a r e  b e l o w  l e g i s l a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  a n d  i t  h a s  o t h e r  a u t h o r i t y  
a s  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  l a w .  * * * )  
2 .  J u s t i c e s  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  m u s t  
p o s s e s s  i n t e g r i t y  a n d  i r r e p r o a c h a b l e  
c h a r a c t e r  a n d  b e  j u s t ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l ,  
a n d  h a v e  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  
l a w . * * * )  
3 .  C a n d i d a t e s  f o r  J u s t i c e s  o f  t h e  
S u p r e m e  C o u r t  s h a l l  b e  s u b m i t t e d  b y  
t h e  J u d i c i a l  C o m m i s s i o n  t o  t h e  
D e w a n  P e r w a k i l a n  R a k y a t  f o r  
a p p r o v a l  a n d  t h e n  b e  c o n f i r m e d  b y  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  * * * )  
4 .  T h e  C h i e f  J u s t i c e  a n d  D e p u t y  C h i e f  
J u s t i c e  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  s h a l l  b e  
e l e c t e d  f r o m  a n d  b y  t h e  J u s t i c e s  o f  
t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t .  * * * )  
5 .  T h e  s t r u c t u r e ,  p o s i t i o n ,  m e m b e r s h i p  
a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  
a n d  t h e  l e g a l  b o d i e s  b e l o w  i t  s h a l l  b e  
r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  * * * )  
.  A r t i c l e  2 4 8  
3 4 6  
1 .  A n  i n d e p e n d e n t  J u d i c i a l  C o m m i s s i o n  
s h a l l  h a v e  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  s u g g e s t  t h e  
a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  J u s t i c e s  o f  t h e  
S u p r e m e  C o u r t  a n d  s h a l l  h a v e  f u r t h e r  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  p r o t e c t  a n d  u p h o l d  t h e  
h o n o r ,  d i g n i t y  a n d  t h e  g o o d  b e h a v i o r  
o f  j u d g e s .  * * * )  
2 .  T h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  J u d i c i a l  
C o m m i s s i o n  m u s t  p o s s e s s  
k n o w l e d g e  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  t h e  f i e l d  
o f  l a w ,  i n t e g r i t y ,  a n d  i r r e p r o a c h a b l e  
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character. ***) 
3. The members of the Judicial 
Commission are appointed and 
removed by the President with the 
agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat. ***) 






be regulated by 
The Constitutional Court has the 
authority to hear matters at the lowest 
and highest levels and to make final 
decisions in the review of legislation 
against . the Constitution, the 
settlement of disputes regarding the 
authority of state bodies whose 
authority .is given by the Constitution, 
the dissolution of political parties, and 
the settlement of disputes concerning 
the results of general elections. ***) 
2. The Constitutional Court has the duty 
to adjudicate on the opinion of the 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat regarding 
allegations of misconduct by the 
President and/or the Vice President in 
accordance with the Constitution.***) 
3. The Constitutional Court is comprised 
of nine constitutional judges who are 
appointed by the President, of whom 
three are proposed by the Supreme 
Court, three by the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, and three by the President. 
***) 
4. The Chairperson and Vice 
Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Court are elected from and by the 
constitutional judges. ***) 
5. Constitutional judges must possess 
integrity and irreproachable character, 
be just, be statespersons who fully 
understand the Constitution and 
administrative law, and must not hold 
government office. ***) 
6. The appointment and removal of 
constitutional judges, the procedural 
rules of the Constitutional Court and 
other provisions · regarding the 
A r t i c l e  2 5  
T h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  a n d  d i s m i s s a l  o f  j u d g e s  s h a l l  
b e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  ( N o  C h a n g e )  
A r t i c l e  2 5 A  
T h e  U n i t a r y  s t a t e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a  
i s  a n  a r c h i p e l a g i c  s t a t e  w h i c h  p o s s e s s e s  
t e r r i t o r y ,  t h e  d e m a r c a t i o n s  a n d  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  
w h i c h  a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  l a w .  * * )  
C h a p t e r  X .  C i t i z e n s  a n d  I n h a b i t a n t s  
A r t i c l e  2 6  
1 .  C i t i z e n s  a r e  n a t i v e  I n d o n e s i a n  
p e r s o n s  a n d  p e r s o n s  o f  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  
w h o  h a v e  a c q u i r e d  a  l e g a l  s t a t u s  a s  
c i t i z e n s .  ( N o  C h a n g e )  
2 .  I n h a b i t a n t s  a r e  I n d o n e s i a n  c i t i z e n s  
a n d  f o r e i g n  p e r s o n s  w h o  r e s i d e  i n  
I n d o n e s i a .  * * )  
3 .  M a t t e r s  r e l a t i n g  t o  c i t i z e n s  a n d  
i n h a b i t a n t s  a r e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  * * )  
A l l  c i t i z e n s  h a v e  e q u a l  s t a t u s  b e f o r e  
t h e  l a w  a n d  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  s h a l l  
a b i d e  b y  t h e  l a w  a n d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
w i t h o u t  a n y  e x c e p t i o n .  ( N o  C h a n g e )  
2 .  E v e r y  c i t i z e n  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  w o r k  a n d  
t o  l i v e  i n  h u m a n  d i g n i t y .  ( N o  C h a n g e )  
3 .  E v e r y  c i t i z e n  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  a n d  d u t y  t o  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  d e f e n s e  o f  t h e  
n a t i o n . * * )  
A r t i c l e  2 8  
F r e e d o m  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  a n d  a s s e m b l y ,  o f  
v e r b a l  a n d  w r i t t e n  e x p r e s s i o n  a n d  t h e  l i k e ,  
s h a l l  b e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  ( N o  C h a n g e )  
A r t i c l e  2 8 A  
E a c h  p e r s o n  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  l i v e  a n d  h a s  t h e  
r i g h t  t o  d e f e n d  t h e i r  l i f e  a n d  t h e i r  l i v i n g . * * )  
3 4 8  
Article 288 
1. Each person has the right to form a 
family and to continue their family line 
through legitimate marriage. **) 
2. Each child has the right to viable life, 
growth and development, and to 
protection from violence and 
Each person has the right to develop 
themselves through the fulfillment of 
their basic needs, the right to 
education and to obtain benefit from 
science and technology, art and 
culture, in order to improve the quality 
of their life and the welfare of the 
human race. **) 
2. Each person has the right to advance 
themselves in struggling to obtain 
their collective rights to develop their 




1. Each person has the right to the 
recognition, the security, the 
protection and the certainty of just 
laws and equal treatment before the 
law.**) 
2. Each person has the right to work and 
to receive just and appropriate 
rewards and treatment in their 
working relationships. **) 
3. Each citizen has the right to obtain 
the same opportunities in 
government. **) 
4. Each person has the right to 
citizenship. **) 
Each person is free to profess their 
religion and to worship in accordance 
with their religion, to choose their 
education and training, their 
occupation, their citizenship, their 
place of residence within the territory 
of the state ''and to leave it and to 
.~•jC,'C,.<·.<.< •  
r e t u r n  t o  
2 .  E a c h  p e r s o n  h a s  t h e  f r e e d o m  t o  
p o s s e s s  c o n v i c t i o n s  a n d  b e l i e f s ,  a n d  
t o  e x p r e s s  t h e i r  t h o u g h t s  a n d  
a t t i t u d e s  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e i r  
c o n s c i e n c e .  * * )  
3 .  E a c h  p e r s o n  h a s ·  t h e  f r e e d o m  t o  
a s s o c i a t e ,  g a t h e r ,  a n d  e x p r e s s  t h e i r  
o p i n i o n s .  * * )  
A r t i c l e  2 8 F  
E a c h  p e r s o n  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  c o m m u n i c a t e  
a n d  t o  o b t a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e v e l o p  
l
ljjj~j t h e m s e l v e s  a n d  t h e i r  s o c i a l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  a n d  
t h e  r i g h t  t o  s e e k  o u t ,  o b t a i n ,  p o s s e s s ,  s t o r e ,  
p r o c e s s ,  a n d  t r a n s m i t  i n f o r m a t i o n  u s i n g  a n y  
/~~~~~~4~11!~1 m e a n s  a v a i l a b l e .  * * )  
E a c h  p e r s o n  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  t h e  
p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e m s e l v e s ,  t h e i r  f a m i l y ,  
t h e i r  h o n o r ,  t h e i r  d i g n i t y ,  t h e  p r o p e r t y  
t h a t  i s  i n  t h e i r  c o n t r o l ,  a n d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
f e e l  s a f e  a n d  t o  b e  p r o t e c t e d  f r o m  t h e  
t h r e a t s  o f  f e a r  f r o m  d o i n g  o r  n o t  d o i n g  
s o m e t h i n g  t h a t  i s  a  b a s i c  r i g h t . * * )  
2 .  E a c h  p e r s o n  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  b e  f r e e  
f r o m  t o r t u r e  o r  t r e a t m e n t  t h a t  l o w e r s  
h u m a n  d i g n i t y  a n d  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
o b t a i n  p o l i t i c a l  a s y l u m  f r o m  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s .  * * )  
A r t i c l e  2 8 H  
3 5 0  
1 .  E a c h  p e r s o n  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  p h y s i c a l  
a n d  s p i r i t u a l  w e l f a r e ,  t o  h a v e  a  h o m e ,  
t o  h a v e  a  g o o d  a n d  h e a l t h y  l i v i n g  
e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  t o  o b t a i n  h e a l t h  
s e r v i c e s .  * * )  
2 .  E a c h  p e r s o n  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
a s s i s t a n c e  a n d  s p e c i a l  t r e a t m e n t  i n  
o r d e r  t o  g a i n  t h e  s a m e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
a n d  b e n e f i t s  i n  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  
e q u a l i t y  a n d  j u s t i c e .  * * )  
3 .  E a c h  p e r s o n  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y  t h a t  a l l o w s  t h e i r  f u l l  p e r s o n a l  
d e v e l o p m e n t  a s  a  h u m a n  b e i n g . * * )  
4 .  E a c h  p e r s o n  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  p r i v a t e  
p r o p e r t y  a n d  t h i s  r i g h t  m a y  n o t  b e  
a r b i t r a r i l y  i n t e r f e r e d  w i t h  b y  a n y o n e  a t  
a l l . * * )  
Article 281 
1. The right to live, the right not to be 
tortured, the right to freedom of 
thought and conscience, the right not 
to be enslaved, the right to be 
individually recognized by the law, 
and the right not to be prosecuted 
under retrospective laws are basic 
human rights that may not be 
interfered with under any 
circumstances at all. **) 
2. · Each person has the fright to be free 
from discriminatory treatment on any 
grounds and has the right to obtain 
protection from such discriminatory 
treatment. **) 
3. Cultural identity and the rights of 
traditional communities are respected 
in accordance with the continuing 
development of civilization over time. 
**) 
4. The protection, advancement, 
upholding and fulfillment of basic 
human rights is the responsibility of 
the state, especially the Government. 
**) 
5. In order to uphold and protect basic 
human rights in accordance with the 
principle of a democratic state ruled 
by laws, the implementation of human 
rights shall be guaranteed, regulated 




1. Each person is obliged to respect the 
basic human rights of others in 
orderly life as a community, as a 
people, and as a nation. **) 
2. In the enjoyment of their rights and 
freedoms, each person is obliged to 
submit to the limits determined by 
law, with the sole purpose of 
guaranteeing recognition and respect 
for the rights of others and to fulfill the 
requirements of justice and taking into 
consideratiorl morality, religious 
v a l u e s ,  s e c u r i t y ,  a n d  p u b l i c  o r d e r  i n  a  
d e m o c r a t i c  c o m m u n i t y .  * * )  
( N o  C h a n g e )  
A r t i c l e  2 9  
1 .  T h e  s t a t e  s h a l l  b e  b a s e d  u p o n  t h e  
b e l i e f  i n  t h e  O n e  a n d  O n l y  G o d .  
2 .  T h e  s t a t e  g u a r a n t e e s  a l l  p e r s o n s  
f r e e d o m  o f  r e l i g i o n  a n d  f r e e d o m  t o  
w o r s h i p  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  r e l i g i o n  a n d  
b e l i e f .  
C h a p t e r  X I I .  N a t i o n a l  D e f e n s e  a n d  
S e c u r i t y  
A r t i c l e  3 0  
3 5 2  
1 .  E a c h  c i t i z e n  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  a n d  d u t y  t o  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  n a t i o n a l  d e f e n s e  a n d  
s e c u r i t y .  * * )  
2 .  N a t i o n a l  d e f e n s e  a n d  s e c u r i t y  i s  
c a r r i e d  o u t  t h r o u g h  a  s y s t e m  o f  
u n i v e r s a l  p e o p l e ' s  d e f e n s e  a n d  
s e c u r i t y  b y  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  N a t i o n a l  
M i l i t a r y  a n d  t h e  s t a t e  P o l i c e  o f  t h e  
R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  a s  t h e  p r i m a r y  
f o r c e ,  a n d  t h e  p e o p l e ,  a s  s u p p o r t i n g  
f o r c e s . * * )  
3 .  T h e  I n d o n e s i a n  N a t i o n a l  M i l i t a r y  i s  
c o m p r i s e d  o f  t h e  A r m y ,  t h e  N a v y ,  a n d  
t h e  A i r  F o r c e  a s  i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  t h e  
s t a t e  w i t h  t h e  t a s k  o f  d e f e n d i n g ,  
p r o t e c t i n g  a n d  p r e s e r v i n g  t h e  u n i t y  
a n d  s o v e r e i g n t y  o f  t h e  s t a t e .  * * )  
4 .  T h e  s t a t e  P o l i c e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  
I n d o n e s i a  i s  a n  i n s t r u m e n t  o f  t h e  s t a t e  
t h a t  s a f e g u a r d s  t h e  s e c u r i t y  a n d  o r d e r  
o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y ,  w i t h  t h e  t a s k  o f  
p r o t e c t i n g ,  s h e l t e r i n g ,  a n d  s e r v i n g  t h e  
c o m m u n i t y ,  a n d  u p h o l d i n g  t h e  l a w .  * * )  
5 .  T h e  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  
I n d o n e s i a n  N a t i o n a l  M i l i t a r y  a n d  t h e  
s t a t e  P o l i c e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  
I n d o n e s i a ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  a u t h o r i t y  
b e t w e e n  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  N a t i o n a l  
M i l i t a r y  a n d  t h e  s t a t e  P o l i c e  o f  t h e  
R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  
t h e i r  t a s k s ,  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  t h e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  c i t i z e n s  i n  n a t i o n a l  
d e f e n s e  a n d  s e c u r i t y ,  a n d  m a t t e r s  
r e l a t i n g  t o  d e f e n s e  a n d  s e c u r i t y  s h a l l  
Article 33';'00:,~ ·· ............... < ,.: · '·•. ;:,·{·· .... 'o/p:!! . ,;; Article 33 
f;·, :_,--:- ~ ' ' ' ' ' ·'///'' ,<-/;;>"~,- .. _.,,,," ,•/,'!·,<·: _:· /,;:;;<:,/;> ·. ,;<·;fl,/1,/.---... :-::1/-~-,:;: ~f · 11 1P,~. econ6rryy,,~ha1J;/9be ?%9dani3~~.as~'i•~ 1. The economyd shall be organized asha 
: ,,~pmrnpn endeavor; ase ·upo~ tpe'l common en eavor based upon t e 
priDSiple~tpf tp~Jarl!iJY.sY2J9fT! .. '0~,·~;~ principles of the family system. (No 
Sectors .·• of;~r production •. , that are , Change) 
;'~';•(:,/, • /'/!/;! ''' ·· '1,/J'~/• ' ~ >'•, "/ ", ,;,'i/f/'- ,''•.· ~ '• ;;/' \'' ·-,i'!j:(''! ·:~-, I 
'lmportantfor the country;and affect;~ 2. Sectors of production that are 
;z J'/.; the :;j[ife ·of.· tO.~ p~ople(::'sh~ll~ be(J important for the country and affect 
; .. controlled ~y th~ stat~::% > ;/;;: 10, . ') the life of the people shall be 
3:.: TheiaDd, the waters and the natural( controlled by the state. (No Change) 
. :~'riqhes'': contai~ed therein'l'rshalf?; 9e~ 3. The land, the waters and the natural 
co~trolleci"by,tllestate,ahd exploited< riches contained therein shall be 
'dJothe:9reat~sJ R~n~fitq(th~.:p~ople::t.J controlled by· the state and exploited 
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( N o  C h a n g e )  
4 .  T h e  n a t i o n a l  eco~omy i s  o r g a n i z e d  
b a s e d  o n  e c o n o m i c  d e m o c r a c y  a n d  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t o g e t h e r n e s s ,  
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  j u s t i c e ,  s u s t a i n a b i l i t y ,  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a w a r e n e s s ,  s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y  a n d  b y  s a f e g u a r d i n g  t h e  
e q u i l i b r i u m  b e t w e e n  p r o g r e s s  a n d  t h e  
u n i t y  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m y .  * * * * )  
5 .  F u r t h e r  stipulations~ c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  A r t i c l e  s h a l l  b e  
r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w . * * * * )  
A r t i c l e  3 4  _  
1 .  T h e  p o o r  a n d  d e s t i t u t e  c h i l d r e n  s h a l l  
b e  c a r e d  f o r  b y  t h e  s t a t e .  * * * * )  
2 .  T h e  s t a t e  s h a l l  d e v e l o p  a  s y s t e m  o f  
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  f o r  a l l  t h e  p e o p l e  a n d  
s h a l l  e m p o w e r  t h e  w e a k  a n d  
i m p o v e r i s h e d  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  
h u m a n  d i g n i t y .  * * * * )  
3 .  T h e  s t a t e  s h a l l  b e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  
p r o v i s i o n  o f  s u i t a b l e  h e a l t h c a r e  
f a c i l i t i e s  a n d  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  f a c i l i t i e s .  
* * * * )  
4 .  F u r t h e r  s t i p u l a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  A r t i c l e  s h a l l  b e  
r e g u l a t e d  b y  l a w .  * * * * )  
_  _ _ t h e  
t h e  s t a t e  E m b l e m  a n d  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
A n t h e m  
A r t i c l e  3 5  
T h e  n a t i o n a l  f l a g  o f  I n d o n e s i a  s h a l l  b e  t h e  
H o n o r e d  R e d - a n d - W h i t e .  ( N o  C h a n g e )  
A r t i c l e  3 6  
T h e  n a t i o n a l  l a n g u a g e  o f  I n d o n e s i a  s h a l l  b e  
t h e  B a h a s a  I n d o n e s i a  o r  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  
l a n g u a g e .  ( N o  C h a n g e )  
T h e  s t a t e  e m b l e m  i s  t h e  G a r u d a  P a n c a s i / a ,  
w i t h  t h e  m o t t o ,  B h i n n e k a  T u n g g a l l k a .  * * )  
A r t i c l e  3 6 8  
T h e  n a t i o n a l  a n t h e m  i s  I n d o n e s i a  R a y a .  * * )  
3 5 4  
Article 36C _ 
Further stipulations regarding the national 
flag, the national language, the state emblem 
and the national anthem shall be regulated by 
law.**) 
Chapter XVI. Amendments to the 
Constitution 
1. A proposal to amend the Constitution 
may be placed on the agenda of a 
session of the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat if it is 
proposed by not less than one-third of 
the total number of members of the 
Majelis Permusywaratan Rakyat. ****) 
2. Each· proposal to amend the 
Constitution shall · be submitted in 
writing and shall clearly show the 
parts which are proposed to be 
. amended, with reasons. ****) 
3. In order to amend the Constitution, 
not less than twothirds of the total 
number of members of the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat must be 
present at the session. ****) 
4. Decisions to amend the Constitution 
shall be made with the agreement of 
not less than fifty per cent plus one 
member of the entire membership of 
the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. 
****) 
5. The form of the Unitary state of the 
Republic of Indonesia may not be 
amended.****) 
Articl.e I 
All regulations and legislation that are in force 
shall continue to have effect until new 
regulations and legislation are enacted under 
this Constitution. ****) 
Article II 
All state bodies that exist shall continue to 
function in so far as they implement the 
355 
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  u n t i l  n e w  
b o d i e s  a r e  f o r m e d  u n d e r  t h i s  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  
* * * * )  
t . A ' r t • ' ' I • • ' I I I W / 1 / j / •  , l ' " • i j l / ! 1 / / 1 1  · ' · 1 ' • 1 / · , •  . .  ' 1 /  ! j /
1
' 1 .  · · · · J " I I I ' • i ( l /
1
/  A r t "  I  I l l  
t  I C  e .  lj:f;;;;~.·f.,:.:>,,-,~·~,,;~;7'?~;:, :  ·%.;;>;;;/;,~,,:,>~f- '/;·,:?:~4;,:,:"'.·<<<;:'.~,/(>:" ·~<,/% I C  e  
> ;  . . . . . .  · ,  ·'"<_!>'-~'?'''"<'/ z . : , - , ,  / ; ' ; ; ; ? · > ' ' ' ' ' ,  ' ' ? : . ) , ' ; , > , ,  '•/[1/J;,~f:~·.'-c:<_;)?J</',;~-, /f,/~',1 ·  . .  :  . : ' / {  .  
~
1
Jhe~nr~tP~~~ig~nt·~n2~,YiCe~~~$e~i9~~nt w~nJB,~~ T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t  s h a l l  b e  f o r m e d  . a t  
~SQ/qs~UJ}bt JP~~/·~reB~~);gtory~>tRolllllJ}~~te~jJ!~r: t h e  lat~st . b y  1 7  A~gust 2 0 0 3  a n d  . b e f o : e  1 t s  
~.~.~.) . . . .  n.~ . .  90.~~e . . .  ~.SI·a . .  n . J  . .  n  . . . .  d~.pend~.n.~.S.~.~
1
·.· . .  ).~;~.~.·······.~.~.~.::%.;~.~~···./;i;;.;V,.;:: f o r m a t i O n  I t S  a u t h o n t y  s h a l l  b e  e x e r C I S e d  I n  f u l l  
~;;:;~·"" . .  -5·.-:,·<~rx·····;:.;i'i';, ·~:>· .·,7A··'i.~;~. : : ,  "/ih{ly',,_,:''''$;~,,,>=-, . .  i'i,;p/i<·f'i,~ b  t h  S  C  r t  
~??:/' >  . .  >:;.:~;;
1
·:.>:/:.· .//~·:,;:x~::<-~·'",·. i./.':!;::::~{Y?:<:~~r~~:<'M>:·I.--;:::_·:->J:~w/~; : - ; ; t l ; : ¢ J W : : · . · i :  y  e  u p r e m e  a u  .  
rl/~::::~·~cl'~~· . .  :!f!!c·l/:;;;qfl~········· . .  ··:~}~2:~if:c·· i.·.2c~i'.· . . .  
r..~f:t.icl•~ ·J~~l:•··· . .  ·•~r.tr.·· ;··~,iD~fi~~~~~tX!/~~.:/.-·:Jr' ·~~:;~~ 
~/~nti! tQ~ . .  i¥ai~U~. Eerm~~~~a~~r~ta0~~~~Yetf~~ 




?lac~qrd9nce:fVY'1th 2<thl~ · . · ·  . .  g~nst1t~t1~n~ ~:th~1r; 
~powers~; w i l l : ; i b e ' . : t u f l y .  el~rcisedtt b y f t t h e  ;  
~:':, , , '  . , , ' , , /  " - ' ) ; , ,  : ) / ; J , ' j - ' < ' " ' , : ,  '''"'~~~~ - ; , ' ,  " ' ' ' J J / " f / f , r , ' ' : ' · - » l f ' ( ' t / ' ; f f , ; '  ' _  . .  ,_,:;'~,;:->~~ 





::·.·.~--;~.: ~~·;;:·: · .  -~:.:>:/,*t.:t•(' . · : . · ; : . : ; , : ; ; : f f < · · .  .  · · : < - . · ·  . .  \  " >  ·:~~;, . ; ; ; f : ; ; > ; : v : ·  i ,  ;:;<{~!" /,-~::/1% 
~•}ADDITIONAtPROVISIONS ;·~ ! 1 1 £ :  v [ / / 3  A D D I T I O N A L  P R O V I S I O N S  
rf~:~~ ,Ji~···.~~.~,.~~~:+;.;i~ct' . .  ;:lf;·tJl·;~:::~~~~:· . . . .  ;  1  .  
' .  A r t 1 c l e . ·  .1;·~~•.·.·•.~ . . .  ·  . . . . . .  
1
J ! j i · · . · · i  . .  l · • x x . • ·  . .  · . · · / : .  ~.·~.1!./1.• . .  ·  • • . • .  ~, . . . . .  · . •  • ·  . .  ' . ·  A r t t c l e  I  
t ·  ,  : ; · f ( f ! / ' " >  ·///hS··:~';:·.:ec".· , / , ; ; ; ! j ; , l i / t · i • ' •  •  · . " h l ; / 1 / ) ' / < '  < / A f ? / ' , ' ,  . · · / ! ; ' / ; ; : ' ' >  _ _ _  i ' i  
~:\fl/jJ~i~"si~~"month"~~Jp!lo'vV!D9Tthe;\~nd~,P~f~,the~~ T h e  M a j e l i s  P e r m u s y a w a r a t a n  R a k y a t  s h a l l  
;  G r e a t k  E a s t  Asia#~ war,~. t i l e  P r e s i d e n t • i \ v i l l  i  c a r r y  o u t  a  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l  a n d  l e g a l  
(  -!/,~/'/'!;,"<<''' .,~,<··," -~ .  ' ' " . ; , • / _ , . l ; i . " ' , : ' '  , " ' · - · · : · > / , ( ; ' : :  :~-1."'(:. '/.:>::(1,;~/·i·,"' I ;  •  
t:.5Jrra~g~lang;:ll"rnR'ef11~;~h~·n m~tfers,,~)~pul~l~;g I  s t a t u s  o f  P r o v i s i o n a l  D e c r e e s  o f  t h e  M a j e l i s  
~Jl:,~hr~;gonsyt~~~~~n. z:ffi2;;~ ·  ~~~ :.p~ ~~{P~~:j Permus.y~waratan R a k y a t  a n d  t h e  D e c r e e s  o f  
r~~~:l/ w  ~~i<.:. < 1 f i / f i ; z . .  J ! . t ; » / ! t < '  I  ~••·· ~~ ~~~~~y! j  t h e  M a j e l l s  P e r m u s y a w a r a t a n  R a k y a t  t o  b e  
~~:;:>· C'·j~/:::::: '::~:-·:·'·_.:''" ; ; ; / . ,  .  -~:·: :·.!!~~/;;~~;'; '  J  Y/{J',~, · ; : : ; , / > : · - - ,  ' :  ( % / : ( ! : : : · : ·  . .  '  •  •  '  •  •  
z y t  A /  .  } I  •  !  ' !  ; 1 / Y l i f .  ! / !
1
1  /}~~ . . .  : :  d e C i d e d  o n  a t  t h e  2 0 0 3  S e S S I O n  o f  t h e  M a j e l l s  
r f ( J {  :  /fS!f~t .  . ;  . ; : ; ; ; .  ';./P?~~y 
1
1 ! /  .  ··1~ ~ 
1
1'~1~~~/ P e r m u s y a w a r a t a n  R a k y a t .  * * * * )  
f:f.::~ . .  ~p~f~:~ . ·  . . .  ~~;w~)\.·. ~:;sfB·P'iP.:I, ~~.1£ ~~ . ! i ! ! . < l  
; ' / . ! ; ; :  . .  1 . 1  " < 1 ' 1 ( ' •  . . . .  ~.·. ~.·.· . 1 . ' 1 1 · · . ·  • •  ~ • • •  ~.. . . .  • • •  •  ·.~·· •  • •  • • •  . •  •  . •  2~/.J . ; : ; . 1 ;  • . . . ' · :  • .  · . · " : .  { _  : · · .  ·  • .  · · .  ·  . . •  . .· /  ' . ·  • .  : : / . j / · · . 1 · · · · . 1 · · .  ·.~ . .  • · . •  . .  · - ; - · ;  /  :  • .  ·  . .  ·  •  · . · · " " " " , ' / ' . 1 1  . •  / ; ' ) · · . 1 . ! "  .·.··.··.~ .  ' . ·  . . •  . . ' . '  . • .  ~·.:··./ ' / :  ' ' ' ' : · · . · . · . · . · . 1 · 1 · / · . · . 1 · ( · 1 · ( \ / · ! · '  < < ' ' : ,  •  
WArtu:~l~fiiY\.::/f~// :w::l~; ;:;&
2
~:. ;~;/ > .  7 / f :  :  A r t t c l e  I I  
~:~!thih,';~jxjffiprytrsfX?~!!P'vVing~~Jti~~Jof:fu~ti~?.~:Rf ;  W i t h  t~e . f i n a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h i s  am~nd~ent o f  t h e  
~!h~;;.~gJ~hs•< . .  E;£fT1U~¥:?.'«~.r~t~D~I~~~/~~a~,A~~~~ Const1t~t1on1 t h e  19~5. Const1tu~1on o f  t h e  
ff~~j~hSJ'vV!II rn~~Jt?.cqg~rmth~PSpn~t}t~.ti?H1~% R e p u b l i C  o f  lndone~la I S  c o m p n s e d  o f  t h e  
r~:zw· ' : / i f i  •  ·  , , , . , ,  ~ ·  ; / 1 ! / ; i l : ; , i  · ' ' ' '  •  ·  : / >  • · ·  ~····1•/
1 
'  p r e a m b l e  a n d  t h e  A r t i c l e s  * * * * )  
~~'~/· ::~f~~~·;;~i.Ef ~;;.~fy~ :~{~;;t;;, •li)~~r .  
D e l e t e d .  
3 5 6  
Appendix 2: Sample of Questions for the Interview 
1. Why was it necessary to amend the 1945 Constitution? 
2. Which body should have the power to make and amend the Constitution? 
3. Do you think it would have been better for an independent commission to prepare (consult 
and decide about constitutional changes and put those changes into a draft legal form) the 
amendment process? 
4. Why did many MPR members not agree to give such powers to an independent 
commission? 
5. ·. Did Indonesia need a completely new Constitution or just amendments to the 1945 
Constitution? 
6. Were the step-by-step amendments of 1999-2002 an effective method of transforming the 
1945 Constitution into a more democratic document? 
7. What do you think were the strengths of this amendment process? 
8. What do you think were the weaknesses of this amendment process? 
9. Do you think the degree of public participation during the amendments was satisfactory? If 
not, why? Is that a problem? 
10. Is there any information about the first amendment process which has not been released to 
the general public but would help to explain how decisions were reached and why 
particular decision were taken? Please explain and give details if relevant. 
11. Is there any information about the second amendment process which has not been 
released to the general public but would help to explain how decisions were reached and 
why particular decision were taken? Please explain and give details if relevant. 
12. Is there any information about the third amendment process which has not been released 
to the general public but would help to explain how decisions were reached and why 
particular decision were taken? Please explain and give details if relevant. 
13. Is there any information about the fourth amendment process which has not been released 
to the general public but would help to explain how decisions were reached and why 
particular decision were taken? Please explain and give details if relevant. 
14. What do you think about the substance of the first amendment? 
15. What do you think about the substance of the second amendment? 
16. What do you think about the substance of the third amendment? 
17. What do you think about the substance of the fourth amendment? 
18. Is the 1945 Constitution now satisfactory in democratic terms? Why yes/why not? 
19. Do you think further Constitution reform is necessary? 
20. If further reform is needed, what are your recommendations? 
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